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UDC 94
N.A. Tokareva
Don state technical university
Rostov-on-Don, Russia
The article is focused on the famine between 1932-1933s in the North Caucasus and Ukraine. Hunger of 1930s
in the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy in the history of XX century. Soviet historiography of famine in 1930s has
not been contacted. During perestroika this issue was raised by writers and publicists. Ukrainian historians declared that
if there was a famine in Russia, the Ukraine had a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Russian scientists proved that the
famine in the Soviet Union was caused by the grain procurement policy of War Communism. Bread could be taken in
the major grain-growing areas. The article also considers hunger in 1930s in the North Caucasus in comparison with the
famine in the Ukraine. Hunger between 1932-1933s in the North Caucasus, as well as in Ukraine, was a part of the
grain procurement policy of War Communism. But there were features: the North Caucasus was above the resistance
level of the Stalinist collectivization and grain procurement policy. Repression in the North Caucasus were not directed
against individual peasants and against entire villages, which deported beyond the North Caucasus. Grassroots party
organization was not united in this period. Ordinary communists resisted policy of forced collectivization and famine.
Key words: peasant, collectivization, hunger, kulaks, poor people, middle peasants, grain reserves.
Famine between 1932 - 1933s is one of the most important in the history of the XX century
in Europe. In Soviet historiography of hunger have not been contacted. We talked about food difficulties caused by "kulak sabotage." During the Khrushchev thaw, a number of historians (VP
Danilov, NA Ivnitskii, YA Moshkov) questioned the "kulak sabotage" [12]. During the reign of LI
Brezhnev about the famine 1932 - 1933 years. preferred not to speak.
In the years of perestroika issue was raised writer and journalist. Ukrainian historians have
done much to illuminate this problem, argue that hunger 30s was genocide against the Ukrainian
people. The position of Ukrainian scientists most clearly delineated in the speeches SV
Kulchitsskogo. He tried to prove that Ukraine was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while in
other areas there was a famine. In his opinion in Ukraine killed 3 million people, while at the same
time in the Volga region - 300 thousand. Man, approximately equal to the size of the territory [10].
Western historians have supported the position of Ukrainian historians. At the end of the 80s. in
Soviet journals published a monograph of Robert Conquest's "Harvest of sorrow and terror famine" [8]. According to Conquest in the period 1932 - 1933 years. killed 7 million people. In
Ukraine - 5 million people in the North Caucasus - 1 million. People in other places 1 million.
People [6, p.8]. The aim of this work is to compare the famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.
The first scientific study of hunger in the North Caucasus carried out by Professor Oskolkov
in the monograph "The Hunger 1932/33. Grain reserves and famine 1932 - 1933 in the North Caucasus region "[11]. Already in the title of the work a correlation hunger with grain procurements.
Until January 1928 grain procurements carried out on the principles of the NEP at market prices.
Implementation of grain procurement methods of War Communism was the main cause of hunger
in the North Caucasus.
VV Kondrashin wrote: "With regard to the study of topics in the Russian regions can be
considered a pioneer of the Rostov remarkable historian EN Oskolkova. On materials of local archives, he gave the first comprehensive description of the situation on the Don and Kuban in 1932
- 1933gg., Showing the violent nature of the grain procurement and the horror of famine occurred
as regions [6, p. 27]. VV Kondrashin noted that in the context of anti-communist theory, EN
Fragments drew attention to the mass repressions during the grain procurement in respect of the
rank and file Communists. He pointed to the need to consider the number of victims of famine in
1932 - 1933 years. and Stalinist repression. EN Fragments noticed that the party at that time was
not uniform.
In 2002. VV Kondrashin, together with an American professor D. Penner published a monograph on the famine 1932/33. materials on the Volga, Don, Kuban [7]. In the context of world
history is considered a famine in the North Caucasus in the monograph of VV Kondrashin: the
tragedy of the Russian countryside. The question of alternatives Stalinist famine.
In the North Caucasus peak famine came in winter-spring 1933. EN Fragments wrote: "Peak
reduction of hunger was in January-April 1933. Of the 75 districts of famine swept the 44 district.
In February 1933, the Bureau of the North-Caucasian Regional Committee was forced to admit in
his official decisions facts causes starvation in some villages [11, p. 73]. VV Kondrashin noted
that in the Decision of the Bureau Regional Committee of February 22, 1933 was recognized as a
fact of mass dissemination of epidemiological diseases, especially typhus. A breeding ground for
disease became stations, crowded with hungry people. [6] VV Kondrashin analyzed classified material from a particular folder Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) of 22 February 1932. Starved
21 of 34 Kuban, 14 of 23 Don and 12 of the 18 districts of Stavropol. Thus, of the 75 districts of
the region of grain to the starving population 47 districts, or 63% [6, p. 172]. On the severity of
the famine areas Kryik divided into three categories: a particularly disadvantaged, disadvantaged
and others. In 13 particularly disadvantaged areas killing the population of entire neighborhoods
and cities. People lose their minds, spread cases of cannibalism and corpse-eating [6].
Thus, the famine affected not only Ukraine, but also the main grain-growing areas of the
North Caucasus. But the famine in Ukraine started earlier than in Russia. According OGGU from
April 1, 1932, in a number of localities (Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk) regions of the
USSR observed troubles and cases of starvation of collective farm families. Registered incomplete
data 83 cases of swelling from hunger, 6 deaths, food carrion 12 families and the abandonment of
children [13, 64].
Similar processes are covered and the North Caucasus. From the same document:
"Prodzatrudneniyami covered 5rayonov: Lobinsky, Millerovskiy, Krasnodar, and Tarasovskiy
Mahoteevsky. On April 1 in these areas reported: deaths from hunger - 6, swelling - 6 cases of eating carrion and surrogates - 45 diseases - 1, cases of suicide attempts - 2 cases of hungry people 1,869 people. "[13, p . 75].
IE Zelenin introduced into scientific use unique document: analytical report STRs OGPU
"On the collectivization of the peasantry and the mass protests in October-December 1931. - January-March. "The document leaves no doubt that at the end of 1931 - spring of 1932 in a number of
areas of the country in the first place in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, there is mass starvation in one
way or another spread to other regions [4, p. 56]. Consequently, the mass famine in Ukraine started earlier than in Russia. Hunger contributed to the growth of mass demonstrations of peasants
and Cossacks against the government. According to the OGPU from January to March 1932 mass
demonstrations swept 55,000 farmers [4]. In the North Caucasus there is the maximum growth of
peasant uprisings. IE Zelenin writes: "Almost half of them (24,000) were in the Ukraine, whose
number is compared with the previous period has increased by more than three times, in the North
Caucasus more than four times [4, p. 56]. But in 1932 a famine in the North Caucasus was not
massive. As of March 1932 the North Caucasus region covered 5 areas. Cases of death and swelling from hunger, eating food from falling and surrogates, diseases, suicide attempts. Total 1869
there were starving people recorded 56 mass action with the number of participants 7000 in two
areas. Eliminated 70 kulak groups and 3 counterrevolutionary organization. Total 8331 starving
people. "[4]. In Ukraine in August 1932 covered 127 districts [4, p. 56].
The famine in Ukraine started earlier than in the North Caucasus, as in Ukraine in 1931 was
a bad harvest. In the North Caucasus in 1931, the harvest was higher by 14% and amounted to
69.7 million q, and the plan was higher than in 1930 by 39.3% [11].
Grain procurement methods of War Communism became causes of hunger in the Ukraine
and the North Caucasus. Most historians believe that the causes of hunger was Stalin's policy of
collectivization and grain procurement. Some scientists believe that in addition to solving the
problems of industrialization, Stalin dealt a fatal blow to the peasantry as a class. At the same
time, IE Zelenin believes that hunger touched quarter of the peasant population living in the main
grain-growing regions. In addition, after the famine 1932 - 1933 farmers were allowed to have
private farming.
Russian historians are the following shares of Stalin, which led to famine: the law of August
7, 1932, a decree on the passport system of 27 December 1932 directive on 22 January 1933 on
the Prohibition of the mass exodus of peasants and Cossacks in the central regions of the country.
Feature of Stalin's policy in the North Caucasus in this period was the eviction of entire villages outside the region. The number of evicted peasants and Cossacks is comparable with the
number of deaths from hunger repression of peasants and Cossacks. Resolution of the North Caucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) January 2, 1932 it is known that the province was
established black board, which recorded the whole village for a clear breakdown of the grain procurement. The same decree created a rustic asset to combat anti-social elements and the Communists, with the kulak organizers counterrevolutionary sabotage, as with representatives of the
working class. [11]. Within two months of the grain procurement on a blackboard brought 15 villages (13 Kuban and Don 2). L.Koganovich Kuban Cossacks threatened with eviction without exception [11].
December 14, 1932 adopted a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and
SNK "On grain requisitions in Ukraine, North Caucasus and the Western Region of the case." In
that ruling, it was decided to evict the residents of the village of Poltava in the North Caucasus.
[11] This decision was preceded by a "Help OGPU on the preliminary results of the investigation
of the counterrevolutionary organization in the village of Poltava Slavic region of the North Caucasus region from 25 November 1932". The document said that the residents of the village of Poltava, the richest village of Kuban, always fought against the Soviet power, promoted the idea of
creating. Fists village Poltava entered the farm in order to sabotage [13, p. 227]. December 16,
1932 the Regional Committee decided to evict the residents of the village of Poltava except the
heroes of the civil war and activists struggle against the kulaks [11].
In December, yanvare1933 of the North Caucasian Regional Committee decided to evict
other villages listed on the blackboard. In the villages of Poltava, and Medvedskaya Urupskaya
lived 47,500 people, of whom 45,600 were deported persons [11]. All in all, according to the calculations of Professor Oskolkova to mid-January, sent at least 63,500 people. Fragments noted
that expelled village located in various parts of the Krasnodar region, and expressed the opinion
that it was the actions of intimidation of collective farmers and individual farmers surrounding areas [11].
For a long time Soviet historiography claimed that the party fully supports the policy of the
CPSU (b) in the village. EN Shards first noted that the implementation of its policy the central
leadership of the CPSU (b) had to tame the rural party organization. Party in this period, the number increased. Number of rural party organizations increased in 1930 - 1932 years. 50-60 thousand
to 115-120 [11].
But the party was not united. A significant part of the Communists in 1932, performed together with farmers and individual farmers in grain procurement. Another part irrevocably support
the policy of the CPSU (b) in the village. In November 1932 the Regional Committee decided to
clean the rural party organizations. In November 1932 - January 1933. 169 villages were excluded
from the 8458 audited Communists 44.8% [11].
In December 1932 BN Shaboldaev Help the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the
grain procurement reported that by December 5 to 80% of grain procured. This is achieved as a
result of hard (most severe) interventions. So, in the Kuban 70-75% grass-roots executives received a foreclosure. Overall, nearly half (47%) of the Communists, the last cleaning, subjected to
penalties. Expelled from the party in the region 1193 persons, including 536 people in November.
Regional Court and its visiting session in November by decree August 7, 1932 Convicted 949
people, of whom 175 were sentenced to death (the sentence to be executed). It is significant that
among the convicts wealthy kulak elements or related to them amounted to 125 people, or 15%.
Others - farmers and officials. [16]
In January 1933, the leader of the Communist Rostov BN Sheboldaev at the Plenum of the
Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) stated that eliminated
about 30% of the members and candidate members. [11] Voice from the audience said that this is
not enough. What Sheboldaev said: "We believe, too, that is not enough ... We will have to calculate the half and sometimes more" [11, p. 58].
According to the calculations of Professor Oskolkova of party organization expelled 40,000
people [11]. The January 1933 Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control
Commission assessed the situation in the country as the intensification of the class struggle, in
which the enemies of the Soviet authorities were trying to break up farms and rural blame the
communists [11]. Thus, officially equated fists and rural Communists enlisted in those and other
enemies of the Soviet regime.
In a judgment of 14 December 1932 "On grain requisitions in Ukraine, North Caucasus and
Western Region" and the CPC Central Committee with respect to the Communists, did not approve of the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) obliged to apply harsh repression sentenced to 5-10 years - imprisonment in a concentration camp and, under certain conditions - execution [11]. Pursuant to this requirement, 600 expelled from the Communist Party were sent to the
northern areas with saboteurs - farmers [11]. Consequently, the grass-roots party organizations
were the same repression as a person officially enrolled into fists. As well as individual peasants,
communists fled from the edge [11]. EN Fragments concludes: "Thus, in the course of a kulak
sabotage regional party organization has lost at least 70,000 of its members, ie more than half. Rural Party organization were crushed "[11, p. 62]. Consequently, the grass-roots party organization
did not support the policy of the CPSU (b) in the village, but was the victim of this policy. At the
January 1933 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Koganovich proposed the establishment of emergency authorities - the political departments of MTS and state farms. These political departments took control of cell rural collective and completed the submission of collective
administration and collective-farm system.
In the autumn of 1932 Stalin Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) approved
the expulsion from the party group Ryutin-Slepkov claiming that the forced collectivization of the
village by the grain procurement requisitions and led the country into crisis.
Fragments analyzes deal Kotova November 8, 1932 "The Hammer" reported that the Regional Court sentenced to death executives collective farm. First Red Army village Otradnaya
coach of the district for what they have given workday is not 491 g of grain and 1 kg. For this
crime they were sentenced October 25, 1932 to ten years in prison. Regional Committee acknowledged the sentence was too lenient. Bureau Regional Committee, in a special resolution, not for
publication, recommended to replace imprisonment with execution. A visiting session of the District Court November 7, 1932 sentenced all the leaders of the kolkhoz to death. The Secretary of
cells NV Kotov has become synonymous. It was made at the January 1933 Plenum of the Central
Committee of the CPSU (b). At the end of January at the joint plenum of territorial and regional
party committee dealing Kotova PN Sheboldaev cited as evidence of the weakness of party organizations [11].
Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU in the North Caucasus said Kotov belonged to
the underground organization, to create the group and tried to establish contact with the SR association "Free socialists in the Black Sea." Was Kotov associated with the SR or not is unknown.
But the man was sentenced to death for what he doubled the rate of issuance of bread per workday
hungry peasants and Cossacks.
If earlier the Soviet government were the main enemy fists or persons enrolled into fists,
now equated to them Communists, who were trying to protect the peasants and Cossacks from
robbery and hunger.
Thus, the famine in Russia and Ukraine was caused by the same causes - grain procurement
policy of War Communism. Stalin needed bread for industrialization. Bread could be taken in the
main grain-growing regions, and that Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Famine in Ukraine and
Russia carefully concealed from the rest of the world. But there were differences. Mass famine in
Ukraine started earlier than in the North Caucasus. In Ukraine, the famine began in 1932, and the
North Caucasus famine began in the winter 1932/33 year. Repression in the North Caucasus were
directed not against individual farmers, but against entire villages and hamlets. In the North Caucasus grassroots party organization actively resisted Stalin's collectivization and grain procurement policy. At the same time, the Ukrainian Communist Party in this period is called the most
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