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Methods of Elimination of Ballot Rigging Possibility

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Methods of Elimination of Ballot Rigging Possibility
 Methods of Elimination of Ballot Rigging Possibility This paper (that is set forth above and below) is the translation from Russian into English.
The first method of elimination of ballot rigging possibility All ballots shall be numbered. A ballot shall differ from another ballot only in that on either ballot (one of these ballots) a number shall be indicated, and the other (one of these ballots) shall contain another number. Thereby, any ballot shall be printed in two counterparts. All counterparts of any ballot (that is both counterparts of any ballot) shall be the same (that is the first counterpart of the ballot shall not differ from the second counterpart of the same ballot). Each counterpart of these two counterparts of any ballot shall have the same number (that is the first counterpart out of these two counterparts of any ballot shall have the number, and the same number shall be printed on the second counterpart of the same ballot), and any other ballot shall contain another number, and the said ballot shall also be printed in two counterparts. Each ballot (that is each counterpart of a ballot) shall have several degrees (that is types) of counterfeit protection (that is each counterpart of any ballot shall have watermarks, microtext and others). In the course of elections two counterparts (that is both counterparts) of any ballot shall be placed together in one non-transparent envelope, that is during elections each envelope (where ballot's counterpart shall be) shall contain only these two counterpart of one ballot. During election these envelopes with ballot counterparts shall be placed in non-transparent boxes with tops or opening small windows. Thereby, any of these boxes shall be located so that any voter could rotate it (using a well-known device which is similar to that used for rotation of a box with lottery tickets) to the effect that envelopes with ballot counterparts in this box mix. Any voter shall rotate this box by themselves, then open the box top and take by themselves any envelope (with ballot counterparts) therefrom, being in this box. During elections the ballot (that is a ballot counterpart) shall contain full names of all candidates for deputy, for one of whom the voter who received this ballot can vote.
Following taking of the envelope with ballot counterparts from the box, the voter shall go with this envelope to a voting booth, there shall be a seal and a pad for seal ink soaking. This pad shall be filled with ink. The ink shall be composed of non-standard components. The information what components the ink shall contain shall be published after elections.
After the voter entered the voting booth, he/she shall affix the seal (that is affix the imprint of the seal which is placed in this booth) in the square which is (and shall be) near full name of the candidate for deputy, as printed on the ballot counterpart, for whom this voter would like to vote (that is for whom the voter would like to cast the vote); this square shall be on the ballot. After that this voter shall fill in the second counterpart of the ballot in the same way as the first one (that is this voter shall affix the seal in the square of the second counterpart of this ballot, which is near the printed full name of the same candidate for deputy) (that is this voter shall fill in these ballot counterparts in the same manner). Then the voter shall take (that is into personal possession) one filled-in counterpart of the ballot. Afterwards, the voter shall deposit the second filled-in ballot counterpart in the sealed ballot box. Then the voter shall leave the voting station with one counterpart of the ballot.
Counterparts of all ballots deposited in the ballot box shall be kept by the election commissions (or commission) for 5 years. Thereby, a live video broadcast on the Internet within the whole period of keeping of these ballots shall be made (that is organized) from all places of storage thereof (or from a place of storage of these ballot counterparts, if the same are kept in one place). The live video broadcast on the Internet during printing of ballots (that is ballot counterparts), showing the procedure of printing of these ballots shall be made from all places of printing of these ballot counterparts.
During elections and in the course of counting of votes, the live video broadcast on the Internet shall be made from all premises for voting, and following the elections the same shall be shown on tape delay. Broadcasting video cameras (or broadcasting TV cameras) in any voting premises shall be placed as follows. One broadcasting video camera (or broadcasting TV camera) shall e directed to the box with envelopes with ballot counterparts (from which voters will take these envelopes, and which voters can rotate), so that a viewer, via the Internet, could count the number of people who received the envelopes with voting ballot counterparts at this voting station, and each voter shall show this broadcasting video camera (or broadcasting TV camera) (and a member of the election commission) that he/she has taken only one envelope with two counterparts of the voting ballot, and other broadcasting video cameras (or broadcasting TV cameras) shall be directed to other places of this voting station. All these video broadcasting recordings shall be kept for 5 years. A blackboard shall stand near this box (that is the box from which voters will take these envelopes), where a member of the election commission shall write in chalk the following: the number of voters who have already taken the envelopes with voting ballot counterparts from this box, that is if the voter has taken the envelope with voting ballots counterparts from this box, a member of the election commission shall immediately erase the number written on the board and write in chalk the number bigger than the last number by one.
Thereby, the specified broadcasting video camera (or broadcasting TV camera) shall be placed in a way that using it, both this box with envelopes, and the number written on this board could be seen simultaneously.
After this voting, the following shall be published by country regions: what voting ballots (that is what numbers the voting ballots have), and how voters of what district filled in the same, that is how voters of a given district filled in the voting ballots (that is the ballot counterparts), and what voting ballots they filled in to be published (only in this district) (for example, how voters of the Central District filled in the voting ballots, and what voting ballots they filled in to be published only in the Central District), by means of printing (production) of booklets (and placement thereof in libraries of this district); these booklets shall contain the following: how a ballot with a given number is filled in (for example, No. 1527), how a ballot with a given but another number is filled in (for example, No. 1528), etc. Namely, this way the following shall be set forth: how all ballots by which voters only of a given district were filled in. And the information on how and what ballots (that is ballots with what numbers) were filled in by voters of another district shall be published in that another district (that is in the latter district), etc. Thus, following voting, the following shall be published: what ballots (that is voting ballots with what numbers) were filled in by voters of a given district (for example, of the Central District), and how they (voters) filled in each of these ballots [and this shall be published only in this district by printing (production) of booklets and placement thereof in libraries of this district only]; and the following shall be published: what voting ballots (that is voting ballots with what numbers) were filled in by voters of another district (for example, the Pushkinskiy District), and how these voters filled in each of these ballots [and this shall be published only in the latter district by printing (production) of booklets and placement thereof in libraries of this district only], etc. The foregoing results of the voting shall be published on the Internet. And the aggregate results of counting of votes of voters of the whole country shall be published throughout the country.
Any voter shall be entitled to come to the library and verify, whether one of these booklets contains correct data on his voting, as he/she knows the number of the ballot filled in by him/her (that is he/she knows the number contained in the ballot he/she filled in), and how he/she filled in his/her ballot. If it follows from the data published in the relevant booklet, that he/she voted not for the candidate he/she actually voted for, then this voter may lodge a complaint about ballot-rigging with police or a court and attach thereto the ballot which he/she filled in at the voting station (during voting) and which confirms that there has been ballot-rigging. Any voter shall have the right not to disclose to a police officer and anybody else (that is another person) that the ballot at his/her (this voter's) disposal (or he/she submitted to the police to confirm the rigging) was filled in (at the voting station during voting) by him/her, and how this ballot turned out to be with him/her. Any voter shall be entitle to request any person or any public (that is non-profit) organization (not disclosing his/her full name to them) to do the following: to file a complaint about ballot-rigging to the police and provide the police with the ballot (that is a ballot counterpart) confirming it [and in this case this voter shall give away (or send by mail) his/her ballot бюллетень (confirming ballot-rigging) to a person who consented to do it (or a public organization which consented to do it)]. Moreover, this voter shall be entitled to disclose such request to any person (or public organization) by telephone orally or in a letter to be sent by mail (and in which he/she will enclose such ballot confirming ballot-rigging), or by e-mail, or in any other secret way. Any public (non-profit) organization (or any person) shall be entitled to lodge the complaint about ballot-riggings (or ballot-riggings) with the police [whereof voters (voter) informed it (him/her))] and attach the ballots (ballot) thereto which confirm(s) it.
If the person (or the public organization) has filed the complaint about rigging to the police and informed the police officers that he/she/it has the ballot confirming such rigging, the police officers in this case shall within three days prepare for expert examination of this ballot and then conduct the same for the ballot concerned in the presence of this persons (or this public organization). As a result of this expert examination these police officer shall determine the following: whether this ballot is counterfeit or not. And immediately after this expert examination the police officers shall return this ballot to that person (or that public organization). In the course of this expert examination, a live video broadcasting on the Internet shall be performed from the place of conduct thereof in order to show its procedure. Under Article 142.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia, the ballot rigging is punishable by imprisonment of up to 4 years.
The sings according to which counterfeit ballots can be distinguished from the uncounterfeit ones shall be published on the Internet immediately after the end of voting.
If it is found out that during elections a voter filled in two ballot counterparts (whereof it was said above and which were taken from envelope by the voter) differently, then these two ballot counterparts shall be declared invalid.
If, due to illness, a voter cannot visit the voting station, members of the election commission shall provide to this voter conditions for voting in his/her place of residence, similar to those arranged for voters who are able to come to the voting station. Thereby, a live video broadcasting on the Internet shall be organized to demonstrate, how this voter takes an envelope with ballot counterparts from the above specified box (with envelopes, which can be rotated by this voter), and how this voter shows the broadcasting video camera (or broadcasting TV camera) that he/she has taken only one envelope from the box. This shall be recorded on videotape recorder, and the recording shall be kept for 5 years.
Referendums and the country's President elections can be conducted in a similar way.
The second method of elimination of ballot rigging possibility The second method of elimination of ballot rigging possibility is similar to the first (above described) method (of elimination of ballot rigging possibility), except for as follows:
1) Any ballot shall be printed (not in two counterparts but) in three counterparts; these three counterparts shall be identical. The same number shall be indicated on each of three counterparts. 2) During elections, any envelope (to be placed in the box which voter shall be able to rotate) shall contain only the following: (not two counterparts of one ballot but) three counterparts of one ballot.
These three counterparts shall be filled in by a voter in the voting booth identically, that is the voter shall fill in the second counterpart in the same way as the first one, and the third counterpart as the first one. Thereby, the voter shall fill in these counterparts as under the first method above, that is by affixing the imprint of the seal in squares printed on the ballot counterparts. Namely, if the voter filled in the first ballot counterpart as follows: affixing of the imprint of the seal on the first counterpart in the square being near the full name of the candidate for deputy, then this voter shall fill in the second ballot counterpart as follows: only affix on the second ballot counterpart the imprint of the seal in the square near the full name of the same candidate for deputy, and this voter shall fill in the third ballot counterpart as follows: only affix on the third ballot counterpart the imprint of the seal in the square near the full name of the same candidate for deputy.
Afterwards, the voter shall take (that is take into personal possession) one filled-in ballot counterpart. Then the voter shall deposit the two remaining ballot counterparts (that is two ballot counterparts that left after the voter has taken one ballot counterpart into personal possession) into the envelope and leave the voting booth. After that the voter shall go to the room for verification of correctness of ballot counterparts filling. No election observers, members of the election commission and video cameras shall be in this room. There shall be a hole in one wall of this room, which length shall constitute 350 millimeters and width - 7 millimeters. The thickness of the wall where such hole is shall be 1 centimeter. A cotton square cloth of 500 millimeters x 500 millimeters shall hang over this hole. To upper corners of this cloth shall be nailed (fastened) above this hole, so that the cloth closes it, thereby, a voter shall be able to come to this wall and put the envelope with two ballot counterparts into this hole. On the other side of the wall with such hole (that is on the side of the wall to which the voter shall not be able to come), there shall be a room where the members of the election commission and the election observers shall seat.
Then the voter shall come to another hole and put the envelope with two filled-in ballot counterparts into this hole in the wall (that is this voter shall give this enveloped through this hole to the members of the election commission, who shall be over the wall in the room) (by the way, these members of the election commission shall not have access to the seal or the copy of the seal which imprint the voter affixed on the ballot counterparts). After that the member of the election commission (with approval of other members of the election commission) [who is on the other side of this wall, that is in this (that is the latter) room] shall take the envelope from the hole (that is the envelope which was passed to him/her by the voter through the hole) with two filled-in ballot counterparts, afterwards the member of the election commission shall determine, whether the voter has filled in the ballot counterparts in this enveloped identically (that is whether the voter has filled in one ballot counterpart in the same way as another counterpart of the ballot or not, namely, the members of the election commission shall determine the following: the voter has filled in one ballot counterpart as follows: affixing the seal in the square being near the full name of the candidate for deputy, then this voter fills in the other ballot counterpart as follows: only affixed the seal in the square near the full name of the same candidate for deputy, or the voter has filled in the latter ballot counterpart differently). If identically, the members of the election commission shall affix the seal on one ballot counterpart and affix the seal on the second ballot counterpart, too (it shall be said on this seal that a given ballot counterpart is valid), then the member of the election commission (with approval of other members of the election commission) shall deposit these two ballot counterparts into this envelope and give the same to the voter thorough the hole (that is put the envelope into the hole in the wall). Afterwards, the voter shall take the envelope from the hole and go with it to the booth to be placed in this room for verification of correctness of ballot counterpart filling. No seal shall be in this booth. In this booth the voter shall take one ballot counterpart form the envelope into personal possession. Then the voter shall deposit the second (that is another) ballot counterpart in this envelope into the ballot box. And after that the voter shall leave the voting station with two ballot counterparts, one of which contains the seal affixed by the member of the election commission with approval of other members of the election commission.
If the members of the election commission and the election observers to be near this hole in the wall find out that the voter has filled in two ballot counterparts differently, they shall affix the imprints of the seal on these two counterparts, stating that this ballot counterpart is invalid. Then the members of the election commission shall record the numbers of the invalid ballot counterparts and leave this record with themselves [after elections the following, in particular, shall be published by districts: what counterparts of the ballot were declared invalid by the election commission (that is numbers of the ballot counterparts which the election commission declared invalid shall be published)]. After that they (that is the election commission members) shall put these ballot counterparts in the envelope. Following this, the election commission member, with consent of other election commission members, shall put this envelope into the hole. Then the voter shall take the envelope. Hereupon the voter shall perform one of the following actions: 1) either put one invalid ballot counterpart in the ballot box, and take the second invalid ballot counterpart into personal possession, and leave the voting station with two ballot counterparts; 2) or take both invalid ballots into personal possession and leave the voting station with three ballot counterparts.
If the voter finds out that the result of his/her voting is fabricated (that is if the voter finds out that it has been published that the ballot counterparts he/she filled in are filled in not in the manner he/she filled in these counterparts, in fact), the voter shall be entitled to strive against such fraud (that is against this) in the procedure set forth under the first method above, but for this the voter will be able to use not a counterpart, but counterparts of the ballot, which he/she took at the voting station (under the first method above, for this purpose the voter may use one ballot counterpart taken at the voting station).
If, due to illness, the voter cannot visit the voting station, the election commission members shall bring the above specified box with envelopes with ballot counterparts to the voter's place of residence. After that this voter shall take any envelope with ballot counterparts from the box [a live video broadcasting thereof on the Internet shall be organized (that is how this voter takes any envelope with ballot counterparts from the box), and all this shall be recorded on a videotape recorder, and the recording shall be kept for 5 years] and fill in the ballot counterparts in secrecy (and identically), take two ballot counterpart into personal possession, and put one ballot counterpart into the sealed portable ballot box. Then these election commission members shall go with this ballot box to another voter who cannot arrive at the voting station, and the latter voter shall perform the same voting procedure, and after the voting the latter voter shall put one ballot counterpart in the same ballot box, etc. And when the ballot box is full of the ballot counterparts, the election commission members shall bring it to the voting station and place in the foreground. Following the end of voting, this ballot box and all other ballot boxes shall be opened by the members of the election commission, and then they shall count the votes.
Referendums and the country's President elections can be conducted in a similar way.
The third method of elimination of ballot rigging possibility The third method of elimination of ballot rigging possibility is similar to the first method above, except for as follows:
1) Any ballot shall be printed (not in two counterparts but) in three counterparts; these three counterparts shall be identical. The same number shall be indicated on each of three counterparts. 2) During elections, any envelope (to be placed in the box which voter shall be able to rotate) shall contain only the following: (not two counterparts of one ballot but) three counterparts of one ballot.
These three counterparts shall be filled in by a voter in the voting booth identically, that is the voter shall fill in the second counterpart in the same way as the first one, and the third counterpart as the first one. Thereby, the voter shall fill in these counterparts as under the first method above, that is by affixing the imprint of the seal in squares printed on the ballot counterparts. Namely, if the voter filled in the first ballot counterpart as follows: affixing of the imprint of the seal on the first counterpart in the square being near the full name of the candidate for deputy, then this voter shall fill in the second ballot counterpart as follows: only affix on the second ballot counterpart the imprint of the seal in the square near the full name of the same candidate for deputy, and this voter shall fill in the third ballot counterpart as follows: only affix on the third ballot counterpart the imprint of the seal in the square near the full name of the same candidate for deputy.
Following this, the voter shall: a) take (that is take into personal possession) not one, but two filled-in ballot counterparts (out of these three filled-in ballot counterparts), b) put one filled-in ballot counterpart (out of these three filled-in ballot counterparts) in the ballot box. If it is found out that these two ballot counterparts (that is two ballot counterparts which the voter has taken into personal possession) were filled in by the voter identically (that is one of these two counterparts is the same as the second one), and the third ballot counterpart (that is the ballot counterpart put by the voter into the ballot box) was filled in by the voter not in the way any of these two counterparts, then these tow counterparts shall be in force, and the third one deposited into the ballot box shall be ineffective (that is the manner these two ballot counterparts were filled in shall be taken into account, the same of the third ballot counterpart shall not be considered).
Referendums and the country's President elections can be conducted in a similar way.
The author of this paper (that is of the foregoing):
Aleksandr Anatolyevich Shmonov
E-mail of Aleksandr Anatolyevich Shmonov: 555226@rambler.ru
Phone number of Aleksandr Anatolyevich Shmonov: 89013041055
This paper (that is the foregoing) was published on June 20, 2009
The foregoing paper in the Russian language can be found (on the Internet) at www.55227.ru
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