close

Вход

Забыли?

вход по аккаунту

?

3455

код для вставкиСкачать
ORGANISATION
ORGANISATION
FOR
CE
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
CG-OPERATION
ET
OE
AND
OEVELOPPEMENT
DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIQUES
BASIC STATISTICS OF GERMANY (F.R.)
THE
Area.
1967 (thousand km-)
Agricultural
Forests,
area,
1967
249
(thousand
km'2)
1967 (thousand km-)
LAND
Major cities, June
1967
140
72
Million
inhabitants
Berlin (West)
Hamburg
2.2
1.9
Munich
1.2
Cologne
0.9
Essen
0.7
Dusseldorf
0.7
Frankfurt
0.7
Dortmund
0.7
THE PEOPLE
1967 (thousand)
59 873
No. of inhabitants per km2
Population
241
Net natural increase in population
(annual average 1965-1967)
per 1 000 inhabitants
Net
immigration (annual average
1965-1967)
100 000
Labour force, total
354 000
1968
Labour force in industry, 1968
26 292 000
12 382 000
6.0
PRODUCTION
GNP 1968 (billions of DM)
GNP per head 1967 (US $)
Gross fixed investment (average
1967):
per cent of GNP
per head (US S)
528.8
2 019
1965-
Origin of GDP, 1968 (per cent):
Agriculture, forestry, fishery
Industry (incl. construction)
Services
24
490
Home food production as a percentage
of total food availability (agricultural
year 1966-1967)
63
THE GOVERNMENT
Public consumption
GNP)
1968
(per
cent
of
Composition of Federal Parliament
15.6
General government current revenue 1968
(per cent of GNP)
Public debt, 1968 (ratio to general govern¬
ment current revenue)
Christian
Social
37
Democrats
Democrats
Free Democrats
245 seats
202
49
Last election: 19lh September 1965.
59
Next
election:
1969.
LIVING STANDARDS
Calories per head, per day 1965-1966
Average gross hourly earnings of male
industrial workers, 1968 (DM)
No. of passenger cars in use, mid-1967
(per 1 000 inhabitants)
2 910
No. of radio sets end 1967 (per 1 000 inha¬
5.20
No. of television sets end 1967 (per 1 000
171
Public current expenditure on education
bitants)
inhabitants)
No. of telephones end 1966 (per 1 000
per head, 1968 (US $)
inhabitants)
310
231
50
159
FOREIGN TRADE
Exports:
Imports:
Imports of goods and services as per cent
of GNP (average 1966-1968)
Exports of goods and services as per cent
of GNP (average 1966-1968)
Main exports 1968 (per cent of total mer¬
chandise exports):
Products of agriculture, forestry and fish¬
Main imports, 1968 (per cent of total mer¬
chandise imports):
Products of agriculture,
forestry and
ing
fishing
Basic materials and semi-finished
Manufactured
foods
Other consumer
and
goods
Basic materials and semi-finished goods
tobacco
manufactures
Investment goods
Other exports
Manufactured foods and tobacco
10
54
2
Too
Total
Note. Figures include the Saar and
9
Other consumer manufactures
13
Investment goods
17
Other imports
Total
THE CURRENCY
Monetary unit: Deutsche Mark.
16
41
Currency units per US dollar
West Bcrlii
4
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS
GERMANY
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The
Organisation
for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development was set up under a Convention signed in Paris on
14th December 1960 by the Member countries of the Organisa¬
tion for European Economic Co-operation and by Canada
and the United States.
This Convention provides that the
OECD shall promote policies designed:
to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment and a rising standard of living in
Member
countries,
while
maintaining
financial
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of
the world economy;
to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member
as well as non-member countries in the process of
economic development ;
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance
with international obligations.
The legal personality possessed by the Organisation for
European Economic Co-operation continues in the OECD,
which came into being on 30th September 1961.
The members of OECD are: Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece,
Iceland,
Ireland,
Italy,
Japan,
Luxembourg,
the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United Slates.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is associated
in certain work of the OECD, particularly that ofthe Economic
and Development Review Committee.
This document was approved
by the Economic and Development Review Committee
in April 1969.
CONTENTS
Introduction
I
5
The Recovery of Activity and Recent Trends in the Economy
6
The Recovery in the Second Half of 1967
6
Continued Expansion
II
in
IV
1968
8
Production and Employment
11
Prices and Wages
14
Balance of Payments
17
The Trade Surplus
20
Trade Performance
23
Fiscal and Monetary Developments
29
Budget Policy
29
Monetary Policy
31
Prospects and Policy Issues
35
Prospects
35
Concluding Remarks
43
Statistical Annex
61
TABLES
In Text
1
Change in Stockbuilding
2
Gross national product
Changes
in Production
6
10
3
Percentage
4
Cost of Living Index and the Effects of the Value-Added Tax
by
Sector,
1965-1968
16
5
Labour Costs and Profits per Unit of Output
17
6
The Balance of Payments
18
7
Export Performance in 15 Geographical Markets
25
8
Export Performance in 121 Country /Commodity Markets
26
9
The Budget of the Total Public Sector and its Estimated Impact
on Domestic Demand
11
31
10
Bank Liquidity
32
11
New Bond Market Issues
34
12
Financial surplus (deficit) of the principal economic sectors
42
Statistical Annex
A
Gross National Product
61
B
Distribution of National Income
62
C
Employment and Labour Market
63
D
Industrial Production, New Orders and Deliveries
64
E
Wages and Prices
65
F
Money and Banking
66
G
Merchandise Trade by Area
67
H
Merchandise Trade by Commodity Groups
68
I
The Balance of Payments
69
DIAGRAMS
1
Cyclical Development of GNP and some Main Components
2
Production, Capacity and Employment
12
7
13
3
Income Distribution
4
Price Developments
15
5
Flows of Long-term Private Capital
19
6
Yields on Corporate Bonds
21
7
Foreign Surplus, Goods and Services
21
8
Relative Trends in Costs and Prices
22
9
Import Surplus in Special Categories
24
10
Shares in World Trade 1962-67
24
11
German Performance in Main Trading Areas Compared to OECD
12
German
13
Self-Financing in the Enterprise Sector (non-housing)
14
Order Inflows - Percentage Deviation from Trend, 1961-68
36
15
Length of Order Books in Industry
37
Total, 1962-1967
Export
Performance
27
in
Main
Commodity
Groups
Compared to OECD Total, 1962-1967
28
33
INTRODUCTION
Activity recovered in the second half of 1967, stimulated by fiscal and
monetary policies.
The expansion of aggregate demand accelerated in
1968, notably in the second half of the year, influenced by sharp advances in
exports and business fixed investment.
By the end of the year, much
of the previous slack had been absorbed.
Unemployment fell sharply.
Moreover, some 200000 foreign workers returned to Germany during
1968, though the foreign labour force is still below the peak reached in
1966.
Prices remained virtually stable up to mid-1968, but rose somewhat
in the second half of the year, partly due to the strong advance in activity,
but partly for non-cyclical reasons.
The re-emergence of price pressures
has caused considerable public concern, leading a number of observers to
call for restrictive policy measures.
months of the year
When certain indicators for the first
notably order data and the IFO business test
seemed
to entail the risk of an excessive rise in domestic demand, the authorities
in March proposed or adopted certain budgetary and monetary measures
designed to keep the advance in aggregate demand in line with the growth
of capacity.
If the measures taken have the desired effect, there should
be no further increase in the pressure on resources, and it is likely that
a calmer price trend will be restored.
But prospects
are necessarily
uncertain and the authorities will keep the Situation under close review.
Great flexibility will be needed to combine an adequate rate of expansion
and a satisfactory degree of price stability.
The surplus on the current account of the balance of payments rose
further in 1968, probably reflecting the relative fall in German costs and
prices over the last two years and possibly also the fact that the economy
was still operating below full capacity for most of the year.
Exports
that might normally have been made only in 1969 were also brought forward
into 1968 in response to the special tax measures.
The border tax adjust¬
ment effected in November, the advance to a higher level of activity, and
a slower growth of foreign markets should help to reduce the surplus in 1969,
perhaps to $ 1£ to \% billionabout half the 1968 figure.
Nevertheless,
the surplus on goods and services on a national accounts basis might still
amount to some 2\ per cent of GNP, well above the 1.5 per cent envisaged
in the medium-term projection. The long-term capital outflow rose steeply
OECD Economic Surveys
in 1968 so that the current and long-term capital account was in approxi¬
mate equilibrium. Much of the outflow came from the banks, who expe¬
rienced an unusually large increase of medium and long-term deposits
from the enterprise sector which benefited from a strong cash flow.
Long-
term interest rates declined, providing strong incentives to foreign borrowing
in Germany.
These factors may become less powerful in 1969.
long-term capital outflow may therefore decline.
The
Much will depend on
monetary policy.
From the point of view of international payments equilibrium it is
to be hoped that domestic demand trends will not prevent the maintenance
of monetary conditions conducive to a sizeable outflow of long-term
capital.
But should a need to restrain demand arise, it would clearly be
desirable to use fiscal rather than monetary policy.
I
THE RECOVERY OF ACTIVITY AND RECENT TRENDS
IN THE ECONOMY
The Recovery in the Second Half of 1967
The recovery as well as the preceding recession were caused by domestic
factors.
Exports constituted an expansionary element in the second half
of 1967, but this was not a new factor in the situation; exports expanded
throughout the cycle, and in the initial phase of the recovery the rise was
rather smaller than earlier (Table 2, p. 10 and Diagram 1).
Table 1 shows that the sharp increase in stockbuilding was a major
factor in the early stage of the recovery.
This at first reflected essentially
the cessation of de-stocking which had taken place during the recession :
Table 1
Change in Stockbuilding
1968
1967
Stockbuilding (DM billion at 1967 prices)
I
II
I
II
-^.2
0.7
4.6
3.5
The turnaround in stockbuilding probably reflected in part an increase in
work in progress, and was thus a by-product of the rise in output caused
by other factors.
But it is also likely that there was an important auto¬
nomous element: the reduction in stocks during the recession had been
Germany
Diagram 1
Cyclical Development of GNP and some Main Components1
GNP
-5
12
Machinery and equipment
Tolal constmction
-14
( r
Exports
Private consumption
-3
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
196a
1 The graphs show deviations of quarterly seasonally adjusted GNP value figures
from an OECD estimate of trend. The GNP figures used are those published by the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
Source: OECD, Deutsche Bundesbank.
OECD Economic Surveys
quite sharp (1.8 per cent of GNP) so that a better trend was in any case
likely in the second half of 1967. And the relaxation of monetary policy
facilitated the restoration of more normal stock /sales ratios.
As it had been in the previous recession, economic policy was also
a major element in bringing about the recovery.
demand components
consumption
The direct effects on the
immediately influenced by
and gross fixed investment
official policy
public
were relatively small.
The
combined rise in these two items in the second half of 1967 was small
DM 2 billion, at 1967 prices, or less than a quarter of the increase in aggre¬
gate demand (Table 2).
Public consumption showed no change, while
fixed investment was influenced by the contingency budgets1.
But the
mere fact that stimulative measures were taken served to improve the
business outlook.
Moreover, the fact that some of the measures taken
were temporary led to a marked acceleration in the flow of orders2.
This
probably improved the business climate even though only part of the rise
in activity resulting from the order inflow may have taken place in the
second half of 1967.
As already noted, the easier monetary policy was
no doubt a factor behind the turnaround in stockbuilding.
As usual during the early phase of the recovery, consumers' demand
remained weak.
Wages and salaries per employed person rose rather
slowly and the increase in employment lagged behind the upturn in activity ;
indeed the seasonally adjusted number of employed wage and salary earners
in the second half of 1967 was 1 per cent lower than in the first half.
Continued Expansion
1968
During the first half of 1968 inventory demand remained the main
expansionary factor.
The stimulus emanating from the policy components
influenced by government policy
fixed asset formation
mainly public consumption and gross
was much smaller than earlier, reflecting in part
the aftermath of the acceleration in investment activity in the second half
of 1967.
Private consumption had begun to recover, but was not yet an
important expansionary element.
The rise in total domestic demand was
somewhat smaller than earlier, but a somewhat faster rise in exports served
to maintain the rate of growth of GNP at
some 2 \ per cent,
only
a little less than in the previous half-year.
1
The measures of the two contingency budgets were described in the last year's
OECD Economic Survey of Germany.
2 The 10 per cent special depreciation allowance introduced early in 1967 only
applied to orders placed by the end of October.
Moreover, the price increases expected
from the introduction of the TVA and the investment tax on 1st January 1968 provided
strong stimulus to bring forward investment spending planned for 1968.
Germany
In the first half of 1968 several observers (including the OECD) expres¬
sed doubt about the sustainability of the recovery, mainly for three reasons:
the stimuli resulting from the contingency budgets were likely to
weaken;
stockbuilding
the main expansionary element up to that point
was
likely to fall in the latter part of the year;
the rise in exports seemed likely to slow down, given notably the
devaluation of the pound sterling and the slackening of the expansion
expected in the United States given the restrictive fiscal package pro¬
posed by the Administration.
In these circumstances, it was felt that private investment demand might
not be strong enough to generate a growth of employment, and that with
the rise in wages unlikely to accelerate much, private consumption might
not increase sufficiently to sustain a satisfactory upswing in activity.
In the event, the expansion of aggregate demand accelerated markedly
in the second half of 1968.
This development was strongly influenced by a
sharp rise in exports partly reflecting a stronger-than-expected rise in world
trade (notably U.S. imports) and partly the speed-up of export shipments
in the last quarter of 1968 first related to the revaluation speculation of the
DM and then to the introduction of the border tax adjustment1.
The rise
in exports represented more than half the increase in aggregate demand in the
second half of 1968.
Moreover, the rise in activity and incomes generated
by higher exports was probably an important factor behind the streng¬
thening of final domestic demand, notably business fixed investment and
private consumption.
Stockbuilding fell, and a sharp rise in imports
served to moderate the rise in output.
Nevertheless, real GNP rose by
5 per cent (an annual rate of 10 per cent) between the first and the second
half of 1968.
During the whole upswing the rise in private consumption in relation
to the advance in GNP has been very moderate.
The weak trend in consu¬
mers' demand in the second half of 1967, and the reasons for this, have
already been noted.
The rise in private consumption accelerated in 1968,
1 The measures introduced in the end of November 1968 operate as a 4 per cent
tax on the f.o.b. value of exports not covered by the EEC agricultural agreements. Exis¬
ting export contracts were exempted insofar as the actual delivery was made before
23rd December 1968. On the import-side a corresponding subsidy on the c.i.f. value
is granted. Imports subject to EEC market regulations (some 13 per cent of total)
are exempted. In the case of goods for which the domestic TVA is only 5.5 per cent
instead of the standard rate of 11 per cent, the rebate is only 2 per cent. Imports of
these goods represent 6-7 per cent of total imports. If fully passed on to the buyer
the subsidy would permit a 3.6 per cent (1.8 per cent) reduction in the landed price of
imports. Insofar as the import-content of exported goods is concerned, the subsidy
would then fully offset the incidence of the export tax.
OECD Economic Surveys
Table 2
Gross national product
Constant 1967 prices
DM billion seasonally adjusted change from previous half year
1968
1967
I
11
0.6
Consumers' expenditure
Government current expenditure
0.6
1.5
2.0
Gross fixed investment
construction
I
2.4
4.6
0.6
0.5
0.9
5.9
1.7
Final domestic demand
2.6
2.7
Change in stockbuilding
4.9
3.9
Total domestic demand
Exports
Imports
Foreign
(Change
GNP at
2.3
of goods and services
of goods and services
balance
in foreign balance)
constant prices
1.3
4.6
2.4
machinery and equipment
II
11.0
7.5
6.6
9.9
1.5
2.9
9.3
1.9
3.0
6.6
2.7
1.3
2.7
3.3
12.6
7.1
6.5
0.4
1.7
3.2
3.7
1.6
10.3
Percentage changes
0.4
Consumers' expenditure
Gross fixed investment
4.4
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
GNP at constant prices
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
2.7
5.1
15.7
4.1
6.2
12.8
3.0
2.6
5.0
(Secretariat seasonal adjustment.)
but nevertheless remained modest in relation to the rise in non-consumption
expenditure.
Although the number of employed turned up, by some
2 per cent between the second halves of 1967 and 1968, and although the
increase in compensation per employed person accelerated (mainly because
of longer working hours) non-wage incomes grew almost 2 ^ times more
rapidly.
Moreover, the rise in imports in relation to the growth of aggre¬
gate demand has been relatively strong.
This can partly be ascribed to
the fact that expenditures other than private consumption with a relatively
high import content have risen more rapidly than aggregate demand.
Thus in the first twelve months of the upswing up to mid- 1968 the rise in
non-consumption expenditure mainly reflected higher stockbuilding which
has a high import content.
By the second half of 1968 the continuing
rapid advance in imports may have been due to the very rapid rate of
advance of demand, entailing some spillover into imports.
The relatively slow rise in private consumption coupled with the
strong rise in imports implied that the secondary effect of the rise in nonconsumption expenditure on incomes and demand was relatively low.
10
Germany
This is illustrated by the fact that the ratio between the increase in GNP
and the increase in non-consumption expenditure was no more than 0.6
to 0.8 per cent over the recovery period up to the end of 1968.
Normally
this ratio averages about 1.2 to 1.3 per cent. The implication, which
has also been demonstrated by earlier cyclical experience, is that the increase
in non-consumption expenditure required to achieve a given rise in GNP
is higher in the early stages of recovery, chiefly because employment and
wages react with a lag.
Production and Employment
Industry benefited more than other sectors from the recovery (Table 3).
The output of manufacturing rose by 12 per cent after a fall of 2 \ per cent
in 1967. With the revival of activity, trade and communications also
showed a strong increase in output, but the rates of increase in agriculture
and the service sectors were less than in the previous year.
Table 3
Percentage Changes in Production by Sector 1965-1968
Volume change over previous year
Weight
in GDP
1965
1966
1967
1968
(1968)
Agriculture and forestry
Industry1
5.3
9.8
3.3
57.3
6.8
Trade and communications
18.8
6.2
1.7
0.6
5.5
Services*
18.6
5.3
4.5
3.5
2.5
100.0
5.6
2.2
0.3
6.8
GDP
1
2
2.0
9.1
Including construction and public utilities.
Including public authorities and private household».
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt,
With the strong advance in output the margin of unused resources
has been quickly reduced.
Capacity growth in the total economy has
been estimated at an average annual rate of around 3.5 per cent during
the 1966 to 1968 period. With GNP growing during the period by about
9 per cent, this would imply that, at the end of 1968 only a small margin
of slack remained in the economy.
But capacity utilisation in industry
(seasonally adjusted) as estimated by the IFO-Institute rose from some
76 per cent at the trough of the recession to 89 per cent in January, regaining
the high rate experienced in the boom year 1965.
But as demand pressures
existing in 1965 may have been excessive from the point of view of main¬
taining the degree of price stability desired by the German authorities,
11
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram 2
Production, Capacity and Employment
7961=100
140
-
Potential GDP
.,
-'
120
.,* Actual GDP5
103
90 L
% 100
CAPACITY UTILIZATION (Manufacturing Industry)
Source ;
DIW»
75 _.
%
10
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION - PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM TREND3
Source:
OECD.
-10 L"
(Million) 22
Total dependent employed4
21
( 1500
, s«nWo». «e«f.
Foreign workers'.
1000
£00
Jobs vacant
\.
Unemployed*
Sour»: OECO,D-iiliclie
Bunrleibonlr.
I
100
I
II
III IV
1961
I
II
III IV
I
1962
II III
1963
IV I
II
III IV
1964
I
II
III IV
1965
I
II
III IV
1966
I
II
III IV 'I
1967
II .III IV
I s
1968
1
Estimates made by Council of Economic Advisors (Sachverstandigenrat).
2
Constant 1967 prices.
3 This graph shows deviations of quaterly seasonally adjusted industrial produc¬
tion figures from an OECD estimate of trend.
4 Seasonally adjusted.
5 On basis of January and February data only.
12
Germany
there may not be much further scope for increasing the rate of resource
utilisation.
The backlog of orders in industry has risen rapidly; for capital
goods the period of production covered by orders in hand (4.2 months
in December) may recently have approached the level reached in mid-1965
(4.4 months).
In the building sector, however, some slack seems to remain,
partly due to the weak trend in residential construction.
Following the usual cyclical pattern, there was a considerable rise of
profits in the initial phase of the upswing when wage incomes were still
growing only moderately, bringing the income distribution roughly back
to the pre-recession pattern; the gross wage and salary share in national
income had risen sharply during the recession.
The growth of the dispo¬
sable
further
income
of the
enterprise
sector
was
reinforced
by
a
DM 4 i billion reimbursement of cumulative turnover tax in respect of
stocks held at the time of the introduction of the TVA.
Typically, the
enterprise sector is a net borrower on a fairly large scale.
Last year,
however, with the cash flow rising sharply and capital expenditure rela¬
tively low, the sector's financial deficit was very small.
The importance of
this development for the long-term rates of interest and for the outflow
of capital from Germany is discussed further below.
Diagram 3
Income Distribution
%
.u
Nottenat tneomm
65
Income from Property and Entrepreneur-hip.
of employees'-
I960
1
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
With constant 1960 employment structure.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
13
1966
1967
1962
OECD Economic Surveys
During 1968 the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate1 declined
from 1.7 to 1.0 per cent and has fallen slightly below this level in the first
quarter of 1969. The number of unfilled vacancies has risen sharply,
exceeding the number of unemployed by more than 350 per cent. Since
the middle of 1968, short-time working has disappeared and there has been
a renewed influx of foreign labour. As noted earlier, the total number
of employed wage and salary earners (seasonally adjusted), which was
falling until late 1967, turned up in 1968, but at the end of the year it was
still some 450 000 below the peak of the first quarter of 1966.
Prices and Wages
With a slow rise in domestic demand in 1968, compared with growth
of output, there was little demand pressure on prices from domestic sources.
Aggregate demand, strongly influenced by the marked expansion of exports,
rose sharply, but given the unused productive capacity which existed at
the beginning of the year the pressure on resources would not seem to have
become excessive.
The higher rate of increase in the GNP deflator, some
2 per cent in 1968 against 0.8 per cent in the year before, would partly be
ascribed to the change in the relative price structure following the intro¬
duction of the TVA.
The change in taxation together with the subsequent
increase of the TVA from 10 to 11 per cent (1st July, 1968), may have been
responsible for one-third of the 1.5 per cent increase in the cost of living
which occurred during 1968 (Table 4).
The remainder was due to some
rise in service prices and the strong increase in rents due to the further
liberalisation of the housing market.
The cost-of-living index, stable during the first half of the year following
an upward step induced by the changeover to TVA in January, rose at
an annual rate of some 2 per cent during the second half of the year.
of this rise reflected the mid-year increase in TVA.
consumer prices
adjustments.
was
supported
by
Part
The upward trend in
rising food prices
and by
rent
Towards the end of the period some conjunctural influence
also became perceptible.
At the beginning of the year industrial producer prices rose by some
1 percentage point more than was to be expected from the tax reform.
However, in the course of the year most of the initial increase was reversed
and prices continued to fall until the middle of the year.
Since then the
strong expansion has led to some revival of the price pressure although
the actual rise remained moderate helped by very stable labour costs.
1
The number of unemployed as per cent of dependent labour force.
14
Germany
Diagram 4
Price Developments
122,4
120
CONSUMER PRICES (1962 = 100)
Non-food
115
All goods and servi ces
110
100
PRICE INDEX FOR EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS
(1962 = 109)
105
100
.
PRICES OF MANUFACTURED GOODS (1962 = 100)
105
100
30
.
0
.
20
L
I
IFO TEST OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY ~% BALANCE OF PRICE EXPECTATIONS
II
III
1961
IV
1
II
III IV I
1962
II
III IV
1963
I
II
III IV
I
1964
II
III IV
1965
I
II
III IV
1966
I
II
III IV
1967
I
II
III IV
1968
I' II
1969
1
Series corrected by IFO method to eliminate TVA distortion after 1-1-1968.
2
Data relate to January /February only.
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, IFO Institut.
15
Table 4
Cost of Living Index and the Effects of the Value-Added Tax
Percentage change against corresponding period of previous year
B
Theoretical
incidence
A
Actual
Changes
of change
in the tax
system
Adjusted
Changes
AB
Average
annual changes
1962 to
1967
and subsequent
tax increase1
% _t 1968-1967
Consumer goods
Food and drink (excluding catering)
Other consumer goods (including fuel and power)
Services (including hotels, catering, repairs)
1.1
1.4
5.3
3.9
Rent (including garages)
7.4
Total index
1
+2.1
1.5
1/2
+1.7
+1.4
+4.0
+7.4
+6.6
1.0
+2.7
These represent price changes resulting from the replacement of turnover tax by value-added tax and the subsequent increase of this tax from 10 to 1 1 per cent on July 1st.
Calculations were made on the basis of estimates produced by the IFO Institute, Munich.
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, IFO-Institut, Secretariat Estimate.
Germany
These trends were confirmed by the IFO test showing, since last autumn,
that industrialists expect slightly rising prices.
Export prices showed a
falling trend until the middle of 1968 when they were some 1.3 per cent
down on the end- 1967 level.
The bulk of the drop occurred in January
after the introduction of the TVA.
The rise in wages and salaries per employed person (seasonally adjusted)
virtually nil during 1967, accelerated to an annual rate of 6 i per cent in
the first half of 1968; in the second half wages and salaries continued to
grow at an annual rate of nearly 8 per cent.
4 per cent during 1968.
Wage rates only rose by
In the first half of the year the strong acceleration
of wage and salary earnings was mostly due to overtime work; during the
second half, when the number of employed began to rise, overtime work
became less important.
Nevertheless, with industrial production rising
sharply, labour costs per unit of output in industry were practically stable,
after a decline of 5 per cent during 1967.
As suggested by Table 5 the
average level of unit labour costs in 1968 as a whole (all sectors) appears
to have been only slightly lower than in 1967; but during 1969 unit costs
may rise again by more than 4 per cent.
Table 5
Labour Costs and Profits per Unit of Output
Total economy
Percentage change from previous year
1963
1964
1965
Unit labour costs1
3.0
1.8
3.9
Unit profits1
1.1
2.5
1.0
1
1966
4.8
1967
1968
0.0
101
Excluding the reimbursement of turnover tax in respect for stocks held at the time of the introduction
of TVA (DM 4.3 billion) the increase was 6 J per cent.
Sources:
Statistisches Bundesamt.
II
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The current account surplus reached the record level of almost $ 3 billion
in 1968; in the second half of the year the surplus was running at an annual
rate of $ 3.5 billion.
Imports increased sharply in response to the strong
expansion of aggregate demand.
But with exports rising at an annual
rate of 30 per cent in the second half of the year, the trade surplus rose
significantly.
The strong acceleration in the growth of exports resulted
to an important extent from the artificial boost from revaluation rumours
17
OECD Economic Surveys
and steps to anticipate the introduction of the 4 per cent export tax.
Some
fall in the net deficit on services, reflecting notably a rise in capital receipts,
also contributed to the rise in the current account surplus.
Net transfer
payments, however, rose, because of higher payments to the EEC agri¬
cultural fund.
The current account surplus was wholly offset by an outflow of long-
term capital so that the current and long-term capital account (basic balance)
was in rough equilibrium.
The short-term capital account, however,
influenced by increasing speculation in foreign exchange markets, changed
from a $ 1.6 billion outflow in 1967 to a large inflow of around $ 1 J billion
in 1968 (including the " errors and omissions " item).
The international
payments crisis led to a reserve inflow of some $ 2 £ billion during
September /November 1968.
By the end of January these funds had left
Central Bank reserves again.
Table 6
The Balance of Payments
US S million
1964
1965
Exports fob
16 228
17 946
20189
21 828
24 877
Imports fob
13 826
16 646
17 233
16 576
19 151
2 402
1 300
2 956
5 252
5 726
1 321
1 273
1 212
1 598
1 564
1 619
119
Trade balance
Services, net
Transfers, net
Current balance
50
Long-term capital (excl. special trans.)
Basic balance
1966
242
67
1 377
186
1060
433
1967
1968
1 761
2 464
2 877
864
1 692
12
Short-term capital balance (including errors
316
and omissions)
Balance on official settlements
147
Change in reserves (+ = increase)
of which : gold
Source:
404
162
1 746
618
126
1 758
418
329
1332
312
Annex Table I.
Long-term capital outflow of the size experienced in 1968, most of it
on private account, was a phenomenon unique in Germany's post-war
economic history.
Over the whole decade of the 1950's the outflow had
scarcely attained $ 0.5 billion and from 1960 to 1966 Germany was even
a net importer of private long-term capital at an average annual rate of
some $ 0.4 billion.
A net private capital outflow of any substantial size
occurred for the first time in 1967.
In that year the net inflow on account
of direct investment fell, there was a shift from net credit needs and a
net outflow on portfolio account.
During 1968 these trends were conside-
18
Diagram 5
BM.D*
Flows of Long-term Private Capital
NET INFLOW (+)
NET OUTFLOW (-)
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4 v
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AND LONG-TERM CRE01T
3
Gmrman portfolio
invmstmmnts
IGmrman
p
ont/ /o-no-fer/n crmdlt* abroad
i
2
portfolio inv*stmtnt
and long-torm credit to Germany
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
L
PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT (inc.. Property)
4
I I Gmrmon invoitmont obrooc/
H Foreign investment In Germany
2
1
0
-1
-2_.
I
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
II
III
1966
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
19
IV
I
II
III
1967
IV
I
II
III
1968
IV
I
II
1969
OECD Economic Surveys
rably reinforced by heavy long-term lending and portfolio investment by
the banks, accounting for some 50 per cent of the total private long-term
capital outflow. Roughly one-third of the long-term investment of the
banks abroad took the form of purchases of DM-denominated Euro-bonds
issued in the German market.
The fact that the banks engaged so heavily
in long-term investment abroad was related to their favourable liquidity
situation: there was a strong inflow of medium and long-term deposits,
the bulk of which emanated from the enterprise sector; this in turn reflected
the sharp increase in the cash flow in this sector.
The high level of long-term private capital exports was also influenced
by developments in the main international financial markets.
After the
gold crisis there was a considerable fall in prices of $-denominated Euro¬
bonds with growing difficulties in floating such bonds.
Thus, quite suddenly
an interest yield differential in favour of DM-denominated Euro-bonds
of some 1 per cent developed until mid-summer 1968.
Moreover, the
U.S. balance of payments programme induced United States companies
and their foreign subsidiaries to finance direct investment abroad by funds
raised in foreign markets.
The volume of DM-denominated Euro-bonds
issued in the German capital market, amounting to only DM 0.8 billion
in 1967, rose sharply to about DM 6 billion ($ 1.5 billion) in 1968, repre¬
senting some 30 per cent of all foreign bonds issued in Europe in that
year. About two-thirds of the Euro-DM-issues were sold, roughly in
equal shares, to the banks and other private purchasers.
The fact that
foreign borrowing was not adversely affected by the revaluation rumours
suggests that the interest rate advantage from long-term borrowing in
Germany more than offset the loss expected to result for the foreign borro¬
wer from a revaluation of the D-Mark.
The Trade Surplus
Up to the revaluation of the D-Mark in 1961 the surplus on the balance
The revaluation and the relative
of goods and services had been very high.
rise in German labour costs in the following years contributed to the resto¬
ration of better equilibrium and a more satisfactory structure of the foreign
balance.
In the 1962-66 period the balance of goods and services showed
a surplus equivalent to 1 to 1 £ per cent of GNP in each year, except 1965
which showed a small deficit. But the position in 1965 was exceptional,
heavily influenced by excessive demand pressures in Germany; when a
better balance in the economy was restored in 1966, the balance on goods
and services reverted to a surplus position.
Over the 1962-66 period as a
whole (excluding 1965) the surplus on goods and services was about offset
by net transfer payments and long-term capital exports so that the basic
balance was in rough equilibrium.
The situation before the recent recession
20
Germany
Diagram 6
Yields on Corporate Bonds
$ Eurobonds
A
\
t
1
1
v
1
1
V
1
1
G-iman bonds
1
1
\
1
fv
/I» /
I
v
V»MI E-robond-
1*
\
V
/
\
w
/
-A ,j
\
I
1964
1965
1966
1968
1967
T
1/2 1969
Source: OECD.
Diagram 7
Foreign Surplus, Goods and Services
% of GNP, current prices
4
3 (2
1
0
I960
1961
1962
19E3
1964
21
196S
1966
1967
1968
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram 8
Relative Trends In Costs and Prices
EXPORT UNIT VALUES (1961 = 100)
UNIT LABOUR COSTS (1961 = 100)
_
120
-.
110
130
UK
S
Germany
S
120
All major OECD
Vajor OECD
Europe1
cduntriesi ->^>r,^<^im^..
'"'
,--
110
.«
_____r_r_____-4
100
'Italy
/
All major OECD
Japan
countries
'100
___:
L
I
i
I
I
I
_|
90
WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES' (Manufactured Goods)
NON-FOOD CONSUMER PRICES (1961 = 100)
140
140
Japan
y
' Italy
130 .
y
13«
/
yKyfr France
120
120
/
A
SZ
Germany /
All major OECD counlries
'V
' //
110
^
r
100
110
Germany
USA
.-
L
J
1961
1
2
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
19682
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
106
19C5
Countries weighted according to importance to German trade.
Partially estimated.
Source: OECD, UN.
Note Unit labour cost is defined as the total cost of wages salaries and associated
employer outlay per «nit of output in the manufacturing sector. For the purpose of
international comparison national data have been converted to dollars at the current
exchange rate.
A devaluation is therefore registered as a reduction in unit labour cost.
Estimates for 1968 are preliminary.
For the purposes of this comparison major OECD countries in Europe comprise
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. All major OECD
countries include also Canada and the United States.
22
Germany
therefore seemed to be roughly in line with what has now become the
official balance of payments target: a balanced basic account with a surplus
on goods and services equivalent to 1.5 per cent of GNP financed by transfer
payments
and long-term capital exports,
notably
to
under-developed
Much larger surpluses developed in 1967 and 1968.
This was partly
countries.
due to temporary factors.
The recession meant that the pressure of demand
fell markedly in Germany relative to that typically prevailing abroad. This
factor will disappear as activity regains a more satisfactory level; by the
end of 1968 the economy was approaching full employment conditions as
defined by the German authorities (an unemployment ratio of 0.8 per cent).
But the recession may also have had a more lasting influence on the payments
position via costs and prices (Diagram 8).
Influenced by weaker demand
pressures, unit labour costs in manufacturing fell in Germany in 1967, and
this trend continued in 1968.
As unit labour costs continued to rise in
most other Member countries, the relative decline in German labour costs
per unit of output between 1966 and 1968 was considerable, even if allo¬
wance is made for the devaluation of pound sterling and certain other
currencies in 1967.
picture.
The movement of certain price indices shows a similar
These cost and price developments seem to have implied that the
trade surplus has increased more than what would be consistent with a
surplus on the balance of goods and services equivalent to 1.5 per cent
of GNP, given the development of the service balance.
Cost and price developments may also have had an impact on the
services account.
Travel expenditure abroad, which had increased sharply
in the previous years, fell somewhat in 1967.
This was to be expected,
given the decline in employment and factor incomes.
But the recovery
of travel expenditure abroad in 1968, when activity and incomes recovered
rapidly, was very weak.
This could be a temporary development.
it is also possible that it is related to cost and price developments.
But
As
receipts from foreigners travelling in Germany have continued to rise, net
tourist expenditure abroad by Germany in 1968 was below the 1966 level.
The rise in the trade surplus has also been influenced by the fact that,
since 1966, the import surplus of agricultural products has tended to decline.
Moreover, the import surplus of non-classified items (mainly military
imports) has fallen considerably in recent years.
Trade Performance
It is widely assumed that an exceptionally good export performance
has been an important element behind the strong increase in the trade
surplus in the last few years.
This assumption is often backed by certain
23
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram 9
DM mil.
Import Surplus in Special Categories
AGRICULTURAL IMPORT SURPLUS
IMPORT- SURPLUS ON NON- CLASSIFIED ITEMS dm Bill.
4
13
.
10.
1
J 0
1959
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
1959
68
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Diagram 10
Shares in World Trade 1962-67
OECD (exd. Germany)
62
26
Non-OECD
24
12
Germany
1962
1963
1965
1964
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin.
24
1966
1967
Germany
broad measures of trade performance suggesting, for example, that Ger¬
many's share in world trade has increased from 10.6 per cent in 1964 to
11.5 per cent in 1967 (Diagram 10). This evidence is hardly in dispute,
but Germany's success over the period was not unique: comparable gains
were achieved by other industrialised countries, while the share of nonOECD countries declined considerably.
For an assessment of German export performance, it would appear
more meaningful to use export data of OECD countries only as these cover
an overwhelming proportion of world exports of manufactured goods and
exports by predominantly industrial countries.
However, a measurement
of the German export share in total OECD trade does not indicate whether
the behaviour of the German share was due to a favourable country or
commodity export pattern, with exports concentrated on fast-growing
markets, or whether it reflected an increase in shares after allowing for the
effect of the country /commodity pattern.
In the following section an
attempt has been made to isolate a large part of the influence of the country /
commodity pattern in order to obtain a better measure of export perfor¬
mance.
As a first step in this direction, Germany's export performance was
reweighted by its geographical market structure.
The approach consisted
in calculating the growth of Germany's exports in a given year assuming
that Germany had exactly maintained the previous year's share in total
OECD exports to each country market.
The results of this method suggest
that during 1962/68 the annual growth rate of Germany's exports was on
average 0.7 per cent higher than expected, with losses during 1962/64 and
considerable gains from 1965 onwards.
Table 7
Export performance in 15 Geographical Markets
Actual growth
Growth of
15 export
Actual growth of
minus market
country1
exports
growth
markets
per cent
Total market
gains or losses
per cent
C=BA
A
B
1962-63
10.6
10.2
1963-64
12.1
10.9
1964-65
9.3
10.4
1.1
1965-66
10.3
12.5
2.2
1966-67
6.2
8.0
1.8
1967-68
12.0
12.0
0.7
1
The growth which would occur in Germany's exports tfit maintained its share in total OECD exports
to each market
2
Corrected ror temporary distortion resulting rrom border tax changes at end 1968.
Source:
OECD Secretariat
25
OECD Economic Surveys
The method used to produce the calculations in Table 7 has the advan¬
tage that in practise it has produced fairly accurate predictions and is
comparatively simple. It seemed useful, however, to produce more refined
calculations on the basis of a greater number of markets defined by commo¬
dity as well as country.
Such calculations appeared likely to yield not only
a more accurate measure of performance, since they allowed markets to
be split into smaller segments, but also more interesting information about
the relationship between exports and the domestic economic situation.
The overall results of calculations made on this basis are shown in Table 8.
The table provides answers to the following questions: what would have
been the increase in German exports, had they maintained their previous
year's share in total OECD exports to the respective country /commodity
market.
For this purpose
German exports were divided into eleven
commodity groups1 and the performance of these groups in eleven main
trading areas was examined.
In this way 121 markets were obtained.
Table 8 contrasts the growth of Germany's export markets reweighted by
countries and commodities and the actual growth of Germany's exports.
Table 8
Export Performance in 121 Country /Commodity Markets
Growth
of
Actual growth
121 countrycommodity
Actual
minus market
export growth
markets1
per cent
growth
Total gains
B
C=BA
or losses
per cent
A
1962-63
11.0
9.9
1963-64
12.8
10.9
1964-65
10.2
10.2
1965-66
12.0
12.5
1966-67
6.9
8.0
1.1
12.7s
0.0
12.7
1967-68»
1
.
0.5
Note: «suits are not strictly comparable with those of Table 7 as the country /commodity approach
must eliminate a small fraction ot OECD exports which are not classified in suflicicnt detail.
the number of trading areas was somewhat reduced.
Furthermore
2
Crude estimate on the basis of past relationship between growth of trade by country and growth
of trade by country/ commodity.
3 Corrected for temporary distortion resulting from Border Tax changes at end 1968.
Source:
OECD Secretariat.
Diagram 11 shows aggregate results of German export performance
in main trading areas.
More detailed results are discussed in Annex 2.
It should, however, be noted that here export performance is measured as
the difference between theoretical and actual share of German exports
in total OECD exports whereas in Tables 7 and 8 it is measured in terms
1
The commodity grouping is described in Annex 1.
26
Germany
of difference between theoretical and actual growth rates of German exports.
It may be seen from Diagram 12 that the German export performance in
its main trading areas has been far from uniform.
There were especially
striking contrasts between EFTA and the EEC, in which areas trade creation
and diversion have exerted a strong influence.
Among commodity groups (Diagram 12) performance was disappoin¬
ting in markets for road motor vehicles, household machinery, aircraft and
ships, and mineral fuels (some 18 per cent of total German exports in
1967).
More favourable results were obtained in the case of iron and steel,
chemicals and food and drink (some 24 per cent of German exports in 1967).
The performance of machinery and equipment, accounting for one-third of
Germany's exports, was roughly maintained in the period under review.
Diagram 11
German Performance in Main Trading Areas1
Compared to OECD Total 1962-1967
Actual Market Shares less "Expected" Market Shares
e
Germany's Market Short in 1962
a
Germany'* Morkat Shotm in 7967
V,
EEC
Marktt an % of all
German Export* iri 1967
%
EFTA
North America
2
23.7
-J-2-i
-2 _.___
_
_I-2 _.___
Total3
Less "developed non-OECD
Oilier OECD developed non-OECD
2
l_
0.2.
2
<n.oA}7.3J
-1-3 I.
-3 L-
1962
1
2
3
1963
1964 1965
1966
1967
_l
1_
I
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
M.3L
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Excluding exports to Germany.
With Ottawa agreement correction.
Note change of scale.
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from zero line measure summary results for single years and cannot
be cumulated.
27
Diagram 12
German Export Performance In Main Commodity Groups
Compared to OECD Total 1962-1967
Actual Market Shares less " Expected " Marked Shares
e
Gemot,', Market Shan la 1962
Market as %' of all
German,; Market Short in 1967
Cheiiicar-
Machinery, equipment
2
C-n_an Erportm In 79-7
.%
Road motor vehicles
I-
- \73.iA?4'3
-2 V_J
I
I
I
I
1-2 _._l
Other basic materials
2
-
0
-
I
I
1
I
I
Other manufactures
2 -
0
_j__
.
-ÎU-J
1
L
_1
I
Iron and steel
0
10.9
-J
_i
1-
1-21.
I
1
Other crude materials
I
.
__I
I
0
0
li_J
'
I
Mineral fuels
.
-2 _,
I
3
1-2 L
Food and drink
I
I
L
_i
Household machinery
1
I
I
_____
Aircratt, ships
3
0
-3 _.
a
i
i
I
1962 1963 1964 1965 USE 1967
1
2
0
_____i-3_-
i
1
i
1352 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
0
i-3 w_j
i
«
.
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Excluding exports to Germany.
With Ottawa agreement correction.
Source:
Note
OECD.
Deviations from zero line measure summary results for single years and
cannot be cumulated.
28
Germany
Detailed results and conclusions are given in Annex 2.
The following
are, however the main points which emerge from calculations based on
the two methods:
(a)
During the period under review Germany lost market shares
up to 1964 and has since gained shares.
The extent of the gain
depends on the method of measurement.
On the best measure¬
ment no gain was achieved over the whole period;
(b)
Differences in results between the two methods suggest a country /
commodity export pattern slightly more favourable than the
country pattern taken alone;
(c)
There is little evidence to suggest that the trade surplus of recent
years has resulted mainly from an outstanding export performance.
Nevertheless given the stagnation of imports during the recession
the gradual increase in market shares from 1965 onwards was
enough to bring the balance of payments back into a high surplus
position.
ffl
FISCAL AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
Budget Policy
Fiscal policy played an important role in bringing about the revival
of domestic demand and output in 1967, but the strong recovery in 1968
took place in spite of a neutral or even slightly restrictive Federal budget.
The expansionary effects of the 2nd contingency budget were concentrated
in late 1967 and the first months of 1968.
The financial deficit was lower
than in 1967, though that part which had an impact on domestic activity
may have grown somewhat.
An estimate of the demand impact of changes
in the Federal budget suggests that there was a reduction in the stimulus
from f per cent of GNP in 1967 to about zero in 19681. In the latter year
the effect on demand of the strong increase in transfer payments was roughly
1 The budget impact has been estimated as follows. To the increase of real Federal
domestic expenditure on goods and services and transfers to other government authorities
has been added the effect of the budget changes on the purchasing power balance of
the household sector. This effect was estimated by applying a multiplier of 1.27 to the
sum of the change in real Federal domestic purchases of goods and services plus the
change in net deflated Federal transfers to households minus the change in deflated
taxes received from households. The multiplier used was derived from the marginal
consumption and the import ratios of households prevailing in the period 1955-1965.
For fuller discussion of the methods used see study of the OECD group of Fiscal
Experts (Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Economy, Paris 1968).
29
OECD Economic Surveys
offset by the effects of certain restrictive measures and a more moderate
rise in the purchase of goods and services1.
The 1969 Budget and the recent supplementary budgetary measures,
place emphasis on the official medium-term aim of full use of the productive
resources to a degree consistent with price stability.
The Government
has reduced the Federal share of income tax receipts from 37 to 35 per cent
on condition that the Lander pass on one half of the DM 1 billion involved
to the Communes.
The Budget also contained various measures to offset
the restrictive impact of the November 1968 border tax measures.
Supple¬
mentary budgetary measures of a restrictive nature were introduced in
March 1969.
These are subject to review in July 1969.
The joint results
of the original and supplementary measures are :
(a)
Of additional tax proceeds of DM 0.5 billion resulting from the
border tax changes, DM 0.3 billion will be used for a programme
of structural change in sectors of the economy most affected by
the quasi-revaluation.
The introduction of an investment subsidy
is planned for industries on the East German border, in develop¬
ment areas and for research investment.
Use of the remaining
DM 0.2 billion originally earmarked for the same purposes will
be decided later;
(b)
Apart from measures relating to the border tax, the March mea¬
sures
included cuts in
to DM 1.6 billion.
Federal
expenditure plans amounting
These affect mainly public consumption and
investment.
(c)
At an earlier stage of budget discussion the federal authorities
had recommended to the Financial Planning Council2 to agree
on additional expenditure by the Lander and Communes in 1969.
This exhortation envisaged that a considerable part of the DM
2.4 billion of extra tax revenue resulting from a growing tax base
would be spent on investment rather than put into a contracyclical
reserve (as envisaged at an earlier date).
The extra tax revenue
is now forecast at DM 2.8 billion rather than DM 2.4 billion,
but the supplementary measures include new guidelines for the
Financial Planning Council.
These state that the Lander should
use DM 1.5 billion of the additional tax proceeds to reduce net
indebtedness.
The same recommendation is given for any further
increase in revenue above forecast.
Similar but unquantilied
guidelines were given to the Communes.
1
These measures were described at some length in last year's survey (see pages
14-15).
2
An institution introduced in order to co-ordinate medium term financial planning
between Federal Government Lander and Communes.
30
Germany
Table 9
The Budget of the Total Public Sector
and its Estimated Impact on Domestic Demand1 2
Percentage increase 1969
After
introduction
of restric
1967
DM Bill.
1968
1966
Originally
planned
tive
measures
in March
1969
Current revenue
177.3
2
73.2
7
8
10
10i
4
10,
9
11
10.
9
7.
7
Expenditure on goods and
services at home
Gross asset formation
5i
20.3
Transfers to domestic sec
10
82.0
tors
Estimated impact of Budget
changes on domestic de
mand (per cent of GNP)
1
2
2_
5i
i
3
2
*
i
For the method of calculation of the Budget impact see footnote on page 2_>.
Including social security, national accounts basis.
Source:
(d)
OECD submission and Secretariat estimates.
Advancepaymentsofcorporate and income tax, which would usually
have been allowed to lag during the upswing, are to be adjusted
to the increased profit levels of 1968.
The additional revenue
will be used for the reduction of net borrowing requirements.
The estimates made in Table 9 suggest that, as a result of the recent res¬
trictive measures, the demand impact of the changes in the budgets of the
total public sector may have been reduced by about \ per cent of GNP.
The performance of fiscal policy has improved considerably in the last two
years in the sense that it has been more closely geared to the requirements
of demand management.
It was an important feature of the Growth and
Stability Law that the need for better co-ordination of fiscal policy between
the various levels of government was recognised.
Better co-operation
between the Federal Government, Lander and Communes now seems to
have been established, although considerable difficulties remain in co-or¬
dinating fiscal policy at the various levels.
Monetary Policy
After a period of steady and substantial growth of bank liquidity in
1967, the trend was arrested in 1968.
Liquidity reserves remained, however,
relatively stable and on a high level.
31
During the first nine months of the
OECD Economic Surveys
year monetary policy allowed market forces, including an important public
sector cash surplus, to exert their restrictive influence.
Moreover, open
market operations in the bond market, expansionary during 1967, had a
slightly negative effect on bank liquidity.
The situation changed during
the final quarter of the year when the large inflow of speculative money
from abroad led to considerable liquidity
gains.
In late
November,
however, the monetary authorities took measures designed to counteract
the liquidity impact of the short-term capital inflow from abroad and to
discourage speculation in favour of the DM.
To the extent that foreign
deposits exceeded the level of November 15th equivalent balances were
neutralised as additional minimum reserves (100 per cent minimum re¬
serves).
Furthermore the acceptance of credits from abroad and the ope¬
ning of new foreign accounts were made subject to special permission.
Both measures were discontinued in early 1969 as, by that time, most of
the speculative funds flowing in before and during the November crisis,
had left Germany again.
Although the banks lost some liquidity during
1968 their reserve position remained comfortable, with net secondary
reserves1 amounting to 6\ per cent of total deposits at the end of the year.
Table 10
Bank Liquidity
DM billion
Period of
Period of
monetary
restraint
monetary
1964 I-
1966 II-
1966 I
1967 II
ease
Market factors1
+6.1
Policy factors»
+4.0
of which:
Sep.-Dec.
1968
1968
4.5
open market
operations in the bond
market
1
Jan.-Sep.
(+1.2)
(
()
Changes in currency in circulation, non-bank balances with Central Bank, Bundesbank's net foreign
position and credit institutions'short-term foreign assets.
2 Changes related to minimum reserves and open market operations with non-banks.
Source:
Monat-berichte der Deutschen Bundesbank.
During 1968, in particular towards the end of the year, the Bundesbank
pursued an active swap policy which by reducing the exchange risk aimed
at calming the forward markets and at facilitating short-term capital
exports to the extent compatible with the requirements of the domestic
money market.
1
In conformity with the Bundesbank's intentions the banks
Money market investment at home and abroad less indebtedness with the Central
Bank.
32
Germany
not only maintained but actually increased their short-term foreign assets.
However, the large inflow in short-term deposits during the second half
of the year produced a negative swing in the banks' net short-term foreign
position of some DM 2.8 billion.
From the beginning of December the
Bundesbank has been pursuing a more restrictive policy with respect to
swap transactions with the commercial banks, limiting facilities strictly
to the banks' actual money market investments.
Diagram 13
Self-Financing in the Enterprise Sector (non-housing)
Gross saving as a percentage of total investment
"
r
IX
90
30
-
I
70
*
a
i.
I960
1961
1962
*
OECD Estimate.
**
OECD Forecast.
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968*
1969**
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, OECD.
Private credit demand strengthened considerably in 1968.
During
1968 the expansion of bank credit (including the banks' purchases of nonbank bonds) grew by DM 10.8 billion more than a year earlier, reflecting
increased borrowing by the private sector; public sector borrowing rose
some DM 4.4 billion less than the previous year's record.
These figures
suggest a growing readiness of the private sector to increase indebtedness,
but as deposits grew roughly in step with credits the private sector's net
indebtedness to the banking system changed only little. The strong rise
in the cash flow of the enterprise sector already noted was an important
factor behind this development.
Non-housing investment could be almost
fully financed by the business sector's own resources, a phenomenon without
precedent in previous recovery years.
Long-term interest rates, fairly stable since autumn 1967, declined
somewhat in 1968.
Public bond yields fell below 6 i per cent.
33
Fixed
OECD Economic Surveys
interest securities with a 6 per cent coupon
critical low-point
time since 1965.
generally assumed to be a
were successfully floated in autumn 1968 for the first
The large amount of issues which followed temporarily
in rates. This
halted and even slightly reversed the downward trend
induced the Bundesbank to re-intervene at the long-end of the market.
The recovery in the capital market during the summer and early autumn
in conditions of rapidly rising demand seems to reflect a change in interest
rate expectations, apparently influenced by the fact that the borrowing
requirement of the public sector turned out smaller than envisaged and
caused less strain on the capital market. Moreover, during 1968 the
banks continued to invest heavily in fixed interest securities, absorbing
roughly two-thirds of net new issues; prior to 1967 the banks had normally
taken no more than 30 to 40 per cent of new issues.
The banks' security
purchases, which contributed decisively to the post-war record of bond
market issues, were made possible by a sharp increase in medium
and
long-term bank deposits which in turn reflected the marked rise in the cash
flow of the enterprise sector.
Table 11
New Bond Market Issues1
1966
Net issues of domestic securities
1967
1968
5.0
15.0
Public authorities
0.6
4.9
3.8
Credit institutions
4.4
9.2
13.9
Other private
Net increase in domestic holdings of foreign bonds
Net bond purchases:
17.7
0.9
0.5
0.5
The credit institutions
1.5
11.6
14.6
Domestic non-banks
4.2
3.4
7.8
Foreign investors
0.1
0.8
0.2
Central Bank
1
Net of repayments and repurchases.
Source:
Note
4.1
1.3
At issue value.
Deutsche Buadeabank.
Detail may not add due to rounding.
At the beginning of March the Central Bank announced that it would
no longer intervene at the long end of the market.
This has entailed a
moderate upward trend in bond rates. In support of the restrictionary
fiscal measures it was furthermore decided to reduce rediscount quotas
of the credit institutes by some DM 3.5 billion and to raise the Lombard
rate1 from 3.5 to 4 per cent.
1
Rate of Central Bank short-term lending against collateral.
34
Germany
IV
PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES*
Prospects
In January the Government submitted its annual economic report
for 19691 to Parliament.
This contained a revision of its medium-term
economic aims for the period 1968-1973.
The growth target for this
period was fixed at an average annual rate of 4 i per cent (constant 1968
prices).
On this basis the following combination of economic aims is
considered optimal:
(a)
Full employment defined as an unemployment ratio of 0.8 per
cent of the dependent labour force.
This implies an average
unemployment ratio during this period of 1 per cent;
(_>)
Price stability
cent.
a rise in the GNP deflator not exceeding 1 per
During 1968/1973 this would imply an average annual
increase in the GNP deflator of 1.8 par cent;
(c)
External equilibrium
a surplus on the balance of goods and
services on a national accounts basis of 1.5 per cent of GNP,
offset by transfer payments and long-term capital exports;
(d)
Reasonable economic growth
an annual GNP increase of 4
per cent in volume.
In the course of 1968 the expansion acquired considerable momentum,
notably in the second half of the year when exports rose fast.
Although
the growth of exports seems bound to weaken in 1969, recent surveys
suggest that business expectations remain buoyant, apparently little affected
by the quasi-revaluation of the D-Mark.
The IFO survey of investment
intentions taken in November pointed to a 20 per cent rise in the value of
fixed investment in manufacturing between
1968 and 1969
(compared
with the 16 per cent indicated by the September survey); if realised, this
would imply a continued rise from the very high level reached in the second
half of 1968.
Although the restrictive measures taken in March could
have a dampening influence on business expectations, fixed investment
demand would seem likely to constitute a major dynamic element in 1969.
The strong trend in the inflow of domestic orders for capital goods seems
to confirm this assumption.
Year over year there should be a strong
acceleration in the growth of investment in machinery and equipment,
But in spite of additional public investment (most of which consists of
construction) the growth of total construction activity may not attain the
rate experienced in 1968, because residential building activity may weaken ;
1
Jahreswirschaftsbericht 1969 der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 31st January 1969.
*
This assessment was made in March 1969 on the basis of statistical information
then available.
35
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram 14
»_______________
Order Inflows
Percentage Deviation from Trend 1961-68
Tola] orders
Totol domestic OtdoTS
Domestic orders
Investment Goods
V
f/
d
'.
r
i.
a
V-
-10
V II
17
-15
*
1
I
II
III IV I
1961
II
III
1962
IV
I
II
III IV I
1963
II
III IV
I
1964
II
III
1965
IV
I
II
III IV
1966
I
II
III
IV
1967
I
II
III IV
1968
I
1969
The graphs show deviations of monthly seasonally adjusted value figures from
an OECD estimate of trend.
Source: OECD, Statistisches Bundesamt.
Nora
Data have been corrected for transition to TVA on 1-1-68.
by the second half of the year it might be back on the downward trend due
to the relative saturation of the housing market prevailing before the stimu¬
lus provided by the contingency budgets.
36
Diagram 15
Length of Order Books in Industry
Duration of Production covered by Orders
Mon the
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY1-2-
4
3
2
1
0
BASIC MATERIALS AND PRODUCER GOODS INDUSTRIES
INVESTMENT GOODS INDUSTRIES
6
-
5
.
4 L
3
2
1
o L
CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES
4
3 U
2
1
0
MJSD
I960
1
M J
SO
1961
M J
S
1962
D
MJSD
1963
MJSDMJSD
1964
Excluding iron and steel production.
1965
Excluding food, drink and tobacco.
Source: IFO Institut.
37
1966
MJ
S
1967
D M
J
SO
1968
1969
Excluding iron and steel castings, oil
refining and non-ferrous metals until March 1967.
2
MJSD
OECD Economic Surveys
Influenced by higher wages and salaries and by higher defence expen¬
diture decided in the 1969 budget, public consumption should rise much
faster than last year.
Private consumption seems likely to be stimulated
by some acceleration of the rate of increase in wage and salary earnings.
Negotiations for some 5 million workers fall due in the first half of 1969,
and the trade unions have announced considerable wage claims.
rise in earnings resulting from wage drift is likely to remain strong.
The
Total
wage and salary earnings per employed person may, therefore, increase
by some 8 per cent.
In view of the stabilizing effect of the import subsidy
and in view of recent restrictive measures the rise in the cost-of-living index
should remain moderate during the year.
could therefore be significant.
The growth of real incomes
Assuming a fall in the personal savings
ratio, mainly because of the probable increase in the share of wages in
national income, private consumption could rise by some 5 \ per cent in
volume, roughly in line with GNP.
On these assumptions, final domestic demand (excluding stocks) may
rise faster than in 1968.
The course of stock-building seems to have been
somewhat erratic in 1968, when a very high rate in the first half-year was
followed by some dip in the second.
The decline can probably be explained
by the expectation of a revaluation of the D-Mark which would make
imports cheaper, and by some stock depletion in response to the export
rush during the last two months of the year.
As stocks at the end of
1968 were barely back at their mid- 1966 level-, it is reasonable to assume
a fairly strong build-up in 1969 though not as strong a one as marked
1968
on
average1.
Total
domestic
demand
(including
stockbuilding)
could rise by 6-7 per cent; although significant, such an increase would be
smaller than that experienced last year because of the different inventory
situation.
It seems reasonable to expect that exports of goods and services will
rise by some 6 per cent in volume, much less than last year.
The growth
of markets for German exports seems likely to be more modest, both
because of the expected slowdown of the expansion of home demand
in some countries (notably the United Kingdom and the United States)
and because of a probable fall in exports in the first months of this year
after the acceleration towards the end of 1968.
showed a marked decline from December).
(January and February
The 4 per cent export tax
should have a moderating influence on the volume of foreign sales although
it is uncertain how much the value of exports will be affected in the shortrun (see page 41).
1
The expected strengthening of demand pressures in
The turnaround from decumulation of stocks in 1967 to accumulation in 1968
represented 2. per cent of GNP.
38
Germany
Germany relative to those prevailing abroad also points to a slower export
rise.
On this basis, and assuming a rather strong rise of imports in relation
to that of aggregate demand, GNP in constant 1967 prices could rise by
5-5 \ per cent between 1968 and 19691.
This forecast is not very diffe¬
rent from that presented by the Government in its 1969 annual report;
although recent indicators have pointed to a rather stronger rise in activity,
the Government still hopes to realise the main features of this forecast,
given the restrictive effect of the measures taken in March.
The official
forecast assumed a 4 \ per cent real GNP rise, with the pattern of the ex¬
pansion very similar to that discussed above.
The Government expected
that a rise in output of this order could be realised without undue pressure
on resources as it was assumed that a certain amount of slack still remained
at the end of 1968.
The rise in activity was likely to require the number
of employed to rise by 0.5 per cent, which would be rendered possible by
a further recruitment of foreign labour (100 000) and a continued decline
in the unemployment ratio to 1 per cent as an average for the year as a
whole (roughly the level prevailing at the beginning of the year).
As
some shortening of the working week was to be expected, the increase
in productivity (output per man-hour) could be very similar to that of
GNP.
In the annual report the authorities expected the GNP deflator to
rise by 2.5 per cent and consumer prices by 2 per cent between the years
1968 and 1969, somewhat faster than in the previous year.
After the
measures taken in March the Government is more confident that this rate
of increase will not be significantly exceeded.
To some extent the expected
acceleration of the price rise will reflect factors unrelated to the general
demand situation.
The fall in food prices last year is thought likely to
be reversed in 1969, and much of the expected price rise would be due to
the upward adjustment ofrents in older dwellings.
These expectations have
already been confirmed by developments during the last few months.
Part of the increase in the annual averages of the GNP deflator or consumer
prices expected for 1969 would reflect the increase which took place in the
course of 1968; one factor was the increase from 10 to 11 per cent in the
TVA in July last year.
The rise of prices in the course of 1969 could
therefore be smaller than indicated by the expected movement of the ave¬
rage for the year as a whole.
The introduction of the import subsidy
adopted in November would help to dampen the pressure on prices.
However, even after the March measures a risk of overheating cannot
be excluded in the present situation.
1
Given the strong momentum of the
In constant 1954 prices the rise would be some 4.-5 per cent.
39
OECD Economic Surveys
expansion in the second half of last year and the fact that the unemployment
ratio is already rather below 1 per cent, inflationary expectations could
begin to develop and generate a stronger advance in domestic demand
than allowed for in the forecast presented above.
The situation is also
complicated by uncertainty about the impact of the quasi-revaluation
the smaller the decline in the external surplus on goods and services, the
greater the risk of overheating.
But assessment of policy needs should be based not only on the fore¬
cast increase in demand between the annual averages for 1968 and 1969,
but on the likely movement of activity
in the course of this year. Account
needs to be taken of the fact that in the second half of 1968 demand was
rising particularly rapidly.
Although the level of resource utilisation was
still below potential, the speed with which demand rose led to some acce¬
leration of the rise in prices.
Given the lag with which many business
series react to a change in demand trends, it is possible that a number of
indicators (notably relating to prices, costs and employment) in early 1969
were still influenced by the strong upturn in the last months of 1968.
By
the same token, the slowdown of the rise in activity which is probably
taking place in the first half of this year has not yet had time to be fully
reflected in certain important indicators.
In the first half of 1969 the rise in real GNP may well slow down to
an annual rate of some 3£ per cent, mainly because of the expected absolute
decline in exports.
But real domestic demand should also expand less
fast than in the second half of 1968.
The rise in business fixed investment,
although significant, is likely to be more moderate than in the previous
half-year which saw such spending recover from its low level of the first
half of the year.
Mainly in response to the slower rise of income associated
with the more moderate advance in activity, private consumption is also
likely to rise somewhat more slowly than previously.
by 3 i per cent at an annual rate
With output increasing
i. e. slightly less fast than the growth
of capacity
the unemployment ratio would not seem likely to fall much
further and capacity utilization should not change much. With regard
to the price rise, there would seem reason to hope for some moderation
compared with the recent trendIn the second half of the year the OECD
forecast
assumes
an
acceleration of the expansion again because of renewed export growth.
There is necessarily uncertainty about the strength of the acceleration.
probable speed-up of the rise in wages is likely to reinforce it.
are also moderating factors.
The
But there
As already noted, residential construction may
revert to its underlying downward trend in the second half, when the sti¬
mulus provided by the contingency budgets is likely to have spent itself.
Business fixed investment should continue to grow, but the rise may be
40
Germany
smaller than in the first half.
Given the increase now expected in the
first half, the rise of such investment for the year as a whole suggested by
the IFO Survey would imply a slowdown in the second half.
Moreover,
by the second half of the year, business fixed asset formation is likely to
have reached a high level in relation to its longer-term trend.
But these
are not very strong arguments, and it is quite possible that investment
demand will rise faster than assumed.
The order inflow in the next few
months together with the IFO test to be taken in spring 1969, will provide
a better basis for assessment.
On the assumptions made, however, real
GNP could expand at an annual rate of somewhat more than 4 per cent
in the second half of the year.
This would mean that, between the
second halves of 1968 and 1969, output would have risen by 3^-4 per cent,
in which case little increase in the average rate of capacity utilisation or
decline in the unemployment ratio from the end-1968 position would
seem likely.
The surplus on the current account of the balance of payments should
fall considerably this year.
The expected strong expansion of domestic
demand is an important element behind this forecast.
The border tax
measures, should also serve to reduce the current account surplus, although
it is difficult to judge how strong -their impact will be.
An analysis of the
effects of the 1961 revaluation (and discounting possible anticipatory effects
before the expiry of the measures early in 1970) would seem to suggest
that the impact could be relatively moderate1.
As exports were swollen
in 1968 by the special factors referred to earlier (perhaps to the extent of
$ 0.4 billion) the current account surplus may decline to about $ 1 ^-1 J bil¬
lion, or about half the 1968 rate.
The trade surplus may rise between the
first and second halves of 1969, as exports will be back on an upward trend
again after their decline in the first months of the year.
Nevertheless, the
trend of the current account may be flat from the first to the second half.
The main factors are likely to be a sharp rise in the deficit on invisibles,
mainly reflecting a sizeable rise in the remittances of foreign workers and
an increased deficit on tourism.
1 The March 1961 revaluation was 5 per cent. In the twelve months which followed
it, GNP grew by some 4i per cent and the terms of trade improved by 3 per cent. Exclu¬
ding food and military purchases from the trade balance which were influenced by special
factors the surplus rose by $ 400 million between the years ending March 1961 and March
1962. The surplus began to decline in the autumn of 1961.
The slowness of the trade balance to respond to the revaluation resulted apparently
from low short-term price elasticities. The price behaviour of both exporters and suppliers
of imports was such that the small volume effects of revaluation were outweighed by
a sharp improvement in the terms of trade. This improvement amounted to almost
3 per cent in the first six months after the change of parity, and resulted in a rise in the
trade surplus at a $ 3 millilon annual rate. During the following six months, the terms
of trade improved much more slowly and the trade balance deteriorated at an annual
neat of Si billion.
41
OECD Economic Surveys
For the balance of goods and services this would imply a surplus for
the year as a whole of some 2 $ per cent of GNP, higher than the level
envisaged in the medium-term projection.
The long term capital outflow seems likely to decline in 1969.
About
half the extraordinarily high private long-term capital outflow during
1968 consisted of lending and portfolio investment abroad by the banks
in response to the strong increase in long- and medium-term deposits
which mainly emanated from the enterprise sector.
This, in turn, reflected
the high internal cash flow of the enterprise sector.
With the rise in profits
likely to slow down appreciably and investment expenditure continuing
to grow strongly, the financial deficit of the enterprise sector may rise to
a more normal size in 1969, in which case the strong increase in long-
and medium-term bank deposits could taper off. This, in turn, might
reduce participation of the banks in the bond market from 60-70 per cent
during 1967/68 to the 30-40 per cent level normal in previous years,
probably entailing a marked decline in the total supply of long-term capital
for investment in bonds.
Table 12
Financial surplus (deficit) of the principal economic sectors
DM billion, current prices
1966
Private households
31.6
1967
1968
30.7
Government
34.6
1969»
35_
3
Enterprises1 (excl. dwelling)
Dwelling1
Foreign sector
1
Secrétariat Estimate.
2
Secretariat Forecast.
1.4
6i
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, OECD.
Thus, a demand gap of considerable magnitude could develop in the bond
market in 1969, with upward pressure on German rates.
At present, the
rate differentials between comparable loans in the German and other markets
seem large enough to offset borrowers' expectations of a possible German
revaluation.
If this differential should narrow, the prospect of maintaining
a large outflow of portfolio capital would become uncertain.
Nevertheless,
given the high level of long term capital exports during the first months
of 1969, the outflow for the year as a whole should be sufficiently high to
offset the current account surplus envisaged.
42
Germany
The balance of payments outlook raises important policy issues.
With
regard to the current account, a large surplus seems likely to remain in 1969.
This might suggest that Germany should aim at an even stronger rise in
domestic demand than the rate which now appears likely.
If the inflationary
risk involved in such a policy were deemed too big there would seem to
be some difficulty in reconciling the policy objectives in respect of price
stability on the one hand and the balance of payments on the other.
It is
understandable that Germany attaches great importance to the maintenance
of a high degree of price stability, given her experiences of extreme infla¬
tionary conditions.
But weight has also to be given to international
considerations.
If further restrictive measures to prevent domestic demand from
rising faster than consistent with reasonable price stability should be neces¬
sary, it is important that fiscal rather than monetary weapons should be
used.
Fiscal policy has been operated in a flexible manner for demand
management purposes in the last two years, suggesting that quick changes
could be made if need be.
It is desirable that monetary policy should as
far as possible be geared to the needs of the balance of payments, main¬
taining conditions conducive to long-term capital exports on a scale suffi¬
cient to match the current account surplus.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Economic policy, helped importantly by the strong rise in world trade,
has achieved a quick recovery of domestic demand.
The budget has been
actively used as an instrument of demand management policy, and the
expansion has been supported by easy monetary conditions.
The weight
so far given to international considerations in the formulation of monetary
policy is particularly important as it has enabled the large surplus on current
account to be matched by a long-term capital outflow.
But the large current external surplus which seems likely to remain,
despite the recovery of domestic demand and the border tax adjustments,
creates problems both from the domestic and the international points of
view.
Its persistence reduces the scope for higher domestic demand and
increases the danger of inflationary pressures.
Moreover, even if matched
by a long-term capital outflow, it impedes the restoration of better pattern
of current accounts in the world as a whole.
There may not be much scope for reducing the current account surplus
of the balance of payments by permitting a faster growth of domestic demand
43
OECD Economic Surveys
than at present envisaged without some sacrifice of price stability at which
the Government aims.
Policy in the future might, therefore, have to seek
some solution to a conflict between internal and external aims without
too great a sacrifice of either.
Policy decisions will have to be guided by
the course of domestic developments, and the trend on trade and current
invisible transactions, between now and the period when the temporary
measures to restrain exports and encourage imports expire.
But it is al¬
ready clear that, if domestic developments begin to call for some further
tightening of policies in the interest of price stability it would be appropriate
that this should take the form of fiscal rather than monetary measures.
A tightening of monetary policy which produced too sharp a reduction or
even a reversal of the capital outflow would be largely self defeating from
an internal point of view.
And its effects on the balance of payments would
risk entailing a serious policy dilemma.
44
ANNEX
LU
CD
<
û.
<
Où
Annex 1
COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION AND LIST OF COUNTRIES USED
IN EXPORT STUDY OF 121
MARKETS
Commodity Classification
1
Food and Drink
Food, beverages, tobacco, feeding-stuffs, animal and vegetable oils,
oilseeds, etc. (SITC 0, 11, 12, 22, 4).
2
Machinery and Equipment
Finished structural parts; metal containers for storage and transport;
tools; non-electric machinery (except domestic appliances); electric power
machinery and switchgear; equipment for distributing electricity; telecom¬
munications
equipment;
transport
equipment
(excluding
road
motor
vehicles); electrical equipment for medical purposes, radiological appli¬
ances; meters and counters; measuring, controlling and scientific instru¬
ments; (SITC 691, 692, 695, 71 ( 722, 723, 724.9, 731, 726, 861.7,
861.8, 861.9)).
3
Household Machinery
Television and radio receivers; domestic electrical equipment; domestic
appliances, non-electrical (SITC 724.1), 724.2, 725, 719.4).
4
Iron and Steel
(SITC 67.)
5
Road motor vehicles
(SITC 732.)
6
Aircraft, ships and boats
(SITC 734, 735.)
7
Other crude materials
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (but not including oilseeds, etc.);
non ferrous metals. (SITC 2(22), 68.)
47
OECD Economic Surveys
8
Mineral Fuels
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC 3).
9
Chemicals
(SITC 5.)
10
Other Basic Manufactures
Leather manufactures; rubber manufactures, wood and cork manu¬
factures; paper and board; textiles; non-metallic mineral manufactures;
wire products; nails screws, etc.; cutlery; household equipment of base
metals; manufactures of metal n.e.s. (SITC 6 (
-*95)).
11
Other Manufactures
Road vehicles other than motor vehicles; miscellaneous manufactures
(excluding medical
instruments;
controlling instruments).
meters
and counters;
measuring
and
(SITC 733, 8(861.7,
Country Classification
France
Switzerland
North America
Italy
Austria
Other OECD
Belgium /Luxembourg
Other EFTA
Developed non-OECD
Netherlands
Less
developed
OECD
48
non-
Annex 2
GERMAN EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Paragraphs 28-32 of the main text contain summary results of German
export performance in recent years.
The criterion for performance adopted
was growth of exports by OECD countries as a whole since this was consi¬
dered more relevant to the German case than exports of a wider group of
countries which would include primary producers.
assessing performance were discussed
Two methods
of
one based on 15 geographical
markets1, the other more detailed method based on 121 country /commodity
markets.
Both methods assumed that normal performance be for Ger¬
many to hold in a given year the market share which it had achieved in the
previous year.
In the case of the analysis by country /commodity markets, there are
certain interesting features of performance in individual markets which
do not appear in the summary results.
are discussed below.
Some of these more detailed results
First, however, some further description of the 121
market method used is needed.
An important assumption underlying the method was that retention
of a market share would constitute a neutral performance, whereas an
increase in market share would indicate an improvement in competitiveness
and a loss the reverse.
One may expect results obtained with such methods
to improve as the number of markets is increased.
Above a certain point,
an increase in the number of markets taken produces rapidly diminishing
returns, however, and it did not appear worthwhile further to subdivide
markets since at this level of detail few markets much larger than 1 per
1
Each OECD country; other OECD countries aggregated into three groups;
primary producing countries aggregated into four groups; the Sino Soviet Bloc.
49
OECD Economic Surveys
cent of German exports remain.
The 121 markets reflect the 1967 pattern
of German exports in the following way:
Size of markets as
Number of
% of 1967 German
Markets
Export
in range
0.0-1.0
93
1.1-2.0
17
2.1-3.0
5
3.1-4.0
4
4.1-5.0
2
5.1-6.0
_1
121
Those markets greater than 2 per cent of German exports are for the
most part those for machinery and equipment.
Since this is rather a hetero¬
geneous grouping, results obtained in this case are likely to be somewhat
less significant than those obtained for other groupings.
The main results are shown in Diagrams (a)-(e).
grouped geographically.
These have been
The information could, of course have been
organised equally well on the basis of commodity groups subdivised geo¬
graphically.
In examining Diagrams (a)-(e), it is important to bear in mind that,
except in the case of North America and non-OECD, the data are summary
For the sake of simplicity, only the six largest of the commodity groups
are shown in the diagrams.
Others are discussed in the text where they are
important in a particular geographical market.
EEC
In this case performance overall (see Diagram 12, page 32) was influen¬
ced heavily by integration effects.
Germany's gain in market share1 over
the period was about 1 per cent of total OECD exports to this area.
The
fact that the performance indicator was consistently positive over the
period while the gain in market share overall was modest reflects the fact
that good results were achieved in spite of a slightly unfavourable commo¬
dity pattern of exports in this market.
The important element here was
mineral fuels2) where Germany's share of the EEC market fell from 46 per
1
Excluding its own imports.
2 For the sake of consistency with other geographical areas, this is not shown
separately in Diagram (a) although it amounted to more than 10 per cent of German
exports to the EEC in 1962.
50
Germany
cent in 1962 to 41 per cent in 1967. The period of poor performance
was, however, brief, and the combination of once-for-all loss of coal exports,
an increase in oil-refining capacity and the 1966/67 recession produced a
positive performance indicator towards the end of the period which is
reflected in the overall indicator.
Elsewhere performance indicators reflect the influence of the conjunc¬
ture on several of the main commodity groups.
The effect on machinery
and equipment, chemicals, and iron and steel is clear. Road motor vehicles
exports behave rather perversely, however, with a positive performance in
1964 (3.5 percentage points of the EEC market more than expected). After
1964, the performance of German motor vehicle exports in the EEC market
deteriorated rapidly, in spite of slackening pressure on domestic resources.
EFTA
Performance in EFTA (Diagram (b)) was in striking contrast to that
in the EEC.
As was seen in Diagram 12 on page 32, in no year was the
overall performance indicator positive.
There were, in fact, only two
commodity categories in which performance yielded a positive index.
These were " food " (not shown in Diagram (_>)) and " other crude mate¬
rials ".
In all other categories, performance was negative.
This holds,
too, for individual EFTA countries where performance was again uni¬
formly poor in the four main markets
and the United Kingdom.
Switzerland, Austria, Scandinavia
Even with intra-EFTA trade eliminated from
the analysis, performance in the EFTA countries was below " expectation ",
especially in machinery and equipment, and motor vehicles.
The lost
shares went mainly to other EEC countries, North America and Japan.
Germany was, of course, rather vulnerable in EFTA because of its large
share in EFTA markets for several important commodities at the beginning
of the period, but the negative indicator of performances in most product
groups for most years is nevertheless striking.
It reflects loss of markets
to a wide range of competitors, notably other EEC countries, Japan and
North America.
North America
The commodity structure of Germany's exports to the United States
(see diagram (c)) has some striking features.
About one third of Germany's
exports to the area are motor cars; exports of mineral fuels are negligible;
and machinery and equipment exports, which constitute about one third
of Germany's exports overall, are in this case only one quarter or so of the
total.
Taken together, however, exports of motor behicles and machinery
and equipment to North America constitute almost 60 per cent of German
51
OECD Economic Surveys
exports to the area.
For this reason, it is important to take account of
the effect of the Ottawa Agreement on intra-North American trade.
This
agreement, which came into force in 1965, was designed to increase trade in
vehicles and parts between Canada and the USA and to aid rationalisa¬
tion of the structure of the motor industry in the two countries.
The Agree¬
ment and related undertakings by motor manufacturers produced annual
trade in both directions which was by 1967 about $ 2 billion annually
higher than would have been the case without these special arrangements.
The sheer size of this trade renders some correction essential, and this
has been attempted.
There is, however, necessarily some element of
arbitrariness both about the way in which the overall level of the trade is
calculated and its allocation between SITC categories.
For this reason,
among others, uncorrected as welle as corrected indicators have been shown
in the two commodity groups affected by the Agreement.
Even in spite of corrections for the Agreement, however, Germany's
performance in exporting motor vehicles to this market has been disappoin¬
ting.
The loss of market shares to competitors has developed over the
period at an accelerating pace, and unlike other major export categories,
the recession in domestic demand induced no recovery.
In most other commodity categories, German performance in the
North American market reflected the medium-term effects of the DM reva¬
luation of 1961 and cyclical developments in the German economy, with
negative or a neutral performance in the first part of the period and positive
performances in the second part as the economy went into recession.
The
most striking performance was that in iron and steel, strongly influenced
by fluctuations in domestic demand, but gains in machinery and equipment
are probably of greater significance since they reflect a positive performance
over a wide range of products on a steady upward trend relatively undis¬
turbed by special influences.
Other OECD and Developed non-OECD
In Diagram 12 on page 32, it will be seen that German performance
in this somewhat heterogeneous market was negative at the beginning of
the period when the medium-term effects of the DM revaluation were
important factors, but improved strongly as the recession developed.
Of
special interest is iron and steel which showed very large negative and
positive swings over the period (Germany's share in this market fell from
29,2 per cent in 1962 ro 19.3 per cent in 1963, but rose from 19.2 per cent
in 1966 to 26.9 per cent in 1967). Among, other commodity groups, che¬
micals and other manufactures showed a clear cyclical pattern, but the
very important machinery and equipment group moved rather irregularly.
52
Germany
Less Developed Non-OECD
This market (Diagram (e)) was influenced by the factors which were
important in varying degrees in the other geographical areas
the medium-
term effects of the revaluation at the beginning of the period and the effect
of the recession later.
The effect of the recession was most marked in the
case of chemicals and iron and steel, whereas medium-term revaluation
effects were more important for road vehicles and machinery and equip¬
ment.
Conclusions
The various detailed conclusions on German exports described in the
text and in the Annex may now be drawn together:
(a)
Overall, both methods showed a performance which was negative
in 1963 and 1964 but positive from 1965 onwards, reflecting cyclical influ¬
ences and the medium-term effects of the 1961 revaluation;
(Z>)
The country method yields in each year a performance slightly
better then the country /commodity approach.
Broadly the differences in
results appear to reflect a country /commodity pattern of German exports
slightly more favourable than the country pattern taken alone;
(c)
The development of individual country /commodity markets as
shown by the 121 market method to have been strongly influenced by two
main factors:
(i)
The medium-term effects of the 1961 revaluation;
(if)
Domestic cyclical influences on exports.
The two factors varied greatly in their impact, however, although within
commodity groups a similar pattern often occurred in different geogra¬
phical markets.
In many cases, the separate influence of one or other of
these factors appears to be clearly identifiable.
(d)
In both methods, aggregate differences between " expected "
values and actual values were relatively small, suggesting that over a very
wide range of markets, German export performance was close to that of
OECD countries as a whole, i.e. Germany shared in the growth of markets
but with gains in market shares more or less balanced by losses.
53
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram a German Performance in EEC1
compared to OECD total 1962-1967
Actual German Market Share less " Expected " Market Share 1962-67
Certain important Commodity Groups
e
Germany'* Morktl Shore in 1962
Market ai 1.
Germany'* Market Shore -in 1967
of all German Export» In 1967
%
Machinery, equipment
3 w
Basic manufactures
39.4 \
0
Chemicals
3
/ ._>
.
0
.
10.9
-2
_____
%
i_
4.0
J -21
Road vehicles
%
4
I_
J-2|__J
I
I
L
Iron and steel
Other raanufaclures
4
<4-jN
3.3
3.4
-3 LI
1
L
-J-3L
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
1.
-3_-__J_
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
J
I_
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Not including exports to Germany.
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from the zero line measure summary results for single years and
cannot be cumulated.
54
Germany
Diagram b
German Perfonnance in EFTA
compared to OECD total 1962-1967
Actual German Market Share less " Expected " Market Share
Certain important Commodity Groups
B Germany's Market Short in 1962
Market ao V.
of all German Export* In 1967
Germany's Market Share in 1967
'
Chemicals
Machinery, Equipment
2
Basic manufactures
2
ZsIoN
/îi3y
&
. \2l0j
0
0
l__]
-3 _.__
I
I
I
I
l-3l__
_1
1_
___I-3_._I
1_
J
I
I
Iron and sieel
Road vehicles
Other manufactures
I
4
1.2
-4 -.
I
1962 1963 1964
I
I
I
1965 1966 1967
1-41
L
_1
1962 1963 1964
1965 1966
I
I-4L
1967
1962
L
1S63 1964
J
1965 1966
I
1967
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from the zero line measure summary results for single years
and cannot be cumulated.
55
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram c German Perfonnance in North America
compared to OECD total 1962-1967
Actual German Market Share less " Expected " Market Share
*
Germany'* Market Shore in 1962
I
i
Germany'* Market Shore -in 1967
\
|
Road vehicles
Market as % of oil
German Exports in 1967
Iron arid steel
Machinery, equipment
4
9.2
9.2
9.9
12.1
2.5
-6 _.J
l_
-1
I
Other manufactures
»
l~EI___J
%
V7.8
I
I
I
I
1.0
1-6-.I
I
Basic manufactures
-
I
I
__
Chemicals
\5.'
0 .
0.6
J
1S62 1S63 196.
1
1965
l
1966 1967
1-2 1
I
1962 1963
I
l
19C4
l
1965 1966
l
i
1967
1962 1963 1964
i
1965
1965
1967
Excluding Ottawa Agreement Trade.
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from the zero line measure summary results for single years
and cannot be cumulated.
56
Germany
Diagram d
German Performance in other OECD and developed non-OECD
compared to OECD total 1962-1967
Actual German Market Share less " Expected " Market Share
Certain important Commodity Groups
Market as % of oil
e .Germany's Morktt Shore In 1962
Gtrman Exports In 1967
Germany's Market Short in 1967
%
Chemicals
Kachinery, equipment
2.5
6.2
-3 I
«
-
"
'-?_.
Basic manufactures
"
3
Iron and steel
I
I
I
I
Road vehicles
o
3
-2b
V-9.9
0
-3 L«
I
I
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
___
I-3U
.
-I
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
0.8
-1
I
I
1962
I
I
I
I
I
I
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from the zero line measure summary results for single years
and cannot be cumulated.
57
OECD Economic Surveys
Diagram e
German Performance in less developed non-OECD
compared to OECD total 1962-1967
Actual German Market Share less " Expected " Market Share
Certain important Commodity Groups
e
Germany's Morktt Short In 1962
D
Germany's Morktt Short m 1967
%
Morktt at % of oil
German Exports in 1967
%
Chemicals
Machinery, equipment
Road vehicles
2
2_
.7.-A
» V.14.9
0
\U.O
0 .
.
B
___]
-2 I
L
%
J
l_
J -2 1
L.
-I
I-2L-L
%
Basic manufactures
%
Iron and steel
4
_l
L
j
i
Other manufactures
4
fp
0
-3 L
1962
I
I
1963
I
1964
1
1965
1
1966 1967
l-3L_l
1962 1963
I
I
1964 1965
1
I
1966
I-3LI
1967
1962
I
I
I
1963 1964 1965 1966
'
1967
Source: OECD.
Note
Deviations from the zero line measure summary results for single years
and cannot be cumulated.
58
STATISTICAL ANNEX
LU
CD
<
û.
<
Où
Table A
Gross National Product
DM billion
Current
1954
prices
prices
1967
1968
206.5
207.7
215.1
46.0
47.6
47.2
85.2
85.4
79.1
85.9
58.0
48.7
47.4
43.5
47.7
63.9
36.5
38.0
35.6
38.2
8.2
8.2
1.8
125.9
83.2
92.1
100.9
116.6
1965
1966
1967
1968
1965
1966
255.7
274.9
281.4
297.3
199.5
69.7
75.5
80.6
82.9
45.6
118.9
121.9
110.4
121.9
Machinery and equipment
58.2
57.6
52.2
Construction
60.7
64.3
58.2
9.0
2.0
91.4
103.0
Expenditure:
Private consumption
Public consumption
Gross fixed asset formation
Change in stocks
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
Gross national product at market prices
111.5
7.2
92.0
96.5
95.3
107.4
96.0
98.6
98.2
114.2
452.7
480.8
485.1
528.8
325.7
333.3
334.1
357.5
Origin :
Agriculture, forestry, fishing
Industry, building, energy, water
Trade, transport, communications
20.1
20.3
20.9
20.7
16.8
16.7
18.4
19.0
238.9
248.3
242.2
270.6
187.5
191.2
188.0
205.2
88.4
93.9
95.1
101.7
62.5
63.5
63.9
67.4
Other services
106.5
119.1
127.9
138.6
60.0
62.7
64.9
66.5
Gross domestic product at market prices
453.8
481.6
486.0
529.0
326.8
334.2
335.1
358.0
Source: Statisti-Ches Bundesamt and OECD Statistical Questionnaire.
Note
Figures may not add up due to rounding, and, in 1968, the changeover from turnover Fax to TVA.
Table B
Distribution of National Income
DM billion, current prices
Compensation of employees
Wages and salaries
Employers' social security contributions
Interest, rent, dividends paid to households1
Savings of corporations
Direct taxes on corporations
Government income from property and entrepreneurship
Less:
Interest on public debt
National income at factor cost
1
Net of interest on consumers* debt.
Source:
Note
Statistisches Bundesamt.
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
1965
1966
225.8
202.7
23.1
97.6
1967
1968
243.0
243.4
261.0
217.5
217.5
232.3
25.5
25.9
28.7
100.1
100.0
5.1
5.2
3.2
11.2
10.8
10.5
8.4
9.2
9.3
2.7
3.5
4.5
345.4
364.8
363.7
402.5
Table C
Employment and Labour Market
Thousands
1967
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
I
11
HI
IV
I
11
IV
III
Labour force
27 300
27 243
26 751
26 665
26 893
26 720
26 679
26 714
26 585
26 511
26 763
Employment, total
27 153
27 082
26 292
26 342
26 303
26 237
26 310
26 318
26000
26198
26 585
26 034
25 838
25 278
25 323
25 248
25 213
25 319
25 332
25 049
25 183
Foreign nationals1
1 119
1244
1014
1019
1055
1024
991
986
951
1015
Self-employed, and family workers
Wage and salary earners
5 312
5 212
5 112
5 012
5 138
5 122
5102
5 086
5 026
5 018
5 002
21841
21870
21 180
21 330
21 165
21 115
21208
21 232
20 974
21 180
21583
9 629
9 568
8 932
9 054
8 945
8 920
8 949
8 912
8 794
8 969
9 158
1804
1 771
1 670
1 682
1 673
1 671
1 675
1 661
1 643
1 673
1 701
1710
3 629
3 617
3 385
3 466
3 449
3 373
3 359
3 361
3 380
3 414
3 495
3 577
2 032
2 040
1902
1908
1949
1 899
1 880
1 882
1 878
1886
1916
1952
520
521
507
505
501
500
515
511
496
497
513
516
1 643
1619
1467
1492
1 372
1477
1520
1498
1397
1499
1533
1540
11916
11565
10441
10 826
2 640
2 582
2 546
2 673
2640
2 582
2 546
2 673
2 800
2 793
2 475
2 475
497
671
695
612
456
678
703
638
16
143
10
279
188
65
39
30
10
1
1
147
161
459
323
386
584
578
462
350
349
302
231
649
540
302
488
294
296
303
319
380
474
533
614
German nationals
Wage and salary earners in manufac
turing and building
of which :
Basic materials
Investment goods
o\
Consumer goods
w
Food, drink, tobacco
Building, construction
Hours worked in manufacturing (million)
Hours worked in building (million)
Short-time workers
Unemployment, seasonally adjusted
Vacancies, seasonnally adjusted
1
Quarterly figures relate to end of quarter, annual figures are averages of end of quarters.
Source: Statistisches Buodesamt, Main Economic Indicators, OECD.
25 530
1090
1020
9 296
Table D
Industrial Production, New Orders and Deliveries
Seasonally adjusted.
Indices
1967
Base
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
year
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
135.8
Production:
Industry, excl. building
Mining and quarrying
Capital goods
114.4
116.3
113.8
127.7
111.1
110.4
114.0
119.8
119.0
126.1
129.5
98.6
94.3
88.6
92.0
89.0
88.4
88.2
89.0
91.3
92.1
90.7
94.1
114.9
114.4
106.4
120.0
103.9
102.4
106.4
113.9
109.2
118.1
122.5
129.4
Consumer goods1
113.4
116.2
111.1
128.3
101.8
105.5
112.7
117.5
117.5
128.3
129.3
138.1
Materials
119.7
123.9
127.2
145.4
123.6
125.2
126.6
133.6
136.3
143.1
147.5
154.6
114.8
119.4
111.0
117.8
85.3
121.6
122.5
114.1
81.5
137.9
128.9
122.8
1963
Building, not seasonally adjusted
New orders in manufacturing1:
Total manufacturing, all markets
£
1954
263
263
261
298
244
249
257
278
276
288
306
320
domestic
248
240
232
262
215
219
230
249
244
254
266
282
foreign
340
385
420
487
393
417
410
428
447
470
512
527
336
333
328
386
288
314
317
363
352
368
405
410
Capital goods, all markets
domestic
321
302
288
336
248
273
282
330
299
320
350
361
foreign
377
427
455
541
419
451
431
463
505
523
570
580
Consumer goods, all markets
210
206
202
223
195
194
204
204
205
229
229
241
domestic
208
202
195
215
190
186
199
198
199
220
220
229
foreign
240
268
293
343
267
298
292
300
294
337
371
378
260
270
253
277
252
251
257
278
257
272
280
297
247
251
224
243
228
224
230
249
227
241
244
259
327
371
420
456
383
394
410
428
414
439
470
502
328
343
314
344
306
311
317
363
309
338
358
371
domestic
317
321
275
297
273
278
282
330
263
295
305
323
foreign
356
407
453
493
413
408
431
463
443
478
522
529
194
204
204
203
216
215
230
Deliveries by manufacturing1
Total manufacturing, all markets
domestic
foreign
Capital goods, all markets
Consumer goods1, all markets
1
210
216
194
216
208
domestic
208
213
188
207
202
188
199
198
197
208
207
217
foreign
233
265
290
341
275
279
292
300
303
323
340
396
Excluding food, drink and tobacco.
Source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD, IFO Schnclldien-t.
Table E
Wages and Prices
Indices
1965
1966
1967
1968
year
Earnings and productivity in manufac
turing:
Hourly wage rates
Hourly gross earnings
Wage and salary earnings per hour
1962
worked
Output per hour worked
Labour cost per unit of output
Agricultural producer prices
.
.
1961/63
Vegetable products
<_.
Animal products
Industrial producer prices, home market
sales
1962
of which:
Capital goods
Consumer goods1
Cost of dwelling construction2
Export prices, industrial goods
of which: Capital goods
Consumer goods1
Import prices, industrial goods
of which: Capital goods
Consumer goods1
The cost of living
Food drink, tobacco
Non-food
of which:
1
2
Rent
.
.
.
1968
1967
Base
III
IV
I
II
137.6
137.9
138.6
139.4
143.7
145.9
141.5
142.7
142.9
143.3
145.8
150.6
I
II
136.9
140.2
HI
IV
146.3
121.8
130.9
137.8
127.3
136.7
141.8
131.0
142.9
150.7
158.9
142.5
150.9
155.2
154.5
146.4
159.8
164.8
165.2
119.6
123.9
131.3
142.0
122.0
130.8
132.5
139.6
132.6
141.4
144.9
148.8
109.5
115.3
114.8
111.9
116.8
115.4
117.1
110.7
110.4
113.0
113.7
111.0
112.3
113.4
105.1
99.8
109.3
106.2
103.1
101.7
98.7
97.3
99.5
103.6
104.5
106.0
94.3
85.5
101.3
104.0
90.7
81.1
85.8
87.8
82.1
86.3
114.9
115.4
108.6
104.5
111.9
106.9
107.2
108.5
103.0
100.5
105.3
109.4
104.0
105.8
104.9
109.1
105.5
104.7
104.6
104.7
109.0
108.3
109.3
109.7
105.9
108.6
108.3
113.2
108.8
108.5
108.1
108.0
112.1
112.2
113.9
114.4
104.4
106.7
107.3
111.4
107.4
107.0
107.5
107.4
111.1
110.6
111.7
112.3
114.6
118.5
115.9
120.8
117.3
116.0
115.5
114.8
119.9
119.9
121.5
104.6
106.8
106.9
106.0
107.2
107.0
106.8
106.8
105.9
105.7
105.8
106.5
106.6
109.7
110.9
110.4
111.0
110.9
110.9
110.8
110.1
110.0
110.2
111.2
104.8
108.4
110.0
109.6
110.0
110.1
110.2
109.1
109.1
109.4
104.3
107.0
105.4
105.9
105.1
103.6
105.7
107.2
107.3
105.2
105.1
106.0
106.0
109.0
107.7
108.1
108.3
107.2
107.3
107.8
108.6
108.0
107.9
107.9
97.0
99.0
101.9
98.6
99.1
104.6
105.3
104.7
101.0
101.3
109.0
112.8
114.4
116.1
114.2
114.8
114.5
114.1
115.7
115.9
115.9
109.0
112.0
112.0
111.1
112.2
115.3
112.0
110.6
111.4
111.4
110.2
111.2
108.9
113.4
116.3
120.0
115.7
115.9
116.5
116.9
119.0
119.4
120.4
121.2
118.5
129.7
138.2
148.4
135.8
137.8
139.2
140.2
143.9
147.3
149.9
152.6
143.8
Excluding food, drink and tobacco.
Data relate to the end of February, May, August and November.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
116.9
Table F
Money and Banking
DM million, end of period
1967
1964
1965
1966
I
II
1968
III
IV
I
II
'
in
iv
Money circulation and official foreign re
serves (DM million) :
Note and coin circulation
29 545
31453
32 906
32458
33 349
33 375
33 829
33 590
34 725
34 484
34 943
Sight deposits of German non-banks
Bundesbank gold and freely usable
foreign assets
48 343
50 997
50 816
48 475
50 443
52 830
58 490
54 605
57 927
61077
64247
27 883
25 415
27 090
27 042
26 812
27 237
27 405
28 124
26 936
27 836
30 031
16 992
17 639
17 167
17175
17169
17135
16 910
15 888
17 249
17 824
18 156
237 898
269 972
296 156
298 245
304478
309 820
320 656
326 135
337 456
39 839
46 612
53 269
55 597
57 034
58 195
61 139
64 333
66 303
198 059
223 360
242 887
242 648
247 444
251 625
259 517
261 802
271 153
Short-term
60 697
67 731
72 811
70 824
72 745
73 302
75 366
74 504
78 143
79 623
82 888
Medium-term
23 418
27 628
32 933
32 975
33 740
33 525
34 573
34 493
36103
36121
36 541
Long-term
153 783
174 613
190 412
194 446
197 993
202 993
210 716
217 138
223 210
232 123 240 645
Deposits, total
166419
187 475
208 896
210 845
217 061
222 066
240 884
242 493
250 751
258 077 279 241
22 330
22 347
23 801
24 159
24 543
25 343
26 789
26 042
27 909
144 089
165 128
185 095
186 686
192 518
196 723
214 095
216 451
222 842
46 272
50150
49 883
46 402
48 797
50 209
57 558
51 132
54 575
56159
62 385
25 935
26 647
31901
33126
34117
34 909
38 655
40 941
43 020
45 285
51425
94 212
10 678
127 112
131 317
134 147
136 948
144 672
150 419
153 157
3 991
3 214
4 244
7 088
6 884
9189
11 193
12 969
13 066
13 763
3 287
3 634
3 517
5 492
6 848
7 475
7 483
8 886
7646
9 083
7 278
6 848
7 761
12 580
13 732
16 664
18 676
21855
20 712
22 846
3 450
5 488
6 280
5 511
7 255
5 903
5 679
5 419
5 851
6 293
3 828
1360
1481
7 069
6477
10 761
12 997
16 436
14 861
16 553
Bank rate
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
Day-to-day money3
Bonds of publics authorities4
3.9
4.9
6.8
4.3
3.8
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.7
1.8
6.4
7.7
8.1
7.4
7.1
7.0
7.1
6.9
6.7
6.5
6.5
of which :
gold
Banks'lending to and deposits from nonbanks (DM million) :
Lending, total
Public authorities
Other non-banks
ON
Public authorities
Other non-banks
Sight deposits
Time deposits
Savings deposits
Bank liquidity (DM million) :
Domestic liquid assets1
Foreign liquid assets9
Total liquid holdings
less:
recourse
to
347 867 360 074
69 474
71052
278 393 289 022
28 871
29 778
229 206 249 463
156 633 165 432
14 035
9 500»
23 535"
Bundesbank
credit
Net liquid holdings
6 104
17 431"
Interest rates (per cent) :
1
Domestic treasury bills and non-interest bearing treasury bonds, storage agency bills and prime bankers' acceptances.
2
3
Short-term balances with foreign banks and foreign money market paper.
Unweighted monthly averages, until 1966 averages of extremes during last week of period.
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
3.0
e) Estimated
pe) Partly estimated.
p) Provisional.
Table G
Merchandise Trade by Area
DM million, monthly averages
OECD countries
Third Countries
Middle
Total
Total
EEC
EFTA
North
Other
America
Europe1
Africa
and South
Australia
Asia
America
and
Oceania
Eastern
Bloc
Imports cif
1964
4 903
3 512
1699
891
737
185
85
369
349
326
54
1965
5 871
4 297
2 221
1011
842
223
99
428
396
343
57
243
1966
6 056
4 381
2 315
996
839
231
104
481
391
371
57
263
1967
5 849
4 223
2 303
916
792
212
90
481
370
376
51
251
I
5 482
3 918
2163
859
691
205
91
483
343
377
45
217
II
5 820
4 257
2 302
890
894
171
81
465
391
346
44
229
III
5 631
4 013
2 214
856
753
190
87
413
412
391
56
252
IV
6 461
4 702
2 533
1059
829
281
100
563
333
389
60
307
6 765
4 925
2 788
1055
831
251
111
574
372
431
60
284
I
6 331
4 538
2 519
1017
758
244
92
576
370
433
50
265
II
6 472
4 687
2 611
1013
852
211
106
559
384
428
52
249
III
6 840
5 013
2 875
1046
870
222
116
560
359
422
77
285
IV
7 417
5 464
3 146
1 146
844
328
132
600
376
439
60
338
1968
OS
201
Exports cif
1964
5 410
4173
1969
1474
450
280
126
250
259
331
59
193
1965
5 971
4 572
2 102
1612
543
315
145
271
279
395
67
223
1966
6 719
5 179
2440
1692
675
372
158
272
322
423
68
276
1967
7 254
5 552
2 667
1719
732
414
185
304
342
429
76
365
I
6 926
5 263
2 563
1654
648
398
173
308
312
436
65
349
11
7 300
5 595
2 726
1752
689
428
193
302
334
404
75
378
III
6 896
5 223
2 490
1631
706
396
181
281
360
388
85
356
IV
7 893
6 048
2 889
1838
886
435
194
325
363
486
78
376
8 296
6 426
3 114
1882
995
435
194
339
373
478
87
376
I
7 779
6 015
2 893
1738
951
433
164
312
350
486
74
356
II
7 615
5 927
2 858
1727
944
398
186
307
342
435
75
320
III
8 224
6 324
3 039
1835
1023
427
193
346
379
483
99
376
IV
9 566
7 439
3 666
2 229
1063
481
234
389
420
508
102
453
1968
1
Excluding Eastern Bloc countries.
Source: Sutistlsches Bundesamt.
Table H
Merchandise Trade by Commodity^Groups
DM million, monthly averages
1967
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
II
III
IV
II
III
IV
Imports cif
Products of agriculture, forestry
and fishing1
1 161
1 182
1095
1 107
1016
1 131
1050
1 181
1054
1 104
1066
1203
Basic materials and semi-finished
2140
2 203
2 254
2 800
2 053
2132
2 270
2 560
2 660
2 672
2 856
3 013
Manufactured foods and tobacco1
520
550
527
584
517
506
487
596
542
533
572
690
Other consumer manufactures1
746
808
688
863
728
634
671
721
799
751
908
994
Investment goods1
924
1024
1004
1 174
975
1055
851
1 135
1088
1 164
1144
1300
Other imports1
380
289
281
237
193
362
302
268
190
249
293
216
5 871
6 056
5 849
6 765
5 482
5 820
5 631
6 461
6 331
6 472
6840
7 417
goods1
oo
Total
Exports fob
Products of agriculture, forestry
and fishing
65
65
73
82
77
68
62
84
84
71
74
101
2 820
Basic materials and semi-finished
1 844
2 076
2 293
2 571
2 209
2 310
2 187
2 467
2 492
2 373
2 597
Manufactured foods and tobacco
125
129
164
198
147
170
154
185
177
188
209
219
Other consumer manufactures
603
682
736
855
696
712
742
794
769
753
888
1008
3 240
3 655
3 870
4 461
3 685
3 918
3 635
4 240
4134
4112
4 323
5 275
94
112
118
128
112
122
116
123
122
115
134
143
5 971
6 719
7 254
8 296
6 926
7 300
6 896
7 893
7 779
7 615
8 224
9 566
goods
Investment goods
Other exports
Total
1
1968 provisional.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Table I
The Balance of Payments
$ million
1965
Trade balance
Exports fob
Imports fob
Merchandise transactions abroad
Services, net
Foreign travel, net
Transportation, net
Investment income, net
Receipts from foreign troops
Other services, net
Transfers, net
1966
1967
1968»
1300
2 956
5 252
17 908
20139
21736
24 856*
16 646
17 233
16 576
19151
38
50
91
21
5 726
-669
453
1031
1224
-^46
234
1309
1091
1323
Official, net
Private, net
Of which : foreign worker remittances
Current balance
119
Long-term capital, net1
Official, net1
Private, net
Foreign investment in Germany, net
Portfolio investment, net
Direct investment
Loans and credits, net
Other, net
German investment abroad, net
Portfolio investment, net
242
2464
2 877
864
67
562
443
^M6
501
1064
1096
414
445
822
860
699
381
246
352
4
25
95
946
Direct investment
Loans and credits, net
Other, net
186
Basic balance
Non-monetary short-term capital
472
Errors and omissions
708
Balance on non-monetary transactions
Private monetary instit. short-term capital
1692
12
450
429
149
0
508
763
1332
970
788
Assets
Liabilities
33
Balance on official settlements
618
Net IMF position
Special transactions
Miscellaneous official accounts
1
2
3
4
5
p
1758
205
463
1332
36
21
98
617
418
329
786
143
395
250
625
312
162
Other assets'1
Excluding special transactions.
Special deposits with the bank of England.
Including prepayment of pre-war government debt to BIS.
Including Roosa Bonds.
Including merchandise transactions abroad.
Preliminary.
Source:
1487
126
1152
Change in reserves (+ = increase)'1
(a) Gold
(_>) Convertible foreign exchange
(c)
297
Deutsche Bundesbank.
69
OECD SALES AGENTS
DÉPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS DE L'OCDE
ARGENTINE - ARGENTINE
JAPAN - JAPON
Editorial
Maruzen Company Ltd.,
6 Tori-Nichome Nihonbashi, TOKYO 103.
P.O.B. 5050, Tokyo International 100-31.
Sudamericana
Humberto
1°
545
S.A.,
BUENOS
AIRES
AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE
B.C.N. Agencies Pty, Ltd.,
178 Collins Street, MELBOURNE, 3000.
AUSTRIA
-
KENYA
New Era Associates
AUTRICHE
Gcrold & Co., Graben 31, WIEN 1
NAIROBI.
Sub-Agent : GRAZ : Buchhandlung Jos. A. Kienreich, Sackstrasse 6.
LEBANON - LIBAN
BELGIUM - BELGIQUE
Standaard Wetenschappelijke
Belgielei 147, ANVERS.
Redico
Immeuble Edison, Rue Bliss, B.P. 5641
Uitgeverii
BEYROUTH.
Librairie des Sciences
76-78,
Coudenberg,
LUXEMBOURG
BRUXELLES
1.
Librairie Paul Brack,
CANADA
LUXEMBOURG.
Queen's Printer - L'imprimeur de la Reine.
MALTA - MALTE
OTTAWA.
Boghandel,
22,
Grand'Rue,
Labour Book Shop, Workers' Memorial Building,
DENMARK - DANEMARK
Munksgaard
Ghale House, Government
Road, P.B. 6854.
Old Bakery Street, VALLETTA.
Ltd.,
Nôrregade
6
THE
KOBENHAVN K.
NETHERLANDS
-
PAYS-BAS
W.P. Van Stockum & Zoon,
FINLAND - FINLANDE
Buitenhof 36, DEN HAAG.
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, Keskuskatu 2,
Sub-Agents
:
AMSTERDAM
C
:
Scheltema
£
HELSINKI.
Holkema,
Rokin
74-76. ROTTERDAM:
FORMOSA - FORMOSE
De Wester Boekhandel,
Nieuwe Binnenweg 331.
Books and Scientific Supplies Services, Ltd.
NEW
P.O.B. 83, TAIPEI.
FRANCE
des
Publications
de
l'OCDE
2, rue André-Pascal, 75 PARIS-16*
Principaux sous-dépositaires :
PARIS : Presses Universitaires de France,
49, bd Saint-Michel, 5»
Sciences Politiques (Lib.), 30, rue Saint-Gu
13 AIX-EN-PROVENCE : Librairie de l'Université.
38 GRENOBLE
67
: Arthaud
STRASBOURG
ZEALAND
-
NOUVELLE-ZELANDE
Government Printing Office,
Mulgrave Street (Private Bag),
TAIWAN.
Bureau
N.V.,
:
WELLINGTON
and Government Bookshops at
AUCKLAND (P.O.B. 5344)
CHR1STCHURCH (P.O.B. 1721)
HAMILTON (P.O.B. 857)
DUNEDIN (P.O.B. 1104).
NORWAY
-
NORVEGE
AS Bokhjômet, Akersgt. 41, OSLO 1.
PAKISTAN
Berger-Levrault.
Mirza Book Agency, 65, Shahrah Quaid-E-Azam,
GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE
LAHORE 3.
Deutscher Bundes-Verlag G.m.b.H.
Postfach 9380, 53 BONN.
PORTUGAL
Livraria Portugal, Rua do Carmo 70, LISBOA.
Sub-Agents : BERLIN 62 : Elwert & Meurer.
MUNCHEN : Hueber, HAMBURG : ReuterKlôckner ; und in den massgebenden Buchhandlungen Deutschlands.
Mundi Prensa, Castellô 37, MADRID 1.
Libreria Bastinos de José Bosch, Pelayo 52,
GREECE - GRECE
BARCELONA 1.
Librairie KauiTmann,
28, rue du Stade,
ATHÈNES-132.
Librairie Internationale Jean Mihalopoulos
SWEDEN - SUEDE
33, rue Sainte-Sophie, THESSALONIKI
P.O. Box
_- Co.,
- ESPAGNE
Fritzes, Kungl. Hovbokhandel,
Fredsgatan 2, STOCKHOLM 16.
SWITZERLAND - SUISSE
ICELAND - ISLANDE
Snsebjôrn Jônsson
SPAIN
h.f.,
Hafuars_r__ti
9,
1131, REYKJAVIK.
INDIA - INDE
Librairie Payot, 6, rue Grenus, 1211 GENÈVE, 11
et
à
LAUSANNE,
NEUCHATEL,
VEVEY,
MONTREUX, BERNE, BALE, ZURICH.
International Book House Ltd.,
TURKEY - TURQUIE
9 Ash Lane, Mahatma Gandhi Road, BOMBAY 1
Librairie Hachette, 469 Istiklal Caddeai, Beyoglu,
ISTANBUL et 12 Ziya Gôkalp Caddesi, ANKARA.
Oxford Book and Stationery Co. :
NEW DELHI Scindia House.
CALCUTTA,
17 Park Street.
IRELAND - IRLANDE
UNITED KINGDOM - ROYAUME-UNI
H.M. Stationery Office, P.O. Box 569, LONDON,
Eason __ Son, 40-41 Lower O'Connell Street,
DUBLIN
ISRAEL
Emanuel Brown,
35 Allenby Road, and 48 Nahlath Benjamin St.,
Branches at : EDINBURGH, BIRMINGHAM,
BRISTOL, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF,
BELFAST.
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
TEL-AVIV.
OECD Publications Center, Suite 1305,
ITALY - ITALIE
Libreria Commissionaria Sansoni
Via Lamarmora 45, 50 121 FIRENZE.
Via P. Mercuri 19/B, 00 193 ROMA.
Sous-dépositaires :
1750 Pennsylvania Ave, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006. Tel : (202) 298-8755.
Libreria Hoepli, Via Hoepli 5, 20 121 MILANO.
Libreria Lattes, Via Garibaldi 3, 10 122 TORINO.
VENEZUELA
Libreria del Este, Avda. F. Miranda, 52,
Edificio Galipan, CARACAS.
YUGOSLAVIA
___ diffusione delle edizioni OCDE - inoltre assicu-
Jugoslovenska
rata dalle mlgliorl llbrerie nelie citrà piu important!.
BEOGRAD.
-
YOUGOSLAVIE
Knjiga,
Terazije
27,
P.O.B.
Let commandes provenant de pays où l'OCDE n'a pas encore désigné de dépositaire
peuvent être adressées à :
OCDE, Bureau des Publications, 2, Rue André-Pascal, 75 Paris (16*).
Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to
OECD, Publications Office, 2, rue Andre-Pascal. 75 Paris (16«)
36,
OECD PUBLICATIONS
2, rue André-Pascal, Paris-XVIc
No. 25.465.
1969.
PRINTED IN FRANCE
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Department of Economics and Statistics, OECD
BASIC STATISTICS
LABOUR
FORCE
STATISTICS
1956-66
{February 196S)
Price
DM
FF/SF
S
£
10.80
13.00
3.20
22s. 6d.
STATISTICS
OF HNERGY
1952-66
(February 1968)
Price
DM
FF/SF
S
£
19.20
23.00
5.80
40s.
FOOD CONSUMPTION
IN
OECD COUNTRIES
1954-66
(April 1968)
PERIODICALS
MAIN
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(monthly)
DM
Per issue
Annual Subscription
OECD
FF/SF
S
£
5.00
6.00
1 .50
10s.
60.00
72.00
1 8.00
1 20s.
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
(July and December)
DM
FF/SF
Per issue
12.50
15.00
3.80
26s
Annual Subscription
20.00
24.00
6.00
41s
32.00
7.50
55s.
S
£
America and Far East
(by air mail)
/.
ORGANISATIPr»
ORGANISATION
V.
FOR
DE
ECONOMIC
COOPÉRATION
CO-OPERATION
ET
DE
1 H
DÉVELOPPEMENT
D t V E
t
0 P M f
.
I
ECONOMIQUES
Документ
Категория
Без категории
Просмотров
4
Размер файла
4 250 Кб
Теги
3455
1/--страниц
Пожаловаться на содержимое документа