close

Вход

Забыли?

вход по аккаунту

?

17448689.2017.1387716

код для вставкиСкачать
Journal of Civil Society
ISSN: 1744-8689 (Print) 1744-8697 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcis20
Localization, Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols
Shaping Bribe Offers in Azerbaijan
Turkhan Sadigov
To cite this article: Turkhan Sadigov (2017): Localization, Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols
Shaping Bribe Offers in Azerbaijan, Journal of Civil Society, DOI: 10.1080/17448689.2017.1387716
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2017.1387716
Published online: 19 Oct 2017.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 73
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcis20
Download by: [UAE University]
Date: 25 October 2017, At: 12:55
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2017.1387716
Localization, Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols Shaping Bribe
Offers in Azerbaijan
Turkhan Sadigov
Department of International Relations, Azerbaijan Tourism and Management University, Baku, Azerbaijan
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
ABSTRACT
The article analyses a neglected side of corruption – citizen-initiated
bribe offers in Azerbaijan. The main rationale for taking a citizen focus
on corruption is to identify whether citizen choices support state-led
anti-corruption initiatives. Drawing on a survey of 1002 respondents,
the research shows that ‘tolerance of corruption’ is high among the
population in Azerbaijan. Logistic regression results show that bribe
offers among citizens are associated with localization and formal
value orientations. This means that the respondents pro-actively use
bribes and readily bend laws to their own local interests. Thus, bribe
offers constitute around half of the entire variation in corruption in
Azerbaijan. Therefore, a successful fight against corruption cannot be
confined to the eradication of only bureaucratic bribe demand, but
needs to take into account corruption choices of the population too.
KEYWORDS
Corruption; bribe offers; postSoviet politics; social capital;
Azerbaijan
Introduction
Corruption is generally viewed as negatively affecting both political development (i.e., political participation, voting behaviour, and women’s representation) (Birch, 2009;
Kostadinova, 2009) and the socio-economic situation of the country (lower growth)
(see Stockemer, 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, & Scruggs, 2013). Pervasive corruption
is an important feature of contemporary post-Soviet societies. Non-Baltic states of the
region consistently rank close to the bottom of major annual corruption indices and
reports, like those of Transparency International (TI), International Alert, World Bank,
and others. Many analysts view the region among the most corrupt in the world
(Holmes, 2012; Stiglitz, 2002, p. 148). A corruption study by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) defines the post-Soviet region as ‘markedly more corrupt than any other
region of the world’ (Roaf, 2000, p. 1). Therefore, corruption is an important socio-economic problem of the region (World Bank, 2013).
Among the most corrupt countries, having both of the mentioned features, Azerbaijan
has recently made consistent progress in terms of its TI Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) scores and ranking for the past eight years (see Table 1).1 According to TI’s
The state of corruption report (McDevitt, 2015, p. 15), one of the causes of the recent
improvement of the Azerbaijani CPI score is transferring of the provision of licencing
and a range of other public services from public agencies to ASAN − a private
CONTACT Turkhan Sadigov
Azerbaijan
turkhans@yahoo.com
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Turkhan Sadigov, 822/23 Koroglu Karimov, Baku, AZ1172,
2
T. SADIGOV
Table 1. TI CPI score dynamics of the lowest ranking resource-rich post-Soviet states (2004–2015).
Years
Azerbaijan
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
2004
1.9
2005
2.2
2006
2.4
2007
2.1
2008
1.9
2009
2.3
2010
2.4
2011
2.4
2012
27
2013
28
2014
29
2015
29
Source: McDevitt (2015).
Russia
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
2.8
2.4
2.5
2.3
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.4
28
28
27
29
2.2
2.6
2.6
2.1
2.2
2.7
2.9
2.7
28
26
29
28
2.3
2.2
2.1
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.6
17
17
18
19
2.0
1.8
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.6
1.6
17
17
17
18
company of a one-stop-shop model. While this progress is made through government
initiative, how sustainable are these top-down changes? To what extent are these
changes also echoed by the dynamics of the country’s civil society? Do the grassroots’ attitudes of the society support these state-led anti-corruption initiatives? A recent TI report
points to ‘tolerance of corruption’ among the broader Azerbaijani population as one of the
major problems in Azerbaijan (TI, 2014, p. 9). What is the degree of this corruption tolerance among the population?
The research and practice of the anti-corruption fight in the region are dominated by a
bureaucracy- rather than an ordinary citizen-centred approach. Many international
organizations, policy-makers, and other practitioners of anti-corruption measures argue
that the success in the fight against corruption in the post-Soviet space depends on the
degree to which reforms and laws restrict misbehaviour of public officials. As Joel
Moses notes
Sachs and others, like Joseph Stiglitz from the World Bank, now bemoan their own failure to
appreciate the depth of official corruption in many post-Soviet countries and the lack of any
sense of the rule of law among the post-Soviet elites, a sense necessary to bring about …
capitalism’ (Emphasis added; Moses, 2003, p. 13).
Missing from this picture is the possibility that the initiation of corrupt behaviour emanates from ordinary citizens. Indeed, even ideal laws and governmental policies do not
guarantee order, because order ultimately depends on the willingness of the population
mass ‒ ordinary citizens ‒ to embrace good practices and integrate them into their daily
behaviour.
Much of the literature on corruption does not consider the impact of citizen responsibility for not offering a bribe on the incidence of corruption. From three major approaches
to corruption, two – the institutionalist (Bardhan, 1997; Obydenkova & Libman, 2015)
and economic approaches – only marginally focus on the role of bribe offers. Institutionalist approaches instead concentrate on the institutional opportunity structure (Rose-Ackermann, 1978) that gives bribe-demanding bureaucrats freedom of hand (RoseAckermann, 1997, 1999), while economic approaches view corruption as a result of personal cost–benefit calculations. Another strand − sociocultural theories (Mocan, 2004) −
researches citizens’ initiation of bribes. However, there is a dearth of empirical research of
bribe offers in particular. Therefore, my research focuses on bribe offers by the general
population to fill in the existing gap in the corruption research.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
3
This article takes a citizen-centred approach to corruption in the post-Soviet region.
Corruption is defined in this study as the informalization of standardized laws, rules,
and regulations by particularism (Ledeneva, 2006, 2013b; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006) of
local interests to provide and receive preferential treatment. A theoretical contribution
of this work is that it fills a research gap in the literature which overwhelmingly focuses
on bureaucrats’ misbehaviour in fighting corruption (e.g., arrests of officials), but not
on how citizens offer bribes. The main subject of the work is the degree to which ordinary
citizens (not occupying any public posts) are willing to support legality and socio-economic reforms in the country. To assess their readiness to support legality and reforms
by ordinary citizens, my research aims to identify the causes of citizen-initiated bribe
offers. Out of the many forms of corruption, the research focuses on bribery as ‘the
most widespread form of corruption’ in the post-Soviet region (Temple & Petrov, 2004,
p. 89). Bribery is also the best form of corruption through which to capture the attitudes
and practices of ordinary citizens. While the initiation of other forms of corruption, like
embezzlement, nepotism/clientelism or extortion, depends heavily on public officials,
bribery can be initiated in equal measure both by officials (demands of bribes) and by
ordinary citizens (offer of bribes).
We analyse bribe offering among the population of Azerbaijan through the findings of
the field survey conducted by the author among 1002 people in Azerbaijan from February
to August 2015. We draw on relevant theories explaining bribe offers by citizens to identify
14 hypotheses about citizen choice of bribe offers. Overall, the regression also shows that
citizen-initiated bribing accounts for approximately half of the variation in the incidence
of population-initiated corruption. Therefore, in order to fight corruption effectively,
policy-makers should not focus exclusively on ‘bribe demands’, but pay attention to
‘bribe offers’ from the population too.
Alternative theoretical approaches
Localization of laws/particularism
One of the major findings of the corruption research is that individualization of purportedly universal and standardized rules, laws, and regulations by citizens is a reliable factor
predicting those citizens’ attitudes and practices of corruption. Ledeneva (1998, 2003,
2011, 2013a) discusses selective and individualized ad hoc application of laws, predominance of informal rather than formal transactions − all this contributing to endemic corruption. Some authors call this drive to localization of laws ‘particularism’, which ‘runs
directly counter to universalism, the norm and practice of individualistic societies,
where equal treatment applies to everyone regardless of the group to which one
belongs’ (Original emphasis; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p. 88).
A number of authors (Banfield, 1958; Harrison, 1997) point out that corruption is
related to localization through widespread perception of formal laws as relativistic: For
individuals, the occurrence of corruption or the lack of it depends very much on
minute situational and local criteria − specific circumstances and social context in
which a transaction happens. A clear line between legality and illegal acts becomes
blurred. This uncertainty creates propitious grounds for selective application of laws,
and active abuse of regulations, including bribing and nepotism.
4
T. SADIGOV
Localization/particularization of laws is also visible in the discussion of the prevalence
of personal traits of a public officer over the rules regulating his/her duties:
Under the contradictory constraints imposed by formal rules and informal norms, relationships matter more than rules for individual survival … Personal loyalty … implies ‘personalized’ service – inclusive of display of emotional attachment, personal attention and friendly
favors – and compliance that prioritizes informal commands over formal instructions. (Ledeneva, 2013a, p. 39)
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
A public officer in such case becomes a patron able to solve the problems of his/her
clients more effectively than formal laws or the entire system of public administration.
Social relations hinge on personal loyalty rather than loyalty to vaguely understood
public good.
We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 1: The greater a respondent’s perception that corruption depends on specific
situational context and circumstances, the more s/he is likely to offer a bribe.
Hypothesis 2: If a respondent views personality of a bureaucrat rather than formal laws as
being more important in defining functions, duties, and responsibilities of a public office
in Azerbaijan, then the respondent is more likely to offer a bribe.
Citizen activism and passivity
Citizen bribe offers might be affected by their socio-political activism. Social passivity
and fatalism lead to low interest in social progress and the lack of a sense of personal
responsibility in standing up to social ills like corruption (Banfield, 1958, pp. 109, 112).
If a person thinks that the success of the fight against corruption depends on government rather than on ordinary people’s readiness to stand up to bribes, or, at least,
refrain from bribing, then this respondent is more likely to offer a bribe, because of
the lack of a sense of personal responsibility for causing corruption (Harrison, 1997;
Putnam, 1993). This respondent is more likely to take a passive role of an observer:
S/he might blame government for corruption, and argue that the ‘system made me
do it’ (Karklins, 2005).
The appeal to symbolic transcendental forces is closely tied to social passivity of a
person. If success in a society like that of Montegrano depends on luck or divine intervention (symbolic realm) then, of course, people perceive appeals to saints and other manipulation of symbolic realm as the main avenue for achieving their material ends (Banfield,
1958, p. 109). Fatalism, with its social passivity and the appeal to symbolic transcendental
forces, leads to low interest in social progress, and the lack of a sense of personal responsibility in standing up ‘here and now’ to social ills, like corruption. Therefore, if a respondent thinks that the cause of social problems is moral and ideological weakness of a
society, s/he is more likely to have a low interest in investing efforts and personal application to oppose corruption.
We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 3: The more a respondent supports the idea that the eradication of corruption
depends on the government rather than citizens’ refusal to offer bribes, the more a respondent is likely to offer a bribe.
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
5
Hypothesis 4: The greater a respondent’s perception that the government should be like
parent (patrimonial view) rather than a public servant (contractarian view), the more a
respondent is likely to offer a bribe.
Hypothesis 5: The higher a respondent’s support for the idea that the root-cause of all socioeconomic problems is moral and ideological weakness of a society, the more likely s/he is to
offer a bribe.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Decoupling of symbol and its content
Socio-economic research has long established that closed systems, formed around ascriptive and symbolic factors, make corruption more probable (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993).
According to several theories of corruption, symbolic capital (excessive focus on status
(Maine, 1861), exclusivity, and privilege) is associated with bribe offers. Predominance
of symbolic (status, prestige) rather content (investment in science, education, and innovation) values leads to an exclusivist social framework, susceptible more to corruption
rather than merit-based interaction. Engvall argues that ‘when individuals invest in
public offices for clear profit-making reasons, it also comes at the expense of investments
in productive commercial activities; finances that could flow into private sector businesses
are instead circulating unofficially among state officials’ (Engvall, 2015, p. 15). Social and
economic relations, thus, are increasingly revolving around the distribution and redistribution of rents on the basis of exclusivist status markers (Harrison, 2000, p. 299) rather
than the production of wealth in a merit-based environment, regulated by inclusive standardized norms. As a result, rigid limits placed on economic activity and productive
investment by status and prestige translate into higher probability of corruption (Banfield,
1958).
Markers of status and prestige, thus, contribute to the spread of corruption by creating
segregated exclusivist nepotistic circles of in-group belonging, new aristocracy of glamour
and status, traditionalist habits of contradistinction between favoured ones and the outsiders. According to Huntington, ‘corruption … results when the absence of mobility
opportunities outside politics, combined with weak and inflexible political institutions,
channels energies into politically deviant behavior’ (Huntington, 1968, p. 66). This exclusivism runs counter to modern society’s definition of legality as based on egalitarian, standardized, uniform, formal, and de-individualized ‘contractual’ relations. This exclusivism
is especially corruption-prone in the post-Soviet region, where the legal system is weak to
enforce laws impartially.
External focus − the belief that the key to the solution of the most important problems
facing a society lies outside of this society rather than in hard work within domestic realm
– is another important variable that is closely tied to the probability of corruption. Corruption-prone communities are more inclined to focus on the manipulation of external
realm (lying beyond their societies), rather than engagement in improvements in their
domestic sphere (Banfield, 1958; Gellner, 1983; Schein, 2010). In this worldview, external
reality, while much more overwhelming and powerful, is more important for the fate of an
agent than the internal/domestic sphere. As a result, most of the attention of both elites
and the population is attached not to the domestic realm but to external reality, full of
threats and promises. This, in turn, leads to the neglect of diligence, meritocracy, technical
and instrumental savvy supplanted by the public relations manipulation of external
6
T. SADIGOV
audiences and governments, and the shamanic application of other symbolic measures
(lavish spending on international contests, publicity stunts, and glamour) to affect developments within the domestic realm. As a result, state statistics are manipulated to project a
better ‘image’, budget funds spent on ‘white elephant’ projects are often misappropriated,
and the contents of the laws are manipulated to achieve desirable symbolic effects, thus
paving the way for corruption.
We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 6: The higher the share of investment that a respondent is willing to spend on the
markers of status and prestige (expensive car plates, phone numbers, and jewellery), the
higher is the probability that s/he offers a bribe.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Hypothesis 7: The higher a respondent’s perception that external reality is more important than
consistent work in the domestic realm, the higher is the probability that s/he offers a bribe.
Personal factors of social and material capital
There is an influential corpus of literature that finds the causes of corruption in varying
levels of social capital, like associational membership, trust in others, and peculiarities
of a belief system. A number of corruption researchers (Banfield, 1958; Harrison, 1997,
2000; Putnam, 1993) argue that a web of civic gatherings and organizations increases
interpersonal trust in a society. The more a person prefers bridging social organizations
(belonging to which is based on a commonality of interests) over bonding organizations
(membership in which is defined by the commonality of ancestry, blood, origin, and other
ascriptive qualities), the less s/he is likely to prefer nepotism and corruption as methods to
solve social problems. On the other hand, weak associational membership leads to a
gradual shrinkage of the social circle to the immediate kin, thus boosting the role of nepotism and corruption in a society.
Economic theories agree with Putnam’s and Banfield’s emphasis on the inter-relation
between trust and corruption. They point out that disparity in wealth distribution is said to
undermine social cohesion of societies and ultimately lead to corruption (Rothstein, 1998;
Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). These authors take interpersonal trust as a proxy to measure
social cohesion and its impact on corruption.
Some theorists argue that following current events through news and other media
outlets is an important proxy of citizen activism, which is negatively associated with corruption (Gudkov & Dubinin, 2001; Putnam, 1993). Putnam argues that following news
reflects involvement of ordinary citizens into community life and their symbolic investment in communal good – aspects that make a citizen less likely to breach communal
laws through resorting to corruption. There is, however, a difference among different
types of media in affecting citizen activism. While the internet gives a person a greater
chance to pro-actively choose, compare, and analyse news content from different
sources, discuss and reflect on it in blogs and social media, news on TV is more likely
to instil reactive and unresponsive consumption of information (Gudkov & Dubinin,
2001). Therefore, we include in our analysis a dummy variable, denoting whether a
person follows any news or not.
Another important personal factor that shapes citizen susceptibility to corruption is
income level. Various theories point to poverty as a primary cause of bribe offers by
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
7
ordinary citizens (Kostadinova, 2012; Sindzingre, 2011). Using relatively small bribe
offers, the poor population gains in exchange comparatively greater social benefits and
welfare funds, and thus are able to live better. Thus, the population uses bribe offers to
survive. Another example of citizen-initiated corruption is vote selling (Domínguez,
Greene, Lawson, & Moreno, 2014; You, 2015). Poor strata of population exchange votes
for immediate payments rather than thinking about longer term policy implications of
their ballot selling. Green argues that ‘poverty fuels corruption, as starving people find
it difficult not to sell their votes for a bag of flour’ (Green, 2012, pp. 85–86). As a
result, using relatively small bribe offers to public servants, the poor population gains in
exchange comparatively greater social benefits (pension payments that citizens may not
be entitled to, welfare funds, etc.) and thus are able to survive.
Various ideological belief systems may impose moral, spiritual, and other symbolist
restraints on individuals’ behaviour and choices regarding various social phenomena,
including corruption. Since ideological systems aim at boosting social stability and progress through discipline and integrity, they invariably should treat corruption as a
threat, because corruption puts individual interest above a collective one. For instance,
such diverse and at times mutually exclusive ideologies as Communism, Liberalism,
and Islam forbid corruption. Therefore, our expectation is that an abidance by a systematized belief system (be it religious or secularist) that prohibits corruption will negatively
affect the actual incidence of bribing among those respondents who follow these ideological frameworks.
We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 8: Higher frequency of associational membership leads to lower probability of a
bribe offer by a respondent.
Hypothesis 9: The higher a respondent’s trust in others, the lower is the probability that s/he
will offer a bribe.
Hypothesis 10: If a respondent follows news on any media, s/he has lower probability of
offering a bribe.
Hypothesis 11: The higher a respondent’s monthly income, the less s/he is likely to offer a
bribe.
Hypothesis 12: Abidance by a systematized principle system (be it religious or secular ideology) should make a respondent less prone to offer a bribe.
Institutional factors
A range of theories find causes of corruption in gaps in the institutional environment
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). To this group also belong researchers who attribute the pervasiveness of corruption to a society’s level of institutionalization (Huntington, 1968, p. 66).
These theories pay particular attention to the choices and decisions that institutions
create for actors involved in corruption. Robert Klitgaard argues that corruption is
almost always defined by a formula: Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability (C = M + D − A) (Klitgaard, 1998, p. 4). If an authority has a monopoly over some
service or product and an unlimited discretion to use its monopoly, complemented by a
low level of accountability to any other authority, then the probability is very high that
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
8
T. SADIGOV
corruption will flourish in such system. We can use Klitgaard’s formula to measure the
impact of citizen discretion (what is the real margin of choice that a citizen has to
avoid paying bribes, if s/he does not want to pay?) and accountability (how likely is it
that a citizen will get punished for offering a bribe?) on the citizens’ bribe offer probability.
Institutions can also affect corruption through socialization mechanisms. According to
Huntington, ‘corruption … results when the absence of mobility opportunities outside
politics, combined with weak and inflexible political institutions, channels energies into
politically deviant behavior’ (Huntington, 1968, p. 66). Since post-Soviet institutions
have long been exposing citizens to corruption (Ledeneva, 2013a), institutional theories
can argue that the population’s bribe offers are explained by the level of their institutional
socialization of corruption. Since socialization is based on subjective perception, asking
respondents about specifics of their socialization might yield distorted data. Therefore,
we focus on the result of the exposure to corrupt institutions – the inclination of
people to manipulate and bend laws. Institutional theories may argue that if institutions
are dominated by ‘legal nihilism,’ this in turn makes people more likely to abuse laws
and offer bribes.
Hypothesis 13: If a respondent has a choice to avoid bribes, then s/he is less likely to offer a
bribe.
Hypothesis 14: The more a respondent uses informal methods instead of the appeal to formal
laws to solve daily problems, the more s/he is likely to offer a bribe.
Data and methods
To study the incidence and characteristics of bribe offers among the population in Azerbaijan, we draw on an original, nationally representative, face-to-face survey of 1002
respondents. The survey was conducted by the author in February–August 2015. The
margin of error for the survey is 5%. Using mixed stratified snowball sampling, the
survey sampling covered all of the economic regions of Azerbaijan. The division of the
respondents by region of residence, age, and gender reflects the relative shares of Azerbaijani population, according to the figures of the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan.2
The primary focus of the research is bribing as ‘the most widespread form of corruption’ in Azerbaijan (Temple & Petrov, 2004, p. 89). The fieldwork was shaped to identify
the impact of relevant independent variables, as well as specific measures of both perception and practice of bribe offers among the respondents. Another method is in-depth
interviewing of Azerbaijani citizens. We draw on 10 in-depth interviews with people
from different social backgrounds (identified based on gender, age, education, place of
residence, and income). The interviews were held in Azerbaijan in May−September
2015 by the author of the article. These interviews consisted of 15 semi-structured and
open-ended questions for discussion of various aspects of corruption and bribe offers.
Variables
This research seeks to identify factors explaining bribe offers of the population. Therefore,
as our dependent variable, we used an annual incidence of bribe offers among the respondents − a categorical dependent variable. We did not consider the frequency of bribe
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
9
offers, because it depends on a range of highly individual circumstances. For instance, if a
person falls ill and turns to hospital, s/he may end up paying varying number of informal
payments depending on which hospital s/he chooses. Or the type of business that an entrepreneur is engaged in puts him in a situation, when he pays more frequently, but less per
bribe, in comparison to an entrepreneur in quite another sphere of business. So, the frequency of bribe payments is a very unreliable measurement of the propensity of the
respondents to engage in bribe offers. Therefore, we chose instead to focus on the incidence of bribe offers (whether a respondent offered a bribe at all, or did not, for the
past 12 months). The incidence of bribe offers measures all of the bribe offers initiated
by a respondent, without difference as to whether these offers were received or not
received by public officers, or whether these bribes satisfied these respondents’ needs,
or failed to satisfy them after they offered a bribe.
Given the dichotomous categorical nature of the dependent variable, we use logistic
regression to analyse our data. We process our quantitative survey results to generate
logistic probabilities that allow us to see how our independent variables affect the dependent variable.
We start by recoding our dichotomous independent variables into dummy parameters.
We have four independent variables that require recoding. These variables are: (1) the
respondents’ attitudes towards whether formal role or informal personality is important
in public administration (as a categorical variable, it has two categories: (a) Informal personality is more important; or (b) Regulations drawn from formal law are more important); (2) whether a respondent refers to some systematized set of principles (be it
religious or secular) when making everyday choices, or her choices are not guided by
any framework; (3) whether a respondent thinks that s/he has a choice to avoid bribes,
or has no choice at all; (4) whether a respondent follows news through some media (be
it TV, internet, radio or any other source) or does not follow news at all. All of these variables are bivariate ones, and therefore are transformed to a 0–1 scale. The remaining 10
factors are ratio variables not requiring transformation.
We therefore create four dummy variables, recoding them in the following way:
Personality of a bureaucrat (Relative importance of the personality of bureaucrats vis-àvis their formal responsibilities, outlined by law):
.
Personality is more important: 1 if personality is important, 0 ‒ if not important.
Belief system (whether a person abides by a systematized set of principles while making
daily choices):
.
Not guided by any framework: 1 if Yes, 0 ‒ otherwise.
Choice to avoid bribes (whether a person thinks s/he has a choice to avoid bribes):
.
Has at least some choice to avoid: 1 if Yes, 0 ‒ otherwise.
News following (whether a person follows news through some media, or does not follow
news at all):
10
.
T. SADIGOV
Does not follow news at all: 1 if Yes, 0 ‒ if follows news through some media.
The regression equation I use to test the model is the following:
Yi = bo + li + ui + ai + ýi + b1 CIRCUMi + b2 LAWSi + b3 PATERNALi
+ b4 RESPONSIBILITYi + b5 MORALi + b6 EXTERNALi + b7 PRESTIGEi
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
+ b8 MEMBERi + b9 INCOMEi + b10 TRUSTi ,
where Yi is the probability of a bribe offer by a respondent i, βo is the predicted constant of
bribing for a respondent who adheres by at least one systematized set of principles while
making decisions; has at least some choice to avoid bribes; follows news through at least
one media; thinks that only formal laws and regulations guide bureaucrats’ behaviour;
while having all of the rest of the independent variables equal 0. λi = 1 if respondent i
thinks that a personality is more important than laws. λi = 0 otherwise (respondent i
thinks that laws are more important than a personality of a public officer). θi = 1 if respondent i does not uphold any belief system when making decisions and choices. θi = 0 otherwise (respondent i abides by at least one belief system when making decisions and
choices). αi = 1 if respondent i thinks that s/he has a choice to avoid bribes. αi = 0 otherwise
(respondent i thinks that s/he has zero chance of avoiding bribe payment). ύi = 1 if respondent i does not follow news on any media. ύi = 0 otherwise (respondent i follows news
through at least one media). β1CIRCUMi is the number (from 0 to 10) that reflects the
respondent i’s position towards whether there is no clear-cut line between corruption
and the lack of it. Corruption depends on a situation and is context-based (=0) or there
is an absolute line between corruption and the lack of it in every situation (=10), or a
number from 1 to 9 that correctly reflects the respondent i’s position. β2LAWSi is the
number (from 0 to 10) that reflects the respondent i’s usage of laws to solve his/her problems (complete lack of appeal to law = 0; constant usage of laws = 10; mixed position
regarding the usage of laws = a number from 1 to 9). β3PATERNALi is the number
(from 0 to 10) that reflects the respondent i’s complete paternalistic (=0), fully contractarian (=10) or mixed (any number from 1 to 9) position regarding a government’s standing
towards the population. β4RESPONSIBILITYi is the number (from 0 to 10) that reflects
the respondent i’s position towards the idea that the eradication of corruption depends
either solely on government (=0) or completely on the population (=10) or mixed position
(a number from 1 to 9). β5MORALi is the number (from 0 to 10) that reflects the respondent i’s position on the importance of the idea that the root-cause of all socio-economic
problems is moral and ideological weakness of a society (0 = very important, 10 = not
important at all, and from 1 to 9 = mixed importance). β6EXTERNALi is the number
(from 0 to 10) that reflects the respondent i’s position towards the importance of external
focus − the belief that the key to the solution of the most important domestic social problems lies outside of the Azerbaijani society (very important = 0, not important at all = 10,
and from 1 to 9 = mixed importance). β7PRESTIGEi is the number in thousand of manats
(from 0 to 100 thousand), denoting the respondent i’s willingness to spend on the markers
of status and prestige. β8MEMBERi is the number that reflects the respondent i’s memberships in voluntary associations and organizations. β9INCOMEi is a respondent i’s monthly
income from all sources. β10TRUSTi is a respondent i’s level of trust to strangers (from
complete distrust (0) to complete trust (10), or a mixed result (between 1 and 9)).
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
11
Since the least score in independent variables is 0, and this score is associated with a
greater probability of bribe offers in our model, we predict a negative association of
these interval independent variables with our dependent variable.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Descriptive highlights
Naturally, in the context of this study, the first issue to be considered is whether respondents engage in bribing, and, if yes, how prevalent it is. The absolute majority (77.8%) of
the respondents indicated that they offered a bribe at least once per past 12 calendar
months. The majority of those that offered a bribe, offered it once (28.14%) for the past
12 months. However, 56.3% of survey participants indicated that they have a valid
choice to avoid a bribe when a public servant presses for it. Those who offered two
(20.0% of the respondents) and 3 bribes (9.8%) closely follow. This means that the
majority of the respondents are not intensively engaged in bribing.
The survey revealed that an average respondent views corruption as the most important
problem that business faces in Azerbaijan. Specifically, one-third of the respondents
(33.6%) pointed to corruption as the most important domestic problem that negatively
affects the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan (see Table 2). The respondents
view corruption as the single most important problem that needs to be tackled not only
with respect to personal problems, but on a countrywide scale.
Regression results
Table 3 reflects logistic multiple regression results. I include pseudo R 2 and log-likelihoods
into my results. Model 1 and Model 2 differ in only one variable − the self-reported choice
of a respondent to avoid bribe payments. By withholding this variable, I measured the relative impact of a choice to avoid bribes on the overall probability of bribe payments by the
respondents.
As Models 1 and 2 show, all of our independent variables, except for five − the respondents’ abidance by a belief system, the level of support for paternalistic state, number of
memberships in voluntary associations, news following, trust in others, and choice to
Table 2. Most important domestic development problem faced by Azerbaijan according to
respondents.
Azerbaijan’s most important problem
Corruption/red tape
Moral decadence in society
Low education level/technical knowledge
Low salaries/low pensions
Monopolism in the economy
Lack of political stability/democracy
High tax rates
High crime rates
Unemployment
Harsh bank credit terms
Weak technological development
Infrastructural problems
Do not know
Total
Frequency
Percent
337
147
65
215
22
37
12
2
81
15
13
45
11
1002
33.63
14.67
6.49
21.46
2.20
3.69
1.20
0.20
8.08
1.50
1.30
4.49
1.10
100.00
12
T. SADIGOV
Table 3. Impact of value orientations on bribe offers in Azerbaijan.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Logit-logged coefficients
Model 1
Model 2
Personality more important than laws
1.817 (3.16)***
1.812 (3.14)***
Adherence to a belief system
0.581 (1.16)
0.577 (1.15)
Corruption depends on circumstances
− 0.507 (−8.04)***
−0.502 (−7.98)***
Usage of laws
−0.382 (−7.53)***
−0.382 (−7.49)***
Level of paternalism
0.050 (1.16)
0.047 (1.08)
High personal responsibility for uprooting corruption
− 0.087 (−1.88)*
−0.088 (−1.90)**
Cause of social problems lies in technical solutions rather than in weak
−0.213 (−4.14)***
−0.211 (−4.09)***
morality
Domestic vs. External orientation
−0.146 (−2.86)**
−0.151 (−2.92)***
Willingness to spend on Prestige
0.022 (3.03)***
0.0233 (3.06)***
Associational membership
0.297 (0.94)
0.322 (1.01)
Not following news
0.203 (0.59)
0.210 (0.61)
Monthly income
0.001 (3.71)***
0.001 (3.72)***
Trust to others
−0.050 (−0.83)
−0.050 (−0.82)
Choice to avoid bribes
–
−0.516 (−0.83)
Constant
4.853 (4.86)***
5.331 (4.59)***
Observations
1002
1002
2
0.6866
0.6873
Pseudo R
Log likelihood
−166.450
−166.090
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. *p < .10 (significant at 10% in a two-tailed t-test). **p < .05 (significant
at 5%). ***p < .01 (significant at 1%.). N = 1002 face-to-face respondents.
avoid bribes − are statistically significant at the 1% level. Perception by a respondent of an
individual responsibility to uproot corruption is significant at the 6% level, and preference
for external/internal orientation is significant at the 3% level. The introduction of a subjectively felt choice to avoid bribes (the variable itself not statistically significant in our
model) only slightly affects the predictive power of the model. Overall, both models are
quite strong, judged by their pseudo R 2 and log likelihood measures (the log likelihood
in ‘iteration 0’ line equals = −531.183, while the final log likelihood is much closer to 0
and equals = −166.090). Predicted probability estimation also shows robust predictive
power of our models (Table 4).
Five statistically significant variables are positively associated with bribing: If a respondent thinks that the personality of a bureaucrat is more important than laws in public
administration operation; if a respondent does not follow news; the more money a respondent spends on markers of prestige; and finally, the more a respondent earns ‒ the more s/
he is likely to offer a bribe. The remaining variables are negatively associated with bribing,
also conforming to our model prediction: The more a respondent thinks that the occurrence or lack of corruption is defined by standardized norms rather than depends on
specific circumstances; the greater her usage of laws to solve daily social problems; the
higher her feeling of personal responsibility for the uprooting of corruption; the higher
her perception that the cause of social problems lies in technical solutions rather than
in weak ideology and morality; the higher her domestic (vs. external) orientation − the
lower is the likelihood that s/he will engage in a bribe offer. Since in all of the independent
variables with the range from 0 to 10, zero was associated with the most likelihood of
bribing, the positive association between the constant and the dependent variables was
also predicted by our model.
The results lend support to our Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 14. Both of the localization/particularization factors are statistically significant, indicating that in the Azerbaijani context ordinary citizens use opportunities to hijack laws and regulations the same
way as bureaucrats do. Symbolic factors are mostly significant in predicting corruption.
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
13
Table 4. Predicted probability of a bribe offer by an average Azerbaijani respondent.
logit: Predictions for BRIBED.
Confidence intervals by delta method
95% Conf. Interval
Pr(y = 1x): 0.9465 [0.9248, 0.9681]
Pr(y = 0x): 0.0535 [0.0319, 0.0752]
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Variables
Personality more important than laws
Adherence to a belief system
Corruption depends on circumstances
Usage of laws
Level of paternalism
High personal responsibility for uprooting corruption
Cause of social problems lies in technical solutions rather than in weak morality
Domestic vs. External orientation
Willingness to spend on Prestige
Associational membership
Not following news
Monthly income
Trust to others
Choice to avoid bribes
x=
0.89720559
.91716567
4.5748503
3.5518962
3.9181637
4.2305389
3.754491
4.001996
27.090818
.23253493
.3003992
486.89222
4.3363273
.93013972
The respondents’ choices are tilted more towards the symbolic rather than content realm.
This may indicate that the Azerbaijani social context is dominated by an exclusivist social
framework, emphasizing in-group belonging more than merit-based openness. The exclusivist closed circles, with contradistinction between those who are favoured and outsiders,
create a milieu susceptible more to corruption rather than to merit-based interaction.
These circles and groups gather around conspicuous consumption, prestige, status, and
spending on luxurious trinkets. The mean share of income that the respondents of our
survey were ready to spend on items of status, prestige, and luxury (expensive car
plates, phone numbers, and jewellery) on average amounted to 27.09% of all their
annual income.
Institutional factors show mixed effects on corruption. The choice to avoid bribes does
not predict respondents’ practice of bribing: Although more than half do have a choice,
more than three-quarters of them nevertheless paid a bribe in the past 12 months. This
may indicate that respondents pro-actively use bribes to attain benefits, thus offering
bribes voluntarily in the majority of the bribing cases. This is corroborated by descriptive
data: The majority of those who offered a bribe did so for various utilitarian reasons (to
save time and money – 35.2%, or to avoid potential red tape – 27.7%).
Although income is among the statistically significant variables, this does not support
our hypothesis 11. The hypothesis predicts a negative association between the variables
(the less income, the more a respondent is likely to offer a bribe), while logistic regression
shows a positive association between the variables (the higher the income, the more a
respondent is likely to offer a bribe).
Most of the hypotheses not supported by the regression are associated with respondents’ social capital. Specifically, such factors as associational membership, adherence to
any belief system, following news on media, and interpersonal trust all are statistically
insignificant. The results indicate that the factors of social capital and trust are not effective
predictors of corruption in Azerbaijan. These results indicate that ascriptive identities and
bonding social capital (family, kinship, clan belonging) play a defining role, while bridging
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
14
T. SADIGOV
social ties are insignificant. Indeed, the Azerbaijani population has substantial trust in
familial and kinship ties in contrast to wider and more formal ties of bridging nature.
The analysis of Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) data shows that the ‘levels
of trust and association diminish … in relation to more distant, non-familial social networks … Thus, Azerbaijanis’ trust in family members, friends, and immediate neighbors
is generally high, while their involvement in civic groups remains low’ (Liles, 2012).
Additionally, such factors as a wide use of client–patron relations in political culture
and the administration based on neo-patrimonialism (Guliyev, 2012, p. 119) also contribute to the reign of informality. As a result, the participation of the Azerbaijani population
in formal institutions and organizations is almost imperceptible in comparison to wide
employment of informal networks. Indeed, the results of my survey show that whereas
only 18.9% of the respondents are members of at least one national association or organization, the share of those who contributed at least one hour of their time for the development of their local community is 39.5%.
Research on small and medium entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan in 2011 revealed the lack of
any significant association between the inclination of the entrepreneurs to pay bribes and
their participation in formal nationwide associations, organizations, or movements,
although there was a significant impact of participation of the respondents in informal
local associations on the probability of bribe offers (Sadigov, 2013). The explanation
might be that in Azerbaijani society local connections, local politics, personalized informal
allegiance have a greater appeal for an individual in comparison to nationwide formal politics and nationwide associations. Social capital, trust, and associational membership have
no meaningful effect on corruption because these factors are minor to non-existent in
Azerbaijan. As a result, we see weaker social responsibility and a greater propensity to disregard social rules and to prefer nepotism and corruption among the respondents in
Azerbaijan.
None of the variables of our logistic regression model demonstrated the level of standard error exceeding 1. However, we test our model for multicollinearity to identify possible specification errors, if any. Table 5 displays correlations among our independent
variables. As is evident from the results, correlation among our independent variables is
moderate and varies between 0.01 (1%) and 0.4936 (49%).
Additional collinearity checks also testify to a low interdependence among the independent variables. While small-to-moderate multicollinearity is fairly widespread, in cases
‘when severe multicollinearity occurs, the standard errors for the coefficients tend to be
very large (inflated), and sometimes the estimated logistic regression coefficients can be
highly unreliable’ (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, & Wells, 2012). Using STATA command
collin, we obtain collinearity measures for our independent variables (Table 6). As seen
from the output, all of the variables have VIF scores less than 2. The results testify to
low collinearity among our independent variables.
As a measure of model fit, we can calculate PRE (Proportional Reduction in Error) – a
useful function that identifies the level of predictive leverage of logistic regression independent variable over dependent variable. PRE is an effective measure of model fit that provides measurement by
compar[ing] the percentage of cases the independent variables predicted correctly to the percentage of cases that would have been correctly predicted if the researcher adopted a naïve
Morality
Choice
Corruption
vs.
Domestic
Not
Trust
to
Belief
depends on Usage
Level of
Personal
Technical vs. External
Associational following Monthly
to
avoid
Personality system circumstances of laws paternalism responsibility solutions orientation Prestige membership
news
income others bribes
Personality
Belief system
Corruption depends on
circumstances
Usage of laws
Level of paternalism
Personal responsibility
Morality vs Technical solutions
Domestic vs. External
orientation
Prestige
Associational membership
Not following news
Monthly income
Trust to others
Choice to avoid bribes
1
0.304
−0.465
1
−0.318
1
−0.378
−0.308
−0.201
−0.344
−0.374
−0.198
−0.229
−0.051
−0.104
−0.233
0.494
0.346
0.180
0.379
0.480
0.186
−0.335
0.179
−0.145
−0.1236
−0.054
0.215
−0.340
0.118
−0.121
−0.1098
−0.026
−0.368
0.266
−0.188
0.020
0.201
0.030
1
0.281
0.172
0.393
0.418
1
0.202
0.238
0.284
1
0.137
0.162
1
0.411
−0.247
0.219
−0.101
−0.034
0.2155
0.064
−0.231
0.306
−0.172
0.164
0.1707
0.010
−0.184
0.096
−0.109
−0.012
0.1759
0.022
−0.229
0.158
−0.120
0.067
0.1478
0.054
1
−0.314
0.201
−0.107
0.083
0.1687
−0.012
1
−0.103
0.101
0.113
−0.176
0.032
1
−0.116
0.130
0.1582
0.044
1
−0.094
−0.040
0.0002
1
−0.043
−0.076
1
0.029
1
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Table 5. Correlation matrix.
15
16
T. SADIGOV
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
Table 6. Collinearity Diagnostics.
Variables
VIF
SQRT
VIF
R-squared
Eigenval
Cond
index
Personality more important than laws
Belief system
Corruption depends on circumstances
Usage of laws
Contractarian vs. Paternalist position
High personal responsibility for
uprooting corruption
Cause of social problems in technical
solutions than in weak morality
Domestic vs. External orientation
Prestige
Associational membership
Not following news
Monthly income
Trust to others
Choice to avoid bribes
Mean VIF
1.53
1.27
1.82
1.53
1.32
1.11
1.24
1.13
1.35
1.24
1.15
1.05
0.6529
0.7867
0.5508
0.6522
0.7596
0.8998
0.3471
0.2133
0.4492
0.3478
0.2404
0.1002
9.8025
1.2714
0.7874
0.6611
0.5283
0.3911
1.0000
2.7767
3.5285
3.8508
4.3076
5.0065
1.37
1.17
0.7277
0.2723
0.3127
5.5993
1.54
1.28
1.28
1.07
1.12
1.11
1.02
1.31
1.24
1.13
1.13
1.03
1.06
1.05
1.01
0.6510
0.7796
0.7808
0.9341
0.8923
0.9019
0.9791
Condition number: 27.3196
0.3490
0.2204
0.2192
0.0659
0.1077
0.0981
0.0209
0.2752
0.2523
0.2289
0.1998
0.1466
0.0585
0.0131
5.9681
6.2336
6.5445
7.0037
8.1775
12.9448
27.3196
Tolerance
Table 7. Proportional Reduction in Error results of the logistic regression
model.
Dependent variable: BRIBED
Using cut-off score of .5
Classification table
Predicted values of BRIBED
0
1
Total
Actual values of BRIBED
0
1
188
35
223
18
761
779
Total
206
796
1002
Percent Correctly Predicted = 94.71%. Percent in Modal Category = 77.74%. Proportional
Reduction in Error = 76.23%. Expected PCP = 91.04%. Expected PMC = 65.40%.
Expected PRE = 74.11%.
model that only used the central tendency of the dependent variable to make predictions.
(Arceneaux, 2013)
PRE reflects Michael Herron’s ‘expected percentage correctly predicted’ and ‘expected
proportional reduction in error’ factors for limited dependent variable models. Thus, the
employment of PRE would give us a better measure of how much the model improves with
regard to random choice.
Table 7 shows the PRE results for our logistic regression model. The results lend strong
support for our model: PRE for the model is 76.2%, more or less consistent with the
pseudo R 2 from the model (0.6873). The test shows 94.7% prediction correctness for
our logistic model.
Conclusion
In recent years, Azerbaijan – one of the worst performers on TI CPI index – has made
sustained progress. The improvement was mainly attributed to the top-down introduction
by the government of measures that raise bureaucratic transparency. The main focus of
this article has been an assessment of the readiness of Azerbaijani ordinary citizens to
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
17
sustain this improvement at the grassroots. This research has looked at a variety of relevant variables that might explain citizen attitudes to and practices of bribe offers.
The scale of corruption among the population is substantial. The research identified
that for the past 12 calendar months before the research, 77% of the respondents
offered a bribe at least once. However, the intensity of bribe offers remains moderate
(the majority of the respondents offered between 1 and 3 bribes). The population’s
bribe offers constitute around half of the entire variation in corruption in Azerbaijan. Citizens generally show social passivity and are not ready to stand up to corruption. This may
partly be explained by the argument that the Azerbaijani social context is dominated by an
exclusivist social framework, emphasizing in-group belonging over merit-based openness.
Indeed, ‘the boundary between formal and informal in Azerbaijan is very fluid and easily
penetrable’ (Sayfutdinova, 2015, p. 9). As a result, we see weaker social responsibility, and
greater propensity to disregard social rules, and prefer nepotism and corruption among
the respondents in Azerbaijan.
Most of the hypotheses not supported by the regression are associated with respondents’ social capital. Specifically, such factors as associational membership, adherence to
any belief system, following news on media, and interpersonal trust all are statistically
insignificant. The results indicate that the factors of social capital and trust are not effective
predictors of corruption in Azerbaijan. The explanation might be that in Azerbaijani
society local connections, local politics, and personalized informal allegiance have a
greater appeal for an individual in comparison to nationwide formal politics and nationwide associations.
The pseudo-R 2 of our logistic regression model is 0.6873, while PRE (Proportional
Reduction in Error) is somewhat better (76.2%). The results show that our model accounts
for more than half of the variation in corruption, while visibly improving with regard to
random choice. Since our models focus mainly on the supply side of corruption, the
remaining half of the variation in corruption may potentially be due to other factors
that go beyond the focus of our research: Level of institutional opportunities for corruption; impact of indigenous traditions of integrity and neighbourhood; influence of the
nature of the administrative and political system (authoritarian, democratic, mixed);
and other variables usually associated with a bribe demand (i.e., bureaucracy-initiated
corruption).
The scale and the depth of the problem of citizen-initiated bribe offers indicate that a
successful fight against corruption cannot be confined to the eradication of only bureaucratic bribe demand, but needs to take into account corruption choices of the population
too. The research revealed that ordinary citizens, although blaming corruption for social
ills, at the same time are widely using bribe offers to advance personal utilitarian interests.
Corruption may be a symptom – a symptom of the ineffectiveness of formal institutions
and rules – on top of being a serious impediment to socio-economic development.
The Azerbaijani case of corruption is illustrative for several reasons. First, it shows that
government anti-corruption initiatives may not be sustainable if not supported by the
practice of the wider population. Since the local social and value context is an important
factor mediating anti-corruption policies, such policies need to take account of longstanding collective values and institutions. Second, there is a big gap between the perception of corruption and the practice of it. While a citizen may decry corruption, s/he
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
18
T. SADIGOV
simultaneously may offer bribes to officials. This shows the limited nature of corruption
perception indices and research.
The research findings indicate that citizen-initiated bribe offers account for a considerable share of corruption in the post-Soviet context. The population may acknowledge the
problem as one of the biggest ones that the post-Soviet societies face. However, the same
population, to an equal degree, also feeds corruption itself − by widely using bribes to buy
the support of officials, simultaneously not standing up to corruption, and generally by
disregarding laws, rules, and institutions. An important corollary of the research, then,
is that institutions as framers of ‘the rules of game’ are not developed because, despite
high demand for impartial institutions and the rule of law, there is no support for them
within a wider society.
On a policy dimension, the findings of the research do not bode well with the general
thrust of anti-corruption campaigns that the post-Soviet governments have launched
recently. For instance, the Azerbaijani anti-corruption campaign is characterized by a
selective rather than holistic approach. Since the launch of the campaign, several
high-profile officials and administrators have been either dismissed or downgraded
(Rosenblum, 2011). According to reports, generally, all of the public officers were
advised ‘to avoid irritating the population and to work effectively and build public
trust’ (Ismayilova, 2011). However, this selective approach addresses only half of the
problem (the demand of bribes), while leaving untouched the supply side of it. More
importantly, it neglects the formidable argument that the problem of corruption is
tightly woven into the social fabric of a post-Soviet society. Simple administrative
measures focusing on bureaucracy do little to affect institutional, economic constraints,
and sociocultural factors that citizens face as recent Russian and Georgian anti-corruption policies have vividly shown. The anti-corruption campaign may yield incomplete
results in a country, where not only bureaucrats, but wide masses of the population
are eager participants in bribing.
Notes
1. 2004 is the first year in which TI CPI record was collected for all of the mentioned states. Pre2004 TI CPI reports lack scores for several resource-rich post-Soviet countries.
2. Information about sampling can be obtained from the author upon request.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the Open Society Foundation.
References
Arceneaux, K. (2013). Generating a percent reduction in error (PRE) statistic using Stata. Retrieved
from http://astro.temple.edu/~arceneau/pre.htm
Banfield, E. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY
19
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic
Literature, 35(3), 1320–1346.
Birch, S. (2009). The case for compulsory voting. Public Policy Research, 16(1), 21–27.
Chen, X., Ender, P., Mitchell, M., & Wells, C. (2012). Logistic regression with Stata. Retrieved from
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/logistic/chapter3/statalog3.htm
Domínguez, J. I., Greene, K. F., Lawson, C. H., & Moreno, A. (Eds.). (2014). Mexico’s evolving
democracy: A comparative study of the 2012 elections. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
University Press.
Engvall, J. (2015). The state as investment market: A framework for interpreting the post-soviet
state in Eurasia. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and
Institutions, 28, 25–40.
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Green, D. (2012). From poverty to power: How active citizens and effective states can change the
world. Oxford: Oxfam International.
Gudkov, L., & Dubinin, B. (2001). Obshestvo telezriteley: massy i massoviye kommunikatsiyi v
Rossiyi v kontse 90-x godov [A society of TV-viewers: The masses and media in Russia at the
end of 1990s]. In Russian. Monitoring Obshestvennogo Mneniya #2 (52). March–April.
Retrieved from http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/197/991/1219/05gudkov-31-45.pdf
Guliyev, F. (2012). Political elites in Azerbaijan. In A. Heinrich & H. Pleines (Eds.), Challenges of the
Caspian resource boom. Domestic elites and policy-making (pp. 117–130). Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Harrison, L. E. (1997). The Pan-American dream: Do Latin America’s cultural values discourage true
partnership with the United States and Canada? New York, NY: Basic Books.
Harrison, L. E. (2000). Promoting progressive cultural change. In L. E. Harrison & S. P. Huntington
(Eds.), Culture matters: How values shape human progress (pp. 296–307). New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Holmes, L. (2012). Corruption in post-Soviet Russia. Global Change, Peace & Security, 24(2), 235–250.
Huntington, S. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ismayilova, K. (2011, January 31). Azerbaijan: Protests in Egypt Are Reverberating in Baku.
Eurasianet. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62802
Karklins, R. (2005). The system made me do it: Corruption in post-communist societies. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Klitgaard, R. (1998). International cooperation against corruption. Finance & Development, 35(1),
3–7.
Kostadinova, T. (2009). Abstain or Rebel: Corruption perceptions and voting in East European elections. Politics and Policy, 37(4), 691–714.
Kostadinova, T. (2012). Political corruption in Eastern Europe: Politics after communism. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner.
Ledeneva, A. (1998). Russia’s economy of favors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ledeneva, A. (2003). Informal practices in changing societies: Comparing Chinese Guanxi and
Russian Blat (Working Paper No. 45). Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change
in Europe: University College London.
Ledeneva, A. (2006). How Russia really works. The informal practices that shaped post-Soviet politics
and business. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Ledeneva, A. (2011). Open secrets and knowing smiles. East European Politics and Societies, 25(4),
720–736.
Ledeneva, A. (2013a). Can Russia modernize? Sistema, power networks and informal governance in
Putin’s Russia. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Ledeneva, A. (2013b). Sistema, power networks and informal governance in Putin’s Russia. The
World Financial Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=1040
Liles, T. (2012). Trust and agency in Azerbaijan: Personal relationships versus civic institutions.
CRRC - Social Science in the Caucasus Blog. Retrieved 15 November, 2012 & August 10,
2015, from http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2012/11/trust-and-agency-in-azerbaijan-personal.
html
Downloaded by [UAE University] at 12:55 25 October 2017
20
T. SADIGOV
Maine, H. S. (1861). Ancient law. London: John Murray.
McDevitt, A. (2015). The state of corruption: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Berlin: Transparency International.
Mocan, N. (2004). What determines corruption? International evidence from micro data (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10460). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER).
Moses, J. C. (2003). Dilemmas of transition in post-soviet countries. Chicago, IL: Burnham.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 86–
99.
Obydenkova, A., & Libman, A. (2015). Understanding the survival of post-communist corruption
in contemporary Russia: The influence of historical legacies. Post-Soviet Affairs, 31(4), 304–338.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Roaf, J. (2000). Corruption in Russia. European II Department, IMF Conference on Post-Election
Strategy, Moscow, April 5–7. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/
invest/pdf/roaf.pdf
Rose-Ackermann, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Rose-Ackermann, S. (1997). Corruption and development. Washington, DC: The World Bank:
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics.
Rose-Ackermann, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reforms.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenblum, S. (2011). How Serious is Azerbaijan’s Anti-Corruption Campaign? CACI Analyst.
Retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5506
Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare
state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World Politics,
58(1), 41–72.
Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: Bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in
Azerbaijan. East European Politics, 30(1), 34–53.
Sayfutdinova, L. (2015). Negotiating welfare with the informalizing state: Formal and informal
practices among engineers in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 6(1), 24–33.
Schein, E. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 599–617.
Sindzingre, A. (2011). A comparative analysis of African and East Asian corruption. In A. J.
Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (3rd ed., pp.
441–462). New Brunswick: Transaction.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Stockemer, D. (2011). Women’s parliamentary representation: Are women more highly represented
in (consolidated) democracies than in non-democracies? Contemporary Politics, 15(4), 429–443.
Stockemer, D., LaMontagne, B., & Scruggs, L. (2013). Bribes and ballots: The impact of corruption
on voter turnout in democracies. International Political Science Review, 34(1), 74–90.
Temple, P., & Petrov, G. (2004). Corruption in higher education: Some findings from the states of
the former Soviet Union. Higher Education Management and Policy, 16(1), 83–99.
Transparency International. (2014). Azerbaijan National Integrity System Assessment 2014.
Retrieved
from
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1330/10305/file/2014_
NISAzerbaijan_EN.pdf
World Bank. (2013). Corruption is ‘public enemy number one’ in developing countries, says World
Bank Group President Kim. Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-countries-world-bank-group-president-kim
You, J.-S. (2015). Democracy, inequality and corruption: Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Документ
Категория
Без категории
Просмотров
3
Размер файла
1 554 Кб
Теги
2017, 1387716, 17448689
1/--страниц
Пожаловаться на содержимое документа