US drone attacks and Pakistani Statehood Joachim von Wedel* The United States drone attacks, which have been taking place in Northwestern Pakistan for some years now, have recently been subjected to more detailed international media coverage. This phenomenon may be explained by the continuity and rising intensity of the attacks, recent personal charges against the US put forward by relatives of some of the victims (Kazim 2011) and possibly by the fact, that the killed civilians include citizens from the European states. The attacks are a part of a coherent historicalmilitary development starting with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001. According to this fact there is a general apprehension which merges the US-American activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan under one single title and regards them as parts of a larger, overwhelming "war on terror". This perception is furthered by the recent adoption of an "Af-Pak-Strategy" by the United States. In contradiction to this perception, the following text defends the thesis, that, in spite of all historical budget planning or technology related closeness of both cases (Kazim 2011),1 the drone attacks in Pakistan, at least from a certain perspective, are police rather than military activities. On the one hand, the thesis concretizes the impression, that the notion " AfPak-Strategy" blurs the difference between an occupied country (Afghanistan) and a sovereign state (Pakistan). It underlines the fact, that the US activities in both countries are qualitatively different. On the other hand, the thesis does not say, that the drone attacks in Pakistan should altogether be considered as police acts. Rather they can legitimately be considered so from the perspective of civilians, especially the civil population of North Western Pakistan. The arguments in favour of the thesis would hint, firstly, at the difficulties of subsuming the drone attacks under the legal justification pretended by the United States, i.e. the right to self defence (Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter). These legal difficulties illustrate the fact that at present the Pakistan case differs * European Academy Kuelz - Kulice, Poland. 1. Cf. e.g. Alston: "Missiles fired from drones are not categorically different from other weapons like missiles fired from gunships or bullets from a soldier's gun". Alston 2010. 12 Joachim von Wedel substantially from a classic military conflict. The resemblance of the case to police activities will be shown in a second step, focussing on the political and technical specificities of the situation. Finally, the text will observe some of the consequences of this situation for Pakistan's statehood. During the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in autumn 2001 great hopes had already been linked with the drone technology (Rashid 2010: 65). Future campaigns were meant to be short, almost painless and relatively inexpensive. In Pakistan drone attacks started in 2004. They apparently took place almost exclusively in the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" in North-West Pakistan. Since 2008 the number of the attacks increased significantly. While there had been a maximum of four attacks per year until 2007, in 2008 there already had been 33 of them (minimum killed were 273). During 2009 the number rose to 53 (minimum number of victims were 368), and during 2010 to 118 (minimum killed were 607). The aggregate number of victims oscillates between 1.374 and 2.189.2 There is a suspicion that for every militant killed ten civilians have had to die (Byman 2009). Responsible for the realization of the attacks is the CIA. One of the basic characteristic features of the drones, which can stay in the air up to 26 hours and cost ca. 40 Mio USD per piece, is their ability to be steered from a distance. Since a large part of the drones seem to start and land at the airport of Shamsi, located ca. 300 km South from the Pakistani city of Quetta and 100 km away from the Afghan border, they are all steered by CIA employees at Langley, Virginia. The drones possess at least three different kinds of cameras and high quality sensors. They can reach - even if technically not completely up-to-date any more (Deutschlandfunk 2010) - a maximum speed of ca. 135 mph and an altitude of 25.000 feet. The monitors at Langley show live pictures taken by the drones which circulate for hours at a distance of two to three kilometres above their target objects. The drone is able to identify potential targets, seemingly on the basis of a list approved by the US administration. The air strife takes place only after the pilot has sanctioned it, and additionally the head of the CIA's clandestine services or his deputy (Alston 2010: 8). When the employee presses a button in Langley, Virginia, a rocket of the type of Hellfire leaves the drone. The CIA employee sees a fireball, and then the ruins on the ground. Later, the drone lands without any damage. 2. Numbers according to Wikipedia "Drone attacks in Pakistan", http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan, February 16th, 2011. US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 13 Dubious legal base The examination of the legal base which follows does not imply that a legal perspective leads to a privileged, better, not to speak of an encompassing judgement of an apparently complex situation. Neither does the legal point of view support the thesis, that the situation as such resembles a police situation. The aim of this section is only to demonstrate the gap between today's situation in North-western Pakistan and the situation which the United States are implicitly referring to, by legitimizing their drone attacks under the 'right to self defence' of the United Nations Charter (Alston 2010, Lobel 1999: 537). Both cases are different to such an extent that the drone attacks in Pakistan cannot reasonably be considered a conventional act of self defence any more. The state-related right to self defence has its legal basis in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This provision is, apart from the authorization of force by the Security Council in Art. 42,3 the only exception to the prohibition of the international use of force in Article 2, paragraph 44. According to Article 51, the adoption of force by a state within a foreign state can be exceptionally legal, if it aims at self defence against an ongoing "armed attack": "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security"5. A potential aggressor could, according to the position held by the authors of 3. Art 42: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations". 4. Art. 2 Abs. 4: "All Members Shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 5. The full wording of Art. 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 14 Joachim von Wedel the Charter in the 1940s, only be a state. The scenario the founding fathers of the Charter had in mind was exclusively an inter-state conflict. This position has been expressed e.g. in a definition adopted by the General Assembly in 1974: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State" (Resolution no. 3314 (XXIX), dec. 14th, 1974). This interpretation, which is still valid in the new century, excluded for many authors, the applicability of the right to self defence by the United States in 2001 (Byers 2002, Myers/White 2002). Private actors were not considered to be potential origins of an "armed attack". Against terrorists there was, according this position, no right to self defence (Schmitz-Elvenich 2008: 107). Private activities, including that of terror groups, were - from that perspective - basically regarded as null (Schmitz-Elvenich 2008: 55), and any "self defence" against such an activity as an "illegal reprisal" (Muellerson 2003: 40f). At the same time there was - at least officially - a wide consensus that all states had to do what they could against international terrorism. The obligation to adopt effective anti-terrorist measures was e.g. considered not to be realized in the case where a state was in a situation of internal instability or unable to effectively fight terrorism at home due to structural weaknesses. In such a situation the state which was the victim of a terrorist attack had the right to adopt all those measures which the inactive state should have taken. These measures could, however, only be taken by victim states, and not by "interested" states. Additionally, and this was also an expression of the subsidiary character of the right to self defence, the respective state had to be asked to adopt such measures on his own, before any activity from outside could take place. In any case, measures of self defence could never be directed against the state, from which the terrorists were acting, but only against the terrorists themselves. This case seems to apply to the present situation; Pakistan being too, weak for an effective anti-terror fight has to accept the CIA's interference. Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent the US drone attacks are really a reaction to the lack of an efficient anti-terror fight by the government in Islamabad, and to what extent they take place independently from those efforts. Also, the United States claim to react at private activities. According to the general opinion in international law such activities can be regarded as state activity only, and therefore they can be a legitimate cause of self defence only if they have been implemented under the direction of a state p ® ' US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 15 (for references cf. Krajewski 2002). A certain closeness of relationship between the private actors and the state is considered to be necessary. According to a conventional interpretation of the right of self defence such closeness can result from "effective control", i.e. the planning and logistical organization of the terrorist activities by the state. The demands are less high in the case of "overall control"; here self defence is justified also against a state which only in a very general way takes part in the planning, organization and coordination of paramilitary activities. A third case, developed by referring to the hostages taken in Teheran 1979 to 1981, is that of approval. Legal self defence can be realized against a state by sanctioning the private activity later on and by doing so, it treats them as having been its own acts. Finally, there has been made a proposition to regard also the hosting of terrorists, i.e. offering a secure stay to them, as a case in which the state itself could be regarded as aggressor. Summing up, all cases are based on the effective and decisive control of the terrorist activity by the respective state. If this is not the case, there is no legitimate self defence against that state. None of these exceptions is relevant in the present case. Nobody claims that Pakistan had been involved in any planning or supervising of the preparation of the 9/11-attacks. A state wanting to act according to its right to self defence as laid down in Article 51 of the UN-Charter has to be a victim of an "armed attack". The case of a merely threatening attack had been known by the fathers of the Charter (Bothe 2003: 229), but has deliberately not been inserted into Art. 51. The wording does not say "an armed attack occurs or threatens", but only an "armed attack occurs". Also, an already completed attack excludes any reference to the right to self defence. If no further damage is threatening, the attacked state cannot justify its activity by citing Art. 51. Already the time lag of one month between the attacks from September 11th, 2001, and the beginning of the attack on Afghanistan had caused a discussion on whether the attack was still "ongoing" (Tomuschat 2001). The act of self defence has to be in close time connection with the attack, otherwise it cannot be considered as a reaction to that attack, but a reprisal with a merely punishing or retaliating character. In the case of the groups and individuals being attacked in North West Pakistan by the United States referring to their right to self defence, neither an attack by a state (not even one being directed by a state from a distance) nor an ongoing attack is visible. The United States do not act against an inimical state, but within an allied state. They do not defend against a 16 Joachim von Wedel present attack but refer to an attack which has been taking place many years ago. According to a conventional interpretation of Article 51, Washington could not justify its activities by that article; rather Pakistan would be entitled to defend itself against the United States by alluding to its right to self defence. New, more extensive interpretations of the right to self defence do not come to that conclusion. They rather want to allow self defence also against non-state actors, and additionally argue in favour of an abandonment of the restriction on "ongoing attacks", which so far had been upheld by the dominant stream of interpretation. These new approaches, which partially go back to the 1980s (Sofaer 2003: 210), had recently been furthered by Washington's reactions on the attacks from September 2001. Also, the large approval found by the Security resolutions 1368 and 1373 had enforced the impression, that a more extensive definition of the notion of self defence would be an adequate and internationally accepted modernisation. For the first time then, a non-state terrorist attack had been considered as a "threat to peace". In fact, these new approaches had been mainly justified by referring to the changed global situation. At a time characterized by the end of the Cold War and the continuing existence of weapons of mass destruction, future attacks would rather not be by the state, but private ones. If the potential victim would not react early enough, i.e. before the threat of an attack became visible, it would be too late for an effective defence. There was only a small "window of opportunity" which had to be used by the state without hesitation (Yoo 2003: 573). These diagnosis had been reflected in propositions to enlarge the notion of self defence by "pre-emptive self-defence" (Hofmann 2002: 32). It had become part of political acts, for e.g. in the case of the reformed United States "National Security Strategy" from 2002. In the context of self defence, Art. 51 is not cited any more. Instead the authors refer to the traditional, i.e. pre-Charter international law. "For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack". The construction of a pre-emptive self defence claimed to exist by this and other authors goes beyond the older, generally accepted notion of anticipatory self defence insofar as there, the attack had to be considered as taking place in the immediate future, whereas the aim in the case of pre-emptive self defence was to impede the construction of weapon systems of infrastructure which would make possible an armed US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 17 attack only in the future. According to the traditionally held position, self defence was possible only against an attack being almost already starting. The newer interpretation enlarges the case; self defence should be acceptable also against a development which may only eventually lead to an attack. The reactions of specialists of international law to these new approaches were generally rather negative. According to them, here, the notion of 'attack" was stretched too far. Armed attacks were not immediately starting when terrorist organizations announced further attacks without concretizing their time or place (Schmitz-Elvenich 2008: 143). The idea of a general permanent danger without time restrictions was, according to this critique, inacceptable as a guideline for the right of self defence, but on the contrary each measure had to be justified by concrete and up-to-date information (Schmitz-Elvenich 2008: 144, Nabers, 2005: 331). If a state was claiming a right to a pre-emptive self defence there was an apparent danger of misuse. Additionally, a control of self defence referring to the criterion of proportionality was impossible, if the specific consequences .of an attack could not - this being the case with pre-emptive self defence - be concretized. In fact these newer approaches to enlarge the right to self defence are situated so far away from the text of the Charter and from the will of its fathers, that the conclusion to say goodbye to the Charter- based notion of • self defence altogether has gained a certain acceptance with the propagators of an enlarged notion of self-defence. The thesis that selfdefense allows "a proportionate response to every use of force, not just 'armed attacks'" had been explicitly adopted by the former legal counsellor of the State Department, Abraham Sofaer (cf. Lobel 1999: 541). He wanted to emancipate state self defence conceptually from the framework defined in Art. 51. The prohibition on the international use of force according to this position had to be restricted only to cases where the territorial integrity or political independence of a foreign state was attacked, but in other cases - especially in the fight against terrorism - this prohibition had lost its validity (O'Connell 2002: 4). Even in the US law in general for some time now, there have been "accepted implicitly at least some uses of force, including targeted killing, as self-defense toward ends of vital national security that do not necessarily fall within the strict terms of armed conflict in the sense meant by the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on the conduct of armed conflict" (Anderson 2009). 18 Joachim von Wedel An indicator of the extent to which the above mentioned claims for an enlargement of the right to self defence by its propagators themselves have been considered incompatible with the UN Charter is the fact that they rely on extensions of Art. 51 only half-heartedly. An argument in favour of an enlargement of the right to self defence is in some cases linked to the much further reaching thesis, that the epoch of the Charter - at least as to the right to self defence - was over altogether; we were living in a "Post-Charter Era" (Sofaer 2003: 225, Miillerson 2003: 35, 47ff). Today's international law was, according to this argumentation, much less "state centric" than in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, and therefore also self defence had to be defined as less "state centric" (Miillerson 2003: 34). This means, that the realization of the right to self defence should not be measured by Art. 51 but by traditional legal standards. The goal is to return to the old standards of self defence which have been elaborated in international law for centuries, leaving the egalitarian approach of the Charter behind (Muellerson 2003: 1). Instead of being restricted by Art. 51, state self-defence had, according to this proposition, to be only necessary and proportionate (Sofaer 2003: 220, Alston 2010:12, Mullerson 2003:43), i.e. it had to reach its goal with the least possible infringement into other legally protected goods, and at the same time had to be acceptable after general comparison to all other legally protected goods involved. The killing of civilians with regard to such a standard of self defence is generally as acceptable as attacks on private groups, or attacks against private actors which are suspected only to plan attacks. The arguments against this position are: the prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter would be overthrown, if the use of military force would depend upon the discretion of the acting state. The numerus clausus of the accepted reasons for self defence would be extended in an irresponsible way, as the presuppositions of self defence would depend to a large extent only upon the judgement of the acting, "defending" state. The goal aimed at by the fathers of the UN Charter to limit the use of force beyond state borders seems, mainly obviously imposed by the attacks in 2001, not to be well compatible with the newer foreign policy of the United States any more. The Charter which provides the legal basis of the right to self defence is either regarded as anachronistic or interpreted in an extensive way, being in accordance neither with the UN Charter's wording nor with the intentions of its fathers any more. Art. 51 is not regarded as being the legal basis of state self-defence any more, but as an impediment. In contrast to the war in Afghanistan, which at least in its initial phase, a c c o r d i n g to available information, could be regarded as an action of selfdefence, the US drone attacks in Pakistan ten years later present themselves as a very different case. Here, you could not speak of any attack by a state any more, and the private attack, which still is invoked by the United States, date many years back. Especially this hint to the legal basis illustrates the gap between the situations in Afghanistan 2001 and Pakistan 2011. The case of Pakistan is apparently not a military case anymore, at least not in that sense as it had been understood on the basis of the UN Charter in the second half of the 20th century. Police-like situation It is more convincing to regard the case of Pakistan as - to a certain extent - a police-like situation. Even if the drones are military weapons (and as such had been used in the Second Iraq War) and their application is connected to an ongoing war in Afghanistan, for several reasons the case gives an impression of being less a military than a police situation. This difference is relevant for a judgement of the legal consequences of the drone attacks. First, the relation between the immediate actors is very different from a military situation characterized by a conflict between combatants. On the American side, the drones are not operated by soldiers, as in the wars in • Afghanistan and Iraq, but by employees of the civil agency - the CIA, Also on the other side there are, in contrast to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, no combatants; but on the one'hand people who, being suspected of terrorism, deliberately do not want to be combatants, and on the other hand the normal civil population of North Western Pakistan, also noncombatants. The distance of all actors from the military does not, at the margins, mean a privatization of the conflict which under certain circumstances could be seen as a form of "new wars" (Herfried Muenkler). It is rather the case that we have to deal with of a typical police situation: state employees with an exclusive access to weapons on the one side, private persons on the other side. The resemblance of the constellation to a police one becomes apparent, secondly, in its technical features. In contrast to the standard military conflict there is no relationship between equals, where every participant has to be aware of more or less similar weapon's on the other side, but the 20 Joachim von Wedel drones reflect an extremely asymmetrical conflict. In Pakistan they are, different from their application in Iraq in 2003, where they had been one of several means going along with the presence of infantry - at that time a type of weapon being to disposition for both parties -, the only weapon being used in the conflict. On the other side there are no weapons of any relevance. In contrast to bomber attacks e.g. on Bagdad in 2003, where there was, at least in theory, an Iraqi air defence system, here the other side has no defence at all, not even in theory. The people being targets are civilians meeting at private homes. The party launching the attacks finds itself in a completely safe situation, which, according to some, is even similar to a game. Some authors warn before a risk of a "play-station mentality" developed by the CIA employees. After starting the hellfire rockets this employee sooner or later can prepare for an evening with his family. The drone puts the CIA by its technique which does not have a complementary weapon on the other side into a position, which is identical to that of a policeman in the streets; a position of complete technical dominance. A third and fundamental difference is highlighted when comparing the Pakistan case with recent bomb attacks on foreign sites (e.g. on the claimed-to-be weapon production site in Sudan in 1998): in Pakistan the attacks take place in a foreign state which is not hostile, but allied. The relationship between Islamabad and Washington is full of tensions and conflicts, but the isolated protests, which had been uttered by members of the Pakistani government against the drone attacks6 do not reach a level which would be sufficient to motivate Washington to change its policy. Apart from that, attacks taking place permanently and for several years are impossible without at least implicit, maybe bought approval (Deutschlandfunk 2010) by the government in Islamabad. The attacks start apparently predominantly from airports within Pakistan and seem to be, as 6. If and, eventually, to what extent there is a consent o f Pakistan's government, remains unclear. Some members of the government apparently had protested, as the minister of defence against a drone attack from October 16th, 2008. The existence of an explicit consent is stated by the Washington Post from November 4th, 2008: "The secret accord was set after the September visit to Washington by Pakistan's new president, Asif Ali Zardari. It provided new mechanics for coordination of Predator attacks and a jointly approved list of high-value targets. Behind the agreement was a recognition by the Zardari government, and by Pakistan's new military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, that the imminent threat to Pakistan's security comes from Islamic terrorists rather than from arch-rival India." US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 21 far as their targets are concerned, in part in the interest of Pakistan's •Tovernment. Any friend-foe-conflict between states, characteristic for a military situation, is lacking here. The use of force by the United States does not take place against another state, but by ignoring the other state. This feature distinguishes the situation significantly from the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, as well as from attacks on de facto or suspected terrorist camps which had been launched bv several states in foreign, hostile countries during the last decades. Object of attacks in Pakistan are not any more, as in the case of military attacks, the military infrastructure, but immediately non-combatants. The drone attacks therefore cannot be considered to be part of a military conflict, but of a more or less peaceful situation. The standard war conflict between state A and state B is replaced here by a constellation, which resembles actions of a federal police unit in a province. The thesis concerning the partial power related insignificance of the Pakistani government may be, once again, supplemented by a hint to the technical situation: The use of drones is, as mentioned earlier, steered exclusively within the United States, i.e. without any possibility to in fluence it from the Pakistani side. The same is true for the planning of the attacks. As far as can be seen, the CIA also does not need any regular, preparative coordination with Pakistani officials e.g. as to the identification of suspects or of places of residence. The application of the drones depends to a large extent - also distinguishing the case from that of long-distance bombers - from sensors and cameras immediately at the drones. The whole process is standardized to such an extent that also within the CIA there are not many persons involved, i.e. there are altogether almost no points in the procedure, where individual discretion could slow clown the process or stop it. Already in theory there is no way for Pakistani officials to influence the attacks, not to speak of specific steps within one attack. The situation as a whole is similar to an automatized, very centralized administrative procedure, where even in the central administration, not to speak in the provinces; there is no substantial possibility to influence its outcomes any more. To sum it up, on the one hand there is a conventional military attack directed against infrastructure in a foreign, hostile country, characterized by the availability of weapons on both sides and individual decisions of the military leaders on the spot. On the other hand, we have to deal with a situation which deviates fundamentally on all of these points: An almost 22 Joachim von Wedel completely automatized and centrally steered attack, against which no defence is possible, and which takes place in an allied and passive country. The first situation is a military one, the second is not. Pakistan's statehood The drone attacks do not annihilate Pakistan's statehood as such. Pakistan as a state without a doubt continues to exist; its organs adopt laws, decide about the application of that law and enforce these decisions. At the same time the drone attacks within their realm of realization do not leave space for any contradicting position of Pakistani officials. In doing so, they document certain borders set for Pakistani statehood by Washington. The degradation of Pakistan to a state, whose police related decisions, to a certain extent, are not relevant any more, resembles a situation which is typical for colonized state - the state transforms into a province or protectorate. The case therefore may, at first glance, invoke the notion of neo-colonialism, i.e. any direct political control of a people by a foreign state. But there is no consistent US political agenda aiming at subjugation or other fundamental political changes in Pakistan. As far as the war on terror is concerned, there is not even a reason for such an agenda. Pakistan does not present itself as a hostile country or one that would categorically contradict US political aims, but as a state which to a certain extent is either not willing or not capable of formulating any contradicting position. Also in general Pakistan, without any doubt, continues to be capable of adopting its own positions in almost all the other sectors of political life. Its foreign policy related activities e.g. do not need any approval from Washington. Washington does not aim at political changes in Pakistan but at self-defence. The US administration claims to realize its self-defence related activities without interference from Islamabad related to their sort, intensity and frequency. Islamabad therefore allows to a certain, regionally limited, extent police-related activities to the United States. It opens its legal order for certain extra-constitutional and extra-legal activities. Within Pakistani police law there, an US-American police law related enclave comes into existence. To a certain extent, this situation is a neo-imperial one. A state claims to be able to realize its security related interests also by infringing into another state (cf. the number of dead Pakistani civilians). Basic state attributes linked to modern international law as well as to the United Nations Charter, e.g. the right to be free from any police activity of another US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 23 slate, apparently have lost their importance. At least theoretically, the respect for the sovereign equality of states is replaced by a one-sided approach; own security has a much higher priority than the (external) sovereignty of another state. The asymmetrical appearance of the case renders visible a tendency, which is not easily to reconcile with an international order based on the claim of sovereign equality. Art. 1 of the UN Charter still speaks of the goal "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights". For the citizens of Pakistan the special quality of this constellation becomes relevant in several respects. First, the pretentiously selfdefending state acts in a way as if it would be free from any police law related restrictions, e.g. the prohibition to violate or to arrest without prior recourse to a court decision. Second, in order for the United States to reach their goal Pakistani statehood has to be rendered defenceless against weapons incapable to distinguish reliably between civilians and combatants, which is a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. The victims' rights are not sheltered by Pakistan's government, but only by private initiative (Kazim 2011). Third, Pakistan's citizens to a certain extent even lose their political rights. A police activity being taken away from their own government cannot be influenced by the citizens. No politician being responsible for police-like activities, democratic accountability ceases, in this respect, to exist. Apart from this, the police law related enclave never has been established in way compatible with Pakistan's constitutional law. This means, that you cannot describe the situation as regionally limited insertion of one legal order (United States police law) into another (Pakistan's one). Rather what happens is the coming into existence of a specific amalgam. The "police law" being reflected by the drone attacks is neither a Pakistani nor a United States one, but neo-archaic law leaving behind central cornerstones of modernity. The constitutional shelter of the individual is neglected and individual rights, which are a central part of the own legal order and have developed over centuries; are violated. Hopefully, this situation will turn out to be a temporary one. References 1. Alston, Philip. 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution. Study on targeted killings'. General Assembly, United Nations. May 28th, 2010. 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'Civilian Immunity in the ,New Wars", in Igor Primoratz, ed., Civilian Immunity in War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 201-216 8. Hofmann, Rainer. 2002. 'International Law and the Use of Military Force Against Iraq', in German Yearbook of International Law 45 (2002), pp. 9-34. 9. Kazim, Hasnain, 2011., Pakistanische Klagen gegen US-Drohnen' in Spiegel Online, January 20th, 2011. 10. Lobel, Jules, 1999. 'The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan', in The Yale Journal of International Law 24 (1999), pp. 537-557. 11. Miillerson, Rein, 2003. 'Jus ad Bellum and International Terrorism', in: Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 32 (2003), pp. 1-51. 12. Myjer, Eric and Nigel White, 2002. 'The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defense' in 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17 (2002)). 13. Nabers, Dirk, 2005. Allianz gegen den Terror. Deutschland, Japan und die USA. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften. 14. Rashid, Ahmed, 2010. Sturz ins Chaos. Afghan is tan, Pakistan und die Riickkehr der Taliban. Darmstadt: Leske Verlag. US drone attacks and Pakistani statehood 25 15. Schmitz-Elvenich, Heiko, 2008. Targeted Killing. Die volkerrechtliche Zulassigkeit der gezielten Totung von Terroristen im A us land.. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. 16. Sofaer, Abraham D, 2003. 'On the Necessity of Pre-emption', in European Journal of International Law Vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 209-226 17. Tomuschat, Christian, 2001., Der 11. September und seine rechtlichen Konsequenzen' in Europaeische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift, pp. 535-545. 18. Walter, Dierk, 2006. Islamistischer Terrorismus. Hintergrunde und Gegenstrategien. Schwalbach/Taunus: Wochenschau Verlag. 19. Wilkinson, Paul, 1992. 'International Terrorism: New Risks to World Order' in: John Baylis and N. J. Rengger, Dilemmas of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 228-260. 20. Yoo, John, 2003. 'Future implications of the Iraq conflict' in The American Journal of International Law 97 (2003), pp. 563-576.