138 • T H E C H I N A J O U R N A L , No. 78 PLA planning for out-of-area deployments and focuses on the Chinese navy’s missions to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Again, the authors have to admit that little is discussed in open sources and that assessments are speculative. The sources at least identify difﬁculties with logistics and communications that would have to be rectiﬁed if deployments to other areas are planned (341). In summary, this is a necessary source book but one limited by the difﬁculty of conducting research on this topic. Leszek Buszynski Australian National University The South China Sea: A Crucible of Regional Cooperation or ConﬂictMaking Sovereignty Claims?, by C. J. Jenner and Tran Truong Thuy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. v+370 pp. A$180.00 (cloth). The short answer to the book title’s question is “both.” The South China Sea is both an area of cooperation and conﬂict, now more than ever. The long answers are provided by a host of distinguished scholars including Geoffrey Till, Rodolfo C. Severino, Renato Cruz De Castro, Mark J. Valencia, Alice Ba, Ian Storey, Bonnie Glaser, Vijay Sakhuja, Nguyen Hung Son, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Thi Lan Anh, Erik Franckx, Marco Benatar, Robert C. Beckman, Leonardo Bernard, Carlyle A. Thayer, and Sukjoon Yoon, along with a posthumous contribution by a pioneer researcher in the ﬁeld, Jon M. Van Dyke. The editor C. J. Jenner also contributed to four chapters. There is widespread agreement throughout the book on the key factors affecting the context for conﬂict or cooperation around the South China Sea. The dynamo of global economic growth is shifting from the North Atlantic to East Asia. United States’ defense strategy is seen to be moving toward low-cost, low-risk, strike-and-leave operations increasingly dependent on ﬁnancial support and logistical assistance from regional allies and partners. America looks unlikely to intervene militarily in any naval skirmish between China and other territorial claimants. The coastal states of the South China Sea have failed to create an effective maritime security institution. China has derailed US efforts to form an ad hoc coalition of Southeast Asian countries that might constrain China’s expansionist ambitions in the South China Sea. In sum, these authors generally see the balance of power in the South China Sea shifting from the United States to China, and they examine the implications for maritime security. The central drivers of the South China Sea disputes are widely seen to be conﬂicting maritime boundary claims, increasing competition over maritime resources, and increasing nationalist pressure in domestic politics. The most likely ﬂash This content downloaded from 130.064.011.153 on October 27, 2017 01:17:28 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). Reviews • 139 points involve drilling for oil or ﬁshing in contested waters as well as US intelligence gathering in China’s offshore exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The extensive naval modernization programs in the region are not inherently threatening but may become so without more conﬁdence-building measures, such as hotlines and military-to-military contacts, including joint patrols and exercises. According to a number of the contributors, the most important way to improve conﬂict resolution is for China to clarify its nine-dash claim to the South China Sea. A few authors assert that the South China Sea disputes are not impossible to resolve and show how conﬂict-resolution mechanisms might be established. Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar ﬁnd that “almost all of the threats to maritime security . . . can be contained and managed if the provisions of UNCLOS are applied in good faith” (185). Other contributors note that mutually beneﬁcial economic ties among countries around the South China Sea give them ample incentive to cooperate and compromise in settling their differences. Even where boundaries cannot be permanently resolved, the parties in dispute are obligated to negotiate provisional arrangements to provide a temporary solution for sustainable resource management. On the whole, the book provides several distinctive and illuminating analyses, as well as durable insights, but suffers the familiar limitations of edited volumes about current political topics: overlapping and outdated coverage. Most of the chapters were written a few years before the July 2016 decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the case of The Philippines v. China. The PCA ruled that the UNCLOS provisions granting coastal states 12 nautical miles of territorial seas and 200 nautical miles of EEZs superseded any historical claims by China or Taiwan. It also ruled that none of the rocks, shoals, or low-tide elevations were islands and could not generate any EEZ or continental shelf claims. Further, China’s artiﬁcial island construction was viewed as unwarranted and also in violation of UNCLOS environmental provisions. The tribunal’s rulings were ﬁnal and binding and have been endorsed by all other claimant states. However, the PCA had no enforcement authority or capability. These unprecedented rulings and China’s negative response to them have changed the situation in the South China Sea substantially and reduced the relevance of many of the book’s chapters correspondingly. The election of the Trump administration in the United States may further change the strategic balance in the region in ways that will quickly outdate sections of the book. The current situation provides only limited options for settling maritime boundary disputes. Some of the book’s chapters examine these options in detail. For example, Stein Tønnesson examines the 2004 Sino-Vietnamese Tonkin Gulf agreements on boundary delimitation and joint ﬁsheries management and considers how this might provide a model for other boundary disputes. So far, this is China’s only maritime boundary accord with any of its neighbors. It is a clear example where China has negotiated substantial compromises over maritime boundaries This content downloaded from 130.064.011.153 on October 27, 2017 01:17:28 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 140 • T H E C H I N A J O U R N A L , No. 78 when conditions were favorable. It would have been interesting to learn more about the critical ﬁrst step in the process in the early 1950s when China changed its 11dash line claim to a nine-dash line claim, deleting the two dashes in the Tonkin Gulf. The book provides little information about the early twentieth-century development of China’s claims in the South China Sea. In recent historical work, Bill Hayton ﬁnds that they are not ancient claims but quite modern. The ﬁrst known claim to James Shoal, the southern-most feature within the nine-dash line, did not appear until 1936. The claims developed in response to domestic political crises among contending factions in China in the 1920s and 1930s, a time of rising nationalist sentiments. The most cogent and concise response to the book title’s question can be found in Carlyle Thayer’s chapter on China’s naval modernization and US strategic rebalancing: “Southeast Asia is ripe for continued great power rivalry but not armed conﬂict between China, a rising military power, and the United States, the upholder of the status quo. These two great powers will continue both to cooperate and contend. The security environment will continue to be characterized by intractable sovereignty disputes, rising resource nationalism, and potentially destabilizing regional force modernization programs” (240). David Rosenberg Middlebury College China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy after the Cold War, by Kai He. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. vii+174 pp. A$155.00 (cloth). This book offers a refreshing blend of substantive knowledge and theoretical insight. It represents a new style of scholarship on China’s foreign relations, demonstrating not only an analyst’s mastery of the Chinese language and primary sources but also familiarity with international relations theories and the logic of social science inquiry and a command of appropriate methodologies. Kai He introduces a “political survival–prospect model” to analyze how Chinese leaders have acted in eight “near crises” during the post–Cold War era. These cases occurred when Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao headed the Chinese government and included the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the collision of a US reconnaissance aircraft with a Chinese interceptor off Hainan Island, and episodes involving China’s and Japan’s contested sovereignty over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands. The ﬁnal chapter takes up brieﬂy two episodes that happened early in Xi Jinping’s administration, which are examined to probe the validity of This content downloaded from 130.064.011.153 on October 27, 2017 01:17:28 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).