How to Destroy Monsters: A doctrine for the rescue of - WISC

How to Destroy Monsters:
A doctrine for the rescue of civilians from atrocities, ethnic cleaning and genocide in nonpermissive environments
Dylan Lee Lehrke
Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College, Dublin
A Paper For
Second Global International Studies Conference
What keeps us apart? What keeps us together? International Order, Justice, and Values
Ljubljana, 23-26 July, 2008
Often quoted:
“America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom
and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”1
John Quincy Adams, U.S. diplomat & future president 1821
Little Known:
Comment made during the debate on American participation with the Britain, France and Russia
in support of those fighting for Greek independence from 1821-29, widely considered to be the
first humanitarian intervention of the modern age, which came largely in response to reports of
Turkish atrocities.2
2
As Rwandan peacekeepers were heading to Sudan in August 2004, responding to what was
being described by some as genocide, the Rwandan Foreign Minister went on BBC radio to talk
about the mission. During the interview, the journalist asked if the troops had a moral duty to
protect civilians under attack. The Foreign Minister answered “yes,” but when asked more
pointedly if they would protect civilians and fire on the Janjaweed militia he faltered. “I am not
sure,” he said, “Let’s allow them to go there to play out their mission.”3
The Foreign Minister’s uncertain answer points to a major problem in many humanitarian
interventions, the inability to know how troops are going to act when faced with a crisis
requiring them to rescue civilians. Two years later it has become clear what the troops would
do—very little. Could they do more? The original mandate allows the AU forces to “protect
civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within
resources and capacity.”4 While not extremely strong, it does allow some action. It also implies
that successful action depends on “resources and capacity.” But the AU’s failing is not the result
of a lack of troops or materials. Even with addition AU forces, UN logistical support and Arab
League funding, the problem will remain. In fact, even 22,000 UN troops with a Chapter VII
mandate would do little. Even the 4th Infantry Division would not help. This is because the
problem is not absence of material but an absence of doctrine—principles that commanders and
soldiers of all ranks can use to guide their actions.
Despite the tragic events in Rwanda and Bosnia, and now in Sudan, there is no doctrine that
enables the rescue of civilians from atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide in a nonpermissive environment. In these situations, rescue means to bring about the immediate and
unconditional end to the killing. This is not to downplay the importance of protection, which is
broader, including the establishment of a political and social order to prevent a repeated need for
rescue.5 However, rescue is the first step in situations where people are dying and so this paper
will make it the first step in discussion as well.
The main assumption of this paper is that civilians should not be killed in war and that
something should be done to stop such killings regardless of motives—justice, morality,
collective interest, or self-interest. Debates on the issue of rescue have focused on whether it is
legal and moral. While this is important and worthy of lengthy analysis, there is also value in
�skipping ahead’ to make sure rescue is practical.
A doctrine explicitly for rescue would build capacity.6 Specifically, a rescue doctrine would:
•
•
•
•
•
Make success more likely and therefore make true humanitarian intervention more
likely.7
Provide guidelines to judge and measure those mixed operations where humanitarianism
is used as a justification.
Minimize humanitarian fatigue by showing what is expected and making success more
visible. 8
Give credibility to any peace support operation (PSO) so escalation by belligerents is less
likely in the first place.9
Enable rescue to meet vital just-war criteria, for example a reasonable chance of success,
and making it more likely to also meet legal criteria, by demonstrating the utility of rules
of discrimination and proportionality.
This paper will do two things.
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First, it will discuss why a rescue doctrine is needed. This is based on the nature of conflicts
in which rescue is likely and the fact that neither peacekeeping nor war-fighting doctrines
suffice.
Second, it will point out that a doctrine for rescue has been emerging. Various lessons
learned reports, articles, and speeches in the wake of Bosnia and Rwanda are contributing to the
creation of a working doctrine. The principles of rescue are:
1. Recognize the difference between aggressors and victims.
2. Do not transfer risk: primarily meaning to civilians/noncombatants
3. Consider all actions through a conflict-resolution lens.
Although this doctrine has yet to be explicitly articulated, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
report has come closest. The report’s conclusion for such operations was that they should:
guarantee maximum protection of all elements of the civilian population; adhere to international
humanitarian law; place the mission above force protection; and coordinate between military and
civilian authorities and organizations.10
A summary of the R2P by Michael Ignatieff claims the report advocates an intervention
strategy that “takes sides, uses force, and sticks around to rebuild,” the opposite of the current
strategy premised on “normal neutrality, casualty-avoidance, and exit strategies.”11 This
generally correlates to the above principles of identifying the aggressor, not transferring risk, and
aiming for conflict resolution. However, in order to operationalize the R2P, further nuance is
required than that provide by the Commission or Ignatieff. This paper is hoped to be a tentative
start.
Why a rescue doctrine is needed
Civilians are the targets in many wars.12 Despite the claims of belligerent, civilians are not
solely killed by stray rounds, poorly targeted mortars, and errant bombs. In Bosnia, for example,
more often than not, violence “was directed not against opposing sides, but against civilian
populations.”13 The same was true in Rwanda, Cambodia, and Uganda in the past, and remains
true in Sudan and Zimbabwe today. The direction of these attacks is intentional and they are not
only random irrational acts of barbarity and hate. Civilians are directly targeted because it is
militarily and strategically useful. According to international law expert Simon Chesterman,
“The brutal truth is that the laws of war are often violated simply because they achieve a
particular objective.”14
For many leaders in less-conventional wars, the ability to threaten and kill civilians is an
effective way to accumulate and secure power.15 This is their center of gravity, the source from
which their military “derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”16
Thus, while an outsider may view rescue and protection as simple humanitarianism, the
parties of the conflict see it as involvement in the war, as actions against their interests, as battles
that they lose if humanity succeeds. In Bosnia, for example, “the political goals of the parties
were diametrically opposed to the humanitarian goals of the UN missions.”17 This usefulness in
targeting civilians means that many soft measures will simply be inadequate for rescue.
The acknowledgment that civilians have military value may be a difficult ethical realization,
but it is in the rationality of these strategies that there is hope for a solution.18 To understand that
the enemy’s center of gravity (CoG) is its control of civilians through fear and atrocity is to
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realize that the best course of action in such conflict it to protect civilians. This is how one wins
since as civilians are saved, the power of the aggressor will decline.
There is increasing agreement that the military should be used in humanitarian emergencies
where atrocities are occurring. Genocide, ethnic cleansing and atrocities that are serving the
perpetrators’ strategic ends “can only be stopped with military force.”19 These situations are what
Nicholas Wheeler calls supreme humanitarian emergencies, “when the only hope of saving lives
depends on outsiders coming to the rescue.”20 Of course the question of when to intervene is a
judgment call requiring adequate intelligence on humanitarian situations and due consideration
of ad bellum criteria. Again, this is a topic important for academic consideration (particularly
around the question of whether humanitarianism is just cause). The extent that in bello
prognostications shape ad bellum decisions (such as proportionality and reasonable chance of
success) is also worth further exploration but cannot be covered in depth here.
In addition, doctrine must guide war termination in such a way so as not to make positive
peace and long term protection more difficult. In bello must consider post bellum criteria (which
is largely still being shaped by academics such as Brian Orend). Thus, the root causes of the
crisis should be identified to ensure military force does not entrench or enhance the root
problems. This, as will be made clear, ties into the last principle of rescue presented here,
requiring that all inventions be viewed through a conflict resolution lens. However, a fuller study
of how rescue impacts a post-conflict environment is also warranted since this paper’s length is
limited. The purpose of the doctrine of this study is solely to guide rescue, the first step, the
establishment of negative peace.
Starting the doctrine
Humanitarian wars have always seen the short end of strategic consideration. As a result,
they have a tendency to go poorly and many soldiers are adverse to such missions. There is
rarely a consideration that development of a better strategy might lead to more motivation.
Afterall, if a group of soldiers is ordered to make a frontal assault, they will be much less
motivated than if the plan stands a bit better a chance of success.
According to Oxford’s Adam Roberts, in “the long history of legal debates about
humanitarian intervention, there has been a consistent failure to address directly the question of
the methods used in such interventions.” In particular, it is important that the means and methods
employed be compatible with the humanitarian mission.21 These two intricately linked elements
are the most critical parts of capability—means and methods. Means are a matter of resources.
Methods are a matter of doctrine.
Of course it is impossible to construct a simple, quantitative rule for determining what is
needed to rescue civilians with maximum efficiency. Every operation will require the basic
military elements but also a structure specifically for the mission. And each mission will require
its own detailed battle plan on how forces will enter the country and what will be the primary
physical objectives. However, it is possible to develop a broad doctrine.
Doctrine, according to the U.S. military, is “The fundamental principles that guide military
forces, or parts of military forces, in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but
requires judgment in application.”22 The British describe doctrine as “the methods of engaging in
[conflicts] to achieve success.”23
Doctrine has a different content and emphasis at various levels. At the supranational level,
doctrine is comprised of international law and the UN Charter. At the national level, it is often
articulated by national security strategies. A military doctrine is shaped by these broad cultural
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and political doctrines.24 No matter the level, doctrine must agree with, not contradict, the other
levels.
If rescue and protection are designated at the supranational level as important, it is the
beginning of a doctrinal development. There seems to be a start in this area. In the 2005 World
Summit Outcome document, heads of state and governments agreed that if national authorities
“manifestly fail” to protect their populations, and if peaceful means are inadequate, the
international community stands “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner.”25
At a national level, doctrine is largely a matter of choices made by politicians, whose desires
are then codified in national security strategies. However, beyond rhetoric, there have been few
explicit choices made by national governments regarding whether rescue warrants involving a
nation in a far away and distant conflict, taking sides, taking risks and possibly committing to a
long stay. The principles brought up in this paper must be accepted at the political level before
the military can legally and soundly commit to them.
However, prognostication of how these principles would shape operational doctrine is
important to do now, since it is this process that helps determine if they would be effective (or at
least more effective than traditional doctrines). But this process has hardly begun. A recent report
on civilian protection by the Stimson Center found “little evidence that member states and the
UN know how to prepare [soldiers] for specifically carrying out protection missions.”26
What is needed is a specific rescue doctrine that articulates a set of theories and principles to
provide military forces with a �philosophy’ on how to save civilians in a multitude of
circumstance.27 This doctrine should not be resource dependant. Developing countries continue
to provide three-quarters of all UN peacekeepers and in many cases, such as Bosnia and Rwanda,
peacekeepers are present when a crisis erupts.28 And, as the Brahimi Report points out, “If a
United Nations peace operation is already on the ground, carrying out [rescue] may become its
responsibility, and it should be prepared.”29
The UN has directly referred to “the protection of civilians” as a task in the mandates of ten
recent operations, ranging from peacekeeping to enforcement.30 In addition, operations not
specifically mandating civilian protection, are not absolved of the task. The Independent Inquiry
into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda concluded that,
whether or not an obligation to protect civilians is explicit in the mandate, the UN and other
actors must be prepared to respond to the expectation of protection created by their very
presence.31
This is a large order for any doctrine but not unreasonable. Peacekeeping doctrine, for
example, is designed so that any force can follow its principles. So is all good
conventional war doctrine, beginning with the principles laid out by Karl von Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu.32 But, as pointed out in the next section, neither is entirely appropriate in
the context of massive human rights abuses.
Existing doctrines inadequacies
Historically, peacekeepers are the forces that most often need to grapple with the
issue of rescue. For this reason, they and their doctrine will be given the closest attention.
In dealing with rescue, UN forces have retained the principles of traditional peacekeeping
developed by Dag Hammarskjöld, former UN Secretary-General.33 These are:
1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission
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2. Non-use of force except in self-defense (and then minimum use of force)
3. Impartiality/neutrality34
These principles are often called the trinity of peacekeeping. But all of these principles have
come into question. In 1959, Hammarskjöld could confidently say, “I do not know the exact
capacity of [the UN]. It did take the very steep hill of Suez; it may take even steeper hills.”35 But
the capacity of the machine was revealed, first on the snowy hills that hosted the 1984 winter
Olympics and then on misty hills in central Africa.
The main reason peacekeeping doctrine did not work for rescue in these cases is because it is
built on winning and sustaining consent, thus the non-use of force and impartiality.36 The
purpose here is not to downgrade the value of consent. Consent minimizes danger and need to
use force and therefore protects civilians. 37 But consent simply cannot be obtained in situations
requiring rescue, those conflicts where civilians are intentional targets because killing them
achieves strategic ends.
The 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace noted that three types of activities have led
operations to forfeit consent. First, protecting humanitarian operations during continued war;
second, protecting civilian populations in safe areas; and last, pressing the parties to achieve
national reconciliation at a faster pace that they were ready for.38 But these activities are exactly
what are needed for a rescue operation. Thus, traditional peacekeeping doctrine will not suffice
for rescue.
British-developed wider peacekeeping was one attempt to fix the problems with the trinity of
of peacekeeping. Its most important concept was that consent is required only at the strategic
level. This allowed force to be used at a tactical level, something that it was hoped would allow
rescue. However, the division of tactical and strategic levels of consent meant that wider
peacekeeping ruled out the strategic use of force. This left soldiers on the ground in the perilous
position of undertaking tactical operations that would have no strategic support or meaning.
Regarding conventional war doctrines, there are simply too many to go into detail. Broadly
speaking, since the political objective of rescue is to save the lives of the innocent, many
traditional doctrines are simply too blunt, as they are centered on killing and incapacitating an
enemy. In short, the focus of operations is on the enemy in traditional war and the victim in
rescue missions. The operational implications for tactical protection are significant.
For example, uncertainty of the role of the force protection element of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) has led to inconsistent responses when attacked. In some cases,
military escorts did not focus on their protectees safety when attacked, moving them or covering
them as VIP bodyguards might, but engaged the attackers without consideration of those more
vulnerable.39 While the PRTs were protecting civilian government workers and not local
civilians, the instinctual reaction of combat trained units is illustrative.
A further example comes from a long-standing principle has been Sun Tzu’s observation
that, “All warfare is based on deception… When capable, feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity… feign disorder and strike him… Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance… I
make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths.”40 But this
doesn’t work in rescue since one must be visible and project strength to the people one is
protecting, otherwise their perceptions would remain one of insecurity and populations act
accordingly (for example by seeking out militia protection).
In addition, rescue operations will never be able to use mass in a way that makes maximum
use modern weapons. For example, basic strategy dictates that, “quick success in military
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operations can best be achieved by surprise, by applying overwhelming force and through the
concentration of all military efforts.”41 Somalia reflected this prevailing American military
doctrine, the Powell Doctrine, which required limited objectives obtained by overwhelming force
applied decisively over a limited period of time.42 But the problem was that the strategic doctrine
did not easily translate into operational principles for containing the conflict on a day-to-day
basis.43 An individual soldier gets no guidance from these principles other than to use maximum
force, which is tactically unsound in many operations other than war.
The result is military proficiency but political failure. According to West Point’s Frederick
Kagan, “The US has developed and implemented a method of warfare that can produce stunning
military victories but does not necessarily accomplish the political goals for which the war was
fought.”44
The above discussion is not intended to dismiss many very useful military principles that are
present in doctrine, such as unity of command and economy of force. Still, most military
strategists seem to agree that rescue is fundamentally different than the missions more militaries
train for and for which most doctrine is crafted. The implications of peacekeeping and war
fighting doctrines being applied to rescue situations will be discussed in more detail in the brief
case studies below.
The rules of engagement and rules of morality
The most important thing that doctrine does is guide how force is used to achieve the primary
military objective, which will in turn achieve the political objective. Thus, as discussed,
peacekeeping doctrine is built to guide force to achieve and maintain consent and war doctrine
guides how force will kill or incapacitate an enemy. Another example is counterinsurgency
doctrine, which is focused on how force wins or loses hearts and minds.
Rescue differs from all of these. In rescue, the ends are to save peoples lives and the
toleration for �collateral damage’ is low since the means could defeat the ends. The Stimson
report dictates that “one must harm fewer people than one saves, one must injure fewer than one
protects, and one must not destroy an area to save it.”45
Guidance on these issues comes from rules of engagement (ROE), which dictate when,
where, against whom, and how force can be used.46 ROE should be designed so the use of force
supports the ends for which the operation was begun in the first place.47 In rescue, this means
that force cannot kill civilians through act or omission, since saving people is the mission.
In one aspect, ROE are the moral rules of a military. They guide how one will act. Moral
codes “establish general principles and summarize past experience, thus forming the starting
point for the exercise of judgment.”48 Note that this definition is very similar to the definition of
doctrine cited above.
Moral bonds among soldiers, supported by clear ROE, lead to unity. The moral bonds are a
reason why one integrated force with uniform equipment and doctrine is more effective than a
Frankenstein-like force stitched together.49 The later lacks established bonds and these are hard
to weld overnight.
Moral bonds are created by encouraging security, certainty, trust, order, courage and
justice.50 Clausewitz believed moral elements were the most important in war, writing that:
If the theory of war did no more than to remind us of these elements, demonstrating the
need to reckon with and give full value to moral qualities, it would expand its horizon
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and simply by establishing this point of view would condemn in advance anyone who
sought to base and analysis on material factors alone.51
Thus, any analysis of UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNPROFOR (and specifically the DutchBat)
in Bosnia should not just consider their under-funded, under-manned and under-resourced
nature. It must take into account their moral quality.52
Sun Tzu too put moral influence as the most important in his five factors of war. What he
meant by moral influence was “that which causes harmony of the people with their leader.”53
This means a lack of moral principles would cause a breakdown of command, in particular the
moral authority of that command.
A quick example: When 20,000 U.S. soldiers arrived in Haiti, their ROEs stated that they
were not to intervene in “Haitian on Haitian” violence. On the first day, U.S. soldiers watched
while Haitian police officers beat a coconut vendor to death while television news crews filmed.
One soldier interviewed said he would “take off his uniform and run to the Dominican Republic”
if he had to witness anything like that again without acting.54 That night, the Clinton
administration changed the ROE to allow U.S. troops to intervene to save Haitians from their
own army and police.55
His is not an isolated incident. “During the 1990s, neutrality in the face of huge human rights
abuses jeopardized a force’s physical and political survival.”56 In too many instances, neutrality
degrades to abstinence from making a moral choice. Lord Moran defined courage as a “moral
quality—a cold choice between two alternatives.”57 As we will see, rescue is not neutral; it
involves making a choice.
In fact, the first two principles are all about morality. First about choosing between right and
wrong, victim and aggressor, good and evil (if one prefers these terms). Second, about accepting
risk yourself, rather than forcing others to bear the burden of pain and loss. A key point then is
this: if one is not willing to make a choice, rescue is not possible and an operation should not be
mounted.
Looking at case studies, one finds that missions that have good resources but fail to act on the
above moral rules tend to fail. In contrast, morality acts as a force multiplier, enabling small
groups to save large numbers of people.
Unity of morality, unity of doctrine, results in power. As Hannah Arendt states “… power
springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse… power
is to an astonishing degree independent of material factors, either of numbers or means.”58 It is a
unified doctrine that enables a force to act together and gives them power.
Thus, size does not equate to power. Size did not help UNITAF or UNOSOM save Somalia.
The basic problem in the operation was not inadequate resources but the “inappropriateness and
the manner in which they were deployed.”59 And a more fundamental problem was a lack of
unity within these forces; many with different ROE and many required to “call home” before
taking any mission. This destroyed all moral bonds and trust between UNOSOM II contingents
(and Task Force Ranger).
But in most conflicts, intervention forces are not sizable and this lacking has become an
excuse for inaction. Many observers claim that the Dutch Bat and UNAMIR were simply too
small to do anything. However, there is no reason that their limitation of resources should have
made them entirely powerless.
During most operations where a small force is given a big task, the force depends on a
symbol. The reception of political refuges by embassies and protection of escaped slaves on
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ships in foreign harbors are the most oft-cited cases of extended deterrence relying on a symbol.
The protection of these people relied on the flag of a country. In these cases, “it is the protecting
potential force of the foreign government that is used to intervene in the local conflict to the
extent of removing the refugee from the vengeance of his pursuers.”60
The UN flag and blue beret have sometimes served this end, often keeping UN personnel
safe.61 Unfortunately, as Jan Eliasson, Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs in Feb 1993, the
UN blue beret “no longer provide[s] adequate protection.”62 What happened? What happened
was that the absence of a doctrine for complex environments requiring rescue caused the moral
bonds between those involved to break. This removed the power from the UN symbol, turning it
from a totem which could not be violated, into a target.
Small rescuing forces rely on the potential of their larger organizations. They cannot create
credibility themselves.63 They rely on “the implication of willingness by the international
community to take further action if there is a resort to violence.”64 Properly backed up, the force,
like the tip of an iceberg, should be ominous to those steering the ship of war. But when moral
bonds linking a small force to a larger reserve are lacking, their freedom of action is limited.
In Bosnia, for example, UN convoys had the authority to take “all necessary measures” to
ensure delivery of aid. However, most leaders would not take actions since they new they “could
not call up reinforcements needed to face down stiffer resistance on next round.”65 They had no
confidence that the moral bonds existed that made the UNPROFOR a united force. There was no
moral bond that would allow for extended deterrence and the units, with no sense of their
positions, had low morale that severely damaged operations.
Most peacekeeping missions will not be structured or equipped to conduct a rescue.
Peacekeepers are often spread thin and lightly armed.66 It is their reserves, their potential, that
give them power. And if they are not backed up, they lack this power. This is what led to the
abject failure in Srebrenica and the failings (and successes) in Rwanda. A brief look at these
cases will provide some orientation before the principles of rescue are explained in detail.
The snowy hills
It seems absurd that the UN, with 20,000 troops supported by NATO, the alliance that
defeated the Soviet Union, can fail to protect a city of 40,000 people from 2,000 troops
supported by perhaps 20 tanks.
This happened because there were no moral bonds linking NATO and the UN to each other,
much less to the battalion of Dutch assigned to defend Srebrenica. Thus, when the Serbs looked
at the UN observation posts on the hills, they didn’t see a UN or NATO threat. They saw a fistfull of soldiers who were suffering from “the Karremans-feeling,” name for the DutchBat
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Karremans. It is a feeling is of both helplessness and passivity.
It is a feeling typical of those who lack moral force and become physically incapable as a result.
This lacking was caused by UNPROFOR’s failure to follow either of the first two principles
of rescue – it refused to recognize the difference between aggressor and victim and made force
protection a priority.
First, throughout the war there remained a “pervasive view in top UN quarters that all parties
were equally responsible for the conflict.”67 The Srebrenica report admits “an inability to
recognize the scope of the evil,” and “a more general tendency to assume that the parties were
equally responsible for the transgressions that occurred.”68 After the fall of Srebrenica,
Karremans still unflinchingly claimed that, “the parties in Bosnia cannot be divided into �the
good guys’ and �the bad guys.’”69
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Second, concerns for the safety of national contingents in Bosnia had a direct effect on the
use of force and the rescue of civilians.70 On the tactical level force was used by UNPROFOR
most often to stop Serb harassment of the peacekeepers, not protect civilians. Being that
harassment of the blue helmets was not a strategic goal, the use of force usually worked, the
Serbs backed down.71 Had UNPROFOR been trying to protect civilians, use of force would
likely need to be more robust since the Serbs would have seen this as a direct threat to their war
aims. Knowing this, the UN eliminated the option of coercive action against Serbs anywhere in
the country, except on a sparing tactical level.72 And even this level was ruled out when a jet was
shot down and NATO decided not to engage tactical level targets for safety reasons. NATO
requested permission to suppress the increasingly dangerous Serb air defense system, but
UNPROFOR commanders vetoed the strategic operation, “which would be tantamount to going
to war with the Serbs” and put their troops at risk.73 And so the circular debate of who should be
put at risk continued. After the war, the UN’s Srebrenica report concluded that, in retrospect, it
was wrong to declare repeatedly and publicly a reluctance to use airpower.74
The misty hills
In contrast to the DutchBat, UNAMIR was big for its size.
Dallaire and the UNAMIR troops were able to overcome the weak mandate and poor
resources to save many lives despite the immoral actions of their superiors who withdrew the
bulk of the UN force and stood by as the genocide passed. By having the courage to accept risk
and recognize evil, the small unit Dallaire did retain was able to wield moral force well beyond it
apparent physical potential.
What must be kept in mind is that this is a tactical demonstration that can only be
extrapolated to the strategic level. In fact, knowing that the reduced UNAMIR could operate only
at a tactical level, not threatening the strategic genocide that was occurring, the Interahamwe felt
no need to risk conflict with the troops. Thus, it is no surprise that, according to Brent Beardsley,
“If there was any determined resistance at close quarters, the government guys tended to back
off.”75 UNAMIR managed to keep the Interahamwe out of Amahoro stadium for months,
protecting upwards of 10,000 people. At the Milles Collines Hotel, ten peacekeepers and four
observers protected 600 and another small group of UN troops protected the King Faisal
Hospital. 76 It appears to one observer that “Rwandans were safe as long as they were gathered
under UN protection.”77 However, since UNAMIR did not represent a threat to the aims of the
Hutu Power movement, it is no surprise that they met no resistance. While UNAMIR could pride
itself on this success, it was only tactical.
Still, we can see a lesson in Rwanda. By demonstrating an ability to take risks and
identifying the aggressors, UNAMIR was able to save lives. At the Hotel des Mille Collines, for
example, Dallaire told one observer to deny entry to any armed person, an order that put him,
with no weapons, at “extreme risk.” “His only weapon was his ability to bluff…”78 This refusal
to transfer risk demonstrated great courage, helping build moral bonds.
Principle one: Recognize the difference between aggressors and victims
In a visit to Rwanda in May 1998, Kofi Annan said that, “In the face of genocide, there can
be no standing aside, no looking away, no neutrality—there are perpetrators and there are
victims; there is evil and there is evil’s harvest.”79
Neutrality is vital for the effective operation of some organizations and missions. However,
neutrality does not automatically equate to morality. The Srebrenica report reached a conclusion
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that, “The United Nations global commitment to ending conflicts does not preclude moral
judgments, but makes them necessary.”80 There is nothing in the idea of humanitarianism to
imply that taking sides is wrong. Indeed, in some conflicts, not to take sides in favor of the
victims would be immoral.81
Inaction, neutrality, and impartiality have ambiguous impacts on crisis. Doing nothing not
only allows the killing to continue unabated, it can contribute to its escalation. Dallaire argues
that the absence of the international community may constitute in itself an encouragement to the
perpetrators of massive violations of human rights such as genocide.82 For example, one of the
reasons that the Hutu “crisis committee” decided to expand violence to the countryside was “the
failure of the international community to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and
other regions.”83 The Independent Inquiry on Rwanda concluded that, “In effect, there can be no
neutrality in the face of genocide, no impartiality in the face of a campaign to exterminate the
population.”84
In Bosnia, when the UN and NATO failed to respond to the attack on Srebrenica, the
invading Serbs chose to take the entire enclave rather than stick to their more limited initial
objectives.85 The result was the fall of the city and the massacre of about 8,000 Muslim men. The
conclusion to The Secretary General’s report on the fall of Srebrenica blamed the UN’s lack of
action on “an institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted with attempted
genocide.”86
According to the Brahimi report, “No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility
of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from
aggressor.”87 The failure wrecked the moral authority of the organization.
As a solution, the UN has been attempting to convert to a more active impartiality, and
blamed the past on a passive neutrality. But the semantic acrobatics have only been running in
circles. In reality, impartiality has many definitions and each side (the parties to the conflict, the
intervener) view each version differently.88 For the parties, it is about perception, while for the
intervener it is about intent.
The first definition of impartiality is one in which the parties receive equal benefit or
detriment, or no benefit or detriment. This is often termed neutrality. This is a passive stance. It
lacks moral agency since it can only act within the limits set by the parties, and thus has no
freedom of action. It chooses a course of action by not choosing.89 The attempt at neutral
impartiality in the 1990s tended to cause stalemates by punishing whoever advanced too far. In
Bosnia, for example, the international community would help one side and then the other; hurt
one side and then the other. “Thus, the UN was accused of taking both sides by both sides.”90
This impartiality paradoxically alienated and encouraged the belligerents.91
Another definition of impartiality is adherence to a principle that does not consider the
relative positions of the parties. Impartiality can then benefit both or one side, purposefully or
incidentally. The UN currently takes this view. According to the Brahimi report, impartiality
means adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate. Such
impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all times.
Force can be used against armed persons because of how they act. The 1995 UN General
Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations provide this definition: “Impartiality must not promote
inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively,
without fear or favor. Neither side should gain unfair advantages as a result of the activities...”92
This view maintains that using force towards the implementation of mandates does not
automatically equal taking sides, even if the activity happens to be to one of the parties’
12
detriment.93 The assertion is that as long as force is used in an even-handed way, impartiality can
be maintained. But as the Peacekeepers Handbook points out, “The importance of �perceived
impartiality’ should be remembered. It is not enough to be impartial – you should be seen to be
so.”94
This is the problem. Canadian doctrine states that, “The use of force, even when applied in an
even-handed manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such.” This is an original realization for a
PSO doctrine. However, the next paragraph states that, “If impartiality is discarded or the [force]
is perceived as being biased… it will have a negative effect upon their consent and make the
conduct of operations more difficult.”95 So any use of force, even if even-handed, will be
perceived as partial and degrade the situation.
This makes impartial rescue a near impossibility. It is too difficult for a rescuer to only �take
the side of the population.’96 In wars where rescue is often needed, the population is a side and
protecting civilians is obstructing a belligerents objectives. Thus, force will likely need to be
used.
This brings up the final definition, viewing impartiality as restoration of the parties to a
relative position that is seen as equal or fair. Either way, the intervention will benefit one side,
the victim. In this case, impartiality is a true moral choice. The general idea is that impartiality
implies an active choice between two or more options.97
There is a misconception that in most conflicts the sides are equal in fault and merit and thus
intervention must change the actions of each side. The basic assumption is that each side has
some power over whether the conflict will continue or end. However, in modern conflicts that
include genocide and ethnic cleansing, the conflicts that most demand rescue, no appeasement by
the victim will likely change the actions of the killers.98
Military interventions must distinguish between aggressors and victims. “Neutrality in its
legal sense dooms military intervention to failure.”99 If action is required, then at least one party
to the conflict opposes what the international presence is trying to achieve, otherwise they could
do their jobs fine.100
A number of studies find that interventions that choose sides, designating aggressor and
victim, often end conflicts quicker than would otherwise be expected. According to political
violence scholar Matthew Krain, intervention against the perpetrator of atrocities, or in support
of the target, has a statistically significant negative effect on the severity of genocides and
politicides.101 These results suggest that taking the side of the victims is the best way to rescue.
According to Krain, “Intervention would challenge those who were immune from risk and divert
time and resources from policies of domestic group eradication toward defense against an
external challenger.”102
Taking sides has clear military advantages. For example, in Rwanda one strategic option
would have been to help the RFP win the war. This would have dramatically shortened the time
it took to defeat the government and thus ended the genocide sooner.103 By taking sides, the
military effort is likely to be easier. Deterring both sides in a civil war, preventing major
massacres, and policing the population requires a huge number of troops.104 Taking sides would
also prevent being forced into fighting both sides. An intervention without taking sides in
Rwanda would have left a political vacuum with the extremist leadership out of power, the rebels
not yet in control of the capital, and a shortage of moderate politicians. The intervening nations
would likely need to establish a provisional government, something the rebels would oppose.105
This would probably have resulted in armed confrontation with the RPF.
13
However, there are problems with leaving all the grunt work to a surrogate army on the
ground. Primarily, it allows an armed force a level of legitimacy that could make protection
harder. This arguably happened with the KLA. Using a proxy is a less risky strategy for
interveners who don’t want to see their own troops in danger, but could complicate conflict
resolution. This violates the next two principles; thus, using a proxy for rescue is not a valid
strategy.
There are two options for force that do not require siding with the victim. The first is to use
force to stop the fighting only, engaging both sides but not actually settling any issues in favor of
one. However, this is void of strategy. It provides only for a cease-fire, which will rescue
militaries more than civilians. Momentary respite will save lives, however, in the case of
Rwanda a cease-fire would not necessarily have ended the militia’s killing behind RGF lines.106
A second option is to side with the aggressor. This is not an infeasible scenario considering
the French support of the Hutu regime in Rwanda. There is even a fairly solid rationale for such
a choice, since by siding with a perpetrator one reduces the level of threat they feel (which is one
of the causes of genocide) and this could result in a reduction in killing. It is possible that had the
UN sided with the Serbs or Hutus the wars would have ended sooner. However, this would make
long-term protection and conflict resolution impossible. Again, this will be covered more in the
last principle.
Principle two: Do not transfer risk to civilians
According to Dallaire, the “no-risk approach” was what prevented the world from reacting
properly to the Rwanda genocide.107 A response that took risks, he implies, would have made
rescue possible. Afraid to take losses themselves, the international community instead
“knowingly, deliberately and disproportionately reallocate risk of harm.”108
The transfer of risk in many operations begins early, and has an impact before troops even hit
the ground. According to Dallaire, an operation should begin with the objective and then
consider how best to achieve it with minimal risk. This is often not the case. UNAMIR, for
example, “began with an evaluation of risk and if there was risk, the objective was forgotten.”109
It is this aversion to risk that often causes civilian rescue to be dismissed in the first place—it is
risky business. Yale legal philosopher Paul Kahn argues that “riskless warfare in pursuit of
human rights” is a “moral contradiction.”110 While it may seem a truism that rescue requires the
rescuer to put oneself in danger and not put the victim in more danger, there are major
implications to some of the most West’s most favored strategies.
Force Protection
The past has shown that force protection of the intervening military will always be a high
priority in operations other that those clearly in defense of the nation.111 Indeed, force protection
has become an intricate part of both peacekeeping and war fighting doctrines, an objective in
itself that must be considered alongside other objectives. But force protection in the extreme can
be self-defeating. This is particularly true in rescue operations. Force protection can make it less
likely that the force will be able to save or protect civilians and can actually increase the risk to
the force. But most important, it can make the situation worse for civilians by transferring risk to
them.
According to military ethics professor Martin Cook, “If force-protection considerations
restrict the means to the point where the operation is unlikely to halt the atrocities in question
14
and will have the foreseeable effect of widespread consequences for other innocent civilians, we
must reassess the moral equation at the basis of the intervention.”112
As already mentioned regarding Bosnia, “Strategic level inaction stemmed from the fear that
any attempt by weak, widely dispersed peacekeepers to impose themselves on events in a
volatile environment would put them at unacceptable risk.”113
But a �hunker down’ mentality intended to reduce vulnerability can actually increase it by
reducing situational awareness and intelligence gathering, undermining local perception, and
providing a ready target for attack.114 The Royal Dutch Army’s Peacekeeping Manual, Peace
Operations, states that, “passive measures to bring about a higher degree of protection (such as
the use of shelters and camouflage) may have a counterproductive effect on the conduct of the
mission.” Success depends partially on presence and perception, and thus the visibility of the
peace force. As a result, a choice must be made “between a degree of protection and the image
which will be portrayed as a result.”115
Also, when force protection becomes a military’s center of gravity, any enemy has a simple
task –kill a few soldiers in any random manner. The killings of the Belgians peacekeepers in
Rwanda was very likely a deliberate strategy to show Brussels how much risk was in the country
and encourage them to withdraw and leave the Tutsis with the risk.116
People versus territory
Certain strategies also transfer risk, making them morally suspect and largely
ineffective. For example, it is much more difficult to defend an entire population than a
small area. In light of this, many rescue schemes have included the setting up �safe areas,’
most infamously at Srebrenica.
Throughout the war in Bosnia, it was unclear whether the primary aim of the UN operation
was to protect territory or people.117 Bosnian ambassador to the UN, Mohammed Sacirbey,
attempted to keep the focus on the people. “The most important thing to keep in mind,” he said,
was that “the safe area was not the land; it was the people.”118
But it turned out UNPROFOR would not protect people or the area, and Srebrenica fell in
July 1995. The establishment of the �safe area’ had encouraged flight to the city and then, by
refusing to defend it, “left a large group of targets unprotected, exposed, and centrally located,
facilitating quicker extermination.”119
Of course if the areas are actually protected some live will be saved, but it is impossible to
judge if it merely saves certain lives and condemns others to death. The geographic limitations
have major outside effects. �Safe areas’ can either fail to protect some people or force them to
migrate to safety.120
In addition, the limited �safe’ space may encourage �zones of violence’ right next door.121
Operation Artemis in the DRC, for example, provided civilian safety only in very limited space
and time. The strict three-month deployment sent a clear signal to everyone, including the
militias, the transitory nature of the force. Also, the geographic limitation meant that those in just
beyond the AOR were still at risk. They were, in fact, at more risk since the militias were not
disarmed but driven out of town, where they were able to continue to launch attacks on the
150,000 people remaining on the city’s outskirts.122 The operation simply relocated the risk.
Air power
Force protection and ease come together in airpower, a favorite strategy of the West because
it is low risk and simple. It is not a bad strategy in itself as a quick comparison between
15
Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and the Kosovo war demonstrates. However, it is often
misused.
During Deliberate Force, “At some increased risk to crewmen, NATO leaders adjusted
standard procedures to further reduce the possibility of collateral damage.” For example, while
normal procedure called for aircraft to minimize their exposure to enemy defensive systems by
dropping all of their weapons in a single pass, many aircraft over Bosnia made multiple passes,
dropping one weapon at a time, and only after the dust from previous weapons had cleared.123
The majority of targets were fielded forces and strategic military assets, although some dual use
facilities were hit, such as bridges.124
In contrast, a positive humanitarian outcome in the Kosovo operation was compromised by
the refusal to accept greater risk to soldiers’ lives.125 Primarily this meant keeping planes out of
the way of anti-aircraft systems, bombing from 15,000 feet.126
There is a perception among some that the air war was effective by going after Serb
population, proving war can be won from the air. In reality, the air war was not effective because
it did not go after enough military targets due to the risk. The air war did nothing to deny the
Serb objective of defeating the KLA and depriving it of the population base required for
sustained operations.127 The means selected by NATO, targeting civilian infrastructure instead of
the Serb military, allowed the Serbs the “time and space” to continue the cleansing of
Kosovars.128
On a final note, the overuse of airpower also resulted in excessive civilian casualties. The
Serbs made the issue of casualties a matter of huge moral importance, in effect, a new center of
gravity that endangered NATO’s moral cohesion.129
Principle three: Consider all actions through a conflict-resolution lens
One of the inherent problems of humanitarian interventions is that they tend not to be
effective precursors of conflict resolution. The self-proclaimed main thesis of The Responsibility
to Protect report is that “any coercive intervention for human protection purposes is but one
element in a continuum of intervention, which begins with preventive efforts and ends with the
responsibility to rebuild. Different time periods call for different types of action but they are
connected.” 130 Rescue is part of the continuum and must be seen as such. Each action must be
considered in terms of whether it helps solve or contributes to the root causes of the conflict.131
There is an ongoing debate in the humanitarian community on whether the object of a
humanitarian intervention should be to deal with “the immediate manifestations of suffering” or
aim to reshaping of the processes that led to the suffering in the first place.132 This debate can be
extended to rescue. The “immediate manifestations” are caused by an aggressor who, as already
pointed out, must be opposed. However, in order to make a society resistant to new rounds of
violent conflict, there must be political involvement.133
There is a clear preference for approaching a crisis as a humanitarian or military problem,
and ignoring the more contentious political issues that contributed to the conflict in the first
place.134 A conflict resolution lens will not allow such a course. It is difficult to separate the
rescue needs of a “group from the political circumstances affecting their vulnerability and the
protection needs that such circumstances engender.”135
This is perhaps the most contentious principle of rescue. The Commission on the
Responsibility to Protect believed that the primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or
avert human suffering and not to alter borders or advance political claims.136 But such a rescue
effort would simply return the victims to their previous state, a state that already failed to protect
16
them. Effective response must not do this. Those who intervene need to face up to its political
nature.137 This means addressing the root causes of the conflict—even the political ones. Rescue
and protection’s purpose should be to alter existing power relationships in favor of the victims.138
Again this means taking sides. But it does not mean reversing the order so that the one-time
aggressor is now the victim. Of course there will be complicated decisions to make about which
side needs to be empowered and which needs to be confronted. But what one will find in most
cases is that there is one side that can be sided with. There is often a moral community that
straddles both sides.
This principle also means that military operations must not damage the “structural stability”
of a society or country beyond quick repair.139 Not only would this make conflict resolution more
difficult, it would also cause suffering and death in the post-conflict society, a temporal transfer
of risk. Most doctrine acknowledges that targets vital to the achievement of long-term goals must
be withheld, or attacked in a manner that will allow recovery or repair.140
What exactly must be done for an operation to support conflict resolution is uncertain, as it
has so rarely happened. We must depend on our good judgment and counterfactual lessons, more
than actual cases of success. A good place to start the debate is with the Sovereignty report’s five
protection tasks. These are: minority protection; security sector reform; disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration; mine action; and pursuit of war criminals.141 There is
additional demand on rescue forces to ensure they do not exacerbate these problems, something
particularly important for mine action and security sector reform.
Conclusion
The ultimate conclusion to the principles of rescue is not easy. Taking into account that one
does not want to transfer risk, one wants to recognize the aggressor and one wants to aim for
revolutionary, not restorative, ends, there is clear reason to wage a war of rescue with the aim
being to target the aggressing military first and foremost.
Traditionally, there are three broad methods to rescue civilians, succinctly stated in a
Refugees International report.142 The doctrine presented here only allows one.
First, the endangered population could be concentrated under the protection of the
intervening force. As pointed out in the discussion on safe areas, this is ill advised since it leaves
some people unprotected, force others to migrate to the area and likely transfers risk
geographically to another area. In addition, it does nothing to resolve the underlying conflict.
Second, the intervening force could respond upon warning to scenes of killing. However, this
is purely reactionary so fails at protection. It merely punishes those responsible, which achieves
little.
The final course of action is for the intervening force incapacitates the killing forces (keeping
in mind that protection of civilians is of course the primary objective). This flies in the face of
modern strategy, especially air power, which is based on an indirect approach that deliberately
avoids combat between armies.143 To engage the military would mean singling out the aggressor
and placing the risk with them, where it belongs. This avoids a Kosovo scenario, where the
strategy was to target Serbian civilians.
Once this war is started, it must be carried through to the end using the above doctrine.
Economist Edward Luttwak has argued convincingly that many wars should run their course
towards victory by one side.144 Luttwak’s work is important in that it points out that war should
not be dabbled in. The aggressing armies cannot be left to continue a protracted struggle from the
hinterlands.
17
So is neutrality doomed? This depends on ones definition of neutrality and impartiality. If
neutrality is used as a tool to abstain from moral decisions, it is useless. It is not neutrality at all.
Is this encouraging war to reach peace? Not at all. In most cases, peaceful means can be used.
However, we must be willing to recognize while we are encouraging peace, for many people, the
peace is already gone. To be willing to enter the fray to save lives is not blow to positive peace,
but only a setback for negative peace. Fought properly, a rescue operation can yield a real peace
on the far side.
If this doctrine is followed, there is a reasonable chance of success for missions that attempt
to rescue civilians from genocide, atrocities, and ethnic cleaning. However, the doctrine must be
accepted at all levels, by soldiers on the ground, politicians back home, and ultimately by civilian
populations within those countries who take on rescue missions. Moral unity, doctrinal unity, is a
prerequisite for action. Until this time, consideration of what is a reasonable cost to pay to rescue
others will continue to constrain the efforts of the international community. Until a leader can
promise only “blood, tears and sweat” and still get support for a rescue operation,
humanitarianism will be limited.
_________________________________________________________
Dylan Lee Lehrke is a PhD student at University of Dublin, Trinity College, and also works for
the U.S. Project on National Security Reform as Chief of Staff of the Case Study Working
Group. He can be reached at Dylan.Lehrke@gmail.com.
1
Quote verified at http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/32145.html
Chesterman, Simon, ed. Civilians in War. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001. p.179 and Garrett, Stephen.
Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention. Praeger, Westport, 1999. p.9.
3
This account is from Holt, Victoria. The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for
Civilian Protection. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C., January 2005.
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Stimson_CivPro_pre-pubdraftFeb04.pdf p.40.
4
Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan, January 2006, Human Rights Watch
Vol.18, No.1 (A), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/2.htm quoting African Union, CommuniquГ©
(PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII)), African Union Peace and Security Council 17th Meeting, October 20, 2004, Addis Ababa.
5
Lang, Anthony F., Jr., ed. Just Intervention. Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2003. p.110.
Protection defines human security as physical safety, economic and social well-being, respect for dignity and worth
as human beings, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, according to International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect. International Development
Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001. http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. p.15, 2.21. Most people
use the rescue and protection synonymously, for good reason since they are linked, but they clearly requires
different strategies so are divided as much as feasibly possible here.
6
Taylor B. Seybolt has stated that governments should build their capacity to stop genocide by developing more
effective military doctrine in Seybolt, Taylor. Eyes Wide Open: Rwanda and the difficulty of worthy military
intervention. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, October 1999. p.3.
http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/EyesWideOpen.pdf.
2
18
7
In determining the strategy to be taken, the potential intervening country estimates the probability of success and
weighs the costs, according to, Regan, Patrick. “Choosing to Intervene: Outside Intervention in Internal Conflict.”
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 3, Aug. 1998, p.760.
8
Nanda, Ved, et al. “Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwadna and Liberia – Revisiting the Validity of
Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law – Part II.” Denv. J. Int’l & Pol’y Vol 26:5 1998, p.867
9
“Parties would be more likely to acquiesce if they believe that the Security Council had the will and the means to
enforce its resolutions.” Pirnie, Bruce, and William Simmons. Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues.
RAND, Santa Monica, 1996. p.48.
10
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect. International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001. http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf
11
In Holzgrefe, J.L. and Robert Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. p.320
12
Chesterman, Civilians in War. p.240.
13
Wheeler, Nicholas. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2000. p.250 (quote) and Morton, Jeffrey, S., et al. Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After
the Break Up of Yugoslavia. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004. p.102.
14
Chesterman, Simon. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2004.
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/chesterman%20(final%20final).pdf. p.37
15
Lang, Anthony F., Jr., ed. Just Intervention. Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2003. p.109
16
Ministry of Defense. The Military Contribution to Peace Support Missions. Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (UK),
Second Edition, referred to throughout as JWP 3-50 (UK), 4-7, p.414
17
Wheeler, N., p.250
18
Of note, there are some instances when civilians are at risk for the opposite reason – because they have no
valuable role. This occurs most often when belligerents are able to finance their militaries without civilian
assistance, causing social disengagement from and abuse of civilians. This was the case in Angola. These groups
“show scant regard for the security of civilians, unlike traditional insurgents or guerillas.” Singh, Bikram.
Touchstones for the Military Leadership Engaged in Asymmetric Warfare. U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute and the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2004.
http://www.stormingmedia.us/77/7714/A771424.html
19
Seybolt, T., p.24, italics in original
20
Wheeler, N., p.34
21
Roberts quote from Wheeler, N., p.36 (NATOs Humanitarian War over Kosovo, Survival, 41/3, 1999, 110),
Means compatibility from Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in Holzgrefe, J., p.75
22
United States Army. JP 1-02 Dictionary of Military Terms. 23 Mar 1994. p.120
23
The Challenges Project. Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century, Concluding Report 1997-2002.
Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002. http://www.peacechallenges.net. p.92
24
Bono, Giovanna. “The EU’s Military Doctrine: An Assessment.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3,
Autumn 2004, p. 440
25
Available from http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html
26
Holt, V., p.41. The report by the Stimson Center analyzed the current capacity of the international community to
conduct missions to protect civilians in non-permissive environments. However, it did not explore what would be
needed except by exploring what was present. In addition, it seemed to focus on military tasks, not principles.
27
Bono, G., p.439, the study of war is often seen as philosophy as it was by Clausewitz
28
Chesterman (2004) p.11.
29
United Nations. General Assembly and Security Council. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000. Paragraph 50.
30
Compilation of resolutions by Holt, V. and partially corroborated by United Nations. Report of the SecretaryGeneral to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2004/431), 28 May 2004. p.3.
31
Chesterman, S., 2004, p.21
32
Two of histories great philosophers on the art of war.
33
Lester G. Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister at that time, is also credited with the development
34
The difference between these is important and will be discussed in an upcoming section.
35
Bellamy, Alex J., et al. Understanding Peacekeeping. Polity, Cambridge, 2004. p.101
36
Minear, Larry and Thomas Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1993. p.93
19
37
Kuhne, Winrich. Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed. International Politics and Society, 4/99,
pp. 358-367. http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF. p.362
38
Findlay, Trevor. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. p.318
39
Robert Perito, “Congressional Testimony: The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace (Oct. 18, 2007).
40
Williams, Thomas J. “Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for AsymmetricWarfare.” Parameters,
Summer 2003, pp. 19-35. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/williams.pdf
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p.62, 7.30
41
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p.62, 7.30
42
Pugh, M., p.7
43
Mayall, J., p.17
44
Ulriksen, Stale. “Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures.” International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p.464.
45
Holt, V., p.12
46
Mileham, Patrick and Willett Lee. Military Ethics for the Expeditionary Era. London: London Royal Inst
International Affairs, 2001. pp.55, 56
47
Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University Press, Washington D.C., January 1995. p.36.
48
Chatterjee, Deen and Don Scheid, eds. Ethics and Foreign Intervention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2003. p.43, similar to the definition that Ethical codes “constitute doctrine whose true value is realized when it is
discussed and debated” in Mileham 69
49
Heidenrich, John G. How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen.
Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2001. p.218
50
Wilcox, Greg. Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative. http://www.d-ni.net/fcs/pdf/4gw_and%20the_moral_imperative.pdf. p.4, 18.
51
Wilcox, G., p.11, the other strategic elements for him were physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical
52
This is not meant to mean moral quality of individual soldiers, although this of course has impact since the socalled strategic corporal is a moral actor whose moral choices can have strategic consequences (for example in
Haditha and Abu Ghraib)
53
Wilcox, G., p.12, the other factors are weather, terrain, command, doctrine
54
Mileham 68
55
O’Neill, William. A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced. The Brookings Institution-Johns
Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, Washington D.C., April 2004.
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20040422oneill.pdf. p.5
56
Donald, Dominick. “Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century.”
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2002, p.21
57
Daddis, Gregory. “Understanding Fear's Effect on Unit Effectiveness.” Military Review, July-August 1994.
http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/JulAug04/daddis.pdf
58
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of London, 1958. p.200.
59
Mayall, James, ed. The New Interventionism: 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former
Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. p.16
60
Stowell, Ellery. “Humanitarian Intervention.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 4, October
1939, p.735
61
The Challenges Project. p.193
62
Tharoor, Sashi and Ian Johnstone, “Humanitarian Security Dilemma in International Peacekeeping.” Gordon, D.S.
and F.H. Toase. Aspects of Peacekeeping. Frank Cass: London, 2001. p. 7
63
Pugh, Michael, ed. The UN, Peace and Force. Frank Cass. London, 1997. p.12
64
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p.57, 7.4
65
Mayall, J., p.16
66
Chesterman, S., 2004, p.195
67
Morton, J., p.113, Referred to as “moral equivalency” in the Srebrencia report on page 104.
68
United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, entitled “The
Fall of Srebrenica” (A/54/549), 15 November 1999. p.106, 107, 108
20
69
Power, Samantha. “A problem from Hell” American and the Age of Genocide. Basic Books, New York, 2002.
p.417
70
Morton, J., p.103
71
When, in 1993, British soldiers escorting a relief convoy to Tuzla from Kladanj, started to shoot back at Serbs
firing from the hills, harassment was dramatically reduced (Kaldor, Mary. New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in
a Global Era. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999). Scanbatt 1 threatened immediate use of force to get through
roadblocks and promptly replied to any attack against it and was also successful. (Luttwak in Crocker, Chester, et al,
eds. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, United States Institute of Peace Press,
Washington, 2001. p.270).
72
Heidenrich, J., p.171
73
Srebrenica Report, p.35, 39 and Pirnie, B., p.65
74
Srebrenica Report, p.104; This despite the UNPROFOR Commander stressing that “to ensure the best possible
deterrence by [air power], doubt must exist as to the exact criteria used to determine its use (Srebrenica Report,
p.30).”
75
Power, S., p.368
76
Details on all three sites from Heidenrich, J., p.171 and Mille Collines from Power, S., p.368
77
Suhrke, Astri. “Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No.
2, Summer 1998, pp.14, 16
78
Dallaire, Romeo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Carroll & Graf Publishers,
New York, 2003. p.269
79
Donald, Dominick. “Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century.”
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2002, p.23
80
Srebrenica Report, p.108
81
Moseley, Alexander and Richard Norman, eds. Human Rights and Military Intervention. Ashgate, Burlington,
2002. p.75
82
Pugh, M., p.181
83
Jentleson, Bruce. “Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas.” Peaceworks No. 35. United
States institute of Peace, Washington D.C., October 2000. http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks35.pdf. p.17.
84
Van Baarda, Ted and Fred Van Iersel. “The Uneasy Relationship between Conscience and Military Law: The
Brahimi Report’s Unresolved Dilemma.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2002, p.30, note that
Neutral and impartial have been historically treated as synonymous. I will use them as this, largely due to continued
lack of clarity on the concepts among almost everyone.
85
The Fall of Srebrenica, p.36; pointed out the same was done in a few instances, including Gorazde and Srebrenica
86
Note that the term Muslim is used over the term Bosniak simply for clarity. The Fall of Srebrenica, p.108
87
United Nations. General Assembly and Security Council. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000. p.ix
88
Lepard, Brain D. Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: a fresh legal approach based on fundamental ethical
principles in international law and world religions. The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 2002.
p.202, 203
89
Donald, D. p.22, 23 and Van Baarda, T., p.32
90
Damrosch, L., p.64
91
Richard Betts in Crocker, C., 2001, 287, 288
92
Kuhne, W., p.363
93
Kuhne, W., p.363
94
Lepard, B., p.207
95
Canadian Forces 2-6
96
Donald, D. p.33
97
Donald, D. p.22, 23 and Van Baarda, T., p.32
98
Krain, Matthew. International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides. International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 363-387. http://www.wooster.edu/polisci/mkrain/isq05/isq05.pdf. p. 4
99
Pugh, M., p.179
100
Chesterman, S., 2004, p.213
101
Krain, M., p.26, 27
102
Krain, M., p.6, 7
21
103
Seybolt, T., Footnote 46 and 59. This is not considered in the shock troop scenario as presented by the Carnegie
Commission report.
104
Seybolt, T., p.13
105
Seybolt, T., p.23
106
Dallaire, R.
107
Dallaire, R., p.497
108
Chatterjee, D., p.91
109
Melvern, L., p.130
110
Morton, J., p.221
111
Lang, A., p.152
112
Lang, A., p.153
113
McInnes 119
114
Urban 3-31
115
O’Neill, W., p.12, 13
116
Early intelligence information picked up by UNAMIR and later events seem to confirm that those who planned
genocide wanted to get UN out to as to achieve the objectives without foreign interference. In Suhrke 9, 10
117
UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, p. 224,
118
Power, S., p.405
119
Krain, M., p.10
120
Richard Haass in Crocker, C., p.300
121
Bellamy, A., p.183
122
MГ©decins Sans FrontiГЁres, Ituri: Unkept Promises? A Pretense of Protection and Inadequate Assistance. July 25,
2003. http://www.msf.org.au/docs/reports/drc.pdf. p.6 and O’Neill, W., p.36
123
Owen, Robert. C. “Operation Deliberate Force: A Case Study on Humanitarian Constraints in Aerospace
Warfare.” http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Owen2001.pdf. pp.64, 65, In addition,
since smart bombs that go “stupid” generally strike long or short of their targets, bridge attack runs were made along
the rivers they crossed, even though this placed the crews at risk to antiaircraft weapons arrayed along the banks.
124
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm, the absence of civilian targets was partially
due to the fact that the cities of Bosnia had already been decimated and the most valuable were still in Muslim
hands.
125
Wheeler, N., p.308
126
To deny NATO aircraft the signal needed to locate and destroy them, Serb air defense operators turned their radar
off. Serbian air defense system’s mere existence, not its use, kept NATO jets above 15,000 feet, which greatly
degraded their effectiveness against Serb forces (Reese, Timothy. “Precision Firepower: SMART BOMBS, DUMB
STRATEGY.” Military Review, July-August 1993. http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ebo/smart-bombs-dumbstrategy.pdf).
127
Wheeler, N., p.270
128
Lawrence Freedman in Crocker, C., p.317
129
Mileham p.38
130
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and Wilton Park Conference. p.4
131
Walsh, Mark R. Managing Peace Operations in the Field. Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 32-49. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/walsh.htm
132
Garrett, Stephen. Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian
Intervention. Praeger, Westport, 1999. p.78
133
The Challenges Project, p.89
134
Damrosch, Lori Fisler. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. Council on Foreign
Relations Press, New York, 1993. p.98
135
Donini, Antonio. Case Study: Negotiating Humanitarian Access. Experience from Taliban Afghanistan.
http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/hnn/hnn%20related%20papers/case%20studies/case%20study%20afghanistan.pd
f. p.3
136
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p.35
137
Uvin, Peter. The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict. OECD Development Assistance Committee
Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Paris, September 1999.
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/synth_fin.pdf. p.4, 5
22
138
Anderson, Mary, and Angelika Spelten. Conflict Transformation: How International Assistance can Contribute.
Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn, Policy Paper 15, December 2000.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5NTDGR/$FILE/gtz-conflit-dec02.pdf?OpenElement. p.3 and
Lang, A., p.112
139
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent
Conflict. 2001. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf. p.31
140
JWP 3-50 (UK) 4-18 and JTF I-13 to I-16
141
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p.65, 66
142
Bernath, Clifford H., and David C. Gompert. “The Power to Protect” Using New Military Capabilities to Stop
Mass Killings. Refugees International, Washington D.C., July 2003. http://coedmha.org/PKO/Philippines2003/plenbrfs/day1/milcap.pdf. p.21; the report articulates the final method as finding
and destroying the killing forces. For the purpose of this study, incapacitating is adequate.
143
Moseley, A., p.107
144
Crocker, C., 2001, Chapter 16
23