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The Anatomy of Combat

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The Anatomy of Combat
by
Raymond J. Volluz
and
Raymond M. Volluz
On The
Measure Of
Effectiveness
Presented at the
20th ISMOR Symposium
Eynsham Hall, Oxford, UK
26 ~ 29 August, 2003
In 1832, Carl von Clausewitz wrote:
“But the first business of every theory (ON WAR) is to clear up conceptions and
ideas which have been jumbled together, and, we may say, entangled and
confused; and only when a right understanding is established, as to names and
conceptions, can we hope to progress with clearness and facility, and be certain
that author and reader will always see things from the same point of view.
Tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each other in time and
space, at the same time essentially different activities, the inner laws and mutual
relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until a clear conception
of the nature of each activity is established.
He to whom all this is nothing, must either repudiate all theoretical consideration,
or his understanding has not as yet been pained by the confused and perplexing
ideas resting on no fixed point of view, leading to no satisfactory result,
sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic, sometimes floating in vague generalities,
which we are often obliged to hear and read on the conduct of War, owing to the
spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed to these
subjects.”
--- Clausewitz “On War”
Six Levels of Analysis
L evel
T y pe
A ctiv ity
R espo n sib le
I
B udgetary
S tructure F orce
N atio nal G o vernm ent/
U S D efense D epartm ent
II
S trategic
B alance R esources
V ersus T hreats
Joint C h iefs of S taff
III
S trategic
P lan U se of R esources
to A chieve O bjectives
U nified C om m ander
(T heater)
IV
T actical
Im plem ent T heater
S trategy
U nit C om m ander
V
T actical
U tilize C apability
M ilitary E lem ent
VI
P rocurem ent
P roduce C apability
P rocurem ent A gency
Manpower and Time -
- are Meaningful at all Levels
figure 3-1
PROJECTED
THREAT
Six Levels of Analysis
Input/Output
LEVELS ARE CONNECTED BY - -
PROBABILITY
OF MISSION
SUCCESS
THEATER
MISSIONS
DEFINED
INPUT/OUTPUT
III THEATER STRATEGY
PROBABILITY
OF ENGAGEMENT
SUCCESS
DEFINITION OF
ENGAGEMENTS
IV ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS
DUEL
ANALYSIS
REQUIREMENTS
TRADES
NUMBERS
VERSUS
REQUIREMENTS
CONFIGURATIONS
PERFORMANCE
CAPABILITIES
V DUEL ANALYSIS
PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS
OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
II WORLD WIDE STRATEGY
PERFORMANCE
THREAT
DEFINITION
DESIRED WORLD
WIDE STRATEGY
I FORCE STRUCTURE
FRIENDLY
ENVIRONMENT
BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS
POLITICAL
CONSTRAINTS
SCENARIO
DEFENSE
MISSIONS
EXISTING &
PROGRAMMED FORCE
VI CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
PARAMETERS
figure 9-7
MAN-DAYS in Theater Measures
Input & Output at All Levels
• MAN-DAYS permit us to specifically introduce
the vital factor of TIME, and the function of
MANEUVER.
• MAN-DAYS permit us to interrelate and compare
the widely-varying functions, such as Ground
Combat, Tactical Air Strikes, and Rear-Area
Maintenance.
• MAN-DAYS does not lead us into some of the
cost effectiveness paradoxes.
5
chapter 1, section 2.0
Let me emphasize that:
• A Military Force is Designed to Conduct Military
Operations.
• Military Operations are a Planned Use of Violence to
Achieve a Political Objective
• A Political Objective, if Achieved, Will Change the
Enemy’s Behavior
• But Military Objectives are:
–
–
To Occupy or Control Areas, or
To do Violence to People or Property
Theater Strategy Involves Terrain,
Time and Manpower
figure 3-3
The Battle is Not Isolated
figure 3-4
Echelon Organization
figure 3-5
Geographic Regime
figure 3-6
Time Regime
figure 3-7
The Battle is Decided by Functional
Performance
COMMAND
SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS
COMBAT
FUNCTIONS
COMMAND
COMBAT
FUNCTIONS
SUPPLY
SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS
SUPPLY
MAINTENANCE
FIRE
FIRE
MAINTENANCE
CONSTRUCTION
MANEUVER
MANEUVER
CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORTATION
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
TRANSPORTATION
SIGNAL
SIGNAL
figure 3-8
Each Function
Has Various Measures
•
•
•
CHARACTERISTICS Measure Facets of PERFORMANCE; e.g. Rate
of Fire, Lethality, Vehicle Capacity
CAPABILITY Measures Maximum Rate of PERFORMANCE in
Some Defined, Idealized Situation
POTENTIAL Measures Attainable PERFORMANCE in an Actual
Situation in a Specified Time Interval
–
MEN
–
PRODUCTIVITY
–
–
W = MANPOWER INVESTMENT
mпЂЅ
EFFICIENCY
hпЂЅ
PACE
t пЂЅ
CAPABILITY
MANPOWER INVESTMENT
POTENTIAL IN
пЃ„t
CAPABILITY x
пЃ„t
пЃ„t
PERFORMANCE IN
POTENTIAL IN
пЃ„t
Then PERFORMANCE = W m h t
The Mechanism of Battle Modeled
Can be Simply Described:
• COMMAND triggers Functional Performance by
Elements;
• Performance results in Events which change
Potentials for further Performance;
• Changed Potentials alter available Courses of
Action,
• The altered situation results in further
COMMAND triggering.
Command Continuously Plans
and Triggers Performance
TERRAIN &
WEATHER
SITUATION
MAP
EDITING
ORDERS
ESTIMATION
STATUS
REPORTS
FILES
REQUESTS
BLUE COURSES OF ACTION
ENEMY
RED COURSES OF
ACTION
REQUESTS
PLANNING
DECISION
ORDERS
FRIENDLY
REPORTS
INTELLIGENCE
SUPERIOR COMMAND
SUBORDINATE UNITS OR ELEMENTS
10
figure 3-9
Blue Objective Function Guides
Blue’s Decisions
пЃ°
t2
B
пѓ№

 Q t
пЃ¬
пѓєпѓ» j
пЃ¬
t1
B
C, B
пЂ­пЃ°
B
C, R
t2
пѓ№
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t1
B
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пЂЅ
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t2
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pB V
iпѓє
пѓ»t
1
B
Bi
пЃќ
t2
At this point:
• We can logically and mathematically
connect:
–
COMMAND, INTELLIGENCE, FIRE,
MANEUVER, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE,
CONSTRUCTION, TRANSPORTATION,
and SIGNAL
• Using MAN-DAYS, we can trace national
effort from budget to battlefield and
determine output over input
And the
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
is:
Man-Days in
Theater
The CRUX of the Anatomy of
Combat Analytic Approach
• From Concept to Deployment of any System,
there are SIX LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
• Identifies TEN TACTICAL WAR FUNCTIONS
• Functional representation of Combat interrelates
COMMAND, FIRE, MANEUVER,
INTELLIGENCE, SUPPLY,
TRANSPORTATION, MAINTENANCE,
CONSTRUCTION and SIGNAL
The CRUX of the Anatomy of
Combat Analytic Approach (continued)
• Developed MILITARY ELEMENT VALUE
THEORY
• Concept of COMBAT POTENTIAL
• Models COMMAND as a GAME MATRIX
• Models INFORMATION FLOW
• Provides for Study of HUMAN FACTORS
• Recognizes Three Separate Levels of Performance
for any Combat System; CAPABILITY,
POTENTIAL and PERFORMANCE
The CRUX of the Anatomy of
Combat Analytic Approach (continued)
• Developed a SYSTEM EVALUATION
CRITERIA
• Constructs Sets of Interrelated Analytic
Computational Models with Defined Interface
Variables
• Develops Militarily Credible SCENARIOS
• Simplified TERRAIN Representation
The Impact of Terrorism:
11 September, 2001
CASUALTIES:
3,046
4
New York, Washington DC, Pennsylvania
Airplanes Destroyed
POPULATION:
288 x 106
7.4 x 106
United States
New York City
(2002 Census)
The Impact of Terrorism:
Analysis
Estimated Blue Man-Days lost in one week*:
Date
Man-Days Lost
Cumulative
11 September
250 x 106
250 x 106
12 September
125 x 106
375 x 106
13 September
100 x 106
475 x 106
14 - 18 September
400 x 106
875 x 106
*plus subsequent and on-going Man-Days lost
The Impact of Terrorism
Analysis (continued)
Terrorist Input in Red Man-Days:
Hi-jackers
19 men
Assume 20 x 4 = 80 men
Over 1 year
29,200
Over 2 years
58,400
Leverage:
Directly Involved
Directly & Indirectly
Man-Days
Man-Days
(BLUE/RED or Percent)
1 year 875 x 106/29,200 = 29,965 (3,000,000%)
2 years 875 x 106/58,400 = 14,983 (1,500,000%)
Any Questions???
42
пЃ¬
Your Authors Would
Like to Thank You for
Your Attention!
пЃ¬
We invite you to visit the
reference for this
presentation, The
Anatomy of Combat.
Available at this
symposium, complete on
CD-ROM at no charge.
The Quest for the Holy Grail
пЃ°
B
C ,B
пЂ­пЃ°
B
C ,R
пЂЅ
B
Q  t
t2
]t пЂ«
1
t2 B
 P R j ] t V R j ]t 
1
2
j
t2 B
 P Bi ] t V B i ]t
1
2
i
Chapter 1, page 20
Presented at the
17th ISMOR Symposium
Eynsham Hall, Oxford, UK
30 August, 2000
2
The Weapon Channel
W = Weapon Crew + Higher-Echelon “Loading”
Distribution:
FRONT
XXXXX
XXXXX
ARMY
XXXX
XXXX
BATTALION
II
II
COMPANY
I
I
WEAPON
• COMMAND-CONTROL-COMMUNICATIONS PER SUBORDINATE UNIT
• MOBILITY VEHICLES - PER WEAPON CREW
STRENGTH OR WEAPON ASSIGNMENT
• SUPPLY HANDLING - PER TONS OF SUPPLY
REQUIREMENT
• SUPPLY TRANSPORT - PER TON-MILES
TRANSPORTED
• VEHICLE SUPPORT - PER TOTAL VEHICLES
CAPACITY
• PERSONNEL SUPPORT - PER MAN
Figure 8.1-8
3
Weapon Channel Values in a Central
European Scenario
DAILY EXPENDITURE
WEAPON
MANEUVER
PERSONNEL
EQUIPMENT
ROUNDS
WEIGHT
18.33
5.20
12.92
0.49
14.54
4.23
18.62
5.29
15.80
4.55
17.01
2.29
370.00
0.03
17.39
2.39
CO MG
10.87
2.55
97.00
0.02
82MM MORT
13.45
2.04
27.36
0.11
13.62
2.76
17.52
3.71
31.20
0.45
17.87
3.90
24.52
5.53
31.20
0.80
29.24
6.88
122MM HOW (SP)
29.74
6.50
130MM GUN
27.37
6.42
28.60
1.07
35.74
8.27
27.56
6.53
23.40
0.96
31.02
7.78
152MM GUN/HOW
26.76
6.14
ASLT GUN
18.85
5.19
28.60
0.88
HEAVY TANK
13.45
4.31
19.50
0.82
ATGM
10.58
2.86
5.50
0.09
10.99
3.49
12.23
3.53
11.54
4.12
TANK SECTION
MTZD RIF LE SQUAD
FIRE SUPPORT
120MM MORT
122MM HOW (T)
152MM HOW (T)
57MM AT (T)
22.69
5.12
65.00
0.36
FROG
61.76
17.76
1.30
2.40
66.63
16.39
56.65
14.67
15.60
2.05
62.71
15.72
140MM MRL
38.19
17.52
62.40
2.44
240MM MRL
35.02
10.71
1.20
2.49
SS-2
309.21
66.55
0.50
10.93
SS-1
200MM MRL
AIR DEFENSE
240.12
84.31
0.50
5.94
57MM (T)
34.83
6.85
130.00
0.73
57MM (SP)
27.89
6.11
208.00
1.47
SPU-4
16.77
4.29
50.00
0.01
SA-3
51.60
13.09
1.00
3.34
51.71
13.29
34.69
10.73
1.50
3.02
(MEN)
(VEHICLES)
SA-2
(MET TONS)
figure 9, page 8
V = W ( t2 - t)
Equation 1, Chapter 6, page 151
пЃ¬
Where:
–
–
–
–
4
V = Value of the Target in Man-days
W = Personnel Allocated to the Weapon
Channels of the Target
t2 = Last Campaign Day the Target Can Affect
the Opposing Course of Action
t = Day on Which the Target is Being
Considered for Attack
The Anatomy Of Combat
The Utility of ARM Weapons
Presented at the 18th ISMOR Symposium
28 to 31 August, 2001
by
Raymond J. Volluz
and
Raymond M. Volluz
An Objective Function Examines - O.F. = STRIKE MISSION + SUPPRESSION MISSION + RED REJUVENATION
BY QUANTIFYING:
пѓ¬
пѓЇ STRIKE
 
пѓ®
MISSION
- BLUE VALUE
пѓ¬
пѓЇ SUPPRESSION

пѓЇ
пѓ®
пЂ«
VALUE пѓј
пѓЇ
пѓЅ
пѓЇ
LOST
пѓѕ
VALUE пѓј
пѓЇ
пѓЅ
пѓЇ
LOST
пѓѕ
MISSION
- BLUE VALUE
пѓ¬
RED REPAIR &
пѓЇ
пѓ­
пѓЇREPLACEMENT EFFORT
пѓ®
пѓј
пѓЇ
пѓЅ
пѓЇ
пѓѕ
RISK FUNCTION ANALYSIS
BLUE COMBAT POTENTIAL
t2
пЃ° C , B пЃќt N B( s )
1
- - To Establish Utility of ARMs
7
Northern NATO Flank Scenario - -
- - Highlights Three Operations
8
Value of Attacking
Command/Control Nets
Presented at the 19th ISMOR Symposium
28 to 31 August, 2002
by
Raymond J. Volluz
12
REFLEX Project seeks to answer:
“What is the relative worth of
attacking the ground-based Air
Defense Command Net?”
- - Goal
13
Preview of 19th ISMOR
LEVEL I - BUDGETARY
LEVEL II - STRATEGIC
SCENARIO
LEGEND:
OPERATIONAL
PROJECTED
UTILITY OF ARMs
REFLEX STUDY (19th ISMOR)
MACRO- MODEL
LEVEL III - STRATEGIC
INTERFACE A
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
COMMAND
MODEL
INTELLIGENCE MODEL
SIGNAL
MODEL
MULTI-SITE
GEOMETRY MODEL
LEVEL IV - ENGAGEMENT
BEST COURSE OF
ACTION FOR
RED OR BLUE
INTERFACE B
TERMINAL EFFECTS
MODEL
SINGLE-SITE FIRE
DOCTRINE MODEL
AIR-TO-AIR
MODEL
LEVEL V - DUEL
INTERFACE C
LEVEL VI - SYSTEM
GUN SITE
MODEL
ECM PERFORMANCE
MODEL
SAM SITE
MODEL
ARM PERFORMANCE
MODEL
INTERCEPTOR
MODEL
REPAIR/REPLACEMENT
MODEL
SAM INTERCEPT
MISSILE MODEL
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
MODEL
Air Defense Models
Figure 8.6-15
Command Continuously Plans
and Triggers Performance
TERRAIN &
WEATHER
SITUATION
MAP
EDITING
ORDERS
ESTIMATION
STATUS
REPORTS
FILES
REQUESTS
BLUE COURSES OF ACTION
ENEMY
RED COURSES OF
ACTION
REQUESTS
PLANNING
DECISION
ORDERS
FRIENDLY
REPORTS
INTELLIGENCE
SUPERIOR COMMAND
SUBORDINATE UNITS OR ELEMENTS
Figure 3-9
10
The Value of Attacking - UMPIRE
MATRIX
BLUE COURSES OF ACTION
BLUE
RED COURSES OF
ACTION
BLUE
UNCERTAINTY
OF RED C/A
RED’S VIEW
RED
RED
UNCERTAINTY
OF BLUE C/A
UMPIRE MATRIX
Perfect Command & Control
(no uncertainty, no time lags,
instantaneous decision making)
BLUE COURSES OF ACTION
BLUE’S VIEW
BLUE COURSES OF ACTION
RED COURSES OF
ACTION
RED COURSES OF
ACTION
- - Command & Control Nets
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