Germany Arrested: The Limits of Expansion вЂўGermany: вЂўFailed to bring the war to decision in 1941, esp. in regards to Br. & USSR. вЂўFoolishly declared war on the U.S. in Dec 1941. вЂўBy spring 1942, had much of the world arrayed against it. вЂўAfter Fr., Ger. set its sights on Br. вЂўIt. & Vichy Fr. entered war for Axis. вЂўComplicated Br. naval security in Med. Sea. вЂўAt ChurchillвЂ™s urging, FDR expressed support for Br. in summer 1940. вЂўNot so the USSR! вЂўHerman GГ¶ring & Luftwaffe planned to defeat Br. alone by two approaches: вЂўOp. вЂњSea LionвЂќ: joint-service, amphib. landing on Br. coast. вЂўAir offensive to gain air superiority & destroy Br. industrial capacity. вЂўRAF lost ca. 20% of fighters & Luftwaffe 30% of bombers in Great Britain. вЂўLuftwaffe was deployed in Fr. & Nor. вЂўCombined strength of 2,900 fighters, bombers, & dive bombers. вЂўBr. defended by RAF Fighter Cmnd. вЂўDoctrine & org. largely the creation of AM Sir Hugh Dowding. вЂўPossessed ca. 900 fighters, about 550 operational daily. вЂўFaulty intel. led Luftwaffe to predict defeat of RAF & destruction of Br. aircraft industry in ca. five weeks. вЂўDowding planned to use air superiority fighters to: вЂўKeep force in being & fight sustained battle of attrition. вЂўPrevent Luftwaffe from striking decisive economic or military blow to Br. вЂўGГ¶ring planned to use Luftwaffe to: вЂўFirst attack Fighter Command & then Bomber Command. вЂўAttack Br. imports. вЂўConduct вЂњretaliatoryвЂќ terror raids on Br. cities. вЂўBattle officially began mid-Aug 1941. вЂўLuftwaffe attacks lacked direction & suffered from shifting focus. вЂўFighter Command focused on Ger. bombers and limited its ops. to skies directly over Br. вЂўIn battle of attrition in the sky, Germans broke first. вЂўGer. Kriegsmarine was in no condition to conduct amphib. ops. despite outcome of Battle of Britain! вЂўGer. defeat over Britain signaled to world that Ger. were not omnipotent! вЂўIn the Blitz, Ger. shifted to months of nighttime terror bombing of Br. cities. вЂўEarly Sep 1941, GГ¶ring & Hitler shifted from air superiority strategy to strategic bombing. вЂўGer. intent was to destroy London & thereby break Br. civilian morale. вЂўRespite allowed Fighter Command to recover & defeat Luftwaffe. вЂўBy end of Sep, Battle of Britain was over! вЂўEarly Sep 1941, GГ¶ring & Hitler shifted from air superiority strategy to strategic bombing. вЂўGer. intent was to destroy London & thereby break Br. civilian morale. вЂўRespite allowed Fighter Command to recover & defeat Luftwaffe. вЂўBy end of Sep, Battle of Britain was over! вЂўBlitz demonstrated: вЂўResilience of modern economies. вЂўAir weapon was unwieldy & inaccurate. вЂўAir power was not quick, cheap, & easy solution to dilemma of indecisive war. вЂўAir weapon was extremely expensive in aircrews, aircraft, & industrial resources. вЂўStruggle taking shape between Br. & It. for control of the Mediterranean Sea. вЂўBr. focused on Suez Canal & Gibraltar. вЂўIt. dreaming of new Roman Empire. вЂўIt. at war with Allies in Jun 1940. вЂўGer. & It. intervened between Hungary & Romania. вЂўGer. interested most in protecting Romanian oil from USSR. вЂўMussolini viewed Ger. presence in Romania as threat to It. interests. вЂўLitany of It. woes: вЂўInvaded Greece in Nov. 1940 & defeated. вЂўHalf of fleet sunk by Br. at Taranto. вЂўPushed back by Jan 1941 total of 400 miles in N. Africa to El Agheila. вЂўIt. disasters demanded Ger. action. вЂўHitlerвЂ™s aims were limited: вЂўRestore situation in Med. & prevent It. collapse. вЂўGuard southern flank of Ger. forces gathering for invasion of USSR. вЂўGen. Erwin Rommel disregarded instructions & decided to attack! вЂўBy end of Apr 1941 Ger. Afrika Korps had regained the 400 lost miles, except port of Tobruk. вЂўGer. intervened further in Balkans to bail out It. вЂўConquered both Yug. & Greece. вЂўGer. faced years of partisan warfare. вЂўBr. evacuated Greece. вЂўReminiscent of Dunkirk the year before! вЂўStrategic prize in the Med. was Crete! вЂўRAF could bomb Romanian oil fields from there. вЂўGer. paratroopers, air force, and navy launched joint op. in May 1941. вЂўIntel. informed Br. of Ger. attack but defenders still ill prepared. вЂўStill, Ger. paid heavy price for capture of island. вЂўAirborne forces never again used in doctrinal role. вЂўBr. evacuated islandвЂ™s defenders. вЂўAmer. & Br. derived airborne doctrine & equipment from Ger. Crete ops. вЂўBy late spring 1941, Ger. had achieved strategic goals in Med. вЂўGer. could not exploit situation due to decision to invade USSR. вЂўMed. about to become strategic backwater as Ger. turned to operational planning for Russian Campaign. вЂўBr. had two advantages in N. Africa: вЂўPolish cryptanalysts broke Ger. highgrade cipher transmissions, called Ultra. вЂўMore air power in theater. вЂўBr. held Tobruk & just inside Egyptian border. вЂўAfter one failed start, Br. launched offensive in mid-Nov 1941. вЂўOperation Crusader: вЂўBr. enjoyed numerical superiority. вЂўGer. suffered from logistical constraints. вЂўGer. fell back on logistical support in Libya & Br. extended their supply lines. вЂўAdopting offensive cost Br. more casualties than Ger. вЂўBr. recovered 400 miles lost earlier. вЂўStopped in area of El Agheila & reoriented armor. вЂўGer. counterattacked Jan 1942 & drove nearly to Tobruk along Gazala Line. вЂўGer. still possessed advantages of leadership, doctrine, & tactical skill. вЂўRommel to encircle entire Gazala Line with late May counterattack. вЂўBr. now using U.S. M3 Grant tanks, but Ger. still drove deep into Egypt. вЂўBr. held line in Jul 1942 at El Alamein between Med. Sea & Qattara Depression. вЂўAlexandria & Nile delta only 60 miles away but beyond RommelвЂ™s reach. вЂўIn Jul 1940 Hitler resolved to destroy USSR. вЂўGer. entered USSR as conquerors, not liberators. вЂўBrought slavery to Slavs & extermination to Jews. вЂўGer. behavior made Soviets defend even StalinвЂ™s malevolent regime. вЂўGer. operational planning well underway by fall 1940. вЂўLogistical planning revealed potential trouble: вЂўWehrmacht would encounter trouble sustaining ops. beyond line from Estonia to Smolensk to Ukraine. вЂўBulk of Ger. logistics still horse-drawn. вЂўGer. military focused on strategic objective of Moscow. вЂўAntiquated, point-based strategy. вЂўHitler focused on Soviet flanks: вЂўLeningrad, cradle of Bolshevik Rev. вЂўUkraine, Soviet agricultural heartland. вЂўGer. military focused on strategic objective of Moscow. вЂўAntiquated, point-based strategy. вЂўHitler focused on Soviet flanks: вЂўLeningrad, cradle of Bolshevik Rev. вЂўUkraine, Soviet agricultural heartland. вЂўGer. deployed three army groups: вЂўArmy Group North (AGN) to clear Baltic States. вЂўArmy Group Center (AGC) to advance to Smolensk. вЂўArmy Group South (AGS) to advance on Kiev & down Dniepr River bend. вЂўEleventh Army to cover Romania & oil. вЂўGer. established no clear priority among strategic objectives & planned only for rapid Soviet collapse. вЂўWehrmacht was tough & professional but plagued by faulty logistics & intel. вЂўRed Army largely unprepared. вЂўStalinвЂ™s late 1930s purges devastated its leadership. вЂўFrom Baltic Sea to Black Sea, Ger. attacked on Jun 22, 1941. вЂўLuftwaffe destroyed 3,000 Soviet aircraft during first week. вЂўGer. armor penetrated into open quickly. вЂўGer. inf. covered up to 30 miles a day! вЂўRace was on for strategic objectives. вЂўBy mid-July: вЂўAGN still not to Leningrad; AGS moving slowly due to fatigue from Balkan ops.; AGC racing toward Moscow. вЂўOverall Soviet losses in first two weeks: вЂўCa. 3,000 aircraft; ca. 7,000 tanks; ca. 5,500 artillery pieces; & ca. 750,000 troops! вЂўSoviet troop losses 1.3M by early Aug!! вЂўGer. advance ground to a halt. вЂўGer. admitted they вЂњunderestimated the colossus of Russia.вЂќ вЂўOverextended Ger. logistics failed: вЂўSupply of rations to field troops ceased. вЂўSoviet counterattacks consumed all Ger. ammunition. вЂўGer. intel. underestimated Red Army strength. вЂўSoviets still had 5.3M soldiers!! вЂўHuge gap opening between pace of Ger. armor & Ger. вЂњstraight legвЂќ inf. вЂўDespite losses, Stalin firmly at the helm of Soviet state. вЂўGer. now engaged in strategic debate! вЂўEnd of Aug Hitler forced mil. to adhere to his вЂњdouble envelopmentвЂќ scheme. вЂўBy Sep 1941 Ger. losses ca. 400,000 & nearly all of reserves committed. вЂўFall advance by Ger. flanks closed in on Kiev & Leningrad. вЂўSiege of latter was epic tale of suffering. вЂўGer. concluded that USSR about to collapse. вЂўGer. supply situation worsening. вЂўOPTEMPO consumed all fuel & ammunition & allowed no accumulation of winter equipment. вЂўGer. renewed offensive in Oct. вЂўRipped through Soviet lines & captured another 600,000 soldiers. вЂўWeather broke in Oct. вЂўAutumn rains turned countryside into sea of mud. вЂўIncreased drain on Ger. logistics virtually eliminated small stockpiles of fuel, ammo, & winter clothing. вЂўGer. reduced to lighting fires under vehicle crankcases to warm engines! вЂўStalin brought in Gen. Georgi Zhukov to defend Moscow. вЂўOne of few competent cmndrs. to survive earlier purges. вЂўRed Army counterattacked early Dec. вЂўTemp. hovering around -25ВєF. вЂўSoviets prepared for winter conditions. вЂўGer. had reached culminating point. вЂўLost strength, will, and initiative! вЂўHitler committed two strategic errors: вЂўDeclared war on U.S. after Pearl Harbor. вЂўOrdered Wehrmacht to stand firm! вЂўThird Reich now emerging as worldвЂ™s greatest danger. вЂўGer. mil. services now conducting almost no joint planning or ops. вЂўThreads of Ger. strategy came together only in HitlerвЂ™s mind. вЂўEstrangement between FГјhrer & officer corps now well along. вЂўSoviets had halted Ger. before Moscow by Jan 1942. вЂўWehrmacht critically wounded. вЂўFate of world turned on events of 1941. вЂўGer. launched mid-year crusade against USSR. вЂўYear ended with world war largely against Third Reich. вЂўWar evermore a clash of economic strength, which favored Allied powers.