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Осетрова Е.Е., Суханова И.Д., Давлетшина Д.К.
СHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Пособие по переводу международных документов для студентов III курса факультета МО
Москва, 2006
I. Особенности языка, стиля и структуры официальных документов.
A.
Документальный текст отличается особенно ярко выраженной установкой на книжно-письменную речь. В нем используются устойчивые (для той или иной его разновидности) словосочетания и термины, отражающие ту сферу деятельности, с которой он связан. Этой общностью функции обусловливается большая степень общности в стиле документальных текстов на разных языках. Эта общность ярче всего проявляется в дипломатических документах международного масштаба, в договорах и соглашениях между странами.
Перевод официально-деловых материалов, включающих в себя дипломатические документы (уставы, тексты международных соглашений, договоры, коммюнике, заявления), правительственные постановления, материалы различных конференций, требует от переводчика знания характерных особенностей их построения и передачи.
§1. Для официальных документов характерна четкость построения, обеспечивающая логическую последовательность изложения, ограничения одной мысли от другой. Обычно большие по размеру документы делятся на:
разделы-sections
подразделы-subsections
главы-chapters
статьи-articles
пункты, параграфы -clauses, items, points, counts, paragraphs
подпункты-subparagraphs
Такие термины, как "clause, item, point, count, paragraph", часто не имеют четкой дифференциации значений и при переводе данного документа необходимо лишь придерживаться того, чтобы одному и тому же английскому термину постоянно соответствовал один и тот же русский вариант. Поэтому, прежде чем приступать к переводу официального документа, переводчик должен выписать из него все английские термины для обозначения деления текста, выбрать для них русские соответствия и при переводе твердо их придерживаться.
Кроме того в английском тексте официальных документов часто используются буквенные изображения разделов или пунктов - a), b), c), d) и т.д. При переводе следует сохранять буквы английского алфавита, т.к. это способствует сохранению точности и облегчает ссылки на соответствующий документ при переводе с русского языка на английский.
§2. При работе с официально-деловыми документами переводчик несет большую ответственность за точность перевода, так как на основе его перевода часто принимаются важные политические решения, обеспечивается аутентичность текстов договоров и соглашений и т.п. Это правило в равной мере относится не только к точной передаче содержания документа, но и к точной передаче некоторых моментов, которые на первый взгляд могут показаться формальными и не имеющими большого значения. Так, необходимо следить за тем, чтобы в переводе было четкое соответствие официальных названий, принятых в русском и английском языках.
Например:
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent StatesСНГ
Содружество независимых государствBritainАнглияGreat BritainВеликобританияThe United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandСоединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной ИрландииThe United States of AmericaСоединенные Штаты АмерикиOSCEОБСЕOrganisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropeОрганизация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в ЕвропеNPTДНЯОTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsДоговор о нераспространении ядерного оружияConference on DisarmamentКонференция по разоружениюNon-Nuclear Weapon StatesГосударства, не обладающие ядерным оружиемNon-Aligned CountriesНеприсоединившиеся страныCTBTДВЗЯИComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-TreatyДоговор о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытанийUniversal Declaration of Human RightsВсеобщая декларация прав человека Задание 1. Переведите следующие географические названия:
а) Ливан, Литва, Черногория, Гвинея, Пекин, Кипр;
б) the English Channel, Principality of Andorra, Cologne, the Holy See, Mauritius, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Задание 2. Расшифруйте следующие аббревиатуры и переведите их на русский язык:
UNICEF, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNDDA, CD, WMD, G-8, NWFZ, OECD, IAEA, CFE, SALT, ABM Treaty, START Treaty, SORT, CWC, BTWC.
Задание 3. Переведите следующие предложения, обращая внимания на перевод выделенных фраз:
1. The Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the Original Parties - the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Iraq.
2. During the opening and closing stages of the conference the Participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during the second stage.
3. Common commitments to the strengthened guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have made Russia and the U.S. partners in developing the foundations of an international non-proliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA safeguards, the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons, the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty.
4. He stressed U.S. support for Russia's participation in the WTO, GATT, its partnership and cooperation with the EU and other institutions important to European and global economic and security architecture.
5. During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of Tunisia.
Word combinations to remember:
to be subject toподлежать чему-тоsignatory statesгосударства, подписавшие договорinstruments of ratificationграмоты о ратификацииinstruments of accessionграмоты о присоединенииto deposit withсдавать на хранениеDepositary Governmentправительство-депозитарийOriginal Partyсторона-первоначальный участник договораSecretary-General of the UNГенеральный секретарь ООНguest of honourпочетный гостьDirector-General of UNESCOГенеральный директор ЮНЕСКОnon-participating statesнеучаствующие государстваagenda itemпункт повестки дня
§3. Одна из основных особенностей вводной части официально-делового документа - преамбулы - стремление в максимально сжатой форме изложить содержание документа, что ведет к тому, что в одном предложении излагаются самые разнообразные положения. А это, в свою очередь, вызывает появление внутри одного предложения многочисленных инфинитивных и причастных оборотов. При передаче на русский язык следует пользоваться дословным переводом.
Например:
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsДоговор о нераспространении ядерного оружияThe states, concluding this Treaty hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty"Государства, заключающие настоящий Договор, ниже именуемые "Сторонами Договора",Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of a nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusions of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, etc,...
Have agreed as follows:учитывая опустошительные последствия, которые имела бы для всего человечества ядерная война, и вытекающую из этого необходимость приложить все усилия для предотвращения опасности возникновения такой войны и принять меры для обеспечения безопасности народов, считая, что распространение ядерного оружия серьезно увеличило бы опасность ядерной войны,
в соответствии с резолюциями Генеральной Ассамблеи Организации Объединенных Наций, призывающими к заключению соглашения о предотвращении более широкого распространения ядерного оружия, обязуясь сотрудничать в целях содействия применению гарантий Международного агентства по атомной энергии в отношении мирной ядерной деятельности, и т.д.,...
согласились о нижеследующем:
Запомните следующие устойчивые выражения, используемые в преамбуле договоров:
приветствуяwelcomingподчеркиваяunderlining, stressingбудучи убежденнымconvincedпризнаваяrecognizingпризнавая такжеrecognizing furtherотмечаяnotingотмечая такжеnoting alsoподтверждаяaffirmingучитываяconsidering, mindful ofсчитаяbelievingобязуясьundertakingстремясьdesiring, seekingссылаясь наrecallingнастоятельно призываяurgingбудучи приверженнымcommitted toвыражая поддержку expressing supportзаявляя о своем намеренииdeclaring one's intentionпровозглашая своей главной целью proclaiming as one's principal aimотталкиваясь отproceeding fromвступая на путьembarking upon the path Задание 1. Переведите следующие устойчивые выражения:
Conscious that; attaching particular importance to; guided by; reaffirming that; expressing its regret that; taking note of; noting with appreciation; bearing in mind; determined.
Задание 2. Переведите выражения в скобках на английский язык. Используйте активную лексику параграфа.
(Генеральная Ассамблея, ссылаясь на) its resolution on a (поэтапном уменьшении ядерной угрозы);
(вновь подтверждая) the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of а (мира, свободного от ядерного оружия);
(будучи преисполнена решимости) to achieve the objective of prohibiting the (разработки, производства, накопления запасов и применения ядерного оружия) and to conclude such an international convention (в короткие сроки);
(учитывая) paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, (призывающий к срочному проведению переговоров) of agreements for the cessation of development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme for progressive and balanced (сокращения запасов ядерного оружия и средств его доставки), leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible date;
(признавая) that (Договор о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний) must constitute disarmament measures, and that these measures, together with an international legal instrument on adequate (гарантиях безопасности) for non-nuclear-weapon states and an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, must be integral steps leading to the (ликвидацию ядерного оружия) within a time-bound framework;
(принимая к сведению) of the opinion of the International Court of Justice to pursue (добросовестным образом) negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects (под строгим и эффективным контролем).
Задание 3. Переведите на английский язык:
Приветствуя вступление в силу Договора о сокращении и ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений, государствами-участниками которого являются Беларусь, Казахстан, Российская Федерация, Соединенные Штаты Америки и Украина;
отмечая односторонние меры государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, по ограничению ядерных вооружений;
будучи преисполнена решимости принять меры в целях достижения реального прогресса на пути к всеобщему и полному разоружению под строгим и эффективным международным контролем;
будучи убеждена, что международное сообщество должно добиваться эффективного запрещения разработки, производства, накопления и применения химического и биологического оружия;
ссылаясь на свои предыдущие резолюции об учреждении специального комитета с целью уничтожения ядерного оружия в короткие сроки;
вновь подтверждая цель Организации, состоящую в повышении уровня транспарентности в вооружениях, и продолжая считать, что она могла бы способствовать укреплению доверия между государствами и их взаимной безопасности.
Задание 4. Переведите текст преамбулы на русский язык:
Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, initialled in Moscow by representatives of Great Britain, the Russian Federation and the United States.
The governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, production and Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of men's environment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:
Задание 5. Переведите данную преамбулу на английский язык:
Российская Федерация и Соединенные Штаты Америки, ниже именуемые Сторонами,
вступая на путь новых отношений в новом столетии и будучи приверженными цели установления и поддержания международного мира и безопасности,
сознавая, что ядерная война имела бы для всего человечества опустошительные последствия,
преисполненные решимости продолжать свои усилия, начало которым было положено Договором об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны и Договором о сокращении и ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений,
будучи убежденными, что предусмотренные настоящим Договором дополнительные меры по сокращению стратегических наступательных вооружений внесут вклад в дело улучшения отношений между Сторонами, будут способствовать уменьшению опасности возникновения ядерной войны и упрочению международного мира и безопасности,
учитывая свои обязательства по статье VI Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия,
руководствуясь принципом равенства и одинаковой безопасности,
признавая, что укрепление стратегической стабильности отвечает интересам Сторон и интересам международной безопасности,
заявляя о своем намерении установить подлинное партнерство, основанное на принципах доверия, открытости и предсказуемости,
согласились о нижеследующем:
Word combinations to remember:
поэтапное уменьшение ядерной угрозыstep-by-step/progressive reduction of nuclear threatмир, свободный от ядерного оружияnuclear-weapon-free worldразработка, производство, накопление запасов ядерного оружияdevelopment, production, stockpiling of nuclear weaponsприменение ядерного оружияuse of nuclear weaponsсокращение запасов ядерного оружия и средств его доставкиreduction of nuclear weapons and their means of deliveryликвидация ядерного оружия elimination of nuclear weapons под строгим и эффективным международным контролемunder strict and effective international controlсрочное проведение переговоровurgent negotiationгарантии безопасностиsecurity assurances/safeguardsдобросовестным образомin good faithв короткие срокиat an early date §4. При переводе официально-деловых материалов (особенно Уставов, договоров и международных соглашений) переводчик часто прибегает к дословному переводу формулировки текста, чтобы исключить возможность разночтений или неправильной интерпретации перевода текста. Это ведет к созданию большого количества штампов, которые быстро становятся традиционными и регулярно употребляются при переводе официально-деловых материалов.
Например:
Совместное заявление об общих вызовах безопасности на рубеже XXI века
Мы, Президенты Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки, заявляем, что сотрудничество между Россией и США будет иметь в XXI веке чрезвычайно важное значение для содействия процветанию и укрепления безопасности во всем мире. В связи с этим мы подтверждаем, что Российская Федерация и Соединенные Штаты Америки являются естественными партнерами в обеспечении международного мира и стабильности. Мы уделили особое внимание наращиванию совместных усилий в деле ликвидации угроз, унаследованных от времен "холодной войны", а также отражении общих вызовов безопасности на рубеже XXI века.
Мы считаем, что самую серьезную и насущную опасность представляет распространение ядерного, биологического, химического и других видов оружия массового уничтожения, технологий его производства и средств доставки. В условиях возрастающей взаимозависимости современного мира эти угрозы обретают транснациональный и глобальный характер, затрагивая не только национальную безопасность Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов, но и международную стабильность в целом. Вновь подтверждаем решимость России и США активно и тесно сотрудничать друг с другом, а также со всеми другими заинтересованными государствами с целью предотвращения и уменьшения такой угрозы посредством осуществления новых шагов, поиска новых форм взаимодействия и укрепления общепризнанных международных норм.JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
We, The Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the United Sates of America, declare that cooperation between Russia and the U.S. will be of the greatest import in the twenty-first century for promoting prosperity and strengthening security throughout the world. In this connection, we reaffirm that the Russian Federation and the United States of America are natural partners in advancing international peace and stability. We have devoted particular attention to intensifying joint efforts to eliminate threats inherited from the Cold War and to meet common security challenges at the threshold of the twenty-first century.
We understand that the most serious and pressing danger is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the technologies for their production, and their means of delivery. Given the increasing interdependence of the modern world, these threats are becoming transnational and global in scope; they affect not only the national security of the Russian Federation and the United States, but also international stability. We reaffirm the determination of Russia and the U.S. to cooperate actively and closely with each other, as well as with all other interested countries, to avert and reduce this threat by taking new steps, seeking new forms of collaboration, and strengthening generally recognized international norms.
Задание 1. Переведите текст декларации, используя активную лексику.
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States
The Participating States,
Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and cooperation;
Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interests and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating state a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;
Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solutions of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and cooperation among states;
Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which are all of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations.
Word combinations to remember:
commitment to peaceприверженность мируParticipating Stateгосударство-участник (конференции)experience of the pastопыт прошлогоstrengthening of international peaceукрепление международного мираcommon adherence toобщая приверженность (верность)in conformity withв соответствии сirrespective ofнезависимо от, невзирая наto be of primary significanceпредставлять первостепенную важность Задание 2. Переведите предложения на русский язык, обращая внимание на перевод выделенных устойчивых выражений:
1. Aggressive nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unresolved territorial disputes, and violations in the area of human rights present serious threats to stability, peace and prosperity. The Presidents agree that the effort to deal with these challenges must be based on respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE, particularly concerning democracy, respect for human rights, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination.
2. The Participants note with satisfaction the progress made in developing a model for ensuring comprehensive security for Europe in which all states will have the inherent right to choose freely their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.
3. The Participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another Participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.
4. The member-states will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law. They will consult in a timely manner on issues of mutual concern, including how best to fulfil their responsibility to cooperate with other NPT parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time fulfilling their responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation.
5. The Presidents declare that they are resolved to take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament. They intend to take unilateral and multilateral measures and conclude agreements that correspond to both the letter and spirit of this Act.
6. Both Sides view the Agreement as good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned which lays the foundation for improving the political climate, establishing a broader confidence and mutual understanding, and to extending mutually advantageous cooperation in a number of spheres.
7. The Participating States recognize the universal significance of continuing active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and conducting them in a spirit of good will, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.
Задание 3. Переведите предложения на английский язык, обращая внимание на перевод выделенных устойчивых выражений.
1. Стороны достигли договоренности в деле разработки международной конвенции о гарантиях безопасности государствам, не обладающим ядерным оружием, против применения или угрозы применения ядерного оружия.
2. На церемонии, состоявшейся параллельно со встречей на высшем уровне Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, лидеры трех государств-депозитариев Договора о нераспространении - Российской Федерации, Соединенного Королевства и Соединенных Штатов - подписали отдельные меморандумы о гарантиях безопасности с лидерами Белaруси, Казахстана и Украины.
3. Обе стороны подтверждают верность целям и принципам Договора, который заложил основу для дружественных и добрососедских отношений народов обеих стран и отвечает их коренным национальным интересами.
4. Государства-участники выражают твердую решимость содействовать укреплению мира и безопасности на Ближнем Востоке и во всем мире, вносить свой вклад в развитие отношений между государствами и в укрепление плодотворного и взаимовыгодного сотрудничества.
5. Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны торжественно заявляют о своей решимости развивать всестороннее сотрудничество на основе равноправия, уважения национального суверенитета, территориальной целостности и невмешательства во внутренние дела друг друга.
6. Обе стороны отметили прогресс, достигнутый в сфере контроля над ядерными вооружениями и поддержания стратегической стабильности в мире на основе выполнения государствами своих международных обязательств в этой сфере.
7. Оба лидера подчеркнули важность выполнения взаимных обязательств в области сокращения и ликвидации оружия массового уничтожения, обычных вооружений, осуществления мер по укреплению доверия, обеспечению международного контроля за экспортом товаров и технологий.
Задание 4. Переведите предложения на русский язык, обращая внимание на выделенные конструкции.
1. Mitigating the negative aspects of the information technology revolution now taking place is a serious challenge to ensuring the future strategic security interests of our two countries.
2. Accelerating the negotiations to adapt the Treaty to changing circumstances and complying with its provisions during the process of adaptation is seen as our contribution to stability, predictability and cooperation in Europe.
3. They reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of having all countries accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, by calling upon them to embark on new and important cooperation in nuclear disarmament.
4. Reaffirming our commitment to strict compliance with our obligations under the START I Treaty, we declare our resolve to collaborate in expediting the entry into force of the START II Treaty.
5. Having taken substantial practical steps to reduce the global nuclear threat and control transfers of sensitive technology, they remain committed to developing the foundations of an international non-proliferation regime.
6. They underscored the necessity of deepening broad based international and bilateral cooperation in combating aggressive nationalism and preventing abuses of human rights.
Задание 5. Составьте предложения, используя выражения в колонках А и В. Переведите из на русский язык.
ABWe reaffirm our commitment toa responsible approach to the transfer of nuclear-related material, equipment and technologyWe express the desire toin the development and building of effective theatre missile defence systemsWe confirm the interest of the sidesto the goal of nuclear disarmamentWe undertake toenhancing the IAEA's ability to improve the efficiency of the safeguards systemsWe reiterate our call forthe Conference underway in New York should decide to make the NPT permanentWe recognise the importance ofpromote reciprocal openness in the exchange of corresponding informationWe attach special importance tocooperate closely to ensure that all peoples of the Euro-Atlantic region shall enjoy the benefits of a stable, just and peaceful orderWe express the strong view thatbroad and expanded cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis to strengthen international regime of controlWe emphasise our determination toworking closely together toward fuller participation of democratic Russia in the range of world-wide political and security institutions of the 21st centuryWe note the historic task ofestablish as soon as possible concrete arrangements for enhancing transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction Задание 6. Составьте предложения на русском языке, используя выражения в колонках А и В. Переведите их на английский язык.
АВМы заявляем о своем желаниидальнейшего развития сотрудничества по экспортному контролю как важной части обеспечения нераспространенияМы подчеркиваем значениепредпринять существенные практические шаги по уменьшению глобальной ядерной угрозыМы отмечаем важностьускорить переговоры, целью которых является адаптация Договора с учетом меняющихся обстоятельствМы выражаем решимостьтесно сотрудничать в деле обеспечения стратегических интересов безопасности наших странМы вновь подтверждаем наше намерениесовместному строительству прочного мира, основанного на принципах демократии и неделимости безопасностиМы придаем особое значениеобеспечения контроля за передачей технологииМы обязуемсядостижении конечной цели ядерного разоружения и укрепления международной безопасностиМы подтверждаем нашу приверженностьстрогому соблюдению своих обязательств по Договору СНВМы подчеркиваем нашу заинтересованность впринципам, которые будут регулировать наше сотрудничество в деле присоединения всех стран к ДНЯОМы остаемся приверженнымиактивизировать совместные усилия по противодействию транснациональным угрозам безопасности наших стран Задание 7.
А. Переведите данные предложения на русский язык:
1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
2. To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack (radars - радиолокационные станции, или РЛС).
3. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article (verification - контроль).
4. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
5. High Contracting Parties undertake to curb the race in strategic offensive arms which would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.
B. Переведите данные предложения на английский язык:
1. Каждая из сторон обязуется ограничить системы противоракетной обороны (ПРО) и принять другие меры в соответствии с положениями настоящего Договора.
2. Каждая из сторон обязуется не создавать, не испытывать и не развертывать системы ПРО.
3. Каждая из сторон обязуется не принимать никаких международных обязательств, которые противоречили бы настоящему Договору.
4. Стороны обязуются продолжить активные переговоры об ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений.
5. Обе стороны-участницы Договора обязуются соблюдать гарантии безопасности, вытекающие из данного Договора.
Задание 8. Переведите текст меморандума на английский язык, используя активную лексику:
Меморандум о гарантиях безопасности в связи с присоединением Беларуси, Казахстана, Украины к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия.
(Беларусь/Казахстан/Украина), Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки,
приветствуя присоединение (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины) к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия в качестве государства, не обладающего ядерным оружием,
учитывая обязательство (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины) об удалении всех ядерных вооружений с ее территории в установленные сроки,
отмечая перемены в мире в области безопасности, в том числе окончание "холодной войны", создавшие условия для глубоких сокращений ядерных сил,
подтверждают следующее:
1. Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки подтверждают (Беларуси/Казахстану/Украине) свое обязательство в соответствии с принципами Заключительного акта Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе уважать независимость и суверенитет и существующие границы (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины);
2. Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки подтверждают свое обязательство воздерживаться от угрозы силой или ее применения против территориальной целостности или политической независимости (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины), и что никакие их вооружения никогда не будут применены против (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины), кроме как в целях самообороны или каким-либо иным образом в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций;
3. Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки подтверждают свое обязательство добиваться незамедлительных действий Совета Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций по оказанию помощи (Беларуси/Казахстану/Украине) как государству-участнику Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, не обладающему ядерным оружием, в случае, если (Беларусь/Казахстан/Украина) станет жертвой акта агрессии или объектом угрозы агрессии с применением ядерного оружия;
4. Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки подтверждают в отношении (Беларуси/Казахстана/Украины) свое обязательство не применять ядерное оружие против любого государства-участника Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, не обладающего ядерным оружием, кроме как в случае нападения на них, их территории и зависимые территории, на их вооруженные силы или их союзников такого государства, действующего вместе с государством, обладающим ядерным оружием, или связанного с ним союзным соглашением;
5. (Беларусь/Казахстан/Украина), Российская Федерация, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенные Штаты Америки будут консультироваться в случае возникновения ситуации, затрагивающей их коренные национальные интересы.
Настоящий Меморандум будет применим с момента подписания.
Word combinations to remember:
обеспечение стратегических интересов безопасностиto ensure strategic security interestускорить переговорыto accelerate the negotiationsадаптация Договора с учетом меняющихся обстоятельствto adapt the Treaty to changing circumstancesпрочный мир, основанный на принципе неделимости безопасностиenduring peace based upon the indivisibility of securityразвитие сотрудничества по экспортному контролюfurther cooperation on export controlsприсоединение всех стран к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружияaccession of all countries to the NPTстрогое соблюдение обязательств по Договоруstrict compliance with the obligations under the Treatyактивизировать совместные усилияto intensify joint effortsпротиводействовать угрозам безопасностиto counteract the threats to securityпередача чувствительной технологииtransfer of sensitive technologyмеры по укреплению доверияconfidence-building measuresвыполнять обязательстваto fulfil obligationsвопросы, вызывающие взаимную обеспокоенностьissues of mutual concern §5. В договорах, контрактах, уставах и других официально-деловых материалах очень часто встречаются случаи употребления глагола "shall" со 2-м и 3-м лицом единственного числа. При переводе на русский язык в таких случаях употребляется настоящее время, а оттенок долженствования, имеющийся в английском предложении, не передается.
Например:
a) The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.Генеральная Ассамблея состоит из всех Членов Организации Объединенных Наций.b) The Organisation and its members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article I, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.Для достижения целей, указанных в статье I, Организация и ее Члены действуют в соответствии со следующими принципами. Задание. Переведите, обращая внимание на передачу модального глагола "shall".
a) 1. Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons.
2. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.
3. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment on the date of acceptance by it.
4. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.
5. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by the State.
6. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate in to all Parties to this Treaty.
7. This Convention shall be implemented in a manned designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of State Parties to the Convention.
8. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organisation.
9. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
10. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty three months in advance.
b) 1. Каждое государство-участник настоящей Конвенции имеет право выйти из Конвенции. О таком выходе оно уведомляет за 3 месяца все другие государства-участники Конвенции и Совет Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций.
2. Настоящая Конвенция подлежит ратификации государствами, подписавшими ее.
3. Правительства-депозитарии незамедлительно уведомляют все подписавшие и присоединившиеся к настоящей Конвенции государства о дате каждого подписания, дате сдачи на хранение каждой ратификационной грамоты и документа о присоединении.
4. Если после такого наблюдения (observation) останутся обоснованные сомнения относительно выполнения обязательства, государство-участник, имеющее такие сомнения, и государство-участник, несущее ответственность за деятельность, вызывающую эти сомнения, консультируются с целью устранения сомнений.
5. Если эти сомнения не устранены, государство-участник, имеющее такие сомнения, уведомляет другие государства-участники, и заинтересованные стороны сотрудничают в отношении дальнейших процедур проверки.
6. Настоящий Договор открыт для подписания его всеми государствами.
7. Генеральная Ассамблея устанавливает свои собственные правила процедуры. Она избирает своего председателя на каждую сессию.
8. Настоящий Устав ни в коей мере не затрагивает неотъемлемого права на индивидуальную или коллективную самооборону.
9. Настоящий Договор вступает в силу после его ратификации всеми первоначальными государствами-участниками и передачи их ратификационных грамот на хранение.
10. Через 20 лет после вступления Договора в силу созывается конференция для того, чтобы решить, должен ли Договор продолжать оставаться в силе бессрочно или действие Договора должно быть продлено на дополнительный определенный период или периоды времени. Это решение принимается большинством участником Договора.
Word combinations to remember:
a)
in pursuit of (pursuant to)
в соответствии сconstitutional processesконституционные процедурыsafety precautionsмеры предосторожностиto detract from the obligationsумалять обязательстваenter into forceвступать в силуaccede to a treatyприсоединиться к договоруbe of unlimited durationбыть бессрочнымthe subject matter of the treatyсодержание настоящего Договораsupreme interests of a countryвысшие интересы страныgive notice ofуведомлять о чем-тоb)выходить из договора за три месяцаwithdraw from a treaty 3 months in advanceобоснованные сомненияreasonable doubtsзаинтересованные стороныparties concernedпроцедура проверкиverification processоткрыт для подписания(to be) open for signatureправила процедурыrules of procedureнеотъемлемое правоinherent rightпродолжать оставаться в силеcontinue in forceбессрочноindefinitelyпродлить договорextend a treatyопределенный периодfixed period §6. В связи с обилием традиционных формулировок, исторически складывавшихся в течение длительного времени, для официально-деловых материалов характерно употребление торжественной, а подчас, и архаичной лексики. При переводе подобных слов нужно использовать соответствующие слова и фразы, имеющиеся в русском языке.
Например:
aforesaidвышеуказанныйabove-mentionedвышеупомянутыйherebyнастоящийhereinafter referred to asв дальнейшем именуемыйhenceforthвпредьforthwithнемедленноthereafterвпоследствииthereunderв силу договораthereuponзатемhereinпри сем Передача таких слов, как "therein, therewith, thereat, thereon, thereof, thereto" зависит от контекста.
Задание. Переведите, обращая внимание на передачу выделенных слов.
a)1. The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty"... have agreed as follows:
2. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Government which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary government shall convene a conference.
3. Thereafter it (amendment) shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
4. Our respective governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
5. Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.
6. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone any nuclear weapons...
7. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary governments to the governments of the State signatory and acceding thereto.
8. The General Assembly requests the Secretary-General, in the light of experience gained from conflict resolution, to make recommendations and suggestions and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its annual session.
9. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
10. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.
b)1. Любое государство-участник может предлагать поправки к настоящему Договору. Поправки вступают в силу для каждого государства-участника, принимающего эти поправки, после принятия их большинством государств-участников Договора, а впоследствии для каждого оставшегося государства-участника в день принятия этих поправок.
2. Ратификационные грамоты и документы о присоединении сдаются на хранение правительствам Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки, которые настоящим назначаются в качестве правительств-депозитариев.
3. Принимая во внимание свою резолюцию 1373 от 28 сентября 2001 года, которая осуждает подобные террористические акты, Совет Безопасности ООН подтверждает, что указанная резолюция применима ко всем актам терроризма, мотивами которых являются нетерпимость и экстремизм.
4. Совет Безопасности немедленно оповещает все заинтересованные стороны о начале миротворческой операции, целью которой является восстановление мира и гражданских свобод в зоне конфликта.
5. Учредительный документ этой международной организации по борьбе с незаконным экспортом оружия, созданной в силу такового, подлежит пересмотру через определенные промежутки времени.
6. Об этом Генеральный Секретарь официально уведомляется Секретарем Суда (Registrar).
7. После этого Правительством Соединенных Штатов Америки будет составлен протокол о сдаче на хранение ратификационных грамот, копии с которого будут разосланы всем подписавшим Устав государствам.
Word combinations to remember:
a)
proposed amendment
предложенная поправкаto amendвносить поправкуto circulate the textsрассылать текстrespective governmentsсоответственные правительстваto exhibit full powersпредъявить полномочияin good and due formв надлежащей формеto certify a copyзаверять копиюto transmitпрепровождать (документ)b)
учредительный документ
constituent instrumentсоставлять протоколto draw up a protocol §7. В английских официальных текстах иногда употребляются латинские и французские слова и фразы. Как правило, эти включения переводятся на русский язык их русскими соответствиями.
Например:
ad hocспециальныйbona fideчистосердечноcondition sine qua nonнепременное условиеen blocв целомex-officioпо обязанности; в силу занимаемого служебного положенияfait accompliсовершившийся фактinter aliaпомимо всего прочего; кроме тогоipso factoпо самому фактуmutatis mutandisс соответствующими изменениямиpar excellenceпо преимуществуmodus vivendiвременное решение вопросаper capitaна душу населенияpro temporeвременно Некоторые иноязычные слова и фразы, получившие широкое распространение в разных языках, при переводе на русский язык либо сохраняются в своем иностранном написании, либо транскрибируются. Последний способ является наиболее распространенным.
Например:
status quoстатус квоqourumкворумpersona (non) grataперсона (нон)гратаterra incognitaтерра инкогнитаtabula rasaтабула расаcasus belliказус беллиa prioriаприориde factoде-фактоde jureде-юре §8. Четкость построения официальных текстов находит свое отражение и в унифицированной схеме окончания текста.
Например:
This Treaty, the Russian, English, French ...texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding States.Настоящий Договор, русский, английский, французский...тексты которого являются равно аутентичными, сдается на хранение в архивы правительств-депозитариев. Должным образом заверенные копии настоящего Договора препровождаются правительствами-депозитариями правительствам государств, подписавших Договор и присоединившихся к нему.In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the Treaty.
Done in triplicate, at the cities of Moscow, Washington and London, the Ist day of July two thousand oh one.В удостоверении чего нижеподписавшиеся, должным образом на то уполномоченные, подписали настоящий Договор.
Совершено в трех экземплярах в городах Москве, Вашингтоне и Лондоне июля месяца I дня две тысячи первого года. Задание 1. Переведите с английского языка на русский:
a) The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the governments of other signatory states. In faith whereof the representatives of the governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.
Done in the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.
b) Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.
c) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
d) Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Задание 2. Переведите с русского языка на английский:
а) Настоящий Договор подлежит ратификации и вступит в силу в день обмена ратификационными грамотами, который будет произведен в Праге в возможно короткий срок.
Настоящий Договор составлен в двух экземплярах, на русском и английском языках, причем все тексты имеют одинаковую силу.
Совершено в г. Москве 20 ноября 2003 г.
б) 1. Настоящий Договор открыт для подписания его всеми государствами. Любое государство, которое не подпишет Договор до вступления его в силу в соответствии с пунктом 3 данной статьи, может присоединиться к нему в любое время.
2. Настоящий Договор подлежит ратификации государствами, подписавшими его. Ратификационные грамоты и документы о присоединении сдаются на хранение правительствам Российской Федерации, Соединенного Королевства Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединенных Штатов Америки, которые настоящим назначаются в качестве правительств-депозитариев.
3. Настоящий Договор вступает в силу после его ратификации государствами, правительства которых назначены в качестве депозитариев Договора, и 40 другими подписавшими настоящий Договор государствами и сдачи ими на хранение ратификационных грамот.
в) 1. Для государств, ратификационные грамоты или документы о присоединении которых будут сданы на хранение после вступления в силу настоящего Договора, он вступает в силу в день сдачи на хранение их ратификационных грамот или документов о присоединении.
2. Правительства-депозитарии незамедлительно уведомляют все подписавшие и присоединившиеся к настоящему Договору государства о дате каждого подписания, дате сдачи на хранение каждой ратификационной грамоты или документа о присоединении, дате вступления в силу настоящего Договора.
3. Настоящий Договор должен быть зарегистрирован правительствами-депозитариями в соответствии со статьей 102 Устава Организации Объединенных Наций.
г) Каждый Участник настоящего Договора в порядке осуществления своего государственного суверенитета имеет право выйти из Договора, если он решит, что связанные с содержанием настоящего Договора исключительные обстоятельства поставили под угрозу высшие интересы его страны. О таком выходе он уведомляет за три месяца всех Участников Договора.
B.
1. Read the text and answer the check-up questions.
In international law and diplomatic practice the term "treaty" is used in two senses. In a generic sense, it refers to all agreements between stales which are of a binding character, and in a restricted sense it refers to a title given to instruments containing such international agreements. Instruments setting out agreements between states bear different titles, such as treaty, Agreement, Convention, Protocol, Act, Declaration, Statute, Regulations, Provisions, Pact, Covenant, Compromis, Accord, Arrangements, Modus Vivendi, Exchange of Notes and Concordat. It is, however, not obligatory to give a title to an international agreement, as agreements can be concluded even by exchange of letters or telegrams. Some of the agreements are highly formal in character whilst others are not. The titles given to international agreements have little significance from the legal point of view, as all international agreements, by whatever name called, are equally binding in nature. In diplomatic literature, the terms "treaty", "convention", and "protocol" are all applied more or less indiscriminately to international agreements. Sometimes the same instrument is designated in different places in its text by different terms. There is no obvious explanation for this diversity of terminology.
International law prescribes neither the form nor the procedure for the making of international engagements, and consequently their form depends upon the will and convenience of the parties. In practice it is governed also by usage and varies depending on whether agreement is reached between states, heads of states, governments (increasingly used), or particular ministers or departments.
It is not every international instrument, however formal it may be, that would be regarded as a treaty. Unless the instrument creates contractual obligations between two or more states, the essential requirements of a treaty are not fulfilled. The binding nature of treaty obligations is the oldest and doubtless the most fundamental rule of international law.
Of all international engagements which are intended to have an obligatory character the most important are "treaties", the term being derived from the French trailer [ L. tractare], which means "to negotiate".
The next most solemn type of international engagement is the "convention", derived from the Latin word conventio meaning "agreement". This term is frequently, though not necessarily, employed in connection with agreements to which a large number of countries are parties, and especially to agreements of the law-making type.
The treaty document covers the following parts:
1. The preamble containing:
(a) a list of the heads of state in whose names the treaty is concluded;
(b) a list of plenipotentiaries;
(c) usually a statement of the purposes and objectives of the treaty, sometimes accompanied by a recital of principles and circumstances;
(d) a declaration that the plenipotentiaries have the necessary powers.
2. The text .generally containing, in the form of numbered articles, the respective agreements of the signatories. It also indicates:
(a) the requirements for bringing the treaty into force;
(b) its duration;
(c) the place where the exchange of ratifications will take place.
3. The final clauses, specifying that the plenipotentiaries have signed the treaty and have affixed their seals thereto, and including information on:
(a) the number of signed copies;
(b) if in more than one language, the languages used, and that each is equally authentic;
(c) the place and date of the signature.
According to the importance of the treaty, the preamble can be more or less enlarged. The statements in the final clauses are, on the contrary, usually identical.
The provisions of the treaty determine the manner in which and the date on which the treaty enters into force. Where the treaty does not specify a date, there is a presumption that the treaty is intended to come into force as soon as all the negotiating states have consented to be bound by the treaty.
After a treaty is concluded, the written instruments, which provide formal evidence of consent to be bound by ratification, accession, and so on, and also reservations and other declarations, are placed in the custody of a depositary, who may be one or more states, or an international organization. The depositary has functions of considerable importance relating to matters of form, including provision of information as to the time at which the treaty enters into force. The United Nations Secretariat plays a significant role as depositary of multilateral treaties.
As regards treaties, conventions, etc., these, when concluded between two countries, are now ordinarily signed in two texts, viz., in the respective languages of the two countries, though exceptions occur. In the case of treaties of a general nature - multilateral treaties - concluded between many states, the usual practice was to use French, but now French and English. Those concluded under the auspices of the United Nations normally have texts in its official languages, all equally authentic.
The authenticity of the text is established by means of the signatures of the plenipotentiaries. It will depend on the circumstances whether signature alone is sufficient to bring the treaty into force or whether some further step, such as ratification, is necessary.
Sometimes, however, when an appreciable interval occurs between the conclusion of the negotiations and the signature of a treaty, the plenipotentiaries append to it their initials ne varietur as a guarantee of the authenticity of the text. (From "A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice" by B. Sen)
1) What are the most typical forms of international agreement? 2) What does the term "treaty" imply in a generic and a restricted sense? 3) What is the compositional design of treaties and conventions? 4) Which part of a treaty contains a statement of the purpose? 5) And which part embodies the substantive commitments undertaken by the contracting parties? 6) How is the authenticity of the text established? 7) What languages are used in treaties and other international compacts?
2. Find in the text the words and phrases of foreign origin and comment on them.
3. Suggest the Russian for: TREATY
a) to accede to a ~; to adhere to a ~; to conclude a ~; to denounce a ~; to enter into a ~; to extend the validity of a ~; to initial a ~; to observe a ~; to prolong the validity of a ~; to ratify a ~; to register a ~; to render a ~ invalid; to renounce a ~; to sign a ~; to violate a ~; to withdraw from a ~; to terminate a ~.
b) a basic ~; a binding ~; a boundary ~; a collective ~; a commercial ~; a demarcation ~; an (in) equitable ~; an international ~, a non-aggression ~; a non-proliferation ~; an open ~; a peace ~; a restricted ~; a trade ~; a universal ~;
c) a ~ of alliance; a ~ of cession; a ~ of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance; a ~ of guarantee; a ~ of mutual security; a ~ of neutrality; a ~ of unlimited duration; breach of an international ~; the coming of a ~ into force; denunciation of a ~; prolongation of a ~; renunciation of a ~; the substantive articles of a ~; object of a ~; observance of a ~; scope of a ~.
5. Translate the sentences into English:
1. В целях обеспечения интересов взаимной безопасности Франция и Германия заключили договор, положения которого являются обязательными для обеих сторон.
2. На конференции был поднят вопрос о продлении срока действия данного договора, истекающего в следующем году.
3. Все государства-участники Договора о взаимной безопасности, невзирая на свои национальные интересы, придерживаются его целей и принципов.
4. Содержание настоящего Договора затрагивает вопросы, вызывающие взаимную обеспокоенность, поэтому его подписание ожидается в ближайшее время.
5. Государство, нарушившее условия Договора о ненападении, будет подвергнуто санкциям за невыполнение своих обязательств.
6. Если какое-либо государство объявит о своем выходе из Соглашения, оно должно разослать соответствующее уведомление о своём намерении в короткие сроки.
7. В договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимопомощи были внесены определенные поправки, не затрагивающие предмет договора.
8. Предполагается, что Договор будет ратифицирован национальными законодательными органами уже в следующем месяце, после чего он вступит в силу.
9. Если одна из Сторон на основании конституционных процедур расторгнет соглашение, оно будет объявлено недействительным.
10. Присоединение к Договору о коллективной обороне предполагает соблюдение военных обязательств под строгим и эффективным международным контролем.
II. Facing Challenges to Security
1. Read the report and answer the check-up questions. Consult the Active Vocabulary list.
Kofi Annan Courage to fulfil our responsibilities
At the beginning of the 2ist century, we face a world of extraordinary challenges - and of extraordinary interconnectedness. We are all vulnerable to new security threats, and to old threats that are evolving in complex and unpredictable ways. Either we allow this array of threats, and our responses to them, to divide us, or we come together to take effective action to meet all of them on the basis of a shared commitment to collective security.
Late last year, convinced that the time had come for a fundamental review of our collective security system, I established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change1. I asked its 16 members-eminent people, representing many nations and points of view - to analyse the threats to peace and security our world faces; to evaluate how well our existing policies and institutions are meeting them; and to recommend changes to those policies and institutions, so as to ensure an effective collective response to those threats.
Their report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", which I received this week, follows a year of consultations around the world. It makes 101 far-sighted but realistic recommendations. If acted on, they would address the security concerns of all states, ensure that the UN works better, strengthen the international rule of law and make all people safer.
A world of interconnected threats
We must first agree on the threats we face. Today, any event or process that leads to deaths on a large scale or the lessening of life chances, and which undermines states as the basic unit of the international system, should be viewed as a threat to international peace and security.
According to the panel, six clusters of threats fall under that rubric: economic and social threats, including poverty and deadly infectious disease; inter-state conflict and rivalry; internal violence, including civil war, state collapse and genocide; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organised crime.
Today, these threats are interconnected to an unprecedented degree, and no state acting alone can defeat them. The panel report spells out the dangers with horrifying clarity. With the amount of highly enriched uranium that could fit into six milk cartons, a terrorist could improvise a nuclear device to level a medium-sized city. A nuclear attack on such a city in the United States or Europe would have staggering costs for the world economy. According to the World Bank, the attacks of September 11th 2001 cost more than $80 billion dollars and pushed 11mt people in developing countries into poverty. The economic fallout from a nuclear terrorist attack would dwarf these numbers. Given the relationship between poverty and infant mortality, we would count the cost of a nuclear terrorist attack in a rich country in two terrible death tolls: in the attacked city, and in poor nations all over the world.
Likewise, the security of developed countries is only as strong as the ability of poor states to respond to and contain a new deadly infectious disease. As the panel notes, the incubation period for most infectious diseases is longer than most international air flights. As a result, any one of the 700m people who travel on airlines in a year could unwittingly carry a lethal virus to an unsuspecting country. The 1918 influenza epidemic killed twice as many people in one year as HIV/AIDS has killed in the past 28 years. Today, a similar virus could kill tens of millions in a fraction of the time.
So, in today's world, any threat to one is truly a threat to all. This principle, once applied only to military attacks by one state against another, should be extended to all categories of threats we face. And since there are real limits on self-protection, all states share an interest in a collective-security system that commits all of them to act co-operatively against these dangers.
Getting serious about prevention
Given the gravity and interconnectedness of today's threats, our world needs to be far more committed to prevention. Prevention, if properly resourced and broadly supported, can be highly effective. The panel report reminds us that in 1963, many thought that 25-50 states would possess nuclear weapons by this year; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped prevent this. The World Health Organisation, which led efforts to eradicate smallpox and roll back the threat of polio, recently helped halt the spread of SARS and save the lives of tens of thousands of people.
The best agents of prevention are capable states, exercising their sovereignty responsibly, dealing with internal dangers before they threaten others, and acting collectively with other states to meet threats on a global scale.
And our best preventive strategy is to support development. Committing resources to achieve the Millennium Development Goals agreed in 2000 (which, among other things, set targets to halve extreme poverty and hunger by 2015) is the best security investment states can make. It will save lives in poor countries, reduce violent conflict and the appeal of radicalism, and bolster the ability of states to deal with threats before they cause real harm.
The dangers of inadequate preventive action are powerfully illustrated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the face of a lamentably slow and ineffective global response, the disease has killed 20m people in as many years, and it continues to spread. Tragically, the worst is yet to come. Its ultimate cost will be measured not just in lives, but in shattered societies. Despite greater international resolve in recent years, we are still not taking all the steps needed to bring the disease under control.
We also need a major initiative to build public-health capacities in the developing world. If diseases can be treated and, better still, prevented at local level, not only the poorer countries will benefit. The whole world will acquire better defences against bio-terrorism and large-scale natural epidemics. And the Security Council should work closely with the World Health Organisation to strengthen biological security through prompt, effective responses to such outbreaks.
Equally critical is greater collective action on environmental degradation - from a long-term strategy to reduce global warming, going beyond the period covered by the Kyoto protocol, to better management of natural resources in countries that are at risk.
Countering terrorism
Prevention is also a vital part of any effective strategy to protect people against terrorism. Terrorism is not new. What is new is the range, scale and intensity of the threat. Today, one terror network, al-Qaeda, has the capacity to kill around the world, and has struck in more than ten UN member states in the past few years. In addition, the prospect that terrorists could acquire instruments of massive destruction creates unprecedented dangers.
The UN must make better use of its assets in the fight against terrorism. It should articulate an effective and principled counter-terrorism strategy that is respectful of the rule of law and universal human rights. But first - a significant problem - terrorism must be defined. One of the panel's signal achievements is to offer such a definition, agreed to by all the panellists. It would define terrorism as any action intended to kill or seriously harm civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling action by a government or international organisation. States should use this definition to build consensus and strengthen the UN's response to this deadly scourge.
The report also makes urgent recommendations on non-proliferation, disarmament, and curbing the supply of dangerous materials to reduce the risk of nuclear, chemical or biological attacks by states or terrorist groups. States must be encouraged to give up the development of domestic uranium enrichment, and be urged to take part in a voluntary time-limited moratorium on the construction of reprocessing plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be strengthened, using the standards in the treaty's additional protocol for safeguards inspections.
Civil and interstate wars
Since the end of the cold war, the UN has become far more engaged in preventing and ending civil wars, and it has continued its long-standing role of working to stop wars between states. As the panel points out, more civil wars have been brought to an end through negotiation since 1990 than in the 200 years before that. Through successes and failures, we have developed expertise and learned hard lessons.
As the demand for UN blue helmets continues to grow, we need to boost the supply of peacekeepers to avoid repeating some of the worst failures of the 1990s. Wealthy states should hasten their efforts to transform existing forces into contingents suitable for peace operations, and put them at the disposal of the UN. We must also invest in mediation and support the implementation of peace agreements. The report stresses the importance of demobilising combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life. If this is not done, civil wars cannot be successfully brought to an end, and other critical goals - democracy, justice and development-will remain unmet.
Time and again, the international community has lost focus once the high point of a crisis has passed or peacekeepers have left a country. I welcome the panel's proposal to help deal with this problem: the creation by the Security Council of a Peacebuilding Commission, which would give the organisation a strategic focus for its work in countries under stress or emerging from conflict.
The use of force
Prevention or peaceful dispute-resolution will sometimes fail. When it does, we must be able to rely on the use of force. No matter what the cause, the report proposes five basic guidelines that all states, and the Security Council, should bear in mind in deciding whether to do so:
* Seriousness of threat: Is the threat serious enough to justify prima facie the use of force?
* Proper purpose: Is the primary purpose of the proposed use of force to halt or avert the threat in question?
* Last resort: Has every non-military option been explored and exhausted?
* Proportional means: Is the force proposed the minimum necessary to meet the threat?
* Balance of consequences: Is it clear that the consequences of action will not be worse than the consequences of inaction?
The report sees no need to amend Article 51 of the UN Charter, which preserves the right of all states to act in self-defence against armed attack, including the right to take pre-emptive action against an imminent threat.
However, in the new security environment in which we live, states may also fear threats that are neither imminent nor proximate, but which could culminate in horrific violence if left to fester. The Security Council is already fully empowered by the charter to deal with these threats. It must be prepared to do so, taking decisive action earlier than in the past, when asked to act by states that have based their claims on reliable evidence.
The question of action to protect civilians inside states has long been fraught with controversy. Yet it is being recognised more and more widely that the question is better framed not as one of a right to intervene, but of our responsibility to protect - a responsibility borne, first and foremost, by states. The panel members, whose background and experience vary widely, have agreed that the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect those who commit genocide, large-scale ethnic cleansing, or other comparable atrocities. I hope UN members will share that view - and that the Security Council will act on it.
A new United Nations
What does the panel's report mean for the UN? The organisation is now nearly 60 years old. It was born in a very different time and designed for a very different world. It has an under-appreciated record of adapting to new dangers-take, for instance, its peacekeeping efforts in civil wars around the world, and its response to the attacks of September 2001. But it clearly needs far-reaching reform if it is to prevent and respond to all the threats that we face today.
Some propose that a collective response through the UN is too difficult or not necessary. But action taken to meet threats always has an impact beyond the immediate context, and all states benefit from a shared global framework. That does not mean that the UN needs to do everything. Indeed, as a matter of good policy and sheer practicality, the UN must learn to share burdens, welcoming help from others and working hand in hand with them. I am pleased that it is already doing so - and that the panel's report makes sensible recommendations to strengthen the UN's partnerships with regional organisations and individual member states.
Inevitably, great attention will fall on the question of Security Council reform. What are the objectives of such reform? They surely must be to make the council more effective and authoritative. The idea of permanent membership was devised to ensure the active engagement of the big powers of 60 years ago in the maintenance of international peace and security. Whether we need new permanent members is a matter of controversy and debate.
The report offers two formulae for consideration by member states, both of which would expand membership to 24, and would have the same goals: to bring into the council's deliberations those who contribute most to the organisation financially, militarily and diplomatically; to ensure that the council broadly represents the membership of the UN as a whole; and not to expand the veto, which would render decision-making more difficult. The panel's proposals offer a chance for a breakthrough on this vital issue in the year ahead. If its recommendations are acted upon, the new Security Council would be more representative of our world, and better equipped to take decisive action.
We also need a strengthened UN secretariat, one that can support the new Peacebuilding Commission and implement more effectively the decisions of the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies on everything from peacekeeping operations to mediating civil wars. The report envisages a secretariat that is more concerted in its action, and in which the secretary-general has more responsibility for management and greater accountability.
An equally important proposal is to overhaul the Economic and Social Council, to strengthen its role in social development and in improving knowledge about the economic and social dimensions of security threats. The report also recommends changes to make the Human Rights Commission a better defender of the human rights of people everywhere.
Time to decide
In his last annual address to Congress in January 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, then America's president, alluded to his plans to create a new collective security institution, the United Nations, and gave warning that: "In our disillusionment after the last war, we gave up the hope of achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world."
Almost exactly 60 years later, we once again find ourselves mired in disillusionment, in an all too imperfect world. It is easy to stand at the sidelines and criticise. And we could talk endlessly about UN reform. But our world no longer has that luxury. The time has come to adapt our collective security system, so that it works efficiently, effectively and equitably.
Next year, UN member states will be reviewing progress in implementing the Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000, culminating in a summit of world leaders in New York in September. This will be an appropriate moment for them to act on some of the most important recommendations in the panel's report, which require decisions at the highest levels of government. I shall indicate which recommendations call for decisions at that level, in my view, in a report of my own early next year.
I fervently hope that world leaders will rise to this challenge. In the past three years we have all lived through a period of deep division and sombre reflection. We must make 2005 a year of bold decision. As the panel simply puts it: "We all share responsibility for each other's security." Let us summon the courage to fulfil that responsibility.
Active Vocabulary
to meet
to address to counter
to respond toреагировать на, противостоять, противодействоватьtransnational organized crimeтранснациональная организованная преступность(un)sustainable development(не)устойчивое развитиеillicit drug-traffickingнезаконный оборот наркотиковenvironmental degradationухудшение состояния окружающей средыcomprehensive approach toвсеобъемлющий подход кcollective-security systemсистема коллективной безопасностиto implement the decisionsвыполнять ,осуществлять решенияimplementation of peace agreementsвыполнение мирных соглашенийto monitor compliance withследить за соблюдениемto put forces at the disposal of the UNпередать войска в распоряжение ООНcountries under stress or emerging from conflictстраны, находящиеся в состоянии войны или выходящие из состояния войныmoratorium on the construction of reprocessing plantsмораторий на строительство перерабатывающих заводовto take pre-emptive action againstпредпринять упреждающие меры противto curb the supply of dangerous materialsограничить поставку опасных материалов
1) What are the challenges to peace and security, old and new, that our world faces today?
2) Is the existing collective security system efficient enough to meet these challenges?
3) What was the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change set up for?
4) What categories of threats to security does our world face, according to the panel?
5) Can a state acting alone defeat these challenges? Comment on the statement: "Any threat to one is truly a threat to all".
6) Why does Kofi Annan emphasize the role of prevention in addressing the security concerns? Why is it so important to support development?
7) What measures can the UN take to counter terrorism? Why is it so important to work out the definition of terrorism?
8) How can the UN help in bringing to an end civil wars?
9) Can states rely on the use of force if peaceful dispute resolution fails? What does article 51 of the UN Charter provide for?
10) Why does the UN need far-reaching reform? What should be done to make the Security Council and other UN bodies more effective and authoritative?
11) What are the challenges to peace and security, old and new, that our world faces today?
12) Is the existing collective security system efficient enough to meet these challenges?
13) What was the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change set up for?
14) What categories of threats to security does our world face, according to the panel?
15) Can a state acting alone defeat these challenges? Comment on the statement: "Any threat to one is truly a threat to all".
16) Why does Kofi Annan emphasize the role of prevention in addressing the security concerns? Why is it so important to support development?
17) What measures can the UN take to counter terrorism? Why is it so important to work out the definition of terrorism?
18) How can the UN help in bringing to an end civil wars?
19) Can states rely on the use of force if peaceful dispute resolution fails? What does article 51 of the UN Charter provide for?
20) Why does the UN need far-reaching reform? What should be done to make the Security Council and other UN bodies more effective and authoritative?
2. Fill in the blanks using the Active Vocabulary. Translate the sentences into Russian.
1. As we look ahead, we can see real risks that resource depletion, especially fresh-water scarcities, as well as severe forms of ............, may increase social and political tensions in unpredictable but potentially dangerous ways.
2. There is near universal agreement that it is preferable to ............, and that strategies of ............ must ............ the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms.
3. The need for a more ............ to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity.
4. Successful strategies for prevention require us to ensure that old conflicts do not start up again, and that the necessary support is provided for ............ .
5. In my address to the General Assembly last September, I called on Member States to unite in the pursuit of more effective policies to stop ............ and egregious violations of human rights.
6. New approaches in this area could include establishing a mechanism to ............ by all parties with existing provisions of international humanitarian law.
7. Although the UN has understandings for military standby agreements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are ............ .
8. The objective of today's peace operations is to assist the parties engaged in ............ to pursue their interests through political channels.
9. I urge Member States to take advantage of this conference to start taking serious actions that will curtail the ............ in conflict-prone regions.
10. I would also urge that Member States support regional disarmament measures, like the ............ which will halt importing, exporting or manufacturing of nuclear weapons in many countries.
11. Because most ............ lack the capacity to detect and seize illicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives.
12. Political leaders find it hard to sell ............ policies abroad to their public at home, because the costs are palpable and immediate, while the benefits - an undesirable of tragic future event that does not occur - are more difficult for the leaders to convey and the public to grasp.
13. The UN adopted an indicative policy framework intended to help achieve the goal of ............ - in rich and poor countries alike. 3. Translate the UN GA Resolution into English paying special attention to the words in italics. Make use of the following words and word combinations:
to respond to (to address; to counter) global threats and challenges; the Millenium Summit; the Millenium Declaration; to establish a cohesive system; to implement sth; a comprehensive approach; to promote a coherent response; the High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; to commend; transnational organized crime; unsustainable development; illicit drug-trafficking; environmental degradation. Резолюция Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН о реагировании на глобальные угрозы и вызовы
Генеральная Ассамблея,
ссылаясь на свои резолюции 55/162 от 14 декабря 2000 года, 56/95 от 14 декабря 2001 года, 57/144 от 16 декабря 2002 года о последующих мерах по итогам Саммита тысячелетия и на резолюцию 57/145 от 16 декабря 2002 года,
руководствуясь целями и принципами Устава Организации Объединенных Наций,
вновь подтверждая координирующую и руководящую роль Организации Объединенных Наций в формировании единой и эффективной системы реагирования на глобальные угрозы и вызовы и приветствуя нынешние усилия государств-членов и Генерального секретаря в этом направлении,
признавая важность, в контексте выполнения Декларации тысячелетия Организации Объединенных Наций всеобъемлющего подхода к устранению, в соответствии с Уставом, международным правом и соответствующими международными инструментами, глобальных угроз и вызовов,
приветствуя доклад Генерального секретаря об осуществлении Декларации тысячелетия Организации Объединенных Наций и содержащиеся в нем замечания о путях и средствах дальнейшего поощрения, при руководящей роли Организации Объединенных Наций, более всеобъемлющего и последовательного реагирования на глобальные угрозы и вызовы XXI века,
принимая к сведению письмо Генерального секретаря от 3 ноября 2003 года на имя Председателя Генеральной Ассамблеи относительно учреждения Группы высокого уровня по угрозам, вызовам и изменениям,
1. высоко оценивает возросшее взаимодействие государств-членов, учреждений и организаций системы Организации Объединенных Наций и международных и региональных организаций, сотрудничающих с Организацией Объединенных Наций, направленное на борьбу с различными глобальными угрозами и вызовами, в том числе создаваемыми международным терроризмом во всех его формах и проявлениях, транснациональной организованной преступностью, региональными конфликтами, нищетой, неустойчивым развитием, незаконным оборотом наркотиков, отмыванием денег, инфекционными заболеваниями, ухудшением состояния окружающей среды, стихийными бедствиями, комплексными чрезвычайными ситуациями и другими факторами;
2. выражает свою признательность государствам-членам и соответствующим региональным и другим организациям за представление своих мнений по вопросам, упомянутым в пунктах 1 и 2 резолюции 57/145;
3. рекомендует Организации Объединенных Наций, ее государствам-членам, учреждениям и организациям ее системы и другим международным и региональным организациям продолжать свои усилия по разработке всеобъемлющей и эффективной стратегии реагирования на глобальные угрозы и вызовы;
4. приветствует учреждение Генеральным секретарем Группы высокого уровня по угрозам, вызовам и изменениям для вынесения рекомендаций по элементам коллективных действий и выражает свою готовность рассмотреть в первоочередном порядке на своей пятьдесят девятой сессии рекомендации Генерального секретаря в этой связи.
4. Translate into English:
а) Россия выдвинула инициативу и последовательно проводит линию на формирование Глобальной стратегии противодействия новым угрозам и вызовам на прочном фундаменте международного права. Время подтвердило актуальность и значимость такой задачи. Российская инициатива получает все более широкую поддержку в мире. В ходе 58-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН по предложению России консенсусно принята новая резолюция, конкретизирующая дальнейшие шаги мирового сообщества в направлении выработки глобальной стратегии. Более того, российская инициатива фактически перешла в практическую плоскость с созданием решением Генерального секретаря ООН Группы высокого уровня по угрозам, вызовам и переменам ("Группа мудрецов"), призванной готовить рекомендации о мерах коллективного противодействия глобальным вызовам и угрозам.
(Информационный бюллетень МИД РФ)
b) Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации (выдержки)
[...] Основные угрозы в международной сфере обусловлены следующими факторами:
- стремление отдельных государств и межгосударственных объединений принизить роль существующих механизмов обеспечения международной безопасности, прежде всего ООН и ОБСЕ;
- опасность ослабления политического, экономического и военного влияния России в мире;
- укрепление военно-политических блоков и союзов, прежде всего расширение НАТО на восток:
- возможность появления в непосредственной близости от российских границ иностранных военных баз и крупных воинских контингентов;
- распространение оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки;
- ослабление интеграционных процессов в Содружестве Независимых Государств;
- возникновение и эскалация конфликтов вблизи государственной границы Российской Федерации и внешних границ государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств;
- притязания на территорию Российской Федерации.
Угрозы национальной безопасности Российской Федерации в международной сфере проявляются в попытках других государств противодействовать укреплению России как одного из центров влияния в многополярном мире, помешать реализации национальных интересов и ослабить ее позиции в Европе, на Ближнем Востоке, в Закавказье, Центральной Азии и Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе.
Серьезную угрозу национальной безопасности Российской Федерации представляет терроризм. Международным терроризмом развязана открытая компания в целях дестабилизации ситуации в России. [...]
III. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
A. 1. Translate the text paying special attention to the underlined words.
Non-proliferation in the 21st century; a transatlantic agenda
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are a threat to mankind and all countries should take steps to promote a safer world by pursuing their eventual elimination. For more than a decade, international organisations, governments, and security analysts alike have focused on the increasing threat emanating from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, after the end of the Cold War. It was not until the events of September 11, however, that the general public became aware that the nexus between the emergence of a new type of international terrorism and the proliferation of these weapons represented a new threat to international security in the 21st century.
Establishing a global legal framework aimed at halting the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, has been a goal of the international community for a few decades. Initiated during the Cold War, this effort led to the creation of a network of treaties, organisations, unilateral and bilateral undertakings, and multilateral inspections, which was considerably strengthened in the 1990s. More recently, however, this fundamental international endeavour lost momentum: many existing agreements had difficulties in being implemented and discussions on new agreements were delayed or frozen. Many practitioners and observers started to question the usefulness of non-proliferation as a valuable instrument in managing international security. In September 2001, the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters even reported "a crisis of multilateral disarmament diplomacy".
Some see the United States at the epicentre of this crisis. In the past, the United States exercised clear leadership in arms control and non-proliferation. However, the Bush administration, continuing a trend that began in Congress during the second Clinton administration, reevaluated a number of arms control and non-proliferation agreements in terms of their relevance to its perception of US national security interests. In doing so, the Bush administration decided to withdraw from or put aside several important treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), START II and III, and the draft compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In addition, many officials in this administration believe, as pointed out by experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "that the United States can provide for its security and for the security of its allies with improved conventional US forces, the deployment of comprehensive missile defenses, new space-based systems, and fewer-but perhaps newer-nuclear weapons".
But the approach of the Bush administration has also generated important questions about both the nature and the effectiveness of the arms control and non-proliferation regime. A product of the Cold War, this regime is still very much based on the political and military balance of-power and alliance systems of that period. Moreover, despite its successes, the non-proliferation norm has never been universally accepted. Various agreements have had different levels of effectiveness and compliance: many key nations have remained outside the regime, while others, nominally part of it, have not fully respected its provisions. As a consequence, a debate is ongoing within the international community on the need to adapt the international non-proliferation regime to a new security environment, and this has stimulated a new debate about non-proliferation.
This debate took on an added dimension after the terrorist attacks of September 11. There is now agreement on both sides of the Atlantic on the need to fight the proliferation of knowledge, technologies and materials that can be used by terrorists as well as states to develop WMD. Americans and Europeans, according to T. Delpech, a leading French security analyst, "have come to recognise that international treaties, which by definition constrain only states, must be associated with other measures to address the problem posed by the spread of non-conventional weapons to non-state networks."
Different agreements, different effectiveness
The international community has gradually established a global arms control and non-proliferation regime, which is a network of organisations, multilateral and bilateral treaties, inspections systems, and unilateral undertakings aimed at stopping the spread of a number of weapons, and in particular of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Based on the 2002 SIPRI Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, we can sort arms control and non-proliferation regimes into five categories:
a. Agreements intended to limit the force levels of parties: in this category are the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia placing limits on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (i.e. START, the Moscow Treaty), and also regional agreements limiting certain force levels, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Other treaties prohibit nuclear weapons in specific regions, such as the Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), South America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South-east Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba).
b. Agreements aimed at the elimination of particular categories of weapons: some of the most important treaties and conventions are in this category. Under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the basis of the international norm against nuclear proliferation, state parties pledged to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to pursue negotiations to reduce existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or transfer of biological agents or toxins in quantities sufficient to produce weapons. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. In the area of conventional weapons, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, or Ottawa Convention, prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and promotes their destruction.
c. Agreements intended to restrict further development or deployment of weapons. Among the former, the 1996 CTBT prohibits nuclear test explosions of any size and establishes a rigorous verification system to detect violations. Among the latter, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit around the earth or stationing in outer space any object carrying nuclear or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.
d. Export control regimes: three of them, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have established guidelines that member states are committed to implement through their national export control systems. The Australia Group, for instance, was established in 1984 and controls more than 50 chemical weapons precursors, biological weapons pathogens, and related dual-use equipment.
e. Practical disarmament and threat reduction measures: these include initiatives to provide financial and technical assistance to eliminate or safeguard weapons and military capabilities that are located in other countries. The most extensive of these measures are those carried out under the US-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, which deals with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS). Other initiatives of this kind include the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (NDCI) co-sponsored by the European Union, the United States, and Canada, with substantial support from Norway and Japan. All these efforts will now be part of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, launched in 2002 and pledging to provide up to US$20 billion over the next decade against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
This complex network of treaties, agreements and initiatives is regarded by the transatlantic community as particularly effective and playing a capital role in international security. Allied heads of state and government stated at the 2002 NATO Prague Summit: "We reaffirm that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the spread and use of WMD and their means of delivery. We stress the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords."
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have steadily reduced their massive nuclear arsenals thanks to their bilateral arms control agreements. At present, only eight countries possess nuclear weapons: the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), and three countries that are not parties to the NPT, India, Israel and Pakistan. Although North Korea, and possibly Iran, are trying to develop nuclear weapons, a number of other countries, have officially abandoned nuclear programmes in the last 20 years within the framework of the NPT: Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine. Similarly, the BWC and the CWC have established international norms against the possession and proliferation of, respectively, biological and chemical weapons. As of May 2003, 149 states are members of the BWC and 151 of the CWC. However, ten nations (China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria) are suspected of maintaining chemical weapons programmes: the same countries, plus Russia, are suspected of retaining biological weapons of research programmes.
Although it is difficult to generalise, different non-proliferation regimes have had different degrees of effectiveness and compliance, two interrelated issues. An agreement is generally considered effective when members align their policies with the objectives of the treaty and when, in enlarging its membership, it leads countries to change their behaviour. The NPT, for instance, though generally considered effective would be much more so if India, Israel and Pakistan decided to join in. Compliance refers to the capacity of an agreement to lead its parties to act in accordance with its provisions. For instance, the BWC, because of its lack of effective verification and enforcement measures, failed to pursue non-compliance by the Soviet Union, which until 1991 ran the most ambitious offensive biological weapons programme in history. Export control regimes and practical disarmament measures enjoy a higher degree of effectiveness and compliance. However, as these are generally informal mechanisms, their effectiveness is supported and enhanced by the existence of multilateral treaties and conventions.
In sum, arms control and non-proliferation regimes are commonly considered quite effective and benefit from a considerable degree of compliance. Despite some weaknesses, these regimes provide a necessary legal mechanism and a global diplomatic norm to address disarmament and proliferation. Policymakers and analysts, however, are increasingly arguing that the world is now confronted with a fundamentally different proliferation problem. The Cold War system based on strong alliances, deterrence, containment, preventive diplomacy and conventional military capabilities has been replaced by asymmetric conflicts, where weak or failed states and international terrorist groups, sometimes in concert, strive to acquire mass destruction capabilities and strike Western democracies. With specific regard to weapons of mass destruction, this poses completely different proliferation problems, which call into question the utility and efficacy of the current non-proliferation regimes.
2. Answer the check up questions:
a) What was the result of the effort of the international community at halting the spread of WMD?
b) What is the current situation in non-proliferation?
c) Why is the US often seen at the epicenter of this crisis? Describe the Bush administration approach to arms control and non-proliferation.
d) Has the non-proliferation norm been universally accepted?
e) How did the events of September 11 influence non-proliferation?
f) What is a global arms control and non-proliferation regime? Describe the main categories of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. Enumerate the most important treaties and conventions.
g) How many countries possess nuclear weapons at present?
h) Comment on the role of the BWC and the CWC.
i) Are arms control and non-proliferation regimes considered effective? What is a fundamentally different proliferation problem the world is now confronted with?
3. Decipher the acronyms from the text: WMD, CBRN, ABM, CTBT, START II, BWC, CFE, CWC, MTCR, NSG, NIS, CTR programme, NDC I, G-8, NATO.
TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
B. 1. Study the text of the treaty with the help of the active vocabulary list.
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any Other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States; the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States, of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHERE OF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
Active Vocabulary
Preamble
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons нераспространениеto conclude a treaty /conclusionзаключать договор/заключение parties to the treatyучастники Договораto safeguard security обеспечить безопасностьto avert the danger of war предотвратить опасность войныto enhance the danger of war увеличить опасность войныdissemination of nuclear weaponsраспространение ядерного оружияthe application of safeguards применение гарантийthe application of atomic energy применение ядерной энергииthe application of nuclear technology применение ядерных технологийnuclear activities (peaceful ~)ядерная деятельность (мирная ~)the safeguards system система гарантийto further the application содействовать применениюthe flow of source and special fissionable materialsдвижение исходных и специальных расщепляющихся материаловnuclear weapon states/non nuclear weapon statesгосударства, обладающие ядерным оружием/не обладающие ядерным оружиемby-products побочные продуктыnuclear explosive devicesядерные взрывные устройстваin furtherance of the principleв осуществлении принципаat the earliest possible date по возможности скорееto undertake effective measuresпредпринять эффективные мерыthe cessation of the nuclear arms race прекращение гонки ядерных вооруженийattainment of the objective достижение целиthe discontinuance of test explosionsпрекращение испытательных взрывовthe easing of international tension смягчение международной напряженностиto acquire nuclear weapon (acquisition)приобретать ядерное оружие , приобретениеmanufacture of nuclear weaponsпроизводство ядерного оружияexisting stockpilesсуществующие запасыelimination from national arsenals исключение из национальных арсеналовmeans of delivery средства доставкиpursuant to a treaty (article)
general and complete disarmament в соответствии с Договором (статьей)
всеобщее и полное разоружение
Articles I-XI
to transfer nuclear weaponsпередавать ядерное оружиеnuclear weapon State-Party to the Treaty государство-участник Договора, обладающее ядерным оружиемto seek assistance добиваться помощиverification проверкаdiversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons переключение ядерной энергии c мирного применения на ядерное оружиеto undertake обязатьсяto be subject to the safeguards на ... распространяются гарантииto hamper the development создавать препятствия для развитияto meet the requirements с целью выполнения требованийindividually в индивидуальном порядкеdeposit сдача (на хранение)entry into force вступление в силуinitiation of the negotiations начало переговоровthe inalienable right неотъемлемое правоthrough appropriate procedures посредством соответствующих процедурwith due consideration for the needs ...с должным учетом нужд ...developing areas (of the world) развивающиеся районы (мира)on a non-discriminatory basisна недискриминационной основеto pursue negotiationsвести переговорыto propose amendments предложить поправкиDepositary Governments Правительства-Депозитарииto submit представлятьto circulate рассылатьthe Board of Governors of IAEA Совет Управляющих МАГАТЭto review the operation of the Treaty рассматривать действие Договораto be open for signature быть открытым для подписанияto accedeприсоединятьсяto be subject to ratification подлежать ратификацииinstruments of ratificationратификационные грамотыinstruments of accession документы о присоединенииto designate назначатьpromptly незамедлительноin exercising the national sovereignty в порядке осуществления государственного суверенитетаto withdraw from the Treaty
(withdrawal)выйти из договора/выходextraordinary events исключительные обстоятельстваto jeopardize the supreme interestsпоставить под угрозу of a country высшие интересы страныto continue in force indefinitely оставаться в силе бессрочно signatory and acceding States
to transmitгосударства, подписавшие договор и присоединившиеся к нему
препроводить 2. Translate the words and word combinations in brackets with the help of the active vocabulary list (The Preamble).
a) The international community should make every effort (для предотвращения опасности войны) and to take measures (для обеспечения безопасности народов).
b) The resolutions of the UN General Assembly called for (заключение договора о) the prevention of wider (распространение ядерного оружия).
c) The States concluding this Treaty (обязуются) to cooperate in facilitating (применение гарантий МАГАТЭ) on peaceful nuclear activities.
d) The benefits of (мирное применение ядерной технологии), including any technological (побочные продукты) which may be derived by (страны, обладающие ядерным оружием) from the development of (ядерные взрывные устройства) should be available for peaceful purposes to all (государствам-участникам Договора, как обладающим, так и не обладающим ядерным оружием.
e) (Государства-участники Договора) declare their intention to achieve (по возможности скорее) (прекращение гонки ядерных вооружений).
f) The Parties expressed their determination to seek to achieve (прекращение испытательных взрывов) of nuclear weapons for all time.
g) The states should facilitate (прекращение производства ядерного оружия), the liquidation of all their (существующие запасы) and (исключение из национальных арсеналов) of nuclear weapons and (средства его доставки).
3. Translate the sentences into English using the vocabulary of the NPT (the Preamble): a). Государства, заключающие настоящий Договор, ниже именуются Участниками договора.
b). Стороны считают, что распространение ядерного оружия серьезно увеличило бы опасность ядерной войны.
c). Мы договорились взять на себя обязательство сотрудничать в целях содействия применению гарантий международного агентства по атомной энергии в отношении мирной ядерной деятельности.
d). Участники договора настоящим подтверждают свое намерение по возможности скорее достигнуть прекращения гонки ядерных вооружений. e). Они заявили о решимости принять эффективные меры в отношении ядерного разоружения.
f). Участники совещания настоятельно призывают все государства действовать в соответствии с резолюциями Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, призывающими к заключению соглашения о предотвращении более широкого распространения ядерного оружия.
g). Стороны выражают поддержку всем странам, стремящимся содействовать смягчению международной напряженности.
h). Государства-члены союза обязуются действовать в соответствии с договором о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем.
i). Мы призываем все государства к сотрудничеству в достижении этой цели.
j). Блага мирного применения ядерной технологии должны быть доступны для мирных целей всем государствам-участникам Договора, как обладающим, так и не обладающим ядерным оружием.
4. Find the following set phrases in the Preamble and the articles of the NPT:
a) напоминая; стремясь; считая; учитывая; подтверждая; настоятельно призывая; выражая; заявляя; обязуясь; будучи убежденными;
b) в дальнейшем именуемые; в соответствии с резолюцией; призывать к чему-либо; в рамках чего-либо; с этой целью; согласились о нижеследующем; с тем чтобы; излагать; соответствовать статье договора; меры по...; в духе доброй воли; затрагивать чье-либо право; затем; впоследствии; настоящим назначаются; заранее уведомлять о чем-либо; должным образом заверенные; в удостоверение чего; совершено в трех экземплярах; должным образом уполномоченные; препроводить.
5. Translate the words and word combinations in brackets using the vocabulary of the NPT:
a) Each (государство-участник настоящего Договора, обладающее ядерным оружием) (обязуется не передавать) to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other (ядерные взрывные устройства).
b) (Гарантии) required by this article (применяются ко всему исходному или специальному расщепляющемуся материалу) in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State.
c) (Гарантии) required by the article (осуществляются) in a manner designed to avoid (создание препятствий) economic or technological development of the Parties.
d) (Переговоры) of such agreements shall commence within 180 days (со времени первоначального вступления в силу) of this Treaty.
e) The text of any (предложенная поправка) shall be submitted to (правительства-депозитарии) which (рассылают его) to all (участникам Договора).
f) Any (поправка) to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all (государства-участники Договора) which, (на дату рассылки такой поправки), are members of (Совет управляющих МАГАТЭ).
g) (Правительства-депозитарии) shall (незамедлительно) inform all (подписавшиеся и присоединившиеся к настоящему Договору государства) of the date of each signature, the date of (сдачи на хранение) of each (ратификационной грамоты или документа о присоединении).
h) Each Party shall (в порядке осуществления государственного суверенитета) have the right (выйти из Договора) if it decides that (исключительные обстоятельства поставили под угрозу высшие интересы) of its country.
i) A conference shall he convened to decide whether the Treaty (останется в силе бессрочно), or (будет продлен) for an additional fixed period or periods.
6. Translate the sentences into English using the vocabulary of the NPT:
a) 1. Государства-участники Договора, не обладающие ядерным оружием, заключают соглашение с Международным агентством по атомной энергии с целью выполнения требований настоящей статьи либо в индивидуальном порядке, либо совместно с другими государствами.
2. Государства сдают на хранение свои ратификационные грамоты или документы о присоединении. 3. Переговоры о таких соглашениях начинаются не позднее даты такой сдачи.
4. Неотъемлемым правом всех государств является право развивать исследования, производство и использование ядерной энергии в мирных целях.
5. Участники Договора сотрудничают в деле содействия дальнейшему развитию применения ядерной энергии в мирных целях, с должным учётом нужд развивающихся районов мира.
6. Каждый участник настоящего Договора обязуется в духе доброй воли вести переговоры об эффективных мерах по прекращению гонки ядерных вооружений в ближайшем будущем и ядерному разоружению. 7. Каждый участник настоящего Договора обязуется в духе доброй воли вести переговоры о договоре о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем.
b) 1. Любой участник настоящего Договора может предложить поправки к этому Договору. 2. Текст любой предложенной поправки представляется правительствам-депозитариям.
3. Любая поправка должна быть утверждена членами совета управляющих Международного агентства по атомной энергии.
4. Через 5 лет после вступления в силу настоящего Договора в Женеве (Швейцария) созывается конференция Участников Договора для рассмотрения действия настоящего Договора.
5. Настоящий Договор открыт для подписания его всеми государствами.
6. Любое государство, которое не подписало Договор до вступления его в силу, могут присоединиться к нему в любое время.
7. Настоящий Договор подлежит ратификации государствами, подписавшими его.
8. Ратификационные грамоты и документы о присоединении сдаются на хранение правительствам Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, Соединённого Королевства Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Соединённых Штатов Америки, которые настоящим назначаются в качестве правительств-депозитариев.
С. 1. Translate the text into Russian in writing paying special attention to the underlined words.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Background
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 188 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.
The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
2. a) Translate the text into Russian, paying special attention to the underlined words.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Its 189 states-parties are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS) - consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom - and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS status to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967." For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in 1991. Select Treaty Articles
Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify these commitments and ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted for weapons purposes, Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states' nuclear facilities. In addition, Article III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials between NWS and NNWS.
Article IV acknowledges the "inalienable right" of NNWS to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes. It also supports the "fullest possible exchange" of such nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete, permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits of nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its practical value. It is now moot due to the restriction on all nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - to which all five NWS are signatories.
Article VI commits the NWS to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Acknowledging the necessity of intermediate steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, Article VII allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.
Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests.
The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration, providing for a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years on whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandating that the five-year review conferences review past implementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty.
NOTE
North Korea announced January 10, 2003 that it was withdrawing from the treaty, effective the next day. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argued that it satisfied this requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding. There is not yet a definitive legal opinion as to whether North Korea is still a party to the NPT.
b) Translate the sentences paying attention to the words in italics.
1) Under the treaty, the NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS ague to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
2) With its nuclear - universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty.
3) The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely.
4) As the perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its practical value.
5) Article X establishes the terms by which a state may with draw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests.
D. Study texts 1, 2, 3 paying special attention to the underlined words. Comment on the outcomes of the NPT Review Conferences and the current situation in nuclear nonproliferation.
1) The 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference
What Does a Review Conference Review?
The NPT provides only a sketchy formal mandate for such conferences, saying merely that "a conference" of the parties shall "review the operation" of the treaty "with a view to assuring" that its provisions "are being realized." Over the years, the review conferences, supported by annual sessions of their preparatory committees (PrepComs), applied these general standards to assess how well the parties were fulfilling their commitments.
Yet, the review process also performs informal functions. It provides a pulpit for articulating national policies, a forum for debate, a crucible for reconciling political differences, a town hall for participation by nongovernmental organizations, and a global classroom for educating the public on global nuclear threats and responses. These formal and informal functions seek to ensure that the treaty remains both true to its principles and relevant to changing times.
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference also had another formal purpose: "to decide whether the [t]reaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Although the treaty provided that the extension would be determined by a majority vote, the parties felt that such a key decision should, if possible, be reached by consensus. Achieving that consensus proved to be one of the most difficult challenges in the history of multilateral diplomacy.
The "Package Deal"
The conference resulted in three decisions and a resolution that the parties heralded as a "package deal." The integrated nature of the package deal - a feature insisted upon by Indonesia, South Africa, and many other states - gave the review process a sharper focus and clarified its ends. Certain positive steps by the nuclear-weapon states before the conference, including a consistent pattern of strong U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), likely contributed to the successful outcome. Decision 1 - Strengthening the Review Process
This decision provided for five-year review conferences, each preceded by three sessions of a PrepCom. These conferences would have three main committees, which could have "subsidiary bodies" on specific issues. It also clarified that in the future the review process would examine "principles, objectives, and ways," including those in Decision 2, and would "look forward as well as back." As Canadian Ambassador Christopher Westdal put it, the goal was "permanence with accountability." Decision 2 - Principles and Objectives
The second decision set forth some "principles and objectives" for assessing progress in the following areas: universality; nonproliferation; disarmament; nuclear-weapon-free zones; security assurances; safeguards; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
For example, the decision laid out a "program of action" for disarmament, including the CTBT, a fissile materials treaty, and the "determined pursuit" by the nuclear-weapon states of "systematic and progressive efforts" to reduce nuclear arsenals. It called for "further steps" to assure non-nuclear-weapon states-parties against the threat of nuclear attack. It anticipated today's worries over the proliferation risks of advanced fuel cycles by clarifying that the treaty's "inalienable right" to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be applied "in conformity with Articles I, II as well as III of the [t]reaty." It also expanded support for the principle that new nuclear "supply arrangements" should require full-scope IAEA safeguards "as a necessary precondition" (i.e., safeguards over all nuclear materials of the importing, non-nuclear-weapon state). India and Pakistan - both NPT nonparties - have been seeking to avoid this precondition.
Decision 3 - Indefinite Extension
The crucial third decision was based on a simple declaratory statement that, "as a majority exists" among the parties to extend the treaty indefinitely, the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. The decision's preamble contained language "emphasizing" the other decisions, which further affirmed the linkages in the package deal.
Resolution on the Middle East
The last key component of the package deal was the Resolution on the Middle East, which, inter alia, endorsed the creation of a Middle Eastern "zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction," (WMD) including "their delivery systems." The NPT's indefinite extension without a vote would not have been possible without addressing this issue - a long-standing goal of the Arab states and many other parties.
Through some skillful diplomacy, especially the success of conference president Jayantha Dhanapala in forging compromises between groups of states backing various treaty extension options, the conference achieved its immediate goals of extending the treaty indefinitely while strengthening accountability.
2) 2000 NPT Review Conference
The states party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) convened April 24 at United Nations headquarters in New York to review the last five years of the treaty's operation and to make recommendations for its continued implementation. On May 22, after a long week of late-night negotiation and diplomatic maneuvering, the parties produced a consensus document, the third such document in the treaty's history. Many observers had predicted disarray, dissension, and even the slim possibility of a conference break-up at this review conference - the first since the treaty was indefinitely extended. Many of the disarmament objectives set out by the parties in 1995, including the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty and further progress in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions, have not been realized. The opening of the conference appeared to confirm these worst-case fears. Non-nuclear-weapon states castigated the nuclear-weapon states in general for slow progress toward disarmament and the United States in particular for its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its potentially destabilizing missile defense plans. Contrary to predictions, however, the treaty emerged from the conference unscathed, with a document featuring stronger language on nuclear disarmament and universal adherence than had ever been agreed to before.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference
And the 13 Practical Steps: A Summary
At the 2000 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, states-parties agreed to take 13 "practical steps" to meet their commitments under Article VI of the NPT.
1. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
2. A nuclear testing moratorium pending entry into force of the CTBT.
3. The immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and effectively verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty. The negotiations should aim to be concluded within five years.
4. The establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to all nuclear disarmament and reduction measures. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
7. The early entry into force and implementation of START 11, the conclusion of START III, and the preservation and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
9. Steps by all nuclear-weapon states toward disarmament including unilateral nuclear reductions; transparency on weapons capabilities and Article Vl-related agreements; reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons; measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies; the engagement of nuclear-weapon states as soon as appropriate in a process leading to complete disarmament.
10. The placement of excess military fissile materials under JAEA or other international verification and the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes.
11. Reaffirmation of the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular state reporting in the NPT review process on the implementation of Article VI obligations.
13. The development of verification capabilities necessary to ensuring compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.
3) 2005 NPT Review Conference Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Meeting Sputters
After four sterile weeks, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference ended May 27 as it began, with competing agendas, widespread distrust, and no consensus on next steps for stopping the spread of or eliminating nuclear weapons.
Egypt and the United States emerged as the main protagonists at the New York gathering, but their disputes reflected age-old splits among the 189 treaty members on how best to realize the accord's visionary goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Still, the fissures seemed to widen and spread at the conference as some of the 150 attending states-parties, particularly Egypt and the United States, demonstrated little inclination to compromise or move beyond positions held prior to the May 2 start of the once-every-five-years event.
Many governments expressed their frustration and regret about the fruitless outcome of the conference and echoed the sentiment of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that the states-parties had "missed a vital opportunity to strengthen our collective security against the many nuclear threats to which all states and all peoples are vulnerable." Still, despite the pervasive disappointment with the conference, governments refrained from suggesting that it imperiled the treaty, at least for now.
The divergence among states-parties stems in large part from tensions between the nuclear-weapon haves and have-nots over how to implement the treaty's dual obligations: the five states-parties possessing nuclear weapons - -China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - -are supposed to work toward giving them up, while all other states-parties have pledged to forgo acquiring them.
Discontent among the have-nots with what they judge as the nuclear-weapon states' paltry progress toward nuclear disarmament has always been palpable, but the grousing has swelled since the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The non-nuclear-weapon states complain that the nuclear-weapon states have not pursued the disarmament measures to which they committed that year as part of a bargain to extend the treaty indefinitely. Specifically, the non-nuclear-weapon states protest the Bush administration's exploration of new and modified types of nuclear weapons, opposition to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. All these moves contravene a package of 13 disarmament steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the United States and all other NPT states-parties. At the same time, U.S. pique with the have-nots has also risen because of its view that they have shown insufficient willingness to take to task some of their brethren, notably Iran and North Korea. Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 and has declared itself a nuclear-weapon power. The International Atomic Energy Agency concluded nearly two years ago that Tehran had pursued clandestine nuclear activities that Washington charges are evidence of an illicit weapons program.
The mutual disenchantment between the have-nots and the nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, manifested itself at the conference in prolonged battles over procedural issues - -including adoption of an agenda - -that consumed almost the first three weeks of the conference. The remaining time proved too short for the states-parties to overcome their differences on substantive issues, such as how to dissuade future withdrawals from the treaty or balance a state's access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes with sufficient guarantees that it is not secretly seeking nuclear arms.
Yet, more time would not have yielded different results because of the entrenched positions and acrimony on all sides.
The United States and some other Western countries blame Egypt for how the conference unfolded because it blocked consensus for action on several procedural issues. Other diplomats said that the seeds for the conference's failure were planted before it began, with the Bush administration's rejection of some of the 13 disarmament steps. Washington had essentially "rearranged the playing field and moved the goalposts" prior to the conference. Even though the United States has generally served as the lightning rod for non-nuclear-weapon state criticism, the other four nuclear-weapon states have also failed to embrace or have discounted some of the 13 disarmament measures.
Egypt's permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz, said "countries seeking to ignore the agreements of the past and shirk additional disarmament measures bear the real responsibility for the conference outcome". He defended Egypt's actions at the conference as motivated by the desire to preserve the "balance of commitments" between the nuclear-weapon haves and have-nots.
Washington's rigidity also sunk an effort by the five nuclear-weapon states to issue a joint conference statement. There had been a real drive to conclude such a statement up until the final days of the conference but that in the end the United States refused to meet a Russian demand to promote the CTBT.
The contentious climate of the conference also produced rifts among groups of states that have generally tried to bridge the differences between the nuclear-weapon states and the NAM. The seven members of the New Agenda Coalition - -Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden - -failed to produce their own final statement, and the 25-member European Union reportedly had difficulty maintaining unity when it found itself opposite the United States in a dispute because the United Kingdom sometimes broke ranks.
On the last day of the conference, Canadian Ambassador Paul Meyer ripped some countries, without naming names, for their intractable approaches. "We have witnessed intransigence from more than one state on pressing issues of the day, coupled with the hubris that demands the priorities of the many be subordinated to the preferences of the few," he fumed.
Despite Meyer's clear frustration, a few diplomats speculated in interviews that some capitals were likely content with how the conference turned out: the nuclear-weapon states were probably pleased to avoid any new disarmament obligations, some NAM members could take satisfaction in preserving the 2000 NPT Review Conference package rather than having it supplanted by a weaker set of commitments, and Iran had to be relieved to escape without an official rebuke of its nuclear activities.
In a closing statement to the conference, New Zealand's ambassador for disarmament, Tim Caughley, observed that "the outcome of this review conference needs to be viewed in the context of the broader malaise and paralysis that abounds in multilateral disarmament diplomacy."
E. Translate the texts into English.
1. О работе конференции по рассмотрению действия Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО) в Нью-Йорке
3 мая на проходящей в Нью-Йорке VII обзорной Конференции по Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО) выступил руководитель российской делегации, заместитель Министра иностранных дел С.И.Кисляк, который огласил приветствие Президента Российской Федерации В.В.Путина участникам форума. В послании Президента, в частности, отмечается, что для России этот Договор, уже доказавший свою действенность, является важной составляющей системы международной безопасности. Именно на основе Договора могут и должны быть нейтрализованы новые угрозы режима нераспространения, включая "черные" ядерные рынки. Особо акцентировано активное участие России в принятии резолюции 1540 Совета Безопасности ООН, призванной не допустить передачу опасных материалов потенциальным террористам, выработке Плана действий "восьмерки" по нераспространению. Подчеркнуто строгое выполнение Россией своих обязательств в области разоружения.
В своем выступлении глава российской делегации также отметил, что основной задачей Конференции является подтверждение всеми государствами - участниками жизнеспособности и актуальности ДНЯО, приверженности выполнению своих обязательств по Договору, выработка на основе объективного и сбалансированного анализа конкретных шагов на будущее по его укреплению.
Отмечено, что Россия активно применяет закрепленное в Договоре право на мирное использование атомной энергии и сотрудничает с государствами -участниками ДНЯО в развитии ядерной энергетики, мирных исследований, применении ядерных технологий.
2. Двойные стандарты США
Договор о ядерном нераспространении (ДНЯО) сослужил добрую службу мировому сообществу.
Тем не менее договор, совершенно очевидно, находится в состоянии, близком к кризису.
Страны-участницы ДНЯО пытаются ужесточить режим нераспространения. МАГАТЭ добивается проведения более строгих инспекций и введения новых ограничений на распространение ядерных технологий. Одновременно коалиция из более чем 60 стран во главе с США согласовала меры пресечения нелегальных поставок ядерных материалов.
Это нужные и важные шаги. Но они никак не помогут решению более глубокой проблемы - кризиса нынешней системы нераспространения. Вопрос, который мучает участников ДНЯО, в том числе тех, кто способен получать ядерное оружие, заключается в следующем: отражает ли этот договор приверженность всех его участников, в первую очередь США, принципам безопасности.
Этот договор всегда был внутренне противоречив. Первоначальная сделка - обязательство пяти официально признанных ядерных стран постепенно разоружаться в обмен на отказ других стран от ядерного оружия - оказалась иллюзорной. А перспектива, что США и, как это было в тот момент, Советский Союз, начнут ядерное разоружение, никогда не была вполне реальной. Двойные стандарты позднее проявились и в том, как спокойно Запад отреагировал на ядерную деятельность Израиля, Индии и Пакистана.
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
F.1.Translate the text into Russian.
Background
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within the framework of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Although the CD had long been involved with the issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it establish a subsidiary body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that body blocked tangible progress for years.
After more than two years of intensive negotiations, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, presented a final draft treaty to the CD in June 1996. An overwhelming majority of Member States of the CD expressed their readiness to support the draft treaty. India, for its part, stated that it could not go along with a consensus on the draft text and its transmittal to the United Nations General Assembly. The main reasons for such a decision, as India pointed out, were related to its strong misgivings about the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty, which it considered unprecedented in multilateral practice and running contrary to customary international law, and the failure of the treaty to include a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.
As a result, Australia, on 22 August 1996, requested that the General Assembly resume the consideration of agenda item 65, entitled "Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty" as provided for in resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995. For that purpose it also submitted the draft CTBT, identical to that negotiated in the CD, for adoption by the General Assembly. On 10 September, the General Assembly by resolution (A/RES/50/245) adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature at the earliest possible date. The Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996.
2. Suggest the Russian equivalents:
substantive negotiations; to be involved with an issue; to block tangible progress; transmittal; misgivings about sth; to run contrary to customary international law; multilateral practice; within a timebound framework; in capacity as Depositary of the Treaty. 3. Find the English for:
в рамках ч-л, создать вспомoгательный орган, представить проект договора, подавляющее большинство, вступление в силу договора, обязательство уничтожить ядерное оружие, пункт повестки дня.
G. 1.Translate the text into Russian, paying special attention to the underlined words:
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY
The Comprehensive Nuclear test-Ban Treaty ("The Treaty" or "CTBT") consists of the Articles of the Treaty and the following documents: Annex 1 to the Treaty - List of States Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28;
Annex 2 to the Treaty - List of States Pursuant to Article XIV;
Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty;
Annex 1 to the Protocol (lists of monitoring stations); and
Annex 2 to the Protocol - List of Characterisation Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening.
Each of these documents is an integral part of the Treaty, and therefore has the same legally binding status as the Articles.
PREAMBLE
The Preamble to the Treaty provides an insight into the object and purpose of the Treaty and States Parties' views and expectations in entering into the Treaty.
The first paragraph records the States Parties' appreciation of recent achievements in the field of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. These achievements have included bilateral agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union, e.g., the INF and START I and II agreements, and multilateral achievements such as the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT) with its attendant document "Principles an3 Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament."
Paragraph two of the Preamble reflects the States Parties' underscoring of the importance of full implementation of the agreements and measures referred to in the first paragraph.
Paragraph three reflects the States Parties' conviction that the "present international situation" is conducive to further measures toward nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. The reference to the present situation is a reference primarily to the easing of East-West tensions associated with the end of the Cold War. In this context, the paragraph also states a declaration of intent on the part of the States Parties to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. As indicated in preambular paragraph 5, the Treaty is viewed as an effective measure against proliferation "in all its aspects" because the cessation of all nuclear explosions will have the effect of constraining not only nuclear weapons development by nonnuclear-weapon states ("horizontal" proliferation), but also the effect of constraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon_states ("vertical" proliferation). This language does not imply that the Treaty prohibits the development of new types of nuclear weapons, or the improvement of existing weapons; it does recognize that the Treaty will have the effect of constraining such activities.
Paragraph four is a restatement of the need for progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, and a reiteration of the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and achieving "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" that appears or is referenced, in almost identical form, in most of the arms control agreements negotiated over the past thirty years that deal in any way with nuclear weapons, e.g., the NPT, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (the LTBT), the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the ABM Treaty.
Paragraph five notes the States Parties' recognition that the cessation of all nuclear explosions will constitute an effective measure of disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects. The paragraph states that the cessation of nuclear explosions will constrain development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. These effects are recognized as constituting "an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects."
The sixth paragraph sets forth the States Parties' recognition that because of the effects described in paragraph five (the term "thus" is a reference to the antecedent description of the effects of an end to nuclear explosions), an end to all nuclear explosions will be a meaningful step in the fulfillment of a systematic process toward nuclear disarmament.
Paragraph seven records the States Parties' belief that the most effective way to achieve an end to all nuclear explosive testing is by means of a universal, and internationally and effectively verifiable, comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and notes that this has long been a priority item on the international disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.
Paragraph eight notes that the Parties to the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty expressed the hope in that Treaty that all test explosions of nuclear weapons would be banned for all time, i.e., that nuclear explosions in the single remaining environment in which they were not banned by the 1963 Treaty, underground, would eventually be banned.
Paragraph nine notes that the Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment.
Finally, paragraph ten affirms the purpose of attracting the adherence of all states to the Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively (through the "cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions") to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of disarmament, and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. Paragraph 10 emphasizes that the CTBT's ban on all nuclear explosions has the effect of contributing to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the process of nuclear disarmament.
Scope
Under Article I (Basic obligations): "1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
Implementing organization
Article II (The Organization) establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to ensure the Treaty's implementation, including verification of compliance, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation. With its seat in Vienna, it will comprise three organs.
The Conference of the States Parties will oversee the Treaty's implementation and the activities of the other two organs, and review compliance.
The Executive Council, with a membership of 51 States parties, will be the principal decision-making body of the Organization and responsible for supervising the activities of the Technical Secretariat.
The Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, will assist States parties to implement the Treaty and carry out verification and other functions. It will supervise and coordinate the operation of the IMS and operate the IDC at Vienna.
Article III (National implementation measures) requires each State party to take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under the Treaty, including the establishment of a National Authority for liaison with the Organization and other States parties.
Verification and compliance
Article IV (Verification) and the Protocol establish the verification regime. Such a regime - consisting of IMS, IDC, consultation and clarification, on-site
inspections and confidence-building measures - "shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty" at its entry into force.
Verification activities should be based on objective information, limited to the subject matter of the Treaty, and carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State party, however, "shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification".
International Monitoring System. The purpose of IMS is to detect and identify nuclear explosions prohibited under article I. As set out in annex 1 to the Protocol, IMS will comprise 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismological stations equipped to detect seismic activity and distinguish between natural events - such as earthquakes - and nuclear explosions. It will also include 80 radionuclide stations - 40 of them capable of detecting noble gases - designed to identify radioactive particles released during a nuclear explosion. The radionuclide stations will be supported by 16 laboratories. In addition, 60 infrasound and 11 hydroacoustic stations will be designed to pick up the sound of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere or under water, respectively.
International Data Centre. The monitoring stations will transmit data to the IDC, which is an integral part of the Technical Secretariat at Vienna. As set out in part I of the Protocol, IDC will produce integrated lists of all signals detected by IMS, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, and screened event bulletins that filter out events that appear to be of a non-nuclear nature. Both raw and processed information will be available to all States parties, and "shall be without prejudice to final judgements with regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties".
Consultation and clarification. The consultation and clarification component of the verification regime encourages States parties to attempt to resolve, either among themselves or through the Organization, ambiguous events before requesting an on-site inspection. A State party must provide clarification of an ambiguous event within 48 hours of receiving such a request from another State party or the Executive Council.
On-site inspection. If the matter cannot be resolved through consultation and clarification, each State party can request an on-site inspection. The decision to approve the on-site inspection must be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of the 51 members of the Executive Council. The procedures for on-site inspections, which "shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred", are established in part II of the Protocol.
Confidence-building measures. To reduce the likelihood that verification data may be misinterpreted, each State party will voluntarily notify the Technical Secretariat of any single chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or more of TNT-equivalent blasting material on its territory. In order to calibrate the stations of IMS, each State party may liaise with the Technical Secretariat in carrying out chemical calibration explosions or providing information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.
Article V (Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions) empowers the Conference to revoke a State's rights under the Treaty, to recommend to States parties collective measures in conformity with international law, or, alternatively, if the case is urgent, to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
Disputes
Article VI (Settlement of disputes) describes the mechanisms by which disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty may be settled. Subject to certain conditions, the International Court of Justice may be requested to give an advisory opinion.
Amendments and review
Article VII (Amendments) gives each State party the right to propose amendments to the Treaty, the Protocol or the annexes to the Protocol at any time after the Treaty's entry into force. The proposed amendment requires the approval of a majority of States parties at an amendment conference with no party casting a negative vote.
Article VIII (Review of the Treaty) stipulates that a conference to review the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty will be held 10 years after its entry into force, "unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties". Such review would take into account "any new scientific and technological developments". Further review conferences may be held with the same objective at intervals of 10 years thereafter, or less, if the Conference so decides in the preceding year.
At the request of any State party, the review conference may "consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes". If it permits such explosions by consensus, then the review conference "shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions".
Duration and withdrawal
Article IX (Duration and withdrawal) states that the Treaty is of unlimited duration.
Other provisions
The next four articles (X, XI, XII and XIII) deal with the status of the Protocol and the annexes; signature; ratification; and accession.
Entry into force
Under Article XIV (Entry into force), the Treaty will enter into force 1 80 days after the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature". This list comprises the States that formally participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, and that appear in table 1 of the December 1 995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World" and table 1 of the April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World", both compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
2. If the Treaty has not entered into force "three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature", the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary of the Treaty, could, at the request of a majority of States that had ratified it, convene a conference to examine the situation and to "decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process" in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.
Reservations
Article XV (Reservations) states that the Treaty's articles and annexes are not subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty and the annexes to the Protocol are not subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
Additional provisions
Under Article XVI (Depositary), the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the Treaty's Depositary. Under Article XVII (Authentic texts), the Treaty texts in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish are equally authentic.
Protocol
Part I describes IMS and outlines the functions of IDC.
Part II sets up the procedures for on-site inspections. It specifies the process of designation of inspectors and inspection assistants, their privileges and immunities, points of entry, arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft, approved inspection equipment, on-site inspection requests, inspection mandate and notification of inspection. Pre-inspection activities and the conduct of inspections are described in detail.
Part III deals with confidence-building measures under article IV (Verification) of the Treaty.
2.Decipher or comment on the following:
the INF; START I and II; the LTBT; the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty; the ABM Treaty; "horizontal" proliferation; "vertical proliferation".
H. 1. Study the CTBT Preamble.
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"),
Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent year in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects,
Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures,
Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures,
Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive effort to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international, control,
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects,
Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.
Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,
Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment,
Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,
Have agreed as follows:
2. Find the English for:
в области ядерного вооружения
сокращение арсеналов
ядерное распространение
скорейшее осуществление мер
сокращать на глобальном уровне
конечная цель
ликвидация оружия
прекращение всех испытательных взрывов ядерного оружия
ограничение разработки оружия
усовершенствованные типы оружия
представлять собой значительный шаг
поддающийся контролю договор
стремление сделать ч-л
прекращение испытательных взрывов
навсегда
присоединение государств к договору
укреплением международного мира
3. Find the following set phrases in the text of the Preamble:
отмечая; отмечая также; подчеркивая; приветствуя; признавая; признавая также; подтверждая; будут убежденными.
4. Translate the final clauses of CTBT into English using the vocabulary you have studied.
a) СТАТЬЯ XI. ПОДПИСАНИЕ
Настоящий Договор открыт для подписания всеми государствами до его вступления в силу.
СТАТЬЯ XII. РАТИФИКАЦИЯ
Настоящий Договор подлежит ратификации государствами, подписавшими Договор, согласно их соответствующий (respective) конституционным процедурам.
СТАТЬЯ ХIII. ПРИСОЕДИНЕНИЕ
Любое государство, которое не подписывает настоящий Договор до вступления его в силу, может в дальнейшем присоединиться к нему в любое время.
СТАТЬЯ XIV. ВСТУПЛЕНИЕ В СИЛУ
1. Настоящий Договор вступает в силу через 180 дней после даты сдачи на хранение ратификационных грамот всеми государствами, перечисленными в Приложении (Annex) 2 к настоящему Договору, но ни в коем случае не ранее чем через два года после его открытия для подписания. 2. Если настоящий Договор не вступает в силу через три года после даты годовщины его открытия для подписания, депозитарий созывает Конференцию государств, которые уже сдали на хранение свои ратификационные грамоты, по просьбе большинства (upon the refuest) этих государств. Эта Конференция рассматривает, в какой мере (examine the extent to while) соблюдено требование, изложенное в пункте 1, и рассматривает и решает консенсусом вопрос о том, какие меры, совместимые с международным правом, могут быть приняты для ускорения процесса, ратификации с целью содействовать скорейшему вступлению в силу настоящего Договора.
3. Если только Конференция, упомянутая в пункте 2, или другие такие конференции не примут иное решение (unless otherwise decoded by the Conference), этот процесс повторяется в последующие годовщины (subsequent anniversaries) открытия настоящего Договора для подписания до его вступления в силу.
4. Все государства, подписавшие Договор, приглашаются присутствовать на Конференции, упомянутой в пункте 2, и на любых последующих конференциях, упомянутых в пункте 3, в качестве наблюдателей.
5. Для государств, ратификационные грамоты или документы о присоединении которых сдаются на хранение после вступления в силу (subsequent to the entry) настоящего Договора, он вступает в силу на 30-й день с даты (folloury the date of) сдачи на хранение их ратификационных грамот или документов о присоединении.
б) СТАТЬЯ XV. ОГОВОРКИ (reservations)
Статьи настоящего Договора и Приложений к нему не подлежат оговоркам. Положения Протокола к настоящему ДОГОВОРУ И Приложений к Протоколу не подлежат оговоркам, несовместимым (incompatible with) с объектом и целью настоящего Договора.
СТАТЬЯ XVI. ДЕПОЗИТАРИЙ
1. Генеральный секретарь Организации Объединенных Нации является депозитарием настоящего Договора и получает подписания, ратификационные грамоты и документы о присоединении.
2. Депозитарий незамедлительно информирует все подписавшие государства и присоединившиеся государства о дате каждого подписания, дате сдачи на хранение каждой ратификационной грамоты или документа о присоединении, дате вступления в силу настоящего Договора и любых поправок и изменений к нему, а также о получении других уведомлений. 3. Депозитарий рассылает должным образом заверенные копии настоящего Договора правительствам подписавших государств и присоединившихся государств.
4. Настоящий Договор регистрируется депозитарием в соответствии со статьей 102 Устава Организации Объединенных Наций. СТАТЬЯ XVlI. АУТЕНТИЧНЫЕ ТЕКСТЫ
Настоящий договор, тексты которого на английском, арабском, испанском, китайском, русском и французском языках являются равно аутентичными, сдается на хранение Генеральному секретарю Организации Объединенных Наций. I. Translate into English:
Договор о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний (ДВЗЯИ)
Договор состоит из преамбулы, 17 статей, двух Приложений и Протокола. В соответствии со Статьей I Договора: 1. Каждое государство-участник обязуется не производить любой испытательный взрыв ядерного оружия и любой другой ядерный взрыв, а также запретить и предотвращать любой такой ядерный взрыв в любом месте, находящемся под его юрисдикцией или контролем. 2. Каждое государство-участник обязуется далее воздерживаться от побуждения, поощрения или какого-либо участия в проведении любого испытательного взрыва ядерного оружия и любого другого ядерного взрыва. Статья II учреждает Организацию по ДВЗЯИ для достижения целей Договора и осуществления его положений, включая положения по международному контролю за его соблюдением. Статья III предписывает осуществление национальных мер для реализации положений Договора. Статья IV определяет режим контроля Договора, включая международную систему мониторинга, консультации и разъяснения, инспекцию на месте, меры по укреплению доверия. Статья VI определяет процедуру урегулирования споров. Статья ХIV определяет порядок вступления в силу Договора. Протокол к Договору регламентирует средства контроля за выполнением Договора. ДВЗЯИ был открыт к подписанию 24 сентября 1996 г. К настоящему времени Договор подписан 155 государствами. 60 государств ратифицировали Договор, в том числе Российская Федерация. Договор определяет 44 ключевых государства, участие которых в Договоре необходимо для вступления его в силу. Из этих государств в настоящее время 41 государство подписало Договор, а 30 его ратифицировали. Депозитарием Договора является Генеральный секретарь ООН. Договор о ВЗЯИ является бессрочным. Участие в Договоре ядерных государств
РФСШАВеликобританияФранцияКНР24.09.9624.09.9624.09.9624.09.9624.09.9630.06.00-06.04.9806.04.98- J. Study the text, paying special attention to the underlined words. Comment on the prospect of CTBT entry into force.
Keeping Test Ban Hopes Alive: The 2005 CTBT Entry-into-force Conference
Diplomats from a record 120 states gathered September 21-23 in New York to try to breathe new life into the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions.
While highlighting the steadily-growing support for the treaty, the Conference also underscored how elusive and frustrating its entry into force remains, due to the non-accession of 11 key states, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Israel, Iran, and North Korea. Despite the relatively high-level effort, which involved foreign ministers from 21 states, leaders of the key hold-out countries have shown no visible signs of shifting their positions. As a result, the long-term prognosis for the CTBT remains as uncertain as ever.
The political hurdles facing the treaty today stem in part from the negotiations a decade ago, when a handful of states insisted that a specific set of 44 states possessing nuclear reactors must ratify the treaty before it enters into force. To date, 33 of the 44 states which are listed in Annex 2 of the treaty, have ratified. Recognising that this would make entry into force particularly challenging, other states successfully inserted into Article XIV a provision that allows states that have ratified to convene conferences to seek ways to "facilitate" entry into force. The September 2005 Conference to Facilitate the Entry Into Force of the CTBT was the fourth such meeting since 1999.
As the 2005 meeting demonstrated, the conferences remain a valuable, though very limited, mechanism by which CTBT adherents can articulate their strong support for the treaty, discuss measures designed to shift the positions of hold-out states and keep up pressure against renewed nuclear testing. As they did in 2003, the states parties at the 2005 conference adopted a final conference document that includes "measures to promote entry into force". They also reappointed Jaap Ramaker, the Dutch ambassador who had chaired the final year of test ban negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, as Special Representative to advance pro-CTBT diplomatic efforts.
But in the face of the United States' stubborn resistance to multilateral agreements that limit its nuclear options and deeply-rooted regional tensions in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia, the conference itself can do little but help reinforce the global norm against testing and keep long-term CTBT entry-into-force hopes alive. To make more substantial progress in the years ahead, leading CTBT states parties must be more willing to pressure hold-out states at the highest political levels.
K. The following texts reflect a recent shift in the US approach to non-proliferation. Study them, paying special attention to the underlined words. Answer the check-up questions.
It is clear from recent events that the focus of the Bush administration has shifted from stopping the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, to eliminating certain regimes that possess such weapons. Since President Kennedy declared in 1961 that WMD "must be abolished before they abolish us", there has been a bipartisan consensus in the United States on supporting multilateral non-proliferation regimes. After the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and President Clinton, who won its ratification in 1997, declared in November 1998 that the most serious threat to US national security was "posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery". President George W. Bush, however, affirmed in his 2003 State of the Union address that "the gravest danger facing America and the world is outlaw, regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons". In other words, the US approach has changed its emphasis from non-proliferation to active counterproliferation.
1. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
The Bush administration has demonstrated a distinctly unsympathetic attitude towards international multilateral agreements. The Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court are two of the most well known cases of international treaties enjoying worldwide support but staunchly opposed by the current US government. In the area of arms control and non-proliferation, a number of agreements have been withdrawn from, undermined or rejected by the Bush administration. Three examples are the ABM Treaty, the BWC, and the CTBT.
An obstacle to the pursuit of a robust and effective ballistic missile defence system, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which placed strict limits on the development, testing and deploying of antimissile weapons, became one of Washington's first targets. In 2001, members of the administration declared the treaty a "relic of the Cold War". Diplomatic efforts were carried out in the spring and summer of 2001 to convince Moscow to mutually withdraw or at least modify the treaty. In the end, the development of a "new" relationship with Russia after 9/11 offered the United States the political background for exercising its unilateral withdrawal rights under Article XV of the treaty in June 2002.
In July 2001, the United States rejected a proposal for an enforcement protocol that would have strengthened the BWC, the result of six years of work by an Ad Hoc Group of state parties. Any efforts to negotiate it were also denied by the Bush administration. At the BWC Fifth Review Conference in November 2001, the United States not only rejected the proposed enforcement protocol but also insisted on terminating the activities and mandate of the Ad Hoc Group.
Already during his presidential campaign, George W. Bush declared his opposition to the CTBT, which had been rejected by the Republican majority in the Senate in October 1999, but was supported by the Clinton administration. The current administration maintains that it will not ask the Senate to reconsider ratification and that, although for the time being it will keep its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, it will not commit itself categorically to not conducting nuclear tests in the future, as the treaty forbids.
These events should have come as no surprise, as leading figures of this administration made no secret of their scepticism toward multilateralism even before Mr Bush took office. In a Foreign Affairs article in January 2000, future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, wrote: "[M]ultilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. US interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the UN and other multilateral organisations, as well as through well-crafted agreements. But the Clinton [ administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest."
In this article, we can perhaps trace the seeds of the idea of a la carte multilateralism (an expression coined by Richard Haass, former director of policy planning at the US Department of State) that the Bush administration introduced to explain its approach to international treaties. Many government officials supported this view in international fora, firmly rejecting any charges of unilateralism coming from severa allied countries. As John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, summarised in front of the Conference on Disarmament: "trying to characterize our policy as 'unilateralist' or 'multilateralist' is a futile exercise. Our policy is, quite simply, pro-American, as you would expect".
In fact, the Bush administration has claimed on various occasions that arms control and non-proliferation remained an important part of US foreign policy and that Washington continued to be strongly committed to honouring multilateral treaties, while insisting that other nations live up to them as well. However, according to Mr Bolton, "in those cases where, for example, arms control treaties are ineffective or counterproductive or obsolete, they shouldn't be allowed to stand in the way of the development of our foreign policy".
This approach, which we may define as a la carte or selective multilateralism - basically meaning that the Bush administration accepted multilateralism only when it was convenient for the United States - became much clearer after 9/11. The tragic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington (and the subsequent anthrax attacks) did not bring a renewed and stronger US commitment to support multilateral strategies and agreements against WMD proliferation, as the administration's initial reactions led some to think. On the other hand, the practice of supporting multilateral solutions (or negotiating international treaties) only as long as they suit US national interests or strategic goals has become a central tenet of this administration's foreign policy. This is evident in at least two major policy documents issued in 2002, the Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy (with its corollary National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction); the arms control agreement signed with Russia, the so-called "Moscow Treaty"; and the US government's policies towards two dangerous proliferating states, Iraq and North Korea.
2. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW The NPR, a strategic planning document mandated by the US Congress, was conducted by the Department of Defense to determine nuclear forces planning over the next five to ten years. Pentagon officials declared that the document envisages a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy by establishing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear); defences (both active and passive); and new defence capabilities "to meet emerging threats". Previously, the US strategic arsenal was formed by a nuclear triad composed of bombers, long-range land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles. Indeed, the NPR sketches plans to reduce US operational strategic nuclear forces to 3,800 warheads by 2007 and to 1,700-2,200 by 2012, These reductions, however, would not necessarily be pursued within the framework of "Cold War treaties" and the document stresses that the United States must retain "maximum flexibility". With regard to arms control and non-proliferation treaties, the NPR does not make any reference to the NPT, reiterates the Bush administration's opposition to the CTBT, puts aside the START process and insists on its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In its most controversial part, the NPR stresses that new nuclear warheads with additional yield flexibility and improved earth-penetrating capacity may be needed "to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply-buried targets, to find and attack mobile and re-locatable targets, to defeat chemical and biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage". In addition, the document supports the modernisation of research and production facilities needed to design and build these new nuclear weapons. Under this new posture, the document explains, nuclear weapons could be employed "in the event of surprising military developments" involving countries such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
In September 2002, the Bush administration issued the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, a 31-page document that proclaimed a new security doctrine. Expanding and formally articulating ideas put forward by the President in his June 2002 West Point speech, the NSS includes the basis of the US strategy to address the new threats by terrorist groups and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, its central and most innovative principle is that these threats are so dangerous that the United States "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively" International law, adds the document, has always allowed nations to "take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack" The nature of the new threats, however, is urging a new interpretation of the concept of imminent danger. Therefore, according to the NSS, the United Slates will act pre-emptively "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries", "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack". Politicians and security analysts have examined and commented this new doctrine in detail. With specific regard to its impact on arms control and non-proliferation regimes, critics have pointed out that the NSS, if implemented together with the Nuclear Posture Review, implies that the United States would not rule out the use of small nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive attack against a hostile state that possesses chemical or biological weapons. Such a stance, according to many analysts, is against international law and could slow progress toward nuclear arms reductions, increasing the acceptability of nuclear weapons use. Others have suggested that the document's new understanding of the concept of pre-emptive action against an imminent danger "even if uncertaint, remains", puts the United States above and beyond international law. This may be reinforced, according to some, by the NSS statement that "our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling the power of the United States". However it is important to note that the NSS document clearly indicates that the US strategy to combat WMD will include "strengthened nonproliferation efforts" and that the United States "will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance". This concept is expanded in a document issued by the Bush administration in December 2002, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCW). Based on a classified document, which the President signed in September 2002, the text outlines the three principal pillars of the US strategy against WMD: counterproliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management.
The NSCW reiterates that the United States must have the capability to defend itself "against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures". According to the Washington Times and the Federation of American Scientists, the classified version of the document includes the statement that the United States "reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including potentially nuclear weapons - to the use of WMD". Washington, however, "will actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of our nonproliferation goals". The document lists the existing agreements and regimes that the United Slates supports and will try to strengthen: the NPT, the CWC, the 8WC, and all export control regimes. The Bush administration declares that it will also seek to negotiate a new Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. On a bilateral basis, Washington will continue to support programmes to secure and destroy WMD stockpiles and materials in Russia and other Newly Independent States, as well as to strengthen export controls
Predictably, there is no mention of the CTBT in the NSCW, and many critics pointed out that this, coupled with the plans outlined by the NPR, might have a negative impact on the professed US commitment to the NPT. Following concerns raised by many NPT state parties. US officials insisted that Washington was taking its obligations under the NPT "very seriously". They added, however, that the Bush administration no longer supported "some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference". At that Conference, the five nuclear weapon states pledged to reduce their nuclear arsenals in accordance with Article VI of the treaty by implementing 13 practical steps These steps, considered as a major achievement of the Review Conference, included ratification of the CTBT; implementation of START II and conclusion of START III; preservation of the ABM Treaty; concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons capabilities.
1) Comment on the phrase: "the US approach has changed its emphasis from non-proliferation to active counterproliferation".
2) What is the attitude of the Bush administration towards international multilateral agreements? Which of them have been withdrawn from?
3) What is "a la carte multilateralism"?
4) What does the NPR envisage?
5) Comment on the main points of the NSS. How will the NSS implementation together with the NPR affect progress forwards nuclear arms reduction?
6) What does NSCW outline? Which of the existing agreements and regimes will the US try to strengthen? 7) Is the US committed to the NPT?
IV. ADVANCING THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS
A.1. Translate the text with the help of the list of technical terms. Pay special attention to the underlined words.
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements
SALT I
Begun in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had produced by May 1972 both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which bans nationwide strategic missile defenses, and the Interim Agreement, an executive-legislative agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not to increase the size of existing ICBM silos "significantly," and capped the number of SLBMs and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warheads, leaving both sides free to enlarge their deployed forces by adding multiple warheads to their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. The agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes.
SALT II
In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, initially limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,400 delivery vehicles (defined as an ICBM silo, a submarine missile-launch tube, or a bomber) and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. (The treaty called for reducing the limit to 2,250 delivery vehicles in 1981.) The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased. However, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement's terms despite its failure to enter into force. But on May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and "not on standards contained in the SALT structure."
START I
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement's rules. The agreement limited deployed warheads by imposing limits on delivery vehicles and requiring the destruction of excess delivery vehicles. The destruction was verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections and regular exchanges of information, as well as national technical means (i.e., satellites). The agreement's entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by making them parties to the agreement and consolidating their nuclear weapons in Russia. START I reductions were completed in December 2001, and the treaty will remain in force until December 2009 unless extended by the parties.
START II
In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to START I. START II, signed in January 1993, called for reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and, also like its predecessor, would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads. The agreement's original implementation deadline was January 2003, but a 1997 protocol extended the deadline until December 2007 because of Russia's concerns over its ability to meet the earlier date. Both the Senate and the Duma have approved START II, but the treaty has not taken effect because the Senate has yet to ratify the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments, whose passage the Duma established as a condition for START II's entry into force.
START III Framework
In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500. Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address "the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads... to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads." Negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which never happened.
SORT
On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a treaty under which the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. Although the two sides have not agreed and appear unlikely to agree on specific counting rules, the Bush administration has made clear that it will reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles in active service, i.e., "operationally deployed" warheads, and will not count warheads removed from service and placed in storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The agreement's limits are similar to those envisioned for START III, but the treaty does not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III. Strategic Nuclear Arms Control AgreementsSALT ISALT IISTART ISTART IISTART IIISORTDeployed Warhead LimitLimited Missiles, Not WarheadsLimited Missiles and Bombers, Not Warheads6,0003,000-3,5002,000-2,5001,700-2,200Deployed Delivery Vehicle LimitU.S.: 1,710 ICBMs & SLBMs; USSR: 2,347 ICBMs & SLBMS22501,600Not ApplicableNot ApplicableNot ApplicableStatusExpiredNever Entered Into ForceIn ForceNever Entered Into ForceNever NegotiatedIn forceDate SignedMay 26, 1972June 18, 1979July 31, 1991January 3, 1993Not ApplicableMay 24, 2002Date Entered Into ForceOctober 3, 1972Not ApplicableDecember 5, 1994Not ApplicableNot ApplicableJune 1, 2003Implementation DeadlineNot ApplicableDecember 31, 1981December 5, 2001December 31, 2007December 31, 2007December 31, 2012Expiration DateOctober 3, 1977December 31, 1985December 5, 2009December 5, 2009Not ApplicableDecember 31, 2012 Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Signed December 8, 1987, the INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for the verification component of the subsequent START I agreement on strategic nuclear reductions. The INF Treaty entered into force June 1, 1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and current active participants in the agreement's implementation include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreement but do not participate in treaty meetings or on-site inspections. The ban on intermediate-range missiles is of unlimited duration.
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
Negotiated and signed during the final years of the Cold War, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is often referred to as the "cornerstone of European security." The treaty, signed on November 19, 1990, eliminated the Soviet Union's overwhelming quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe by setting equal limits on the amount of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Designed to prevent either alliance from concentrating forces for launching a blitzkrieg-type offensive, the treaty employs a system of concentric zones mandating smaller deployments of tanks, ACVs, and artillery the closer one moves toward the center of Europe. While the threat of such an offensive all but disappeared with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty's weapons limits and inspection regime, which provides an unprecedented degree of transparency of military holdings, continue to play an important role in Europe. CFE states-parties overhauled the treaty in November 1999, replacing the block and zone weapons limits with national and territorial arms ceilings, but the original CFE Treaty will remain in force until all states-parties ratify the adaptation agreement. List of technical terms
land-based missiles
syn.: ground-launchedракеты наземного базированияspace-based missilesракеты космического базированияsea-based missilesракеты морского базированияcruise missilesкрылатые ракетыshort-range missilesракеты малого радиуса действияmedium-range missiles syn.: intermediate-rangeракеты среднего радиуса действияlong-range missilesракеты дальнего радиуса действияintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)межконтинентальные баллистические ракеты (МБР) anti-ballistic missile defense противоракетная оборона ICBM silo пусковая установка наземного базирования SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missiles) баллистические ракеты подводных лодок (БРПЛ) submarine-missile launch tube пусковая установка морского базированияmultiple warheadsбоеголовки с разделяющимися головными частями
bombers бомбардировщикиdelivery vehicles мобильные пусковые установкиoperational находящийся в боевом составеundergoing overhaul or repair находящийся в стадии капитального или текущего ремонтаarmored combat vehicles боевые бронированные машины Active Vocabulary
1. to deploy nuclear arsenals
n. deploymentразмещать (развертывать) ядерные потенциалы2.to reduce toсокращать доto reduce byсокращать наreduction inсокращение3.to cap forces установить ограничение, предел
численности вооруженных сил 4.to curb the race in armsсдерживать гонку вооружений5.to impose limits on syn.: to place restrictions onналагать ограничения на6. to launch an attackнаносить удар7.to face a retaliatory strikeстолкнуться с возможностью ответного удара8.
9.
on - on-site inspection
intrusive inspection
to denuclearize инспекция на местах
инспекция с выездом инспекторов на места
превращать в безъядерную зону
10.to lay the groundwork forзаложить основу для11.to deter sb from sth / from doing sthудерживать кого-л. от12.to overhaul a treatyпересматривать договорto negotiate a treatyзаключать договорto supersede a treatyотменять, заменять собойto multilateralize a treatyсделать договор многостороннимto propose amendments to a treatyпредлагать поправки к договоруto be bound by a treatyбыть связанным договоромlegally binding treatyюридически обязывающий договор13.to retreat from past commitmentsотступать от предыдущих обязательств14.to initiate research on nuclear weaponsначать (инициировать) исследования в области ядерных вооружений15.to develop a more advanced nuclear delivery systemразрабатывать более усовершенствованную систему доставки ядерного оружия16.
17.to modernize nuclear arsenal
conventional weapons
модернизировать ядерный потенциал
обычные вооружения18.break-up of the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact)
syn.: collapse, dissolutionраспад Советского Союза (Организации Варшавского Договора)19.would - be proliferatorsпотенциальные распространители20.treaty holdoutsгосударства, отказывающиеся от участия в договоре21.cornerstone of European securityкраеугольный камень Европейской безопасности 2. Give English equivalents for the Russian words and translate the text:
The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of систем противоракетной обороны (Договор ПРО) limited the number of систем противоракетной обороны of the United States and the Soviet Union to one each. A 1997 "demarcation" agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation distinguished between "strategic", or противоракетных систем дальнего радиуса действия, which are still prohibited, and "non-strategic" or противоракетных систем меньшего радиуса действия, which are not. The 1987 United States - Soviet Union Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, which includes all ракеты наземного базирования и крылатые ракеты with a range of 800 to 5,000 km. The 1991 United States - Soviet Union Strategic Arms Limitation Reduction Treaty (START I) placed a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 размещенных ядерных ракетах дальнего радиуса действия for each side by 2001, thereby сократив the 1991 stockpile levels на 30 per cent. The 1993 Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaty (START II) committed both parties сократить the number of warheads на ядерных ракетах дальнего радиуса действия до 3,500 on each side by 2003, and eliminated МБР (межконтинентальные баллистические ракеты). Agreement was reached in 1997 to begin START III negotiations on further сокращениях запасов ядерного оружия, once START II has entered into force.
3. Translate the sentences using the active vocabulary:
1. Этот договор, заложивший основу для прочных многосторонних отношений, до сих пор считается краеугольным камнем европейской безопасности.
2. В результате распада СССР и Организации Варшавского Договора (ОВД) ситуация в области контроля над вооружениями радикально изменилась, что побудило некоторые государства отступить от ранее взятых обязательств.
3. Потенциальных распространителей ядерного оружия необходимо срочно призвать к заключению обязывающего договора о сдерживании гонки вооружений, который не должен заменять собой заключенные соглашения в этой области.
4. В доктрине предусматривается, что любое государство в случае нанесения удара первым может столкнуться с возможностью ответного удара, что накладывает определенные ограничения на политику государств в области ядерных исследований.
5. В связи с изменением геополитической обстановки возникла необходимость пересмотра Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, при том что существует много государств, отказывающихся от участия в нём и не желающих быть связанными его обязательствами.
6. Разработка новых усовершенствованных видов ядерного оружия вряд ли будет способствовать превращению этих регионов в безъядерные и удерживать эти государства от модернизации своих ядерных потенциалов.
4. Render into English:
Россия может выйти из договора о РСМД. США заявляют, что их ПРО в Европе не направлена против Москвы. Администрация Джорджа Буша вновь заявила о том, что американская ПРО в Европе не направлена против России. Это последовало за вчерашним заявлением Москвы о возможности выхода в одностороннем порядке из договора о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности (РСМД).
"Эти планы в области ПРО и развертывания никоим образом не нацелены на Россию", - заявил журналистам в Вашингтоне официальный представитель госдепартамента США Шон Маккормак, комментируя заявление начальником Генштаба Вооруженных сил РФ Юрием Балуевским.
"Они (планы по ПРО) задуманы для содействия в защите США и их друзей и союзников от возможных пусков ракет странами-изгоями, такими как Иран", - отметил Маккормак. "Мы даже предложили сотрудничать с Россией по вопросам ПРО", - сказал представитель госдепартамента, подчеркнув, что "это предложение по-прежнему остается в силе".
Москва может в одностороннем порядке выйти из договора о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности (РСМД), заявил вчера журналистам начальник Генштаба Вооруженных сил РФ генерал армии Юрий Балуевский. По его словам, участие России в договоре будет зависеть от действий США в области ПРО, договор между Москвой и Вашингтоном имеет бессрочный характер. "Но возможность выхода из него существует, если одна из сторон предоставит убедительные доказательства необходимости выхода. Сегодня такие убедительные доказательства есть", - сказал Балуевский.
Как отметил начальник Генштаба, многие страны разрабатывают и совершенствуют ракеты средней дальности. "Россия, к сожалению, выполнив договор о РСМД, потеряла многие системы такого оружия, которые были уникальны",-отметилБалуевский.
Отвечая на вопросы о возможности выхода России из договора о РСМД в одностороннем порядке, Балуевский заявил: "Будем смотреть, как в дальнейшем будут действовать наши американские партнеры". "То, что сегодня они делают, создавая третий позиционный район ПРО в Европе, не поддается никакому объяснению", - заявил Балуевский.
B. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
1. Translate the text into Russian paying special attention to the underlined words.
The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty at a Glance
Negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972 and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The treaty, from which the United States withdrew on June 13, 2002, barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. In the treaty preamble, the two sides asserted that effective limits on anti-missile systems would be a "substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms." The treaty, however, originally permitted both countries to deploy two fixed, ground-based defenses of 100 missile interceptors each. One defense could protect the national capital, while the second could be used to guard an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. In a protocol signed July 3, 1974, the two sides halved the number of permitted defenses. The Soviet Union opted to keep its existing missile defense system around Moscow, while the United States eventually fielded its 100 permitted missile interceptors to protect an ICBM base near Grand Forks, North Dakota. Moscow's defense still exists, but its effectiveness is questionable. The United States shut down its permitted ABM defense only months after activating it in October 1975 because the financial costs of operating it were considered too high for the little protection it offered. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of an effort to control their offensive arms race. The two sides reasoned that limiting defensive systems would reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any defense that the other might deploy. Without effective national defenses, each superpower remained vulnerable, even at reduced or low offensive force holdings, to the other's nuclear weapons, deterring either side from launching an attack first because it faced a potential retaliatory strike that would assure its own destruction. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush, who argued that Washington and Moscow no longer needed to base their relationship on their ability to destroy each other, announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, claiming that it prevented U.S. development of defenses against possible terrorist or "rogue-state" ballistic missile attacks. During his presidential campaign, Bush said he would offer amendments on the treaty to Russia and would withdraw the United States from the accord if Russia rejected the proposed changes, but the Bush administration never proposed amendments to the treaty in its talks with Russia on the subject. Although of "unlimited duration," the treaty permits a state-party to withdraw from the accord if "extraordinary events...have jeopardized its supreme interests." The U.S. withdrawal took effect June 13, and the treaty no longer remains in force.
2. Replace the words in brackets with their English equivalents.
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (ниже именуемые сторонами),
(исходя из того) that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
(учитывая) that effective measures (по ограничению систем противоракетной обороны) would be a substantial factor in (сдерживанию гонки) in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of (возникновения войны) involving nuclear weapons,
(Исходя из того) that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain (согласованные меры) with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the (создание более благоприятных условий) for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
(Учитывая свои обязательства) under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
(Заявляя о своем намерении ) to achieve (по возможности скорее) (прекращение гонки вооружений) and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and (всеобщее и полное разоружение),
(Желая) to contribute to (смягчение международной напряженности) and (укрепление доверия) between States,
(Согласились о нижеследующем):
Article I
1. Each Party (обязуется ограничить системы противоракетной обороны) and to adopt other measures in accordance with (положения настоящего Договора).
2. Each Party (обязуется не развертывать) ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and (не развертывать) ABM systems for defense of an individual region (кроме как предусмотрено) in Article III of this Treaty.
3. Complete the final clauses of the AMB Treaty by filling in the blanks with thе words and word combinations from the list below:
to jeopardize supreme interests; to withdraw from this Treaty; give notice of; pursuant to; the exchange of instruments of ratification; propose amendments; a review of this Treaty; both texts being equally authentic; in exercising its national sovereignty; entry into force; unlimited duration; constitutional procedures.
Article XIV
1. Each Party may (.................) to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after (..........) of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct (..................). Article XV
1. This Treaty shall be of (...................). 2. Each Party shall, (........................), have the right (........................) if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty (...................). It shall (.............) its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with (.................) of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of (............................). 2. This Treaty shall be registered (...............) Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, (...................).
C. START I
1. Do the two-way translation of the Preamble and Article I of START I.
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMSДоговор между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки о сокращении и ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений1.The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ........................................, Союз Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенные Штаты Америки, ниже именуемые Сторонами,2............... that nuclear war would have ................. for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought, сознавая, что ядерная война имела бы опустошительные последствия для всего человечества, что ....................3............... that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations .............. in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and ..........................., будучи убежденными, что меры по .................... и другие обязательства, изложенные в настоящем Договоре, будут способствовать ........................ ядерной войны, а также упрочению международного мира и безопасности,4.................... that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability, признавая, что интересы Сторон и интересы международной безопасности требуют укрепления стратегической стабильности, 5.............................. with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of ................... May 26, 1972; and .............. June 1, 1990,учитывая свои обязательства ............................ по статье VI .......................... 1 июля 1968 года, статье XI Договора об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны от 26 мая 1972 года и Совместному заявлению вашингтонской встречи на высшем уровне от 1 июня 1990 года,6.............................согласились о нижеследующем:
ARTICLE I
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms ................, and .................... the other obligations ..... in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.СТАТЬЯ I
Каждая из Сторон сокращает и ограничивает свои стратегические наступательные вооружения в соответствии с положениями настоящего Договора и выполняет другие обязательства, изложенные в настоящем Договоре, а также в его ...........................................
2. Translate the final clauses of START I into Russian. Pay special attention to the underlined words, the use of "shall" and archaic words.
ARTICLE XVII
1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE XVIII
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. ARTICLE XIX
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
D. SORT (the Moscow Treaty)
1. a) Translate the text into Russian.
Bush, Putin Mending Ties, Sign SORT
En route to a June 1-3 Group of Eight summit in Evian, France, President George W. Bush traveled to St. Petersburg to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The meeting marked the first encounter between the two leaders since they split over how to disarm Iraq, chilling the warming relationship both had strived to forge. Bush and Putin were expected to exchange views on Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the war on terrorism. The UN Security Council's May 22 vote to lift sanctions on Iraq diminished one potentially nettlesome issue. Bush's visit was to be crowned with an exchange of instruments of ratification for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which the Russian Duma approved May 14, during a preparatory visit by Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia's parliament, passed the treaty May 28, clearing the way for the presidents to bring the treaty into force. The U.S. Senate unanimously endorsed the ratification of the agreement March 6. Missile defense has also emerged as a possible topic at the meeting. Over the past several months, Russian officials and press reports have indicated that Moscow would like some type of political agreement or joint declaration on missile defense, and Russia said several months ago that it had sent a draft text to Washington. In a May 14 interview, a State Department official said that Moscow appears to want an umbrella agreement to permit U.S. and Russian companies to work together on missile defense projects. Russia's interest in missile defense cooperation remains largely confined to defenses against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Moscow continues to express concern about the U.S. plan to build a multilayered defense against long-range ballistic missiles and strongly opposes the possibility of U.S. space-based defenses. The United States has publicly disclosed plans to put three to five armed satellites in space by as early as 2008 to test whether such a defense is feasible. Russia has joined China in pressing for a treaty to be negotiated at the UN Conference on Disarmament barring any type of weapon from being placed in space.
b) Suggest the Russian equivalents for:
to mend ties; to split over sth; nettlesome issue; an umbrella agreement; to be confined to sth; short/medium/long-range ballistic missiles; a multilayered defense; space-based defenses; feasible.
c) Find the English for:
на пути к ч-л; встреча; охладить отношения; снять санкции; обмен ратификационными грамотами; единогласно одобрить; проект документа; решительно выступать против ч-л; обнародовать планы; запретить ч-л.
2. Complete the text of SORT in the English language replacing the word combinations in brackets with their English equivalents.
Text of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, (ниже именуемые сторонами),
(вступая на путь новых отношений) for a new century and (будучи приверженными цели) of strengthening their relationship (путем) cooperation and friendship,
(считая, что новые глобальные вызовы и угрозы) require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,
(стремясь) to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of (обоюдной безопасности), cooperation, trust, openness and (предсказуемости),
(будучи приверженными) to implementing significant (сокращений стратегических наступательных вооружений),
(отталкиваясь от) the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russia Federation on Strategic issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,
(учитывая свои обязательства по Договору) between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (о сокращении и ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений от) July 31, 1991, (ниже именуемому Договором о СНВ)б
(учитывая свои обязательства) under Article VI (Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия) of July 1 1968, and
(будучи убежденными), that this Treaty will help to establish more favourable conditions for actively (содействия безопасности и сотрудничеству) and (укрепления) international stability,
(согласились о нижеследующем)
Статья I
Each Party (сокращает и ограничивает стратегические ядерные боезаряды), as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads (не превышало) 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine itself (состав и структуру своих наступательных вооружений), based on (установленного суммарного предела) for the number of such warheads
Статья II
The Parties agree that the START Treaty (остается в силе в соответствии с его положениями).
Статья III
(Для целей реализации настоящего Договора) the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of the Bilateral Implementation Commission.
Статья IV
1. This Treaty (подлежит ратификации) in accordance with (конституционными процедурами) of each Party. Настоящий Договор вступает в силу в день обмена ратификационными грамотами.
2. This Treaty (остается в силе) until December 31, 2012 and (может быть продлен) by agreement of the Parties or (заменен) earlier by a subsequent agreement.
3. Each Party (в осуществление своего государственного суверенитета может выйти из настоящего Договора), upon three months written notice to the other Party.
Статья V
This Treaty shall be registered (в соответствии с) article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Совершено в Москве 24 мая 2002 года в двух экземплярах, каждый на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.
3. Translate the text, paying special attention to the underlined words.
a)ТНЕ MOSCOW TREATY
In a step consistent with the reductions of strategic nuclear forces announced by the NPR, Washington signed in May 2002 the US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction (SORT) or Moscow Treaty. The treaty requires each country to "reduce and limit" their strategic nuclear warhead to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 31 December 2012 (nearly two-thirds below current levels), and indicates that "each party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit". It does not contain any provision for verification or inspection, but it does create a Bilateral Implementation Commission that should hold meetings at least twice a year. The START agreement will continue to be implemented, which means thаt the data exchanges, data updates, inspections and related monitoring and verification measures it called for will parallel implementation of the Moscow Treaty. The Moscow Treaty was approved unanimously by the US Senate in March 2003 and ratified by the Russian Duma in May 2003.
This legally binding treaty constitutes a welcome disarmament and confidence-building step, especially because it could transform the nature and substance of the US-Russian nuclear security relationship; however, many arms control experts have argued that its practical significance is limited. First of all, the treaty does not include a definition of "strategic nuclear warhead". Secondly, because of its lack of a binding timetable for reductions or firm verification procedures, the Moscow Treaty does not lead to any actual elimination of nuclear weapons. According to Joseph Cirincione, Director of the Non-proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Both nations will slightly reduce the number of missiles and bombers", and "the treaty will limit the number of nuclear weapons on these missile and bombers". But "the actual weapons will be moved from one spot to another, not eliminated - and they could be moved back". Thus, the United States will be allowed to store the decommissioned warheads, but to preserve the possibility to re-deploy reduced warheads should the need arise. In addition, Russia will be allowed to place multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, the treaty does not deal with the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield or shorter-range use, that both nations still possess.
b) Translate the text into English. Make use of the vocabulary from the previous text (exercise 3a) and the text of Treaty.
Российско-американский Договор о сокращении стратегических наступательных потенциалов
Договор между Российской Федерацией и Соединенными Штатами Америки о сокращении стратегических наступательных потенциалов (Договор о СНП) подписан 24 мая 2002 года, вступил в силу 1 июня 2003 года. Договор в юридически обязывающей форме закрепляет согласие сторон на дальнейшее совместное снижение уровней своих стратегических наступательных вооружений. В соответствии с его положениями к 31 декабря 2012 года Россия и США должны сократить свои стратегические ядерные боезаряды до уровня в 1700-2200 единиц, т.е. примерно в три раза по сравнению с предельным уровнем (6000 единиц), установленным Договором о СНВ. При этом каждая из сторон будет сама определять состав и структуру своих стратегических наступательных вооружений, исходя из установленного суммарного предела для количества таких боезарядов.
В Договоре о СНП констатируется, что новые глобальные вызовы и угрозы требуют создания качественно новой основы стратегических отношений между Россией и США и что оба государства будут стремиться к установлению подлинного партнерства. В преамбуле Договора отражены принципы, на которых будет строиться такое партнерство в военно-стратегической области: сотрудничество, доверие, открытость, предсказуемость и впервые такой принцип, как обоюдная безопасность.
Договор о СНП обеспечивает преемственность и последовательность в развитии договорной базы в области стратегических наступательных вооружений. В нем подтверждается, что Договор о СНВ остается в силе в соответствии с его положениями, а также содержится ссылка на обязательства сторон по этому Договору.
Для содействия реализации Договора о СНП создана Двусторонняя комиссия по выполнению (ДКВ). В соответствии с Договором она должна созываться не реже двух раз в год. До настоящего времени проведены 3 сессии ДКВ.
Осуществление Договора о СНП явится значительным вкладом сторон в выполнение их обязательств в отношении ядерного разоружения согласно статье VI Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия и будет способствовать укреплению режима нераспространения.
E. Translate the text paying special alteration to the underlined words.
Russia Declares Itself No Longer Bound by START II
Responding to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty the previous day, Russia declared June 14 that it would no longer be bound by the START II nuclear arms reduction agreement.
Moscow's announcement was more symbolic than substantive because START II had never taken effect and was unlikely to do so after Russia tied its fate to that of the ABM Treaty two years ago. In addition, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a new strategic reductions treaty May 24 that effectively superseded START II. International law requires countries not to undermine the object of treaties they have signed, even if those treaties have not entered into force. However, in its June 14 statement Russia declared it no longer considered itself legally obligated to refrain from actions forbidden by START II because it believed the treaty was dead. If it had entered into force, START II would have required the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to no more than 3,500 warheads apiece. START II also banned multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)* on ICBMs. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush described MIRVs as "the most destabilizing strategic weapons."
According to a U.S. official, the collapse of START II has not upset the Bush administration because the United States and Russia have already "moved beyond" the accord with the May 24 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. The new treaty commits each country to limit its deployed strategic nuclear forces to fewer than 2,200 warheads by the end of 2012. Previously viewed as a major accomplishment of START II, the MIRV ban is not part of the new agreement, but the Bush administration appears indifferent. Russia is now free to extend the service life of some of its ageing MIRVed missiles, such as the SS-18, which would make it easier and less costly for Russia to maintain the force level permitted by the new treaty. Moscow has talked about putting multiple warheads on its newest ICBM, the Topol-M (SS-27). But Russia would need to slightly modify the Topol-M and declare it as a new type of missile for the action to be legal under START, which is in force until December 2009. Russia began fielding small numbers of single-warhead Topol-Ms in 1998. Russia had long complained that START II was unfair because Moscow deploys a greater proportion of its strategic warheads on MIRVed ICBMs than the United States. To maintain parity with U.S. forces under START II, Moscow would have needed to build a substantial number of expensive, new single-warhead ICBMs after eliminating its MIRVs. Although many Russian politicians disliked START II, they eventually saw it as possible leverage to preserve the ABM Treaty, which Moscow perceived as increasingly threatened by U.S. missile defense plans. When Russia finally ratified START II in May 2000-seven years after the treaty was signed and four years after the Senate approved the accord-it conditioned the treaty's entry into force on U.S. approval of a 1997 package of several arms control agreements, including measures to clarify the terms of the ABM Treaty. Moscow also stated that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be grounds for Russia to pull out of START II.
The U.S. official said June 18 that these past Russian linkages "made it impossible for START II to enter into force."
*MIRVs - разделяющиеся головные части с боеголовками индивидуального наведения
F.1. Translate the text into Russian paying special attention to the underlined words.
Nonproliferation Through Disarmament
Sixty years after the first atomic bombings, some 40 countries have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons. If it is true that the nuclear gennie cannot be put back in the bottle, why aren't there dozens of nuclear-armed states? The decades-long global struggle against nuclear proliferation has largely succeeded because the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) established effective nonproliferation and disarmament rules and standards.
The treaty and associated measures make it far more difficult for the non-nuclear states to acquire the material and technology needed to build such weapons. Equally important, it commits the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China to pursue nuclear disarmament and has led them to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT members, thereby reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and the motives for other states to acquire them.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the reaffirmation of the nuclear-weapon states' disarmament obligations was essential to the indefinite extension of the treaty. At the 2000 Review Conference, states-parties went even further, agreeing to a 13-point action plan, including bringing into force the treaty banning nuclear testing, making future nuclear arms reductions irreversible and verifiable, and negotiating a verifiable cutoff of fissile material production for weapons.
As the May 2005 NPT Review Conference approaches, progress on nuclear disarmament is as essential to winning the struggle against proliferation as ever. Sadly, the nuclear-weapon states' recent disarmament record is mainly one of lost opportunity and inaction.
Most disturbing are the brazen claims of senior Bush administration officials that disarmament commitments made at previous review conferences no longer apply. Washington is also actively opposing or sidestepping the most important disarmament measures. As a result, states-parties are divided about how to strengthen the treaty. Leading states, including many U.S. allies, are calling on Washington to revise its policies and adopt a more balanced and productive approach.
President George W. Bush opposes entry into force of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would impede development of new types of nuclear warheads by existing nuclear powers and would-be proliferators. China and other key CTBT hold-outs have followed suit by delaying ratification.
Adding insult to injury, Bush has approved a military strategy that calls for new nuclear capabilities designed to enhance the credibility and range of options for the possible use of nuclear weapons. Not only has the United States initiated research on new, more "usable" nuclear weapons, but Russia claims it is developing a more advanced nuclear delivery system.
China continues to slowly modernize its nuclear arsenal of approximately 400 warheads, while France and the United Kingdom are considering nuclear force modernization. Maintaining and expanding reliance on nuclear weapons only undermines nonproliferation efforts by suggesting to other states that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security.
Stalled for years by China, negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty are now blocked by U.S. opposition to a verification system. The stance is short-sighted and self-defeating. Such a treaty is effectively verifiable and would lock in the production freeze observed by the NPT's five nuclear-weapon states. It would also cap the supply of bomb material available to NPT holdouts India, Israel, and Pakistan.
The United States and Russia will cite their progress toward securing Soviet-era weapons-usable material and dismantling weapons banned under the 1991 START agreement. While important, their efforts reflect commitments made a decade ago.
They will also tout their newest arms reduction pact, which will reduce their stockpile of deployed strategic weapons. But contrary to arms reduction goals of the 1990s, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty does not require the verifiable destruction of warheads or their delivery vehicles and will allow each side to maintain massive strategic nuclear arsenals of 5,000 warheads or more past 2012 - about 10 times the size of any other states' current nuclear stockpile.
U.S. and Russian leaders have also failed to discuss how they might reduce their so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which total at least 4,000. Greater Russian reliance on such weapons combined with NATO states' reluctance to part with the 480 U.S. tactical warheads based in Europe impedes progress.
Although NPT member states will not likely reach consensus on a new disarmament action plan at the next review conference, they cannot afford to retreat from their past commitments. At a minimum, NPT states must reaffirm their common nuclear disarmament goals, examine how to achieve them, and agree to resume progress on further, specific measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race.
By itself, progress on nuclear disarmament will not hold back proliferation. But in the long run, the number of countries with nuclear weapons cannot be held in check if the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states do not hold up their end of the NPT bargain.
2. Explain the meaning of the word combinations in italics. Translate the sentences into Russian.
a) If it is true that the nuclear gennie cannot be put back in the bottle, why aren't there dozens of nuclear-armed states?
b) The stance is short-sighted and self-defeating.
c) Sadly, the nuclear weapon states' recent disarmament record is mainly one of lost opportunity and inaction.
d) Adding insult to injury, Bush has approached a military strategy that calls for new nuclear capabilities designed to enhance the credibility and range of option to the possible use of nuclear weapons.
e) Such a treaty is effectively verifiable and would lock in the production freeze observed by the NPT's five nuclear-weapon states.
f) ...the number of countries with nuclear weapons cannot be had in check if the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states do not hold up their end of the NPT bargain.
3. Render into English.
Концепция внешней политики РФ (выдержки)
[...] 2. Укрепление международной безопасности
Россия выступает за дальнейшее снижение роли фактора силы в международных отношениях при одновременном укреплении стратегической и региональной стабильности. В этих целях Российской Федерации:
будет неукоснительно выполнять взятые на себя обязательства по действующим договорам и соглашениям в области ограничения и сокращения вооружений и участвовать в разработке и заключении новых договоренностей, отвечающих как ее национальным интересам, так и интересам безопасности других государств;
готова идти на дальнейшее сокращение своего ядерного потенциала на основе двусторонних договоренностей с США и - в многостороннем формате - с участием других ядерных держав при том условии, что стратегическая стабильность в ядерной области не будет нарушена. Россия будет добиваться сохранения и соблюдения Договора 1972 года об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны - краеугольного камня стратегической стабильности. Реализация США планов создания противоракетной обороны территории страны неизбежно вынудит Российскую Федерацию принять адекватные меры по поддержанию на должном уровне своей национальной безопасности;
подтверждает неизменность своего курса на участие совместно с другими государствами в предотвращении распространения ядерного оружия, других видов оружия массового уничтожения, средств их доставки, а также соответствующих материалов и технологий. Российская Федерация - твердый сторонник укрепления и развития соответствующих международных режимов, включая создание Глобальной системы контроля за нераспространением ракет и ракетных технологий. Российская Федерация намерена твердо придерживаться своих обязательств по Договору о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний и призывает присоединиться к нему все государства мира;
уделяет особое внимание такому аспекту укрепления стратегической стабильности, как обеспечение информационной безопасности;
намерена и далее содействовать укреплению региональной стабильности путем участия в процессах сокращения и ограничения обычных вооруженных сил, а также применения мер доверия в военной области; [...] V. RESPONDING TO THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
1.
a) Translate the text paying special attention to the underlined words.
The Chemical Weapons Convention at a Glance
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multilateral treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their destruction within a specified period of time. The treaty is of unlimited duration and is far more comprehensive than any prior international agreement on chemical weapons. (The 1925 Geneva Protocol, for instance, only outlaws the use of chemical weapons.) CWC negotiations started in 1980 in the UN Conference on Disarmament. The convention opened for signature on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. The CWC is implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is headquartered in The Hague with about 500 employees. The OPCW receives states-parties' declarations, which detail chemical weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial activities. After receiving declarations, the OPCW inspects and monitors states-parties' facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention, aiming to ensure compliance. The CWC is open to any country and currently has 175 states-parties. Eleven signatories, including Israel, have yet to ratify the convention. Key nonsignatories include North Korea and Syria, both whom the United States suspect have chemical weapons programs. Iraq recently pledged to adhere to the CWC. PROHIBITIONS
The Chemical Weapons Convention bans: * Developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical weapons. * The direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons. * Chemical weapons use or military preparation for use. * Assisting, encouraging, or inducing other states to engage in CWC-prohibited activity. * The use of riot control agents "as a method of warfare." DECLARATION REQUIREMENTS
The CWC requires states-parties to declare in writing to the OPCW their chemical weapons stockpiles, chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs), relevant chemical industry facilities, and other weapons-related information. This must be done within 30 days of the convention's entry into force for the states-parties. Chemical Weapons Stockpiles - States-parties must declare all their chemical weapons. Chemical weapons stockpiles are broken down into three "categories":
* Category 1 chemical weapons, which are based on Schedule 1 chemicals. Examples include VX and sarin. (See below for an explanation of "scheduled" chemicals.) * Category 2 chemical weapons, which are based on non-Schedule 1 chemicals. An example is phosgene. * Category 3 chemical weapons, which include unfilled munitions and devices and equipment designed specifically to employ chemical weapons. Other weapons-related declarations states-parties must make include: * Chemical weapons production facilities on their territories since January 1, 1946. * Facilities (such as laboratories and test sites) designed, constructed, or used primarily for chemical weapons development since January 1, 1946. * "Old" chemical weapons on their territories (chemical weapons manufactured before 1925 or those produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they are no longer useable). * "Abandoned" chemical weapons (those abandoned without consent on their territories after January 1, 1925, by another state). * Chemical weapons they have abandoned on other states' territories. * Plans for destroying weapons and facilities. * All transfers or receipts of chemical weapons or chemical weapons-production equipment since January 1, 1946. * All riot control agents in their possession.
Chemical Industry - The CWC requires states-parties to declare chemical industry facilities that produce or use chemicals of concern to the convention. These chemicals are grouped into "schedules," based on the risk they pose to the convention. A facility producing a Schedule 1 chemical is considered a Schedule 1 facility. * Schedule 1 chemicals and precursors pose a "high risk" to the convention and are rarely used for peaceful purposes. States-parties may not retain these chemicals except in small, limited quantities for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or defensive use. Many Schedule 1 chemicals have been stockpiled as chemical weapons. * Schedule 2 chemicals are toxic chemicals that pose a "significant risk" to the convention and precursors important in the production of Schedule 1 or toxic Schedule 2 chemicals. These chemicals are not produced in large quantities for commercial or other peaceful purposes. * Schedule 3 chemicals are usually produced in large quantities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC but still pose a risk to the convention. Some of these chemicals have been stockpiled as chemical weapons. The CWC also requires the declaration of facilities that produce certain nonscheduled chemicals. DESTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
The convention requires states-parties to destroy: * All chemical weapons under their jurisdiction or control. i) Category 1 chemical weapons destruction must start within two years after the CWC enters into force for a state-party. States-parties must destroy 1 percent within three years of the CWC's entry into force, 20 percent within five years, 45 percent within seven years, and 100 percent within 10 years (by April 29, 2007). The OPCW may extend these deadlines due to "exceptional circumstances," but states-parties must destroy their entire stockpile by April 29, 2012.
ii) Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons destruction must start within one year after the CWC enters into force for a state-party. States-parties must complete destruction by April 29, 2002, with destruction done in equal annual increments. * All chemical weapons production facilities under their jurisdiction or control. i) Destruction of CWPFs capable of producing Schedule 1 chemicals must start within one year after the CWC enters into force for a state-party. States-parties must complete destruction by April 29, 2007.
ii) Destruction of other CWPFs must start within one year after the CWC enters into force for a state-party. States-parties must complete destruction by April 29, 2002.
iii) States-parties may request to convert CWPFs to facilities that they can use for nonprohibited purposes. Once their requests are approved, states-parties must complete conversion by April 29, 2003. * Chemical weapons abandoned on other states' territories. * Old chemical weapons. On-Site Activity * The convention establishes three types of on-site activities that aim to generate confidence in states-parties' CWC compliance. These include: * "Routine inspections" of chemical weapons-related facilities and chemical industry facilities to verify the content of declarations and to confirm that activities are consistent with CWC obligations. * "Challenge inspections," which can be conducted at any facility or location in states-parties to clarify questions of possible noncompliance. (To prevent abuse of this measure, the OPCW's executive body can vote by a three-quarters majority to stop a challenge inspection from going forward.) Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons.
Trade
* The convention restricts trade with non-states-parties, outlawing the transfer of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals. * In 2002 the OPCW will consider the need for additional measures to ensure that Schedule 3 transfers to non-states-parties are not used for purposes prohibited by the convention. Current requirements call for exporting states-parties to obtain an end-use certificate from importing states. * The convention encourages trade among states-parties. It calls upon them not to maintain restrictions on one another that would hamper the trade of chemical-related items to be used for peaceful purposes. Penalties for Noncompliance
* If states-parties took prohibited actions that could result in "serious damage" to the convention, the OPCW could recommend collective punitive measures to other states-parties. In cases of "particular gravity," the OPCW should bring the issue before the UN Security Council and General Assembly. * States-parties must take measures to address questions raised about their compliance with the CWC. If they do not, the OPCW may, inter alia, restrict or suspend their CWC-related rights and privileges (such as voting and trade rights). b) Translate the text into Russian in writing.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
Brief Background
After 12 years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September 1992. The CWC contains a mechanism for verifying compliance by States with the provisions of the Convention that is unprecedented in scope and in the stringency of its verification regime. The CWC opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The CWC is the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control. In order to prepare for the entry-into-force of the CWC, a Preparatory Commission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established with the responsibility to prepare detailed operation procedures and to put into place the necessary infrastructure for the permanent implementing agency provided for in the Convention. Headquarters for this organization were established in the Hague, the Netherlands. The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997, 180 days after deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification. With the entry-into-force of the Convention, the OPCW was formally established.
Active Vocabulary
to conduct on-site visitsпроводить инспекции на местеto be (in) consistent with CWC obligations(не) соответствовать обязательствам КЗХОto lodge a complaint with the UN Security Councilподать жалобу в Совет безопасности ООНto investigate complaintsрассматривать жалобыto bring the issue before the UN Security Council
syn. refer the question to the UN Security Councilпередать вопрос на рассмотрение в Совет Безопасности ООНto engage in military preparationsучаствовать в военных ученияхto use for hostile purposesиспользовать во враждебных целяхto agree on specific measuresсогласовать конкретные мерыto violate/breach the terms of the conventionнарушить условия конвенцииto envision sb doing sthпредполагать что кто-то что-то сделаетto mandate that sb do sthдавать распоряжение, постановлятьto table a proposal внести предложениеroutine inspectionsплановые инспекцииchallenge inspectionsинспекции по запросуproduction facilities/sitesпроизводственные объектыriot control agentsхимические средства борьбы с беспорядкамиmethod of warfareсредство ведения войныcollective punitive measures/penalties for noncomplianceколлективные штрафные меры за несоблюдениеunder one's jurisdiction or controlнаходящийся под чьей-либо юрисдикцией или контролем
2. Fill in the blanks using the Active Vocabulary. Translate the sentences into Russian:
1. The Convention ............... that states-parties destroy all chemical weapons ................
2. The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the use of ............... as a ................
3. Destruction of chemical weapons ............... must start within one year after the CWC enters into force for a state-party.
4. The BWC bans the stockpiling and retention of weapons designed to use such agents or toxins for ............... .
5. If states-parties took prohibited actions that could result in serious damage to the convention, the OPCW could recommend ............... to other states-parties.
6. Some signatory states have recently ............... which raised the question about their ............... .
7. The aim of the ............... is to verify the content of declarations and to conform that activities ............... .
8. In cases of "particular gravity", the OPCW should ............... .
9. The Review conference was a good opportunity ............... to strengthen both the BWC and compliance with it.
10. ............... can be ............... at any ............... in states-parties to clarify questions of possible noncompliance.
11. The protocol ............... states submitting to an international body declarations of treaty-relevant activities.
12. The Treaty regime allows states-parties ............... if they believe other member states are ............... .
13. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances ............... to use chemical weapons.
14. The UN Security Council's power ............... has never been invoked.
15. The EU ............... to strike a compromise on disputed issues.
3. Translate the sentences into English using the Active Vocabulary.
1. Конвенция о запрещении химического оружия обязывает государства-участников никогда не разрабатывать и не сохранять оружие, предназначенное для использования агентов или токсинов во враждебных целях.
2. Государство-участник КЗХО подает жалобу в Совет Безопасности ООН в случае, если какое-либо другое государство-участник действует в нарушение своих обязательств.
3. Положительным итогом Конференции по рассмотрению действия КБТО стало согласование мер укрепления доверия.
4. Статья IV содержит требование о принятии необходимых мер по запрещению и предотвращению действий в пределах территории государства, под его юрисдикцией или под его контролем.
5. В протоколе предусмотрена возможность коллективных санкций (штрафных мер) за несоблюдение условий договора, а также за деятельность, не соответствующую его положениям.
6. В 2003 году дело, связанное с ядерной программой, якобы разрабатываемой в Северной Корее, было передано в Совет Безопасности ООН.
7. В конце марта 2006 года Совет Управляющих МАГАТЭ призвал Иран прекратить программу обогащения урана (uranium enrichment programme) и ратифицировать дополнительный протокол к ДНЯО, позволяющий проведение инспекций по запросу его ядерных объектов.
8. Совет Безопасности уполномочен рассматривать жалобы, связанные с нарушением норм международного права, и выносить единогласные решения, не противоречащие интересам государств.
9. Эти страны внесли предложение об усилении контроля за соблюдением Конвенции, которое нашло отражение в юридически обязывающем документе.
4. a) Do the two-way translation of the CWC Preamble
PREAMBLE
ПРЕАМБУЛАThe States Parties to this Convention, Государства - участники настоящей Конвенции,............. to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards .............. under strict and effective international control, including ..............................of all types of weapons of mass destruction, будучи преисполнены решимости действовать с целью достижения эффективного прогресса в направлении всеобщего и полного разоружения под строгим и эффективным международным контролем, включая запрещение и ликвидацию всех видов оружия массового уничтожения,........ ................ to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, желая внести вклад в реализацию целей и принципов Устава Организации Объединенных Наций,Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations ........................................... of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925), ............ о том, что Генеральная Ассамблея Организации Объединенных Наций неоднократно осуждала все действия, противоречащие принципам и целям Протокола о запрещении применения на войне ............................................................, подписанного в Женеве 17 июня 1925 года (Женевский протокол 1925 года),.............. that this Convention .........principles and objectives of and .................. the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, признавая, что настоящая Конвенция вновь подтверждает принципы и цели, а также взятые обязательства по Женевскому протоколу 1925 года и по Конвенции о ............................................................, подписанной в Вашингтоне, Лондоне и Москве 10 апреля 1972 года, Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
................... цель, закрепленную в статье IХ Конвенции о ............................................................,............. ......................, ............. the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
будучи преисполнены решимости в интересах всего человечества полностью исключить возможность применения химического оружия ........................., .............................., ............Женевскому протоколу 1925 года,............. the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare,
признавая......................... и принципах международного права запрещение использования гербицидов ........................, ............... that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used ....................., считая, что достижения в области химии должны использоваться исключительно на благо человечества,................... free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes ......................this Convention in order .....................of all States Parties, желая поощрять свободную торговлю химикатами, а также международное сотрудничество и обмен научно-технической информацией в области химической деятельности в целях, не запрещаемых по настоящей Конвенции, для ускорения экономического и технического развития всех государств-участников, .................that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represent a necessary step ................................................., будучи убеждены, что ......................................................... химического оружия и его уничтожение представляют собой необходимый шаг по пути к достижению этих общих целей,Have agreed as follows: согласились о нижеследующем: b) Translate into Russian paying attention to the underlined words.
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. c) Translate the final clauses of the CWC into English using the vocabulary you have learned.
ARTICLE XVI
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL 1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925. ARTICLE XVII
STATUS OF THE ANNEXES The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this Convention includes the Annexes. ARTICLE XVIII
SIGNATURE This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into force. ARTICLE XIX
RATIFICATION This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes. ARTICLE XX
ACCESSION Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter. ARTICLE XXI
ENTRY INTO FORCE 1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. 2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession. ARTICLE XXII
RESERVATIONS The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose. ARTICLE XXIII
DEPOSITARY The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, inter alia: (a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices; (b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States; and (c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE XXIV
AUTHENTIC TEXTS This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Convention. Done at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.
5. Render into English. Comment on Russia's efforts to implement the CWC.
a) Конвенция о запрещении разработки, производства, накопления и применения химического оружия и о его уничтожении (КЗХО)
Вступила в силу 29 апреля 1997 года - через 180 дней после того, как была сдана 65 ратификационная грамота.
По состоянию на декабрь 2004 г. Конвенцию ратифицировали 167 государств, подписали, но не ратифицировали - 16, не подписали - 11. Россия присоединилась к КЗХО в 1997 году и стала членом Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО). Химконвенция - важнейший многосторонний международно-правовой документ, который не только запрещает разработку, производство, приобретение, накопление и передачу целого вида оружия массового уничтожения, но и обязывает все присоединившиеся к нему государства уничтожить свои запасы химического оружия (ХО). Контроль за соблюдением и помощь при осуществлении положений Конвенции, включая положение о международной проверке соблюдения КЗХО, осуществляется созданной в 1997 г. Организацией по запрещению химического оружия. Основным органом ОЗХО является Конференция государств-участников, которая состоит из всех членов Организации и собирается один раз в год, а при необходимости чаще. Исполнительный совет, который обычно собирается четыре раза в год, является исполнительным органом Организации, который подотчетен Конференции государств-участников. Он состоит из 41 члена, которые избираются Конференцией сроком на 2 года, при этом особое внимание уделяется справедливому географическому распределению, значительности химпромышленности, а также политическим интересам и интересам безопасности. В соответствии с этими условиями Исполсовет формируется следующим образом: * Девять государств - участников от Африки, * Девять государств - участников от Азии, * Пять государств - участников от Восточной Европы, * Семь государств - участников от Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна, * Десять государств - участников из числа западноевропейских и других государств, * Одно дополнительное государство-участник, назначаемое последовательно государствами - участниками, расположенными в регионах Азии, Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна. Россия является членом Исполнительного совета. Технический секретариат помогает Конференции и Исполсовету в выполнении ими своих функций. Осуществляет меры проверки, предусмотренные КЗХО, а также выполняет другие поручения в соответствии с Конвенцией. Штат Техсекретариата насчитывает около 500 сотрудников. Согласно КЗХО, ликвидация государствами своих запасов химоружия подразделяется на четыре этапа: первый этап - 1% запасов, второй этап - 20%, третий этап - 45% и четвертый этап - 100%. При этом полное уничтожение запасов ХО, по условиям Конвенции, должно было завершиться не позднее апреля 2007 г. Вместе с тем допускается продление конечного срока на 5 лет, то есть до 2012 г. Важным приоритетом деятельности ОЗХО с точки зрения нераспространения химоружия является достижение универсальности Конвенции. Число участников растет, но целый ряд государств, в том числе в "конфликтоопасных" регионах, все еще остается вне рамок КЗХО. Существенная роль в расширении круга государств-участников принадлежит реализации принятого ОЗХО "Плана действий" по обеспечению универсальности Конвенции. Необходимым элементом стабильного функционирования КЗХО являются меры национальной имплементации ее положений, которые должны принять все ее государства-участники. Ряд участников КЗХО в силу тех или иных причин не смог выполнить эти требования, в числе которых - принятие соответствующего национального имплементационного законодательства и создание действенного режима его выполнения. Активизации работы на этом направление способствовало принятие соответствующего "Плана действий". Департамент по вопросам безопасности и разоружения МИД Российской Федерации
b) Избавление мира от наиболее опасных видов оружия массового уничтожения и, в частности химического, является приоритетным направлением российской внешней политики. Поэтому Российская Федерация приняла активное участие в разработке Конвенции о запрещении химического оружия (КЗХО), вступившей в силу 29 апреля 1997 года, и стала одним из первых государств, подписавших ее. 5 декабря 1997года, завершив процедуру ратификации КЗХО, Россия вошла в состав Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО). В России основной задачей КЗХО на нынешнем этапе считают скорейшее уничтожение существующих химических арсеналов. Согласно КЗХО, ее участники обязались ликвидировать свои запасы не позднее апреля 2007 года, однако предусмотрена возможность продления срока уничтожения на 5 лет - до 2012 года. Такой возможностью к настоящему времени воспользовались четыре из шести государств-обладателей химического оружия, включая Россию и США, которые не смогут завершить уничтожение своих запасов к 29 апреля 2007 года. С учетом масштабности задач, стоящих перед Российской Федерацией, обладающей крупнейшим в мире арсеналом ХО, в октябре 2001 года в ОЗХО направлена просьба об изменении промежуточных и продлении конечного срока уничтожения химарсеналов до 2012 г. В результате утвержден новый график выполнения Россией обязательств по уничтожению химоружия. Первый этап ликвидации химоружия выполнен в апреле 2003 года - уничтожен 1% запасов ХО (400 тонн). Второй этап (уничтожение 20% запасов ХО или 8 тысяч тонн) завершается 29 апреля 2007 года, а третий этап (уничтожение 45% или 18 тысяч тонн) - 31 декабря 2009 года. Россия рассчитывает на то, что и другие государства-обладатели ХО приложат усилия для выполнения своих обязательств. Российская Федерация высоко ценит содействие в уничтожении запасов ХО, оказываемое ей другими государствами. Дополнительные возможности для этого создает реализация инициативы по Глобальному партнерству против распространения оружия и материалов массового уничтожения, учрежденной на саммите "Группы восьми" в Кананаскисе в 2002 году. Начиная с 2003 года, к инициативе Глобального партнерства стали присоединяться страны, не входящие в "восьмерку", но осознавшие, что скорейшее уничтожение химического оружия отвечает интересам всех государств. Всего в настоящее время содействие России в уничтожении химоружия оказывают Бельгия, Германия, Великобритания, Ирландия, Италия, Канада, Нидерланды, Новая Зеландия, Норвегия, Польша, США, Чехия, Швейцария, Швеция, Финляндия, Франция, Евросоюз. В ходе прошедшей в марте 2006 года 44-й сессии Исполнительного совета ОЗХО в решении по установлению конкретной даты завершения третьего этапа ликвидации отравляющих веществ в России была отмечена "важная роль прогнозируемого, скоординированного, адресного и эффективно используемого международного содействия" процессу уничтожения химического оружия в России. Россия придает большое значение поддержанию стандартов эффективной проверки выполнения Конвенции, осуществлению ее на недискриминационной основе. Важнейшим элементом Химконвенции в плане обеспечения нераспространения химоружия считаем контроль за деятельностью химпромышленности. Положительно оцениваем повышение внимания государств-участников и Техсекретариата ОЗХО к вопросам объявлений и инспекций в химической промышленности.
(МИД РФ)
B. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on their Destruction
1. Read the text and answer the check-up questions.
THE EVOLVING THREAT
Historically, there has been sporadic use of biological weapons, but only in the 20th century have large-scale, offensive biological-weapons programmes been undertaken by major states. It is known, for example, that the US had one such programme for over 25 years from the Second World War until the end of the 1960s. During that period it weaponised bacteria such as anthrax, viruses similar to that which causes Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) and toxins including botulinum.
Bacteria are tiny, single-celled living organisms; viruses are very small elements of hereditary material, surrounded by a protective protein coat, which cannot replicate except inside a living cell. Because these agents multiply rapidly in the victim's body, very small amounts are required to achieve a major effect. Toxins are chemical substances, not always derived from living organisms, but they can also be deadly in extraordinarily small quantities.
Nature provides a weapons designer with a wide choice of agents: VEE, for example, has a low lethality in humans but it is regarded as an incapacitating disease. A huge variety of agents are available for attacking livestock or plants - to inflict economic damage, rather than to affect personnel directly. For the latter, a number of distinct target types and methods can be envisaged, but one particular characteristic of biological and toxin weapons is prominent. It is clear that in attacking humans via their lungs, by spraying from an aircraft and allowing the wind to carry the agent to the target, biological weapons can achieve an area coverage which puts them in the class of weapons of mass destruction - rivalled only by nuclear weapons. While some agents (such as plague) could cause uncontrollable epidemics, others would spread very little from the first victim and their use would thus have more predictable outcomes.
Although both are weapons of mass destruction, there is one very obvious difference between nuclear and biological weapons. Producing fissile material requires a massive industrial effort which few potential nuclear proliferators have achieved. In contrast, biological weapons are relatively simple to produce. The United States Office of Technology Assessment stated in a 1993 report that, with a small vial of seed culture and a simple fermenter, kilograms of an agent like anthrax could be produced in as little as four days. Developing effective weapons that disperse agents in particles of the right size and viability is more difficult.- but not impossible. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) has reported that Iraq had filled shells, bombs, rockets and missile warheads with biological and toxin agents. In 1995, UNSCOM noted that the programme covered a whole variety of biological-weapon delivery means, from tactical weapons (such as 122mm rocket and artillery shells) to strategic weapons (including aerial bombs and AI-Hussein warheads filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin) and 'economic' weapons (for example, wheat cover smut which affects crops).
The modern revolution in biotechnology has had a major effect on production capabilities. For example, the ability to introduce a foreign toxin gene into a bacterium has allowed very much larger amounts of toxins to be easily produced than was previously possible by extraction from natural sources. Additionally, the growth and spread of the biotechnology industry has led to much more sophisticated capabilities being developed and used around the world. There is clearly now a much greater potential for the rapid production of agents in smaller, less, easily identifiable, facilities. Examples and effects of known biological agents
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
* Pulmonary infection 95% fatal
* Antibiotics usually ineffective in pulmonary infection
* Death in less that 7 days after exposure Botulinum toxins (botulism)
* Gastrointestinal symptoms and paralysis in 1-3 days
* Lethality up to 60% in food poisoning
* Estimated human LD50* less than one 5-millionth of a gram
* 1000-10,000 times more potent than VX nerve gas
* Lethal Dose - estimated to kill 50% of the population exposed to it
1. How long have biological weapons been used?
2. What is the difference between bacteria, viruses and toxins?
3. What makes biological weapons as dangerous as nuclear weapons?
4. What is the main difference between nuclear and biological weapons?
5. Comment on the effect of modern revolution in biology on production capabilities.
2. a) Translate the text paying special attention to the underlined words.
The Biological Weapons Convention At a Glance
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a legally binding treaty that outlaws biological arms. After being discussed and negotiated in the United Nations' disarmament forum starting in 1969, the BWC opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. It currently has 150 states-parties and 14 signatory states. Terms of the Treaty
The BWC bans:
* The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of: i. Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;" ii. Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."
* The transfer of or assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above.
The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes the "agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery" described above within nine months of the convention's entry into force. The BWC does not ban the use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use. It also does not ban biodefense programs.
Verification
The treaty regime mandates that states-parties consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve compliance concerns. It also allows states-parties to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if they believe other member states are violating the convention. The Security Council can investigate complaints, but this power has never been invoked. Security Council voting rules give China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States veto power over Security Council decisions, including those to conduct BWC investigations.
Membership and Duration
The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration that is open to any country. Notably absent from the list of member states is Syria, a treaty signatory that the United States believes is probably developing biological weapons. Implementation
The convention has been flagrantly violated in the past. The Soviet Union, a state-party and one of the convention's depositary states, maintained an enormous offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the BWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated, but questions remain about what happened to elements of the Soviet program. Iraq violated its commitments as a signatory state with its biological weapons program, which was uncovered by the UN Special Commission on Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Iraq became a state-party after the war but is thought by the United States to be still violating the convention. In November 2001, the United States publicly accused Iraq, as well as member state North Korea, of breaching the convention's terms. Washington also expressed concern about compliance by Iran and Libya, which are also states-parties, and by Syria. The United States itself raised concerns in 2001 about whether some of its activities, ostensibly being conducted as part of its biodefense program, are permitted under the BWC. In 2002, Washington added Cuba, also a state-party, to its list of countries conducting activities that violate the convention.
Efforts to Enhance Compliance
States-parties have convened a review conference about every five years to review and improve upon the treaty's implementation. In an effort to enhance confidence and promote cooperation among states-parties, at the second BWC review conference in 1986 member states agreed to implement a set of confidence-building measures. Under these politically binding measures, states should:
* Exchange data on high-containment research centers and laboratories or on centers and laboratories that specialize in permitted biological activities related to the convention. * Exchange information on abnormal outbreaks of infectious diseases. * Encourage the publication of biological research results related to the BWC and promote the use of knowledge gained from this research. * Promote scientific contact on biological research related to the convention. At the third BWC review conference in 1991, the scope of the first measure was expanded to include national biological defense programs and the second and fourth measures were slightly modified. In addition, three more measures were added to this list. States should:
* Declare legislation, regulations, and "other measures" pertaining to the BWC. * Declare offensive or defensive biological research and development programs in existence since January 1, 1946. * Declare vaccine production facilities. These endeavors have been largely unsuccessful; the vast majority of states-parties have consistently failed to submit declarations on their activities and facilities. The 1991 review conference also tasked a group of "governmental experts" to evaluate potential verification measures for use in a future compliance protocol to the BWC. The group subsequently considered 21 such measures and submitted a report to a special conference of states-parties in 1994. Building off this report, the conference tasked a second body, known as the Ad Hoc Group, with negotiating a legally binding protocol to the BWC to strengthen the convention.
The Protocol Regime and Negotiations
The Ad Hoc Group met from January 1995 to July 2001 and aimed to finish its work before the fifth review conference, which began in November 2001. During the course of the negotiations, the group developed a protocol that envisioned states submitting to an international body declarations of treaty-relevant facilities and activities. That body would conduct routine on-site visits to declared facilities and could conduct challenge inspections of suspect facilities and activities as well. However, a number of fundamental issues - such as the scope of on-site visits and the role export controls would play in the regime - proved difficult to resolve. In March 2001, the Ad Hoc Group's chairman issued a draft protocol containing language attempting to strike a compromise on disputed issues. But in July 2001, at the Ad Hoc Group's last scheduled meeting, the United States rejected the draft and any further protocol negotiations, claiming such a protocol could not help strengthen compliance with the BWC and could hurt U.S. national security and commercial interests. The fifth BWC review conference, which many experts thought could resolve the fate of the Ad Hoc Group, was suspended on its last day, December 7, 2001, after the United States tabled a controversial proposal to terminate the Ad Hoc Group's mandate and replace it with an annual meeting of BWC states-parties. It is uncertain whether the Ad Hoc Group will meet again. The United States is the only country that publicly favors revoking the group's mandate. The review conference will reconvene in November 2002. The states-parties resumed the fifth review conference in November 2002. The participants failed to agree on any verification measures, including the proposed protocol. The states-parties agreed instead to hold three meetings before the next review conference in 2006. They will discuss nonproliferation measures during the meetings, but the agenda does not include any discussion of verification measures. No decision was taken regarding the Ad Hoc Group, and its future remains unclear.
b) Translate the text into Russian in writing.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
Brief Background
As a result of prolonged efforts by the international community to establish a new instrument that would supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons, was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention.
Recognizing the need to strengthen the BWC, a group of governmental experts (VEREX) was established at the Third Review Conference of the BWC in 1991 to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. At a Special Conference held in September 1994 in Geneva, the States parties agreed to establish the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the BWC in order to negotiate and develop a legally-binding verification regime for the Convention. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group was mandated to consider four specific areas, namely: definitions of terms and objective criteria; incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime; a system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention; and specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full implementation of Article X on international cooperation and exchange in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities.
At the Fourth Review Conference of the States parties to the BWC in 1996, the work of the Ad Hoc Group was discussed and the progress made thus far was welcomed. It also mandated the Ad Hoc Group to conclude its work on the future protocol at the latest by the Fifth Review Conference to be held in 2001.
On 23 September 1998, an Informal Ministerial Meeting of the States parties to the BWC was held in New York at the initiative of Australia in order to demonstrate high-level political support for the negotiations.
At its 24th session (23 July -17 August 2002), which was the last scheduled session before the Fifth BWC Review Conference, the Ad Hoc Group was unable to conclude the negotiations on the draft protocol. The Fifth Review Conference was convened from 19 November to 7 December 2001 in Geneva. Due to persisting divergent views and positions on certain key issues, however, the Conference decided to adjourn its proceedings and resume its work from 11 to 22 November 2002 in Geneva. In pursuant to the decision taken at the Fifth Review Conference in 2001, the Conference was reconvened from 11 to 15 November 2002 in Geneva. States Parties adopted a Final Report that included a decision to hold annual meetings of States Parties and experts meetings in the next three years leading up to the Review Conference in 2006.
3. a) Translate the BWC Preamble into English. Make use of the following words and words combinations:
to act with a view to doing sth, through effective measures, to facilitate the achievement of sth, to make contribution to sth, to mitigate the horrors of war, to repeatedly condemn sth, the general improvement of the international atmosphere, the urgency of eliminating sth, to that end, for the sake of all mankind, to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind, to spare no effort to do sth.
КОНВЕНЦИЯ
О ЗАПРЕЩЕНИИ РАЗРАБОТКИ, ПРОИЗВОДСТВА И НАКОПЛЕНИЯ ЗАПАСОВ БАКТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО (БИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО) И ТОКСИННОГО ОРУЖИЯ И ОБ ИХ УНИЧТОЖЕНИИ
(16 декабря 1971 года)
Государства - участники настоящей Конвенции,
преисполненные решимости действовать в целях достижения эффективного прогресса на пути всеобщего и полного разоружения, включающего запрещение и ликвидацию всех видов оружия массового уничтожения, и уверенные в том, что запрещение разработки, производства и накопления запасов химического и бактериологического (биологического) оружия и их уничтожение путем эффективных мер будут способствовать достижению всеобщего и полного разоружения под строгим и эффективным международным контролем,
признавая важное значение Протокола о запрещении применения на войне удушливых, ядовитых или других подобных газов и бактериологических средств, подписанного в Женеве 17 июня 1925 года, а также тот вклад, который указанный Протокол уже внес и продолжает вносить в дело уменьшения ужасов войны, подтверждая свою верность принципам и целям упомянутого Протокола и призывая все государства к их строгому соблюдению,
напоминая о том, что Генеральная Ассамблея Организации Объединенных Наций неоднократно осуждала все действия, противоречащие принципам и целям Женевского протокола от 17 июня 1925 года,
желая способствовать углублению доверия между народами и общему оздоровлению международной атмосферы,
стремясь также способствовать осуществлению целей и принципов Устава Организации Объединенных Наций,
будучи убеждены в важности и неотложности исключения из арсеналов государств путем эффективных мер такого опасного оружия массового уничтожения, каким является оружие с использованием химических или бактериологических (биологических) агентов,
признавая, что соглашение о запрещении бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия является первым возможным шагом в направлении достижения соглашения об эффективных мерах также по запрещению разработки, производства и накопления химического оружия, и преисполненные решимости продолжать переговоры с этой целью,
преисполненные решимости ради всего человечества полностью исключить возможность использования бактериологических (биологических) агентов или токсинов в качестве оружия,
будучи убеждены, что такое использование противоречило бы совести человечества и что не следует жалеть никаких усилий для уменьшения этой опасности,
согласились о нижеследующем:
b) Replace the words in brackets with their English equivalents. Article I
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances (не разрабатывать, не производить, не накапливать) or otherwise (не приобретать и не сохранять): (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) (оружие, оборудование или средства доставки, предназначенные для использования) such agents or toxins (во враждебных целях или в вооруженных конфликтах).
Article II
Each State Party to this Convention (обязуется уничтожить или переключить на мирные цели), as soon as possible but not later than nine months (после вступления в силу) of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, (которыми оно обладает) or under its jurisdiction or control. (При выполнении положений) of this article all necessary (меры предосторожности) shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III
Each State Party to this Convention (обязуется не передавать кому-бы то ни было ни прямо, ни косвенно), and not in any way (не помогать, не поощрять и не побуждать) any State, group of States or international organizations (производить) or otherwise (приобретать) any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. Article VI
(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting (в нарушение обязательств) deriving from the provisions of the Convention (может подать жалобу в Совет Безопасности ООН). Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as (просьбу о ее рассмотрении Советом Безопасности). c) Translate the final clauses of the Convention into Russian.
Article XI
Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XII
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Article XIII
(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIV
(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV
This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two. 4. Read the text paying special attention in the underlined words. Comment on the current problems facing the BWC implementation and ways to accelerate its universality.
PRACTICAL STEPS FOR ACCELERATING
BWC UNIVERSALITY
After 30 years, the membership of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) stands at 155. While this is a clear majority of the countries of the world, the BWC is lagging behind its closest counterpart, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with its 178 member states. The fact that membership of the BWC has not even doubled since the original call for universality at its First Review Conference in 1980 suggests that the time is ripe for the Sixth Review Conference in November/December 2006 to consider new approaches to achieving universality.
The issue of universality for all WMD treaties has increased in salience in recent years. Some treaties have adopted new approaches and reaped the benefits. The BWC, lacking any mechanism to conduct a sustained universality campaign, has been unable to do so. The Sixth BWC Review Conference presents an opportunity for States Parties to supplement the traditional approach with new mechanisms which could provide increased pressure on a sustained basis. Other treaties such as the CWC and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can provide useful experience.
The current situation
The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975 and by the end of that year had 64 member states. Achieving universality has been a long-stated aim of states parties and a concern of BWC review conferences since 1980, when the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, issued March 21, 1980, included the following: "The Conference notes with satisfaction that 81 States have ratified the Convention, 6 States have acceded to the Convention and a further 37 States have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention. The Conference calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States Parties thereto in the efforts to eliminate the risk of biological warfare."
Similar exhortations to signatory and non-signatory states were included in all subsequent final declarations. It has taken thirty years for membership to reach 155.
The table above shows how, since entering into force in 1997, the CWC has caught up with and overtaken the BWC in terms of ratifications, while the BWC has stagnated around the 150-mark. Of course, both the CWC and CTBT benefit from something that the BWC lacks, namely mechanisms (in both cases permanent secretariats) which can run intensive universality campaigns. In addition, the CWC incorporates positive and negative incentives for states to join the treaty in the form of access to technology and assistance and restrictions on transfers of chemicals to non-states parties.
The opportunity to establish a permanent organisation for the BWC has passed and is unlikely to return in the foreseeable future. The CWC and CTBT also benefit from having the UN Secretary-General as their depositary, which has made the formal requirements of ratifications and accessions by new members more straightforward than for the BWC, where the depositary duties are shared among the US, UK and Russian governments.
It appears that universality could be an issue on which the Sixth Review Conference might be able to agree action. Calling for universality is something which ought to be difficult to oppose, while the history of the BWC plus recent experience from other treaties demonstrates that a new approach is needed.
In 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted a Common Position, stating that it will "make specific efforts to convince States which have not yet adhered to or ratified the BWC to do so without delay". A Canadian non-paper in 2005 cited the "lack of universality" as one challenge facing the BWC and states that "States Parties should continue to push for the complete universalization of the BWC prior to the Sixth Review Conference." The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office envisages "agreement on practical strategies for universalisation of the Convention" in 2006. In February 2006, the EU adopted a Joint Action on the BWC, which stated that the Sixth Review Conference "will be a good opportunity to agree on specific, practical and realistic measures to strengthen both the BWC and compliance with it." It would appear then, that at least some BWC states parties are receptive to new thinking on universality.
5. Translate the text into English:
"Конвенция о запрещении разработки, производства и накопления запасов бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия и об их уничтожении" (1972г.) устанавливает следующие обязательства государств-участников: - никогда не разрабатывать, не производить, не накапливать и не сохранять микробиологические или другие биологические агенты или токсины, каково бы не было их происхождение или метод производства, таких видов и в таких количествах, которые не имеют назначения для профилактических, защитных или других мирных целей; оружие, оборудование или средства доставки, предназначенные для использования таких агентов или токсинов во враждебных целях или в вооруженных конфликтах (ст. I); - уничтожить или переключить на мирные цели все агенты, токсины, оружие, оборудование и средства доставки, указанные в статье I Конвенции, которыми оно обладает или которые находятся под его юрисдикцией или контролем (ст. II); - не передавать кому бы то ни было, ни прямо, ни косвенно, равно как и никоим образом не помогать, не поощрять и не побуждать какое-либо государство, группу государств или международные организации к производству или к приобретению каким-либо иным способом любых агентов, токсинов, оружия, оборудования или средств доставки, указанных в статье I Конвенции (ст. III); - в соответствии со своими конституционными процедурами принять необходимые меры по запрещению и предотвращению действий, указанных в статье I Конвенции, в пределах территории такого государства, под его юрисдикцией или под его контролем, где бы то ни было (ст. IV); - консультироваться и сотрудничать друг с другом в решении любых вопросов, которые могут возникнуть в отношении цели или в связи с выполнением положений Конвенции (ст. V); - подать жалобу в Совет Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций в случае, если государство-участник констатирует, что какое-либо другое государство-участник действует в нарушение обязательств, вытекающих из положений Конвенции, которая должна содержать все возможные доказательства, подтверждающие ее обоснованность (ст. VI); - предоставлять или поддерживать помощь в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций любому участнику Конвенции, который обратится с такой просьбой (ст. VII); - способствовать, возможно, самому полному обмену оборудованием, материалами, научной и технической информацией об использовании бактериологических (биологических) средств и токсинов в мирных целях (ст. X).
6. Render into English. Comment on Russia's efforts to implement the BWC
Конвенция о запрещении разработки, производства и накопления запасов бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия и об их уничтожении (КБТО)
Подписана 10 апреля 1972 года в Москве, Вашингтоне и Лондоне. Вступила в силу 26 марта 1975 года. Ратифицировали или присоединились 155 государств (СССР ратифицировал 26 марта 1975 года). Депозитариями Конвенции являются правительства России, Великобритании и США. Конвенция явилась первым многосторонним соглашением в области разоружения, запрещающим целый вид оружия массового уничтожения. Помимо запрета на разработку, производство и накопление биологического оружия участники Конвенции обязались не передавать его кому бы то ни было. Они обязались также уничтожить или переключить на мирные цели все запрещенные средства в течение 9 месяцев после вступления Конвенции в силу. На II и III Конференциях по рассмотрению действия КБТО (1986 и 1991 годы) были согласованы меры укрепления доверия, в соответствии с которыми ежегодно государства-участники представляют в ООН информацию о своей деятельности в биологической области. Поскольку Конвенция не предусматривает механизма контроля за ее соблюдением, с 1995 года по 2001 годы в Женеве проходили переговоры по разработке такого механизма в виде юридически обязывающего документа (Протокола). Абсолютное большинство стран активно поддерживали принятие Протокола. За это выступала и Россия. В результате создалась реальная возможность завершить работу над ним до конца 2001 года, что и предусматривалось мандатом переговоров. Однако на последней сессии переговоров (июль-август 2001 года) ввиду отсутствия консенсуса не удалось принять проект разработанного на переговорах Протокола. Вопрос о дальнейшем укреплении КБТО обсуждался на V Конференции по рассмотрению действия Конвенции (ноябрь-декабрь 2001 года, Женева). Из-за отсутствия единодушного согласия всех государств по вопросу о продолжении многосторонних переговоров по выработке юридически обязывающего документа Конференция была прервана. В ходе второй части V Конференции (ноябрь 2002 года) принято компромиссное решение, предусматривающее проведение в 2003-2005 годах ежегодных встреч государств - участников Конвенции и встреч экспертов для рассмотрения мер, содействующих ее соблюдению (а не создание контрольного механизма). На первой ежегодной встрече (10-14 ноября 2003 года) были обсуждены вопросы национальных законодательств в области КБТО, а также биобезопасности в контексте Конвенции. По итогам дискуссий согласован документ, отражающий общую точку зрения по существу обсуждавшихся вопросов. В ходе встречи Россия представила развернутые материалы о своем законодательстве и системе экспортного контроля в сфере КБТО. На второй ежегодной встрече (6-10 декабря 2004 года) рассмотрены вопросы о расследовании и реагировании на возможные случаи применения биооружия, а также тематика, связанная с предотвращением возникновения вспышек инфекционных заболеваний. Как и в 2003 году удалось выйти на итоговый документ, отражающий общее понимание по обсуждавшимся вопросам. В 2005 году обсуждалась возможность разработки кодексов поведения ученых-биологов. На прошедшей в июне встрече экспертов большинство стран высказалось за разработку этических норм поведения ученых-биологов. В принятом на ежегодной встрече в декабре итоговом документе признается полезность кодекса поведения ученых для укрепления запрета на биологическое оружие. Вопрос о дальнейшей работе по укреплению КБТО будет рассмотрен на ее VI Обзорной конференции в конце 2006 года. Предполагаем обсудить проблему подготовки к Конференции в рамках председательства России в "восьмерке". Важной мерой, способствующей предотвращению распространения биооружия, является универсализация КБТО. Россия выступает за скорейшее присоединение к ней тех стран, которые еще не сделали это. Россия принимает энергичные меры по укреплению Конвенции на национальном уровне. В 90-е годы у нас был принят ряд законов и нормативных актов, целью которых являлось исключение самой возможности проведения деятельности в ее нарушение. Среди них: указ Президента, в соответствии с которым на территории Российской Федерации не допускается разработка и выполнение биологических программ в нарушение Конвенции и осуществляется контроль за выполнением ее требований. В Уголовный кодекс введены дополнения, предусматривающие ответственность за деятельность, противоречащую Конвенции. Соответствующие дополнения внесены в Таможенный кодекс России. Был принят Закон об экспортном контроле. Рядом нормативных актов установлен жесткий контроль за экспортом возбудителей заболеваний человека, животных и растений, а также оборудования, имеющего "двойное" назначение. Введено государственное регулирование и контроль в области генно-инженерной деятельности. Существует система государственного лицензирования работ с опасными патогенами и токсинами. Контроль за обеспечением выполнения КБТО в Российской Федерации возложен на Федеральное агентство по промышленности. (МИД РФ)
VI. COMBATING TERRORISM
A. Read the text and answer the check-up questions.
Definition of terrorism
Few words are as politically or emotionally charged as terrorism. One 1998 study by the US Army found that over 100 definitions of the word "terrorism" have been used. For this reason, many news sources avoid using this term, opting instead for less accusatory words like "bombers", "militants", etc.
Among these definitions, several do not recognize the possibility of the legitimate use of violence by civilians against an invader in an occupied country, and would thus label all resistance movements as terrorist groups. Others make a distinction between lawful and unlawful use of violence. Ultimately, the distinction is a political judgment.
Reasons for controversy
The definition of terrorism is inherently controversial. The use of violence for the achievement of political ends is common to state and non-state groups. The difficulty is in agreeing on a basis for determining when the use of violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is legitimate.
The label "terrorist" is highly pejorative; it is a badge which denotes a lack of legitimacy and morality. For "terrorist" groups, it is important to be accepted as something other than a terrorist group. Groups that have described themselves as "terrorist" are therefore almost unknown. It is equally important for a group's opponents that the label "terrorist" be applied. The appellation "terrorist" is therefore always disputed, and attempts at defining the concept invariably arouse debate because rival definitions may be employed with a view to including the actions of certain parties, and excluding others, each of which will subjectively claim a legitimate basis for employing violence in pursuit of their own political cause or aim.
Definitions
Dictionaries
* The Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as "a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorising or condition of being terrorised."
* Webster's New International Dictionary defines terrorism as the "act of terrorizing, or state of being terrorized; specif.: a The system of the Reign of Terror. b A mode of governing, or of opposing government, by intimidation. c Any policy of intimidation.
* The definition of the term in the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (2nd edition) begins:
Term with no agreement amongst government or academic analysts, but almost invariably used in a pejorative sense, most frequently to describe life-threatening actions perpetrated by politically motivated self-appointed sub-state groups.
* The American Heritage Dictionary defines terrorism as "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons."
European Union
The European Union employs a definition of terrorism for legal/official purposes which is set out in Art. 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). This provides that terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious offences against persons and property which, "given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation." United Nations
* While the United Nations has not yet accepted a definition of terrorism, the UN's "academic consensus definition," written by terrorism expert A.P. Schmid and widely used by social scientists, runs:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought," (Schmid, 1988).
* UN short legal definition, also proposed by A.P. Schmid: an act of terrorism is the "peacetime equivalent of a war crime."
* In November 2004, a UN panel described terrorism as any act: "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."
1. What makes terrorism so hard to define?
2. What definitions are employed by the European Union and the United Nations?
B. Read and translate the section on terrorism from the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report. Pay special attention to the underlined words.
Terrorism
A. The threat we face
145. Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.
Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order.
146. Two new dynamics give the terrorist threat greater urgency. Al-Qaida is the first instance - not likely to be the last - of an armed non-state network with global reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against more than 10 Member States on four continents in the past five years have demonstrated that Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has singled out the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as one of its enemies. Second, the threat that terrorists - of whatever type, with whatever motivation - will seek to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented dangers. Our recommendations provided above on controlling the supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust global public health systems are central to a strategy to prevent this threat.
B. Meeting the challenge of prevention
1. A comprehensive strategy
147. Throughout the Panel's regional consultations, it heard concerns from Governments and civil society organizations that the current "war on terrorism" has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists target: human rights and the rule of law. Most of those who expressed such concerns did not question the seriousness of the terrorist threat and acknowledged that the right to life is the most fundamental of human rights. They did, however, express fears that approaches to terror focusing wholly on military, police and intelligence measures risk undermining efforts to promote good governance and human rights, alienate large parts of the world's population and thereby weaken the potential for collective action against terrorism. The crucial need, in relation to the States in the regions from which terrorists originate, is to address not only their capacity but their will to fight terror. To develop that will - with States drawing support rather than opposition from their own publics - requires a broader-based approach.
148. A thread that runs through all such concerns is the imperative to develop a global strategy of fighting terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsible States and the rule of law and fundamental human rights. What is required is a comprehensive strategy that incorporates but is broader than coercive measures. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote such a comprehensive strategy, which includes:
(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse. All of the strategies discussed above for preventing other threats have secondary benefits in working to remove some of the causes or facilitators of terrorism;
(b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate. One recent innovation by UNDP, the Arab Human Development Report, has helped catalyse a wide ranging debate within the Middle East on the need for gender empowerment, political freedom, rule of law and civil liberties;
(c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls;
(d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations;
(e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.
2. Better counter-terrorism instruments
149. Several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important normative foundations.
However, far too many States remain outside the conventions and not all countries ratifying the conventions proceed to adopt internal enforcement measures. Also, attempts to address the problem of terrorist financing have been inadequate. While in the three months after 11 September 2001 $112 million in alleged terrorist funds were frozen, only $24 million were frozen in the two years that followed. Seized funds represent only a small fraction of total funds available to terrorist organizations. While many States have insufficient antimoney-laundering laws and technical capacity, the evasion techniques of terrorists are highly developed and many terrorist funds have a lega1 origin and are hard to regulate.
150. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers.
151. The Security Council has played an important role in filling gaps in counter-terrorism strategy. Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has attempted to weaken State support for and strengthen State resistance to terrorism.
From 1992 onwards, the Security Council applied sanctions against individuals and States that supported terrorism - including, in 1999 and 2000, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The initial response by the Security Council to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was swift and impressive. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) imposed uniform, mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on all States and established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor compliance and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States.
152. However, the Security Council must proceed with caution. The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists.
153. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work of its Counter - Terrorism Committee have played an important role in ending the support of some States for terrorism and mobilizing other States in the fight against it. However,
Council sanctions against Al-Qaida and Taliban suffer from lagging support and implementation by Member States and affect only a small subset of known Al-Qaida operatives, while a number of States are lagging behind in their compliance with the directives of the Counter-Terrorism \ Committee. We believe that further action is needed to achieve full implementation of these directives.
3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism
154. Because United Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support, States seeking operational support for counter-terrorism activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance. A United Nations capacity to facilitate this assistance would in some instances ease domestic political constraints, and this can be achieved by providing for the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to perform this function.
155. Non-compliance can be a matter of insufficient will but is more frequently a function of lack of capacity. United Nations Member States and specialized bodies should increase their efforts to provide States with access to effective legal, administrative and police tools to prevent terrorism. To aid this process, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.
156. If confronted by States that have the capacity to undertake their obligations but repeatedly fail to do so, the Security Council may need to take additional measures to ensure compliance, and should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance.
4. Defining terrorism
157. The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism. This prevents the United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes. 158. Since 1945, an ever stronger set of norms and laws - including the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court - has regulated and constrained States' decisions to use force and their conduct in war - for example in the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to use force proportionally and to live up to basic humanitarian principles. Violations of these obligations should continue to be met with widespread condemnation and war crimes should be prosecuted.
159. The norms governing the use of force by non -State actors have not kept pace with those pertaining to States. This is not so much a legal question as a political one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12 international counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes. Legal scholars know this, but there is a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and little-known provisions of other treaties and the compelling normative framework, understood by all, that should surround the question of terrorism. The United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non -State use of force as it has concerning State use of force. Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political imperative.
160. The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The first is the argument that any definition should include States' use of armed forces against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework against State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors and we do not find this objection to be compelling. The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. The right to resistance is contested by some. But it is not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.
161. Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the strong, dear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of force must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority surrounding non -State use of force. Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians and non-combatants must be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all.
162. We welcome the recent passage of Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), which includes several measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism.
163. Nevertheless, we believe there is particular value in achieving a consensus definition within the General Assembly, given its unique legitimacy in normative terms, and that it should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism.
164. That definition of terrorism should include the following elements:
(a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity;
(b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;
(с) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566(2004);
(d) Description of terrorism as "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".
С. Read the text and comment on the legal instruments the international community has elaborated and the special bodies it has set up to prevent and combat terrorism.
Implementing international action against terrorism
Terrorism has been of concern to the international community since 1937 when the League of Nations elaborated the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Subsequently, the United Nations and regional inter-governmental organizations have dealt with terrorism from a legal and political perspective. Since 1963, the international community has elaborated universal legal instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism. The most recent, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opens for signature on 14 September 2005.
In addition, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have adopted several resolutions pertaining to terrorism. In particular, and in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Security adopted resolution 1373 (2001) on 28 September (2001) which declared that:
"... acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations". It called upon Member States to "become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols" and "to increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols ".
This resolution also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the implementation of the resolution by all States and increase the capability of States to fight terrorism, including bringing Member States to an acceptable level of compliance with the terrorism-related conventions and protocols. The CTC has since become the United Nations' leading body to promote collective action against international terrorism. In restructuring the CTC, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) has been established as a special political mission for an initial period ending on 31 December 2007. It is headed by an Executive Director, Ambassador Javier Ruperez, appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The Role of UNODC in the Prevention of Terrorism
In the context of the UN's efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has an expanded programme of work for technical assistance to counter terrorism that is based on mandates recommended by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and approved by the General Assembly. These mandates, carried out by UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) within the Division for Treaty Affairs (DTA), include the provision of technical assistance and advisory services to countries in their fight against terrorism. As a consequence, UNODC's operational activities focus on strengthening the legal regime against terrorism. This involves providing legislative assistance to countries, which enables them to become parties to, and implement, the universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).
A detailed description of UNODC's activities may be found in the Report of the Secretary-General "Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime" submitted to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its fourteenth session. Overall then, UNODC aims at responding promptly and efficiently to requests for counter-terrorism assistance, in accordance with the priorities set by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the CTC by:
* Reviewing domestic legislation and providing advice on drafting new laws;
* Providing in-depth assistance on the ratification and implementation of new legislation against terrorism through a mentorship programme or other follow-up action; and
* Facilitating and providing training to national criminal justice systems with regard to the practical implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism.
D. 1. Translate the text into Russian paying special attention to the underlined words.
CONVENTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM
There are 12 universal conventions and protocols against terrorism, which have been developed under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, open to participation by all Member States. Recently, a thirteenth instrument, The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism has been adopted by the General Assembly and opens for signature on September 14, 2005. UN Security Council resolutions, passed both before and after recent terrorist attacks, have called upon Member States to ratify these international instruments and to fully implement them through passage of the domestic legislation necessary to fulfil obligations imposed by the conventions. These conventions and protocols have been negotiated from 1963. Most are penal in nature with a common format. Typically the instruments:
1) Define a particular type of terrorist violence as an offence under the convention, such as seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or violence;
2) Require State Parties to penalize that activity in their domestic law;
3) Identify certain bases upon which the Parties responsible are required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offence, such as registration, territoriality or nationality;
4) Create an obligation on the State in which a suspect is found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence and to refer the offence for prosecution if the Party does not extradite pursuant to other provisions of the convention. This last element is commonly known as the principle of "no safe haven for terrorists". It has been stressed by the Security Council in Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, as an essential anti-terrorism obligation of Member States.
There are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism. But many states are not yet party to these legal instruments, or are not yet implementing them.
In addition to these treaties, other instruments may be relevant to particular circumstances, such as bilateral extradition treaties, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Moreover, there are now a number of important UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on international terrorism, dealing with specific incidents.
The following list identifies the major terrorism conventions and protocols and provides a brief summary of some of the major terms of each instrument. In addition to the provisions summarized below, most of these conventions provide that parties must establish criminal jurisdiction over offenders (e.g., the state(s) where the offence takes place, or in some cases the state of nationality of the perpetrator or victim).
1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention", 1963 - safety of aviation):
* applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;
* authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, when necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft;
* requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ("Hague Convention", 1970 - aircraft hijackings):
* makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight [to] "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so;
* requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties;"
* requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
* requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the convention.
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention", 1971 - applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight):
* makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; and to attempt such acts or be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;
* requires parties to the convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties;"
* requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973 - outlaws attacks on senior government officials and diplomats):
* defines internationally protected person as a Head of State, a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a representative or official of a state or of an international organization who is entitled to special protection from attack under international law;
* requires each party to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature," the intentional murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an accomplice;"
5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages Convention", 1979):
* provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention;"
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear Materials Convention", 1980 - combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material):
* criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, etc., of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage;
7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety), (1988):
* extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (1988 - applies to terrorist activities on ships):
* establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation; * makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships;
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988-applies to terrorist activities on fixed offshore platforms):
* establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation;
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991 - provides for chemical marking to facilitate detection of plastic explosives, e.g., to combat aircraft sabotage):
* designed to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing); * parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked" plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain one of the detection agents described in the Technical Annex to the treaty; * generally speaking, each party must, among other things: take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry-into-force of the convention; ensure that all stocks of such unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police, are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date-of-entry into force of the convention for that state.
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997): (UN General Assembly Resolution)
* creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place;
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999):
* requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, though groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gun running; * commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts; * provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other states on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy will no longer be justification for refusing to cooperate.
Active Vocabulary
1.to commit a terrorist act
syn.: to performсовершить террористический актto commit a terrorist act involving radioactive material or nuclear devicesсовершить террористический акт с использованием ядерного материала и других радиоактивных веществ2.to abstain from doing a terrorist act
syn.: to refrain from doingвоздержаться от совершения террористического акта3.to confront terrorism
syn.: to fight
to counter
to combatбороться с терроризмом4.to condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestationsосуждать терроризм во всех его формах и проявлениях
* * *
5.to cause death or serious bodily injuryпричинять смерть или серьезные увечьяto cause environmental or property damageнанести ущерб окружающей среде или собственности6.to endanger the safety of an aircraftставить под угрозу безопасность самолета7.to allocate funds for terrorist activitiesвыделять средства на террористическую деятельность8.to constitute a crime against humanityпредставлять собой преступления против человечности9.to compel a government to do any actsвынудить государство совершать какие-либо действия10.to intimidate populationзапугивать население11.to jeopardize friendly relationsставить под угрозу дружественные отношения12. to hamper international cooperation in technologyпрепятствовать международному сотрудничеству в области технологий
* * *
13.to adopt enforcement measures
syn.: to impose
to takeпринимать меры по обеспечению соблюдения (законов)14. to impose obligations on statesналагать обязательства на государствato impose sanctions syn.: to applyналагать санкции15.to establish a legal regimeустановить правовой режимto establish jurisdiction over offendersустановить подсудность правонарушителей16.to prosecute terroristsпреследовать террористов в судебном порядке17.to hold a person liable for a terrorist actсчитать кого-либо виновным за совершение террористического акта18.to penalize offences
syn.: to make offences punishable by appropriate penaltiesвнести правонарушения в разряд наказуемых19.to criminalize acts of terrorismвнести теракты в разряд противозаконных20.to deny terrorists access to nuclear materialsотказать террористам в доступе к ядерным материалам21.to extradite terrorists to their home countriesвыдавать террористов на родину22.to take custody of offendersарестовать нарушителейto have custody of offendersдержать нарушителей под арестом23.to submit the case for prosecutionпредставить дело для судебного обвинения
* * *
24.to exercise control over explosivesосуществлять контроль за взрывчатыми веществами25.to be entitled to special protection from attack under international lawпользоваться особой защитой от нападения в соответствии с международным правом26.to live up to basic humanitarian principlesсоответствовать основным гуманитарным принципам27.to seek support for counter-terrorism activitiesстремиться получить поддержку антитеррористической деятельности
27.to seek support for counter-terrorism activitiesстремиться получить поддержку антитеррористической деятельности28.to agree on an anti-terrorism conventionсогласовать антитеррористическую конвенциюto elaborate a counter-terrorism convention
syn.: to draftразработать антитеррористическую конвенцию
* * *
29.offender syn.: perpetratorправонарушитель30. accompliceсообщник31.non-state actorsнегосударственные субъекты32.counter-terrorism assistanceоказание помощи в борьбе с терроризмом33.contrary to the purposes and principles of the UNпротиворечащий целям и принципам ООН34.resolutions pertaining to terrorism
syn.: terrorism - related resolutionsрезолюции, относящиеся к терроризму35.civilians
syn.: non-combatantsгражданские лица36.antimoney-laundering lawsзаконы об отмывании денег
* * *
Convention against the taking of hostagesКонвенция по борьбе с захватом заложниковConvention for the Suppression of Terrorist BombingКонвенция по борьбе с бомбовым терроризмомConvention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of AircraftКонвенция по борьбе с угоном воздушных судовConvention for the Suppression of the Financing of TerrorismКонвенция по борьбе с финансированием терроризмаUN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)Управление по наркотикам и преступности в рамках ООНCounter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)Контртеррористический Комитет 1. Translate the following expressions with the word "legal" into Russian:
* to ratify and implement legal instruments against terrorism;
* to establish a legal regime applicable to acts against international aviation;
* to provide a legal basis for international cooperation;
* to strengthen the international legal framework to combat terrorism;
* multilateral legal provisions that address terrorist attacks.
2. Fill in the gaps with suitable prepositions and translate the sentences into Russian:
1. The Security Council applied sanctions ........... individuals and states that supported terrorism which resulted ........... agreeing ........... an Anti-Terrorist Convention.
2. International Convention ........... the Suppression ........... the Financing ........... Terrorism provides ........... the freezing and seizure ........... funds allocated ........... terrorist activities.
3. The Heads ........... States are convinced ........... the need to enhance international cooperation ........... States ........... adopting effective measures ........... the prevention ........... acts ........... terrorism and ........... the prosecution and punishment ........... their perpetrators. 4. Terrorism is described ........... an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury ........... civilians or non-combatants ........... the purpose ........... intimidating a population.
5. The act was committed ........... the aim ........... compelling an international organization to abstain ........... performing any act.
6. This resolution pertaining ........... terrorism declared that methods ........... terrorism are contrary ........... the new purposes and principles.
7. The key element ........... the anti-terrorism campaign is to deny terrorists access ........... nuclear materials.
8. Internationally protected persons are entitled ........... special protection ........... 9. Most ........... these conventions provide that parties must establish criminal jurisdiction ........... offenders.
10. This Convention commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally liable ........... such acts.
11. To regulate their conduct in war the states are required to live ........... basic humanitarian principles.
12. Counter-terrorist obligations imposed ........... the Security Council ........... all States are uniform and mandatory.
13. ........... the Convention ........... the Suppression ........... Terrorist Bombing each party exercises strict and effective control ........... manufacture and transfer ........... explosives that can cause destruction ........... the public place.
14. Prevention ........... proliferation ........... nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation ........... materials, equipment and technology ........... peaceful purposes.
15. Terrorism, committed ........... whomever, was condemned ........... all its forms and manifestations as one of the most serious threats ........... international peace.
3. Translate the text into English in writing. Make use of the following words and word combination:
multilateral; legal instruments; convention against the taking of hostages; convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (of terrorist bombings, of the financing of terrorism); the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
Борьба с терроризмом
Организация Объединенных Наций создала юридический механизм для борьбы с международным терроризмом. Под эгидой Организации Объединенных Наций были проведены переговоры, приведшие к принятию 13 глобальных международно-правовых документов, в том числе договоров о борьбе с захватом заложников, угоном воздушных судов, бомбовым терроризмом, финансированием терроризма, к которым недавно добавилась договоренность о предотвращении ядерного терроризма. По состоянию на июнь 2005 года все эти документы были ратифицированы 63 странами. Готовится текст новой всеобъемлющей конвенции против терроризма. Контртеррористический комитет Организации Объединенных Наций осуществляет надзор за тем, как страны соблюдают обязательства, взятые после террористических нападений 11 сентября 2001 года, и координирует сотрудничество в области борьбы с терроризмом. Управление по наркотикам и преступности и другие учреждения Организации Объединенных Наций оказали помощь более чем 100 странам в целях укрепления их возможностей бороться с терроризмом.
E. 1. Translate the text into Russian
a)
UN Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Convention; Treaty Seven Years in the Making The UN General Assembly April 13 adopted an international convention addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, bringing an end to more than seven years of negotiations on the document. The treaty criminalizes the possession, use, or threat of use of radioactive devices by nonstate actors, their accomplices, and organizers "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury" or environmental or property damage.
Originally proposed by Russia in 1998 and entrusted to the oversight of an ad hoc committee established to tackle the issue of international terrorism, the convention, titled the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, is now the 13th such UN legal instrument on terrorism and the first concluded since Sept. 11, 2001. It was adopted by consensus and will open for signature Sept. 14 during the 60th Anniversary Summit of the United Nations. It will enter into force after 22 governments have ratified it.
Beyond criminalizing acts of nuclear terrorism, the convention also will require governments either to prosecute terrorist suspects in domestic courts or extradite them to their home countries. It further encourages increased exchanges of information and greater cooperation between countries in the pursuit of terrorist suspects.
In a brief mention of preventative nuclear security measures, the treaty urges states to ensure the protection of radioactive materials, "taking into account" recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The convention also classifies as a punishable offense any attacks on nuclear facilities that could risk the release of radioactive material. Although widely welcomed as an important contribution to the international legal framework governing terrorism and nuclear security, the agreed treaty text does not represent as ambitious a document as some nations had hoped. In an April 1 news conference, Albert Hoffman, the South African coordinator of the negotiations, said that a number of proposals were ultimately excluded from the treaty's scope so as to facilitate its universal adoption.
According to Hoffman, some delegations had expressed concern that the convention exempts military activities and personnel from prosecution for similar offenses as those articulated in the treaty. Other delegations would have liked to see the treaty protect against acts of terrorism committed by state actors involving nuclear weapons or materials. The final convention does not address state use of nuclear weapons.
States were also unable to reach consensus on a definition of terrorism, one of the key points of contention prolonging the negotiations, which was ultimately left out of the final convention. A recent report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, released late March 2005, proposed to define terrorism as "any action...intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."
Annan's report, entitled "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All," also called for UN General Assembly approval of the nuclear terrorism convention and for "consolidating, securing and, when possible, eliminating hazardous materials and implementing effective export controls" as key elements of a strategy to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials.
Congratulating the General Assembly on its approval of a convention that represents "a vital step forward on multilateral efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism," Annan also urged states to finalize a draft comprehensive legal instrument addressing international terrorism. This broader convention, however, will have to revisit the problem of reconciling differing states' views on a definition of terrorism.
b) Suggest the Russian for:
to criminalize the possession or use of radioactive devices; to be entrusted to the oversight of an ad hoc committee; to prosecute terrorist suspects in domestic courts; to extradite sb; the pursuit of terrorist suspects; a punishable offense; the release of radioactive material; to facilitate universal adoption; to exempt from prosecution; civilians or non-combatants; to eliminate hazardous materials; to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials; to revisit the problem; to reconcile differing views.
c) Find the English for:
негосударственные субъекты; причинить смерть или серьезные увечья; нанести существенный ущерб собственности или окружающей среде; решать проблему; правовой документ; совершить теракт; применить ядерное оружие вооруженными силами государств; определение терроризма; спорный вопрос; запугивать; вынудить государство совершить какие-либо действия.
2. Translate the Preamble and the articles of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism into Russian. Pay special attention to the underlined words. The States Parties to this Convention,
Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States,
Recalling the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations of 24 October 1995, Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy,
Bearing in mind the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980,
Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which, inter alia, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States,
Noting that the Declaration also encouraged States to review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed thereto,
Recalling also that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/210, an ad hoc committee was established to elaborate, inter alia, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism to supplement related existing international instruments,
Noting that acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security,
Noting also that existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks,
Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of such acts of terrorism and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators,
Noting that the activities of military forces of States are governed by rules of international law outside of the framework of this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other laws, Have agreed as follows:
Article 2
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment,
(b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or
(iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person
(a) Threatens, under circumstances which indicate the credibility of the threat, to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article; or
(b) Demands unlawfully and intentionally radioactive material, a device or a nuclear facility by threat, under circumstances which indicate the credibility of the threat, or by use of force.
3. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article.
4. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or
(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned. Article 5
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a) To establish as criminal offences under its national law the offences set forth in article 2;
(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of these offences.
Article 10
1. Upon receiving information that an offence set forth in article 2 has been committed or is being committed in the territory of a State or that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed such an offence may be present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its national law to investigate the facts contained in the information.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the state in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its national law so as to ensure that person's presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.
3. Translate the final clauses of the Convention into English.
Статья 21
Государства-участники выполняют свои обязательства по настоящей Конвенции таким образом, чтобы это отвечало принципам суверенного равенства и территориальной целостности государств и принципу невмешательства во внутренние дела других государств.
Статья 24
1. Настоящая Конвенция открыта для подписания всеми государствами с 14 сентября 2005 года по 31 декабря 2006 года в Центральных учреждениях Организации Объединенных Наций в Нью-Йорке.
2. Настоящая Конвенция подлежит ратификации, принятию или утверждению. Ратификационные грамоты или документы о принятии или утверждении сдаются на хранение Генеральному секретарю Организации Объединенных Наций.
3. Настоящая Конвенция открыта для присоединения любого государства. Документы о присоединении сдаются на хранение Генеральному секретарю Организации Объединенных Наций.
Статья 25
1. Настоящая Конвенция вступает в силу на тридцатый день после сдачи на хранение Генеральному секретарю Организации Объединенных Наций двадцать второй ратификационной грамоты или документа о принятии, утверждении или присоединении.
Статья 26
1. Государство-участник может предлагать поправки к настоящей Конвенции. Предлагаемые поправки представляются депозитарию, который незамедлительно направляет их всем государствам-участникам.
2. По получении просьбы большинства государств-участников о созыве конференции для рассмотрения предлагаемых поправок депозитарий приглашает все государства-участники принять участие в такой конференции, которая проводится не ранее чем через три месяца после направления приглашений.
3. Участники конференции делают все возможное для принятия поправок консенсусом. Если это оказывается невозможным, поправки принимаются большинством в две трети голосов всех государств-участников. Депозитарий незамедлительно рассылает любые принятые на конференции поправки всем государствам-членам.
Статья 27
1. Любое государство-участник может денонсировать настоящую Конвенцию путем письменного уведомления Генерального секретаря Организации Объединенных Наций.
2. Денонсация вступает в силу по истечении одного года с даты получения уведомления Генеральным секретарем Организации Объединенных Наций.
Статья 28
Подлинник настоящей Конвенции, тексты которой на английском, арабском, испанском, китайском, русском и французском языках являются равно аутентичными, сдается на хранение Генеральному секретарю Организации Объединенных Наций, который рассылает заверенные копии настоящей Конвенции всем государствам.
В УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЧЕГО нижеподписавшиеся, должным образом на то уполномоченные своими соответствующими правительствами, подписали настоящую Конвенцию, открытую для подписания в Центральных учреждениях Организации Объединенных Наций в Нью-Йорке 14 сентября 2005 года.
4. a) Translate the text into English in writing
Проект конвенции был внесен Москвой еще в 1997 году. Целью документа является предотвращение терактов с использованием самодельных ядерных устройств. Согласно документу, преступлением является незаконное владение радиоактивным материалом или устройством с намерением причинить смерть или серьезные увечья, нанести существенный ущерб собственности или окружающей среде, а также вынудить физическое или юридическое лицо, международную организацию или государство совершить какое-либо действие или воздержаться от него.
В конвенции детально прописан механизм сотрудничества государств по предотвращению актов ядерного терроризма. В то же время документ не охватывает полностью вопрос применения или угрозы применения ядерного оружия вооруженными силами государств.
Конвенция устанавливает ответственность лиц, виновных в совершении актов ядерного терроризма, на основе принципа "выдай либо суди". Она также включает в себя механизм возвращения похищенных радиоактивных материалов, ядерных устройств или веществ.
Генеральная ассамблея ООН приняла конвенцию 13 апреля 2005 года.
b) Translate the text into Russian
US Department of State
Press Statement
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
The United States welcomes the UN General Assembly's unanimous adoption April 13 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Along with the twelve existing international terrorism conventions and protocols, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention will strengthen the international legal framework to combat terrorism. The Convention will provide a legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit terrorist acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device.
President Bush and Russian President Putin called for early adoption of this Convention in their February 24 joint statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation. The United States is pleased that United Nations Member States have demonstrated a seriousness of purpose and worked together in a multilateral setting to conclude the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. It is the first counter-terrorism convention adopted by the General Assembly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We call on Member States to build on the success of this effort and to work cooperatively to conclude the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. With the adoption by consensus today of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the United Nations has sent an undeniably clear signal that the international community will not tolerate those who threaten or commit terrorist acts involving radioactive material or nuclear devices.
c) Translate into English.
Заявление Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова в связи с принятием Международной конвенции о борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма
1 апреля в Нью-Йорке Спецкомитет Генассамблеи ООН завершил работу над проектом Международной конвенции о борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма. Конвенция стала первым договором, принятым в ООН по инициативе России. Впервые антитеррористическая Конвенция разработана международным сообществом на упреждение, то есть до совершения террористических актов с использованием ядерного материала и других радиоактивных веществ. И вообще, это первый универсальный договор, направленный на предотвращение террористических актов массового поражения.
В условиях, когда "Аль-Каида" и другие террористические структуры стремятся к обладанию ядерным потенциалом, принятие такого договора имеет исключительно важное значение, прежде всего для поддержания международного мира и безопасности.
Если говорить о содержательной характеристике Конвенции, то она, в первую очередь, нацелена на то, чтобы:
- подвести правовую базу под эффективное противодействие актам ядерного терроризма, включая их пресечение и ликвидацию последствий;
- обеспечить антитеррористическую защиту как мирного, так и военного атома, пресечь теракты с использованием самодельных ядерных устройств;
- обеспечить неотвратимость ответственности лиц, виновных в совершении актов ядерного терроризма, на основе принципа "либо выдай, либо суди".
Принятие Конвенции увенчало сложный переговорный процесс, растянувшийся почти на восемь лет. Мы благодарны всем странам, которые проявили понимание важности вопросов, регулируемых Конвенцией, и пошли на весьма непростые для них компромиссы. Это позволило выйти на консенсусное принятие указанного договора, что особенно важно.
Убежден, новая Конвенция будет способствовать сплочению государств в борьбе с вызовами, которые террористы бросают нашей цивилизации. Ее принятие открывает дополнительные возможности для наращивания антитеррористического взаимодействия под эгидой ООН, включая скорейшее согласование проекта Всеобъемлющей конвенции о международном терроризме, инициированного Индией.
В ближайшие дни Конвенция будет принята Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН. Имеется в виду открыть ее для подписания во время "саммита-2005" - встречи лидеров государств-членов ООН в Нью-Йорке, приуроченной к 60-летию этой Организации.
F
1. Translate the text into Russian paying special attention to the underlined words.
Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and Non-State Trafficking
On April 28, 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The text of UNSC 1540 does not use the term "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) in any operational sense. Nor does it rely on any definition of "terrorist" for the purposes of implementation. But the resolution was conceived and received as enforceable international law designed to counter the threat of terrorist acquisition of WMD. The resolution evolved from a primarily counter-proliferation initiative to a more focused code of conduct that the permanent five (P-5) members of the Security Council could agree to, and then, through a process involving other states and civil society, to a binding legal instrument that can be portrayed as reinforcing not only nonproliferation but disarmament norms in relation to nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons.
With the inclusion of regime-based norms and because most states view terrorist access to NBC weapons as a salient and urgent global concern, UNSC 1540 has been generally well received. Participation in the universal reporting process has been rather positive, despite its novelty and complexity. Implementation of this resolution - which includes the enacting of enforceable domestic legislation as well as national reporting - will require an interactive cooperative process between states and the committee established by the resolution (dubbed the "1540 Committee"). Early signs of qualitative progress in this direction are visible. States are actively seeking advice on implementation and reporting requirements. The level of cooperation among states and between states and the 1540 Committee has been high, and states that had not previously done so have begun to consider their own export controls and how to improve them. These developments could be the first steps towards an effective multilateral approach to preventing non-state access to NBC weapons. Reception and implementation of UNSC, however, have not been without complications. The highly political nature of the WMD and terrorism issues - separately and together - combined with the negotiating history of UNSC 1540 have sparked controversy and resulted in some suspicion of its means of enforcement even where there is agreement with its ends. Even before the open Security Council debate on April 22, 2004, states and NGOs had the opportunity for input through an officially closed but informally transparent negotiating process. Throughout the negotiations in late 2003 and early 2004 states and observers voiced concerns about such matters as whether the Security Council was taking on a legislative role, whether the resolution would legitimise selective state possession of WMD weapons, and why multilateral disarmament obligations were not mentioned.
Many of the concerns raised during this time were addressed in the final version of the resolution but some distrust remained. This distrust might in fact reflect dissatisfaction with the process rather than the outcome, suggesting that, wherever possible, transparency and confidence-building will be essential for large-scale, engaged and effective implementation of UNSC 1540.
Key elements of UNSC 1540
Security Council enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are formally invoked and applied to all operative paragraphs of UNSC 1540. The first three operative paragraphs of UNSC 1540 use the language "all states shall", thereby creating enforceable legally binding obligations on states. The remaining elements of the resolution carry politically binding implications in that they advocate principles and establish mechanisms for cooperative implementation. The key elements of the resolution are:
1. No state support for non-state efforts to access NBC weapons 2. National legislation to prohibit non-state access to NBC weapons 3. Adoption and enforcement of effective domestic controls to prevent NBC weapons proliferation 4. Establishment of an implementation committee, and first reports from states on implementation steps and plans due within six months 5. Preservation of existing treaty obligations 6. A call for national control lists 7. Assistance in implementing the resolution 8. A call for universal adoption and full implementation and strengthening of NBC related treaties 9. Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation 10. Cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in NBC materials and means of delivery 2. Replace the words in brackets with their English equivalents
Resolution 1540 (2004)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004
The Security Council,
(подтверждая) that (распространение) of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as (средства его доставки), constitutes a threat to international peace and security, (вновь подтверждая), in this context, the Statement of its (Председателя) adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States (выполнять свои обязательства в области контроля над вооружениями и разоружения) and, (по предотвращению распространения) in all its aspects of all (видов оружия массового уничтожения),
(ссылаясь также на то,) that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context (угрожающие или подрывающие региональную и глобальную стабильность),
(подтверждая) its (решимость) to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, (в соответствии с) its primary responsibilities, (предусмотренными) in the United Nations Charter,
(подтверждая) its support for (многосторонние договоры) whose aim is (ликвидация или предотвращение) of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order (содействовать международной стабильности),
(приветствуя) efforts in this context by (многосторонние договоренности) which contribute to non-proliferation,
(подтверждая) that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not (препятствовать международному сотрудничеству) in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as (прикрытие для распространения),
(будучи серьезно обеспокоен) by the threat of terrorism and the risk that (негосударственные субъекты) such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may (приобретать, разрабатывать, осуществлять оборот или применять) nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,
(будучи серьезно обеспокоен) by the threat of (незаконного оборота) in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also (создает угрозу) to international peace and security, (признавая) the need (улучшения координации) of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels ( с целью усиления глобального ответа) to this serious challenge and threat to international security,
(признавая) that most States (взяли на себя юридические обязательства) under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by (Кодекс поведения МАГАТЭ) on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,
(признавая далее) the urgent need for all States (принятия дополнительных эффективных мер) to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, (призывая) all Member States (полностью выполнять) the disarmament treaties and agreements (участниками которых они являются),
(вновь подтверждая) the need (бороться) by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
(будучи преисполнен решимости) (способствовать) henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, (действуя на основании главы VII) of the Charter of the United Nations,
3. Translate into English. 1. постановляет, что все государства воздерживаются от оказания в любой форме поддержки негосударственным субъектам, которые пытаются разрабатывать, приобретать, производить, обладать, перевозить, передавать или применять ядерное, химическое или биологическое оружие и средства его доставки;
2. постановляет также, что все государства в соответствии со своими национальными процедурами принимают и эффективно применяют соответствующие законы, запрещающие любому негосударственному субъекту производить, приобретать, обладать, разрабатывать, перевозить, передавать или применять ядерное, химическое или биологическое оружие и средства его доставки, в особенности в террористических целях, равно как и попытки участвовать в любых из вышеупомянутых действий, участвовать в них в качестве сообщника, оказывать им помощь или финансирование;
3. постановляет также, что все государства принимают и применяют эффективные меры в целях установления национального контроля для предотвращения распространения ядерного, химического или биологического оружия и средств его доставки, в том числе посредством установления надлежащего контроля над относящимися к ним материалами;
5. постановляет, что никакие обязательства по настоящей резолюции не должны толковаться как противоречащие или изменяющие права и обязательства государств - участников Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Конвенции о запрещении химического оружия и Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия, или меняющие сферу ответственности Международного агентства по атомной энергии или Организации по запрещению химического оружия;
6. признает практическую значимость для выполнения настоящей резолюции эффективных национальных контрольных списков и призывает все государства-члены, в случае необходимости, стремиться к скорейшей разработке таких списков;
8. призывает все государства:
а) способствовать всеобщему принятию, полному выполнению и, в случае необходимости, укреплению многосторонних договоров, участниками которых они являются, нацеленных на предотвращение распространения ядерного, биологического или химического оружия;
b) принимать на национальном уровне, где это еще не сделано, правила и нормативные акты, обеспечивающие соблюдение обязательств по ключевым многосторонним договорам в области нераспространения;
c) подтвердить и реализовывать на практике свою приверженность делу многостороннего сотрудничества, в частности в рамках Международного агентства по атомной энергии, Организации по запрещению химического оружия и Конвенции о запрещении разработки, производства и накопления запасов бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия и об их уничтожении, являющихся важными средствами продвижения и достижения их общих целей в области нераспространения и содействия международному сотрудничеству в мирных целях;
d) разработать надлежащие методы работы с промышленными и общественными кругами и их информирования относительно обязательств, вытекающих из таких законов;
9. призывает все государства содействовать диалогу и сотрудничеству в области нераспространения с тем, чтобы противостоять угрозе распространения ядерного, химического или биологического оружия и средств его доставки;
10. призывает далее все государства в целях противодействия этой угрозе в соответствии с их национальными системами правового регулирования и законодательством и в соответствии с международным правом предпринимать совместные действия для предотвращения незаконного оборота ядерного, химического или биологического оружия, средств его доставки и относящихся к ним материалов;
11. выражает свое намерение тщательно следить за ходом выполнения настоящей резолюции и принимать на надлежащем уровне дальнейшие решения, которые могут потребоваться для этой цели;
12. постановляет продолжать заниматься этим вопросом.
G. 1. Translate the text into Russian. Comment on the role of DDA in combating terrorism.
Terrorism and Disarmament
The role of the Department for Disarmament Affairs
The Secretary-General, in his address to the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security held in Madrid in March 2005, declared that terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples and that the United Nations must be at the forefront in fighting against it. In its Outcome Document, adopted 13 September 2005, the 2005 World Summit condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and acknowledged the important role played by the United Nations in combating it. The World Summit also stressed the vital contribution of regional and bilateral cooperation, particularly at the practical levels of law enforcement cooperation and technical exchange. The Outcome Document went on to urge the United Nations, to assist States in building national and regional capacity to combat terrorism and invited the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the General Assembly and the Security Council to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of United Nations activities in this regard. The basic elements of a comprehensive United Nations counter-terrorism strategy that the Secretary-General first set out in his statement to the Madrid Summit mentioned above were reflected in the Outcome document. These basic elements, also known as the "five D's" are: * to dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals; * to deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks; * to deter States from supporting terrorists; * to develop State capacity to prevent terrorism; and * to defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism. Two of those elements are directly relevant to the work of DDA, namely, denying terrorists the means to carry out their attacks; and developing States' capacity to prevent terrorism. Both of these elements are directly addressed through the activities of the Department. DDA provides substantive support to the work of the Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In this resolution, the Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and required all States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to this effect. The resolution also required them to establish various types of domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. In this connection, DDA supports all aspects of the work of the experts serving the 1540 Committee; maintains the Committee's website; and also supports the work of the Committee and its experts in facilitating the provision of technical assistance to Member States, where required, for the effective implementation of UNSC resolution 1540. DDA also promotes the universalization of a series of international and regional instruments in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation all of which have a direct bearing on many aspects of the terrorist threat. DDA therefore encourages States to implement their obligations under those instruments and assists them in capacity-building across a broad range of issues, including small arms and light weapons, through projects implemented by its three Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.
2. Translate the text into Russian in writing.
THE UN AGAINST TERRORISM
September 2005 was marked by a momentous event in the history of the United Nations counter-terrorism effort.
At the World Summit in New York, world leaders unequivocally condemned terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes" as "one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."
The leaders also resolved to conclude work on the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism, including a legal definition of terrorist acts, during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. This achievement would mark the culmination of years of negotiation and debate on various proposals, including those contained in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report, "In Larger Freedom." In this document, he called urgently for the adoption of a definition of terrorism similar to that contained in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which states "that the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimized by any cause or grievance, and that any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to carry out or to abstain from any act cannot be justified on any grounds and constitutes an act of terrorism."
Participants in the Summit also welcomed the Secretary-General's speech, delivered in Madrid in March 2005, in which he unveiled a counter-terrorism strategy based on the five "D's" - dissuade, deny, deter, develop and defend - and said that the General Assembly should develop those elements into a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.
The entire family of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes remains committed to the global counter-terrorism effort, whether by combating nuclear terrorism and stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons or providing technical assistance to countries with a view to ratification and implementation of the legal instruments against terrorism. 3. Translate the text into English. Make use of the vocabulary you have studied.
Выдержка из итогового документа Всемирного саммита 2005 года
Терроризм 81. Мы решительно осуждаем терроризм во всех его формах и проявлениях, кем бы, где бы и с какой бы целью он ни осуществлялся, поскольку он является одной из самых серьезных угроз международному миру и безопасности. 82. Мы приветствуем определение Генеральным секретарем элементов стратегии борьбы с терроризмом. Генеральной Ассамблее следует безотлагательно доработать эти элементы в целях принятия и осуществления стратегии для продвижения на национальном, региональном и международном уровнях всеобъемлющих, скоординированных и последовательных мер по борьбе с терроризмом, в которой учитывались бы также условия, способствующие распространению терроризма. В этой связи мы высоко оцениваем различные инициативы по поощрению диалога, терпимости и взаимопонимания между цивилизациями. 83. Мы подчеркиваем необходимость прилагать все возможные усилия для согласования и заключения всеобъемлющей конвенции о международном терроризме в ходе шестидесятой сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи. 84. Мы признаем возможность рассмотрения вопроса о созыве под эгидой Организации Объединенных Наций конференции высокого уровня для выработки международной стратегии борьбы с терроризмом во всех его формах и проявлениях. 85. Мы признаем, что международное сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом должно осуществляться в соответствии с нормами международного права, включая Устав и соответствующие международные конвенции и протоколы. Государства должны обеспечивать, чтобы любые меры, принимаемые в целях борьбы с терроризмом, соответствовали их обязательствам по международному праву, в частности международным стандартам в области прав человека, беженскому праву и международному гуманитарному праву. 86. Мы вновь призываем государства воздерживаться от организации, финансирования, поощрения, подготовки или оказания какой-либо иной поддержки террористической деятельности и принимать надлежащие меры для обеспечения того, чтобы их территория не использовалась для такой деятельности. 87. Мы признаем важную роль, которую Организация Объединенных Наций играет в борьбе с терроризмом, и подчеркиваем также жизненно важный вклад регионального и двустороннего сотрудничества, в частности на практическом уровне сотрудничества и технического обмена в правоохранительной сфере. 88. Мы настоятельно призываем международное сообщество, включая Организацию Объединенных Наций, помочь государствам в создании регионального и национального потенциала по борьбе с терроризмом. Мы предлагаем Генеральному секретарю представить Генеральной Ассамблее и Совету Безопасности, в рамках их соответствующих мандатов, предложения по укреплению потенциала системы Организации Объединенных Наций в деле оказания государствам помощи в борьбе с терроризмом и повышения координации деятельности Организации Объединенных Наций в этой связи. 89. Мы подчеркиваем важное значение оказания помощи жертвам терроризма и обеспечения поддержки им и их семьям в связи с потерей близких и причиненными страданиями. 90. Мы призываем Совет Безопасности рассмотреть пути укрепления его роли в деле контроля и обеспечения соблюдения санкций в контексте борьбы с терроризмом, в том числе путем консолидации требований, предъявляемых к отчетности государств, принимая во внимание и учитывая различные мандаты его вспомогательных органов по борьбе с терроризмом. Мы привержены полному сотрудничеству с тремя компетентными вспомогательными органами в деле выполнения ими своих задач, признавая, что многие государства по-прежнему нуждаются в помощи для осуществления соответствующих резолюций Совета Безопасности. 91. Мы поддерживаем усилия, предпринимаемые с целью обеспечить скорейшее вступление в силу Международной конвенции о борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма, и настоятельно рекомендуем государствам как можно скорее стать ее участниками и без дальнейших задержек присоединиться к 12 другим международным антитеррористическим конвенциям и протоколам и выполнять их положения.
H. Render into English
Российская Федерация в борьбе с международным терроризмом
Россия активно участвует в предпринимаемых мировым сообществом усилиях по борьбе с международным терроризмом, внесла важный вклад в создание и укрепление международной антитеррористической коалиции, уложившейся после трагических событий 11 сентября 2001 г. в США.
Во многом именно благодаря сбалансированной, неконфронтационной внешней политике России, ее твердой и последовательной приверженности решению ключевых мировых проблем на основе многостороннего сотрудничества, верховенства международного права и укрепления центральной роли ООН удалось избежать раскола антитеррористической коалиции в связи с односторонней военной операцией США и их союзников против Ирака. При решающем участии России были выработаны и приняты резолюции 1483, 1511 и 1546 Совета Безопасности ООН, открывшие возможности выхода из острейшего иракского кризиса и восстановления пошатнувшегося единства мирового сообщества, в том числе в противодействии международному терроризму,
Нынешнее развитие ситуации в Ираке лишний раз свидетельствует об ошибочности силовой односторонней акции, предпринятой против этой страны, и об опасности, которую такие акции несут, в том числе для эффективности совместных антитеррористических усилий мирового сообщества. Основополагающим условием единства и успешной деятельности международной антитеррористической коалиции была и остается строгая приверженность международному праву. Борьба с терроризмом не должна превращаться в предлог для реализации геополитических целей, наращивания национальных и блоковых военных потенциалов или "принудительного реформирования" суверенных государств. Сейчас общая задача государств - не только восстановить объемы и качество сотрудничества в рамках антитеррористической коалиции, но и продолжить работу, нацеленную на превращение антитеррористического союза в несущую конструкцию эффективной системы международной безопасности и сотрудничества. I. Act as interpreter:
1. - Что, на ваш взгляд, представляет сегодня главную угрозу международному миру и безопасности?
- I think that terrorism today poses a major threat to all states and to all peoples and that international organizations such as the UN should condemn it in all its forms and manifestations. The UN Security Council is entitled to impose mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on all governments.
- А какие меры принимаются для обеспечения соблюдения резолюций Совета Безопасности ООН?
- Sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work of its Counter-Terrorism Committee have played an important role in ending the support of some states for terrorism and mobilizing other states in the fight against it. Yet, a number of countries are lagging behind in their compliance with the directives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. 2. - How can the UN provide counter-terrorism assistance to states?
- Во-первых, предоставление военной, полицейской, технической и другой помощи входит в компетенцию Контртеррористического Комитета. Во-вторых, в случае если государства не могут выполнить возложенные на них обязательства, Совет Безопасности вправе наложить дополнительные санкции для обеспечения соблюдения его резолюций.
- As far as I am concerned, many states seek support for counter-terrorism activities, while UN-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support. Can the UN facilitate bilateral assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities?
- Я считаю, что государства должны объединить усилия в рамках ООН для преследования террористов в судебном порядке. Борьба с террористической деятельностью будет лишь в том случае эффективной, если террористам будет отказано в доступе к ядерным материалам, а также если будет пресечено выделение средств на террористическую деятельность. Именно на этих направлениях ООН должна сконцентрировать своё внимание.
3.
- How has the UN dealt with terrorist acts from a legal and political perspective?
- Прежде всего, ООН добилась внесения террористических актов в разряд противозаконных и уголовно наказуемых. Кроме того, государства установили подсудность лиц, совершавших теракт и их сообщников.
- What legal documents have been recently elaborated within the UN framework?
- Необходимо отметить основополагающие конвенции, относящиеся к терроризму и принятые в рамках ООН: Конвенцию по борьбе с финансированием терроризма, по борьбе с бомбовым терроризмом, с захватом заложников, с угоном воздушных судов.
- All terrorist acts constitute a crime against humanity, jeopardizing friendly relations between states. Are other resolutions and conventions expected to be agreed on to adopt counterterrorism enforcement measures?
- В настоящее время контртеррористический комитет разрабатывает ряд резолюций, соответствующих основным гуманитарным принципам и не противоречащим целям ООН. Надеюсь, что они смогут объединить все государства мира в борьбе с этим бичем 21 века.
VII. Supplementary Reader.
Additional texts on current global security issues.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems
George Bunn
Fifty years ago this month, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his "Atoms for Peace" address to the UN General Assembly. He proposed to share nuclear materials and information for peaceful purposes with other countries through a new international agency. That speech led to negotiations which, several years later, created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA today has the dual responsibility of helping countries that do not have nuclear weapons to engage in peaceful nuclear programs while ensuring that they do not make nuclear weapons. In the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA gained authority for policing the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure that those without nuclear weapons did not acquire them.
Today, the NPT is a worldwide treaty that bans all members except the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States from having nuclear weapons and commits those five states to eventually eliminating their atomic arsenals. The treaty provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. The 187 states that subscribe to the NPT include all significant states of concern with the exception of India, Israel, Pakistan, and - arguably - North Korea. According to Ambassador Robert T. Grey, a former U.S. arms control negotiator, the NPT is "in many ways an agreement as important as the UN Charter itself." Yet, many believe that the NPT regime is battered and in need of strengthening. The NPT has in fact suffered major blows. Since 1991, uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and other possibly weapons-related activities that Iraq, North Korea, and Iran hid from IAEA inspectors have been discovered. Iraq's weapons program was found after the 1991 Persian Gulf War thanks to UN Security Council orders demanding more intrusive inspections than were then required by IAEA inspection standards. North Korea's weapons program later became known through intelligence, IAEA inspections, and North Korea's own admissions. The IAEA's discovery of Iran's failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to inspectors has recently led to a standoff with Tehran. Historically, the IAEA has rarely demanded inspections beyond the perimeter of reactors or related nuclear sites that had been declared open for inspection by the countries where they were located. Further, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation does not violate the NPT if done for peaceful purposes under IAEA inspection. In fact, a number of more developed countries (e.g., Japan) conduct such activities. In the three countries where uranium enrichment or plutonium separation was thought to have been conducted for weapons purposes - Iran, Iraq, and North Korea - the activities had taken place largely at locations not declared open for inspection to the IAEA. Moreover, that North Korea and Iran both obtained enrichment technology from Pakistan suggests dangers to the NPT regime from nonparties that are not bound by the treaty's prohibition against assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons. The back-to-back nuclear tests by New Delhi and Islamabad in 1998 illustrate the dangers that an arms race in South Asia can have and suggest the temptation that such tests could encourage current non-nuclear-weapon parties to withdraw from the treaty in order to follow suit. At the same time, the United States has not complied with some of its own NPT-created obligations. For example, in 1995 the United States won the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties to extend the NPT indefinitely by promising to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty was duly negotiated and signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996, but the Senate failed to ratify it in 1999. The Bush administration now opposes the CTBT, and the Senate is unlikely to consider it again, at least before the next election. That reflects a broader tendency by this Bush administration to downgrade treaties and regimes and to upgrade unilateral efforts, such as the pre-emptive use of force against Iraq, to enforce compliance with nonproliferation. In addition, the Bush administration has undertaken efforts to create new types of nuclear weapons that might well require new testing.[4] Thus, while pushing other countries to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to be relying ever more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense. This double standard constitutes another threat to the NPT regime.
These points are all relevant to the status of the NPT today and will be explained in more detail below or in other articles in this issue. Early Nonproliferation Efforts
Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech came after the failure of earlier U.S. nonproliferation efforts. At the end of World War II, when the United States had the only nuclear weapons in the world, President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal if other countries would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and would permit inspections to verify that agreement. The "Baruch Plan" of the Truman administration would have given an agency under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council a monopoly over research on how to make nuclear explosives and the power, free of veto and backed up by military force if necessary, to conduct inspections in other countries to make sure they were not making nuclear weapons. The United States, however, would not surrender its weapons to the agency until inspectors were on duty in the Soviet Union and in other countries with nuclear potential. The Soviet Union rejected this approach; it was already seeking its own nuclear weapons. Skeptical about the Baruch Plan being debated at the United Nations, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946 Atomic Energy Act with provisions designed to keep nuclear technology secret from other countries. By contrast, Eisenhower proposed providing assistance to other countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of his proposal, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was amended to authorize nuclear assistance to others, and the IAEA was created to provide both assistance and inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, followed by the Soviet Union, France, and others, began providing research reactors that used weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium (though usually in lesser amounts than needed for a weapon) to non-nuclear-weapon states around the world. These transfers and the training that accompanied the reactors helped scientists in many countries learn about nuclear fission and its potential uses. As these scientists moved up the nuclear learning curve, global support increased for controlling the spread of the new technology in order to prevent its use for weapons. Soon, debate about nonproliferation in the UN General Assembly produced a 1961 consensus Irish resolution saying that countries already having nuclear weapons would "undertake to refrain from relinquishing control" of them to others and would refrain "from transmitting information for their manufacture to States not possessing" them. Countries without nuclear weapons would agree not to receive or manufacture them. These ideas were the basis for the NPT. The United States submitted a simple draft treaty based on this resolution to the Soviet Union when a new 18-nation Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva in 1962. The Soviet response was to insist on a treaty that would prohibit the arrangements that the United States then had with NATO allies such as West Germany for deployment, in their countries, of U.S. nuclear weapons under the control of U.S. soldiers - weapons to be used to protect these countries, if necessary, in the event of an attack on them by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet proposal and U.S. plans for a "multilateral force" of naval vessels with nuclear weapons - vessels manned by sailors from participating NATO countries and under NATO command - became major obstacles to agreement. By then, the multilateral force plan was strongly supported only by West Germany. However, for the United States to agree that an NPT should prohibit U.S. allies not having nuclear weapons from joining in control of U.S. nuclear weapons in peacetime required meetings with President Lyndon Johnson at Camp David, further negotiations with Soviet representatives, recommendations to the president from an important committee of distinguished advisers, lengthy discussions with West Germany and other allies, a congressional resolution urging negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, and bureaucratic maneuvering to gain Johnson's approval for proposed treaty language. In the compromise, the United States gave up on the multilateral force; the Soviets gave up on a prohibition against U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and other allied countries), provided the weapons remained under sole control of U.S. personnel. The non-nuclear-weapon states were asked to accept draft language which prohibited them from having nuclear weapons and which called for the IAEA to be permitted to carry out inspections to guarantee that their nuclear programs were limited to peaceful uses. In addition, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed to provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to conduct future negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Negotiations then began for gaining acceptance of these provisions by important non-nuclear-weapon governments and their parliaments and for prescribing the inspections that would be conducted by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT. India, which had participated actively in the NPT negotiations as a country without nuclear weapons, refused to join. It wanted to retain the option to produce its own nuclear weapons as its then-adversary, China, already had. Pakistan, another adversary of India, refused to join because India would not. Israel, which the United States had tried to restrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in separate negotiations during the 1960s, also refused to join. China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations but had acquired nuclear weapons before its negotiation was completed. The NPT draft permitted them to join the treaty with the same rights and duties as the other nuclear-weapon states - the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. They did so later. States began signing the treaty in 1968, and it went into force in 1970. However, the negotiations at the IAEA among parties and potential parties on the scope of inspections for non-nuclear-weapon parties continued for several years. Many countries, including West European allies of the United States, did not ratify the treaty until these negotiations were completed to their satisfaction. There were also further negotiations every five years at NPT review conferences. These dealt with implementation of treaty provisions such as those promising assistance to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful uses and calling for reductions of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament. At an important conference in 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely from its initial 25-year term. The 1995 decision and the review conference of 2000 focused particular attention on the NPT-related promises of the nuclear-weapon states to "cease the nuclear arms race" including stopping nuclear testing, negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons, and eventually achieving nuclear disarmament. Current Problems
Even as the legal regime was expanded by these agreements, the NPT came under strain elsewhere. One of the most significant blows was Iraq's demonstrated ability to hide its nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the Gulf War. With inspection authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that war - authority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification standards had given the IAEA - inspectors found previously hidden Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons and even an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched research-reactor uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet Union. These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEA's NPT inspection authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA parties who negotiated the 1997 model for this protocol did not agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept the model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards. It is now up to each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards agreement pursuant to the model. As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards agreements; only 37, or about 20 percent, had given final approval to them through parliamentary or other ratification. Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States rejects an important one - the CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing - and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself. After the experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques to deal with other problem states such as North Korea. Some evidence was produced by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s using a new technique called "environmental monitoring" - testing for small traces of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or vegetation in areas within or surrounding a nuclear site, or in streams or rivers nearby. This is explicitly authorized in the 1997 Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors that a country has declared open for inspection. Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites encouraged the IAEA to press North Korea for broader inspections in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused. A stalemate between North Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle a reactor whose spent fuel rods had apparently been used by North Korea to produce plutonium. Pyongyang was also asked to provide information about its past activities. These steps were to be in exchange for the construction of new, more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors from South Korea and Japan, as well as interim supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States. However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities at other sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003, North Korea and the United States each concluded that the 1994 agreement was not to their liking, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT.[16] Discovery of Iran's failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered concern since last year. Using environmental monitoring and other techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that Iran permitted them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items, including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used for enriching uranium in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uranium - none of which Iran had reported to the IAEA. In negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to sign an additional protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside its uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though the IAEA director-general's report shows that Iran had not disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-enrichment efforts or an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making weapons - to the consternation of officials in the United States. The IAEA Board of Governors then adopted, with U.S. support, a decision to order continued inspections in Iran for clandestine activities. The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not to permit such efforts even if subject to IAEA inspection. The concern is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it might then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium to make weapons. The Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants of non-nuclear-weapon states be placed under multilateral ownership and control so that the co-owners from the different countries could check on each other. However, Japan; some western European non-nuclear-weapon countries; and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and a few others, as well as all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Should these all now be subject to a rule requiring multilateral ownership and oversight? Would limiting the requirement to non-nuclear-weapon countries be regarded as adding further insult to the NPT's existing discrimination in favor of nuclear-weapon states? IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled in the future, with each country involved being urged to check on what its partner countries are doing to make sure that the enriched uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons purposes. The Bush administration has pressed hard on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to restrain them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it has done so sometimes in unilateral or domineering ways that seem inconsistent with a multilateral regime like that of the NPT. The American-led, counter-proliferation-justified, preventive-war invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the United States waged without UN Security Council authorization is a recent example. At the time, the invasion was said to be necessary to prevent Iraq from again acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or long-range missiles. It took place even though Security Council-authorized inspections, consistent with the NPT, were going on in Iraq to look for these weapons. It resulted in UN inspectors being withdrawn from Iraq for their own safety. U.S inspectors have subsequently found little evidence of ongoing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons programs but the decision reflected Bush's tendency to downgrade treaties and international efforts in favor of more proactive proliferation efforts." Likewise, the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT in 1999. The Bush administration has not asked the Senate to reconsider that vote and instead has said that the United States "will not become a party" to that treaty. At the same time, the administration seeks money from Congress for new types of nuclear weapons - ones that may well need testing before the United States would rely on them. However, in 1995, when the United States negotiated an agreement with all the non-nuclear-weapon states to extend the NPT beyond 1995, it agreed to negotiate a CTBT by 1996 as part of the price it had to pay to gain agreement to renew the NPT. The CTBT was negotiated by 1996. Then, in the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration agreed on "the importance and urgency" of ratification of the CTBT "without delay" to "achieve the early entry into force" of the treaty even though the Senate then had no plans to vote again on the CTBT. Is the CTBT such an essential element of the nonproliferation regime that U.S. failure to join it could provide persuasive justification for withdrawal from the NPT for those who choose to do so? Other problems of this sort occurred with Article VI of the NPT, agreed to in the original treaty negotiations in order to gain the support for the treaty of non-nuclear-weapon states. In that provision, the United States and the other recognized nuclear-weapon states promised to negotiate nuclear-weapon reductions with the goal of nuclear disarmament. Then, to gain the votes of these parties for extension of the NPT in 1995, the United States agreed to pursue "progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." At the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration made similar commitments. It also promised to implement START II (negotiated in the prior Bush administration) and to conclude "START III [more reductions] as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the [Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)] Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability." These promises were shredded when the present Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The withdrawal nullified START II because the Russian Duma had conditioned its approval vote for START II on a continuation of the ABM Treaty. The substitute for START II negotiated with Russia by President George W. Bush, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, required withdrawal of warheads from many long-range missiles on each side to the end that, by 2012, no more than 2,200 warheads would be deployed on either side. The treaty, however, does not require the warheads to be destroyed, calls for no inspections, has a more permissive withdrawal clause than in START II, and contains no stated plan for a subsequent treaty such as START III that would require further reductions. Does this satisfy the NPT commitment to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament? ElBaradei has suggested that the United States may be employing a double standard by not actually cutting its own arsenal of nuclear weapons (as distinct from its missiles) while attempting to restrain other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties to the treaty's extension in 1995, the United States also made promises in connection with a UN Security Council resolution calling for what are called negative security assurances, which for the United States was a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties unless they attack the United States while in alliance with another nuclear-weapon state. Yet, in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 and its National Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002, the Bush administration made clear that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT party that threatened the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies whether or not this NPT party was allied with a nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the United States watered down another promise that was important to gaining the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties for renewal of the NPT in 1995. Whether all these problems will produce further withdrawals from the NPT is, of course, unknown, but they might be used as excuses for withdrawal by any who want to do so. What Has the NPT Accomplished?
The NPT nonproliferation norm, the long-term efforts of the United States and others to gain acceptance of it, and the international inspections the NPT produced deserve significant credit for the fact that the world does not now have 30 or more countries with nuclear weapons. In 1963 the Department of Defense looked at the motivations of the "nuclear-capable" countries at the time and estimated for Kennedy that perhaps 10 more of them could have nuclear weapons and suitable delivery vehicles in less than a decade if nothing was done to prevent such a scenario from unfolding; they were the remaining major industrialized Group of Seven allies of the United States plus China, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Poland, and Sweden. Thus, based on the 1963 list, 14 or more countries could have had nuclear weapons by the early 1970s.
The Defense Department's list did not include Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, or Taiwan, which all had scientists who were then considering or would soon consider how to build nuclear weapons. It did not include South Africa, which later built several nuclear weapons, then gave them up and, like the others, joined the NPT. It did not include any republics of the Soviet Union. Three republics - Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine - had Soviet weapons on their territory when the Soviet Union collapsed and gave them up to join the NPT after negotiations with Russia and the United States supplied them with financial incentives and promises not to attack them with nuclear weapons. Without the NPT norm, these countries would probably not have given their inherited weapons up. The Pentagon list did not include Argentina and Brazil, which later began nuclear weapons programs but then negotiated a bilateral agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and joined the NPT - turning rivalry into cooperation in response to the norm of the NPT and of a Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone agreement. North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq began later and were not on the Pentagon's 1963 list either. If there had been no NPT, if all these countries plus the ones on the list acquired nuclear weapons, the total would have been at least 28 by now. Some neighbors and rivals would then probably have been motivated to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. What would the total have become? More than 30 countries with nuclear weapons? Today, we have nine counting North Korea but not Iran.
The single most important factor in producing this success has been the nonproliferation norm established by the NPT and the incentives for remaining non-nuclear that the NPT helped initiate. The next most important factor has probably been leadership, cooperative efforts, and financial assistance in some cases from the United States working with many other NPT parties. Given the more difficult nonproliferation and security challenges of today, it is vital that U.S. leadership be used to strengthen, not to weaken or abandon, the nuclear nonproliferation regime. December 2003
Repairing the Nonproliferation Regime
Daryl G. Kimball
Six decades after the first atomic blasts, the world's leaders agree that nuclear weapons pose one of the greatest threats to global security and human existence. But as the recently concluded nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference demonstrates, there is a growing divide about how to address this danger. The four week-long conference closed in New York on May 27 without any agreed assessment or plan to bolster the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Future progress will depend on correcting the policies that sank the 2005 review conference. Well before the meeting, the Bush administration signaled that it would not support core disarmament-related commitments and decisions made at the 2000 and 1995 review conferences, including supporting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, irreversibly and verifiably reducing nuclear arms, and negotiating a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for weapons. Yet, U.S. representatives claimed their disarmament record is "unassailable." At the same time, they argued that peaceful nuclear cooperation is put at risk unless cases of noncompliance involving North Korea and Iran are forcefully addressed. Predictably, Egypt and other nonaligned states did not want to allow the repudiation of past NPT conference commitments, which include pursuit of a nuclear-free Middle East and negative nuclear security assurances. Meanwhile, Iran, under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency for safeguards violations, mischaracterized concern about its nuclear ambitions as an assault on developing states' treaty "right" to peaceful nuclear endeavors. As a result, participants took weeks reaching agreement on an agenda and none of the three "main committees" could produce consensus reports. U.S. officials deny any responsibility for the breakdown of the conference and blame Cairo's stubborn resistance. But Egypt and others might have been more flexible if the United States did not seek to discard prior NPT agreements. U.S. intransigence scuttled the chance for agreement on Western proposals to make treaty withdrawal more difficult; toughen treaty monitoring, compliance, and enforcement; and tighten controls on nuclear weapons-related technology. The NPT remains vital, but a crucial opportunity to strengthen it was squandered. Overcoming the differences revealed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and avoiding further setbacks will not be easy but are possible, especially if the United States can adopt a more balanced, pragmatic, and flexible strategy. The most urgent tasks are the resumption of talks leading to the verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and the successful conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and Iran that recognizes Iran's "right" to pursue peaceful nuclear endeavors but produces a voluntary and indefinite freeze of its uranium enrichment program. Failure on either front could lead neighboring countries to rethink their nuclear options and/or lead to a military confrontation. The Bush administration must seize on North Korea's recently stated intention to resume long-stalled negotiations on its nuclear program and be prepared to offer a new and more practical proposal to resolve the crisis. To increase Iran's incentives to cooperate and comply with the NPT, the White House must make it clear that it will not seek regime change and that it will support the guaranteed and controlled supply of nuclear energy fuel as a substitute for an Iranian uranium enrichment program. To prevent the further production and proliferation of weapons-usable nuclear material, the United States, EU, and others should back an indefinite moratorium on all new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation plants. Even with tougher international inspection authority and tighter controls on nuclear technology transfers, confidence in the nonproliferation system will erode if more states produce more nuclear bomb material. The pause would provide time to consider options for the guaranteed supply of nuclear energy fuel services and launch long-stalled talks on a global ban on the production of fissile material for weapons. Finally, the leaders of the nuclear-weapon states must restore confidence that they will continue to reduce the number and the role of nuclear weapons. It is in the United States' self-interest to resume talks with Russia on verifiable strategic nuclear reductions before START I and its verification provisions expire in 2009. NATO should move to withdraw the obsolete U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe to encourage Russia to account for and reduce its even larger tactical nuclear arsenal, parts of which could fall into terrorist hands. The nuclear-weapon states should also disavow the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear- weapon states and targets. The dangers of the bomb are obvious and the need for action is as clear as ever. Without more effective global leadership in all-not just some-of these areas, the struggle against nuclear proliferation will fall short and leave behind an even more dangerous world for generations to come.
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Россия и вопросы нераспространения ядерного оружия
Угроза распространения ядерного оружия - один из наиболее серьёзных вызовов международной безопасности и стабильности. Угроза тем более серьезная, в условиях, когда к обладанию средствами массового уничтожения могут тянуться террористы. Работа по предотвращению распространения оружия массового уничтожения, в первую очередь ядерного, - один из центральных приоритетов Российской федерации в области безопасности.
В декабре 2003 года вопросы нераспространения стали предметом специального рассмотрения Совета Безопасности Российской федерации, Как подчеркивал Президент России В. В. Путин, "наряду с международным терроризмом распространение оружия массового уничтожения остается главной угрозой миру в ХХ1 веке... Эффективная политика в сфере нераспространения оружия массового уничтожения - это безопасность нашего государства в целом, наших граждан, обеспечение международной стабильности и повышение авторитета РОССИИ в мире".
Наша страна была одним из инициаторов разработки основы режима ядерного нераспространения - Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО). Россия - один из его депозитариев (ДНЯО - самый крупный по числу участников международный договор. Его участниками являются 188 государств. Вне Договора остаются Индия, Пакистан и Израиль. Кроме того, КНДР заявила о выходе из ДНЯО 10 января 2003 года). Россия всегда была привержена всемерному укреплению ДНЯО и построенного на нем режима.
По условиям ДНЯО каждые пять лет созывается Конференция по рассмотрению его действия. На Конференции 1995 года Россия активно выступала за бессрочнее продление ДНЯО. Такое решение было принято.
Очередная Конференция прошла в мае 2QQ5 года в Нью-Йорке. К сожалению, из-за серьезных разногласий в позициях государств на ней не удалось выработать субстантивные рекомендации на следующий пятилетний период. Вместе с тем есть и много позитивных моментов. На Конференции удалось провести объективный и сбалансированный анализ функционирования ДНЯО по всем основным направлениям: нераспространение, ядерное разоружение, мирное использование атомной энергии. Участники Договора подтвердили жизнеспособность, важность его как основы режима ядерного нераспространения, приверженность строгому выполнению своих обязательств по ДНЯО. Еще один вывод - возникшие в последнее время вызовы и угрозы режиму нераспространения могут и должны быть устранены на основе ДНЯО.
В связи с ДНЯО действует система гарантий МАГАТЭ (т.е. контроля за непереключением мирной ядерной деятельности на военную), охватывающая практически все государства, хотя в ряде стран под гарантии поставлена не вся ядерная деятельность, В 90-х годах с российским участием был разработан типовой Дополнительный протокол к соглашению о гарантиях с МАГАТЭ, позволяющий значительно расширить инспекционную деятельность Агентства. Протокол подписали уже около 100 государств, в т.ч. Россия. Наша. страна последовательно выступает за укрепление системы гарантий и универсализацию Дополнительного протокола, что позволит Агентству контролировать использование ядерных материалов и оборудования в сугубо мирных, целях и обеспечивать транспарентность
Угроза распространения ядерного оружия - один из наиболее серьезных вызовов международной безопасности и стабильности. Угроза, тем более серьёзная в условиях, когда к обладанию средствами массового уничтожения могут тянуться террористы Работа по предотвращению распространения оружия массового уничтожения, в первую очередь ядерного, - один из центральных приоритетов Российской Федерации в области безопасности.
В декабре 2003 года вопросы нераспространения стали предметом специального рассмотрения Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации. Как подчеркивал Президент России В.В.Путин, "наряду с международным терроризмом распространение оружия массового уничтожения остаётся главной угрозой миру в XXI веке... Эффективная политика в сфере нераспространения оружия массового уничтожения - это безопасность нашего государства в целом, наших граждан, обеспечение международной стабильности и повышение авторитета РОССИИ в мире".
Наша страна была одним из инициаторов разработки основы режима ядерного нераспространения - Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО). Россия - один из его депозитариев (ДНЯО - самый крупный по числу участников международный договор. Его участниками являются 188 государств. Вне Договора остаются Индия, Пакистан и Израиль. Кроме того, КНДР заявила о выходе из ДНЯО 10 января 2003 года) Россия всегда была привержена всемерному укреплению ДНЯО и построенного на нем режима.
По условиям ДНЯО каждые пять лет созывается Конференция по рассмотрению его действия. На Конференции 1995 года Россия активно выступала за бессрочное продление ДНЯО. Такое решение было принято.
Очередная Конференция прошла в мае 2005 года в Нью-Йорке. К сожалению, из-за серьезных разногласий в позициях государств на ней не удалось выработать субстантивные рекомендации на следующий пятилетний период. Вместе с тем есть и много позитивных моментов На Конференции удалось провести объективный и сбалансированный анализ функционирования ДНЯО по всем основным направлениям: нераспространение, ядерное разоружение, мирное использование атомной энергии. Участники Договора подтвердили жизнеспособность, важность его как основы режима ядерного нераспространения, приверженность строгому выполнению своих обязательств по ДНЯО. Еще один вывод - возникшие в последнее время вызовы и угрозы режиму нераспространения могут и должны быть устранены на основе ДНЯО.
В связи с ДНЯО действует система гарантий МАГАТЭ (т.е. контроля за непереключением, мирной ядерной деятельности на военную), охватывающая практически все государства, хотя в ряде стран под гарантии поставлена не вся ядерная деятельность. В 90-х годах с российским участием был разработан типовой Дополнительный протокол к соглашению о гарантиях с МАГАТЭ, позволяющий значительно расширить инспекционную деятельность Агентства. Протокол подписали уже около 100 государств, в т.ч. Россия. Наша страна последовательно выступает за укрепление системы гарантий и универсализацию Дополнительного протокола, что позволит Агентству контролировать использование ядерных материалов и оборудования в сугубо мирных целях и обеспечивать транспарентность национальных ядерных программ, В России существует национальная программа научно-технической поддержки гарантий Агентства.
В рамках режима нераспространения сложилась система экспортного контроля, в которую входят т.н. Комитет Цангера и Группа ядерных поставщиков (ГЯП), регулирующие поставки чувствительных с точки зрения ядерного распространения материалов и оборудования, Участниками ГЯП являются 45 государств.
Повышенное внимание Россия придаёт коллективным усилиям по предотвращению такой опасной тенденции, как нелегальный оборот материалов и технологий, которые могут быть использованы для создания ядерного оружия. Наша страна выражает крайнюю обеспокоенность в связи с недавним обнаружением "чёрного рынка" ядерных материалов и технологий, что особенно опасно в свете растущей террористической угрозы.
Россия стала инициатором принятой в апреле 2004 года резолюции СБ ООН № 1540 по нераспространению оружия массового уничтожения. Главный лейтмотив резолюции - укрепление международного сотрудничества всех государств-членов ООН в борьбе с незаконным оборотом ОМУ, средств его доставки и связанных с их производством материалов и технологий, а также призыв к введению на национальном уровне жестких законодательных мер, ставящих надежный заслон на пути попадания смертоносных товаров в руки негосударственных субъектов, т.е. прежде всего террористических и экстремистских организаций.
Наша страна совместно с США осуществляет проект по решению проблем безопасности радиоактивных, источников повышенного риска (прежде всего в странах бывшего СССР) в рамках Плана действий МАГАТЭ по борьбе с ядерным терроризмом. Кроме того, Россия внесла в ООН проект международной конвенции о борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма. Данный проект уже одобрен большинством стран-участниц ООН. Подписание Конвенции планируется на очередной сессии Генассамблеи ООН в Нью-Йорке в сентябре с. г.
Что касается мирного использования атомной энергии, то в соответствии с ДНЯО Россия активно участвует в программах сотрудничества и предоставляет техническую помощь, прежде всего развивающимся государствам. Это выражается в поставках российского оборудования, приборов и материалов, а также организации на базе российских институтов и предприятий обучения специалистов, включая межрегиональные и региональные учебные курсы, и в обмене опытом. В 2004 году взнос России в добровольный фонд технической помощи и сотрудничества МАГАТЭ составил 853 тыс.долл.
В целях решения проблем, находящихся на стыке нераспространения и мирного атома Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным в 2000 году была выдвинута инициатива об энергетическом обеспечении человечества, кардинальном решении проблемы нераспространения ядерного оружия и экологическом оздоровлении планеты. В развитие этой инициативы в рамках МАГАТЭ успешно осуществляется Международный проект по инновационным ядерным реакторам и топливным циклам - ИНПРО. Одной из основных целей проекта является разработка ядерных энергетических технологий, устойчивых к распространению.
Важным региональным дополнением к международному режиму ядерного нераспространения является создание зон, свободных от ядерного оружия (ЗСЯО). Россия вносит свой весомый вклад и в этот процесс. На сегодняшний день сформировалось четыре таких зоны: в Латинской Америке (Договор Тлателолко); в Южной части Тихого океана (Договор Раратонга); в Юго-Восточной Азии (Бангкокский договор); в Африке (Договор Пелиндаба). После вступления в силу Договора Пелиндаба число государств, охваченных режимом ЗСЯО, превысит 110.
В рамках выполнения своих обязательств по ДНЯО Россия последовательно осуществляет шаги в области ядерного разоружения. В декабре 2001 года завершился период сокращений стратегических наступательных вооружений, предусмотренных Договором СНВ-1. На тот момент наша страна вышла на уровень ниже предусмотренных Договором 6000 ядерных боезарядов. На конец 2004 года наши СНВ на развернутых стратегических носителях насчитывали менее 5000 боезарядов.
Новым существенным шагом в ядерном разоружении стало заключение между Россией и США в мае 2002 года Договора о сокращении стратегических наступательных потенциалов (СНП). Этот документ юридически закрепляет договоренность о взаимном сокращении суммарного количества стратегических ядерных боезарядов на две трети до 1700-2200 единиц у каждой из сторон к 31 декабря 2012 года.
Вопросы ядерного нераспространения регулярно поднимаются нашей страной на различных международных форумах, в том числе в рамках Группы восьми, СНГ, Совета Россия-НАТО и др.
Can a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Be Effectively Verified?
John Carlson
Capping the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for nuclear weapons has long been a goal of the international nuclear nonproliferation agenda because it has been seen as putting a real-world limit on the potential for any nuclear weapons buildup. During the last decade, this goal has, at times, appeared close to being realized.
Negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) was one of the central principles and objectives that helped achieve the indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and it was again endorsed by states-parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The five nuclear-weapon states have also contributed to this effort as they are all understood to have ceased fissile material production for weapons purposes.
Yet, for the last few years, negotiation of such a treaty has been blocked by the failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree on its broader work program. Recently, China, the United States, and other countries have advanced proposals that could provide momentum to move the process of negotiating an FMCT forward. Before diplomats reach that stage, however, a new potential obstacle looms: ensuring that the negotiating mandate still has consensus.
Currently, the negotiating mandate for the CD, drawn from a 1993 UN General Assembly resolution,[1] outlines the following elements: an FMCT is to ban "the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" and the treaty is to be "nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable."
The United States had supported this mandate for the last decade, but in July, officials in the Bush administration concluded that effective international verification of an FMCT was not realistically achievable. The administration still supports the early conclusion of an FMCT to establish cutoff as an international norm but is concerned that perceived technical verification difficulties will seriously delay conclusion of the treaty. In their view, for example, potential sticking points include how to distinguish new production from pre-existing material and how to verify that production said to be for naval fuel is really being used for that purpose.
There is no reason, however, that these difficulties should lead to a deadlock. There is a way to address the United States' desire to conclude a treaty quickly as well as to meet the broad desire to have a treaty with effective verification: separating the questions of political objectives and commitments and verification measures into two separate negotiations. In fact, there is already a model for this in the NPT.
September 16, 2005
The UN and Terrorism: Defining the Indefinable?
Its Sept. 14 passing of resolution 1624 (2005) calling on states to prohibit incitement to commit something it failed to comprehensively define indicates that the United Nations may have achieved new levels of absurdity even for an organization often reduced to surrealism by political differences among its member states. Underlying this latest imbroglio is the unpalatable fact that terrorism, like beauty, resides in the eye of the beholder. This is not a new problem: the truism that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is as old as it is trite. Nor is it one that is likely to go away any time soon.
On the face of it, the current impasse on defining terrorism appears to have arisen partly out of some (mainly Muslim) countries' sympathies with armed campaigns like that being waged by Palestinian groups against Israel. Such campaigns, say some, represent legitimate resistance and should not be classed at terrorism. Meanwhile, countries like the United States and the United Kingdom have been calling for a definition encompassing an earlier draft's insistence that "deliberate and unlawful targeting and killing cannot be justified or legitimized by any cause or grievance." Therein lies the rub. Partly.
However Muslim countries have not been the only ones to express concern at the proposed wording of any UN-wide definition of terrorism. For instance, last month, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, argued in a letter to other envoys that any definition of what constitutes a terrorist act should exclude "military activities that are appropriately governed by international humanitarian law." In other words, limits should be placed on the degree to which government actions - such as say, bombing civilians - should be considered terrorism.
As such concerns illustrate, many of the differences over any generally acceptable definition of terrorism are related to the identity of both those describing others as terrorists and those being thus described. Other, interrelated issues include the extent to which terrorism is considered a means towards an end as well as the nature of that end.
Most of those termed terrorists reject being described thus, justifying their methods by insisting these are forced on them by a lack of resources. This insistence ignores the advantages of terrorism, which is notably difficult to counter, and underlines one of the fundamental truths about it - namely that it is primarily a tactic. An emphasis on means makes terrorism appear less legitimate as its accompanying sub-categories (such as bombing, assassination, or hijacking) tend to be more derogatorily emotive than those that address ends (such as insurgency, revolution, or uprising).
This may partly have motivated another suggestion put forward in Bolton's letter - namely that that the focus be on the formulation of "a nonexclusive list of actions that would amount to terrorist acts" (and punishable under international law) rather than seeking to define terrorism. The pros and cons of such a list (and its non-exclusivity) apart, Bolton's stress on such methods over the nitty-gritty of trying to arrive at a generally-acceptable definition of terrorism does suggest a degree of impatience that could be detrimental to combating it.
This charge could also be leveled as other aspects of the Bush administration's ongoing counter-terrorism campaign. Semantically, that administration's declaration of a war on terrorism (or 'terror' as it is now increasingly termed) both highlighted and targeted the enemy's preferred means. However, this much-discussed and much-derided declaration -albeit one that Washington is finally if belatedly attempting to distance itself from - also further muddied the definitional waters, suggesting an understanding of terrorism that could prove lacking for the task at hand. Much the same could be said for U.S. thinking on the ends towards which terrorism is employed.
Generally speaking, terrorism is widely viewed as violence towards a political end. This perspective is not universally accepted. Some scholars associate it with the deliberate evocation of terror. Others argue that motivations are irrelevant. Meanwhile, the ruling that the suspect in the 'sniper' murders that occurred in the Washington, D.C., area in 2002 could be charged under Virginia's post-Sept. 11, 2001 anti-terrorism law showed that the perception of terrorism as being politically motivated is not always shared by U.S. officials.
Such readings risk so broadening the term terrorism as to make it useless. Not only do they fail to differentiate between the political activist who uses violence to achieve their ends, and the common criminal, but they also overemphasize the psychological intent of those who employ what is basically a method. It is helpful to its practitioners if terrorism terrorizes but, while this often confers strategic and tactical advantages, it is not their primary aim. Likewise - despite claims to the contrary made by some U.S. officials in the past - terrorism such as the United States is currently facing is neither nihilistic nor simply directed against such nebulous targets as democracy or the American way of life. Whether arising out of attempts to mobilize public opinion or just plain ignorance, such rhetoric suggests confusion as to nature of the terrorism threatening America and is dangerously unhelpful in terms of countering it.
In this regard, the current UN debate over what is and what is not terrorism is one that should be encouraged and expanded. The United Nations is a frustrating venue for such an exercise. Moreover, to paraphrase the British academic. Sir Michael Howard, its General Assembly - to which the task of agreeing upon a definition of terrorism falls - is a parlement rather than a parliament. The United Nations' often Machiavellian internal political dynamics notwithstanding it will also only ever be as effective as its member states allow it to be. That will mean reconciling the priorities of its poorer members, who, for instance, tend to view the war on poverty as more important than the war on terrorism), with those of its richer ones, for whom al-Qaida and their fellow travelers currently represent public enemy number one.
hi attempting to define terrorism, the United Nations may indeed be attempting to define the indefinable. But it is in the hammering out of such a definition that a real understanding of terrorism will be partly forged. Such understanding is necessary if the scourge of terrorism is to be managed as optimally as it must. In that sense, defining terrorism is much more important that having a definition of it.
1 Группа высокого уровня по угрозам, вызовам и переменам ("Группа мудрецов").
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